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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to examine what factors have been affecting the 
implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh from 1998 to 2010. The study seeks to answer 
these specific research questions: (1) What is the relative impact of accounting 
regulatory frameworks and politico-institutional factors on the implementation of IFRSs 
in Bangladesh?; 2(a): How do (i) training opportunities in the accounting profession and 
(ii) the state of corruption, as outcomes of culture in Bangladesh, affect the 
implementation of IFRSs?; 2(b): What other country specific factors are affecting 
implementation of IFRSs?; (3) How does a study of implementing IFRSs help to build 
an understanding of a theory of the role of the state in accounting change in a 
developing country such as Bangladesh? This study adopts a mixed methodology in 
which interviews over two years (2010-2011) are conducted and documentary analyses 
of IFRSs-related enforcement documents (1998-2010) are evaluated to identify the 
possible obstacles for implementing IFRSs in Bangladesh. 
 
In relation to RQ-1, the study finds that politico-institutional factors are stronger and 
more dominant factors than accounting regulatory frameworks for impeding IFRSs 
implementation in Bangladesh. A lack of co-operation among the institutional bodies 
has existed in both democratic and military-backed government eras (the military-
backed government ruled for 19 years out of 40 years of independence in Bangladesh). 
However, the military-backed government was effective compared to the democratic 
government in terms of taking action against companies identified as being corrupt. 
There is evidence of ‘blaming culture’ with the state institutions and the professional 
bodies blaming each other regarding the IFRSs implementation process.  
 
With respect to RQ-2(a), deficiencies in the training opportunities in accounting 
profession and high levels of corruption are inhibiting IFRSs implementation. 
Interviewees comment that professional curricula contain limited content on IFRSs and 
there are limited training opportunities for accountants in the majority of companies. 
Looser enforcement of the laws is found during the periods of democratic government. 
However, the levels of corruption were lower during the military-backed government. 
Regarding RQ-2(b), some country specific factors are also identified in this study:  a 
lack of qualified accountants; a lack of interest in IFRSs by managers of some 
companies; a culture of secrecy; and higher costs of IFRSs compliance with lower 
benefits for small companies.  
 
In terms of RQ-3, this study contributes to IFRSs implementation as an example of 
accounting change in a developing country by applying a Weberian view of the theory 
of the role of the state. Additionally, this study considers the state-society relationship 
employing institutional dynamics (Dillard et al., 2004). In particular, outcomes of 
accounting change in Bangladesh are observed from state and individual organisation 
levels. However, the influence of the organisation field level is unknown in this research 
because industry lobbying groups were not interviewed. Since the role of the state is 
                                                                                                   vi 
vague in prior accounting research, this study discusses roles of the state (i.e. the state 
approves experts to write rules; it consults with various stakeholders; it enforces 
outcomes; it is accountable to its citizens; and it engages with donor agencies) in a 
developing country’s experience during the process of accounting change. Extending 
Weber’s (1958)[1904], (1968)[1922] argument on state-society, the study finds that for 
a state in an era of democratic government, politico-institutional factors and corruption 
(as an indication of societal values) may be more important and concentrated factors 
than for a state under a military-backed government in terms of impeding IFRSs 
implementation. The study reveals that all roles of the state have negative influences on 
accounting change. However, interviewees’ initial concerns about the roles of donor 
agencies are transformed into concerns about the democratic government’s failure to 
implement IFRSs. 
 
The implications of the study are relevant to policy makers, practitioners and users of 
financial information. Although the study is based on Bangladesh, the results of the 
study are expected to be relevant to other developing countries experiencing similar 
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“The major emerging and transition economies of the world-Brazil, China, 
India, and Russia-are adopting or considering the adoption of IFRSs, not US 
GAAP, in an effort to become integrated in the world’s capital markets and 
attract the investment necessary to finance their development...There is clear 
momentum towards accepting IFRSs as a common financial reporting language 
throughout the world.....Investors are able to make comparisons of companies 
operating in different jurisdictions more easily”  (Sir David Tweedie
1
, 2007, p. 
2). 
 
“...the most likely effect of local politics and local market realities on IFRS will 
be much less visible ....I believe the primary effect of local political and market 
factors will lie under the surface, at the level of implementation, which is bound 
to be substantially inconsistent across nations” (Ball, 2006, p. 16). 
 
These two comments represent contrasting attitudes towards IFRSs adoption and 
implementation. Although there are ample benefits in adopting IFRSs as a common 
financial reporting language (Tweedie, 2007), an underlying question remains over the 
implementation issues because of political and market factors (Ball, 2006).  
 
Debates persist around the justification for IFRSs adoption. Two schools of thought 
exist, and the first is very supportive of the adoption of IFRSs, arguing that the adoption 
of IFRSs increases the transparency of financial information and the globalisation of 
capital markets, and attracts Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Taylor & Turley, 1986; 
Wolk et al., 1989; Larson, 1993; Chamisa, 2000; Tyrrall et al., 2007). The second 
school of thought, however, is negative to the adoption of IFRSs and argues that the 
Anglo-American nature of IFRSs will not be beneficial for the developing countries 
because of various related factors, e.g. economic, social and, cultural differences (Nair, 
1982; Hove, 1989; Perera, 1989; Wallace, 1988, 1993; McGee, 1999; Saudagaran & 
Diga, 2000; Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003). Some researchers provide mixed opinion 
on IFRSs adoption (Choi & Mueller, 1984; Chandler, 1992; Belkaoui, 2004; Ashraf & 
                                                 
1
 Sir David Tweedie, former Chairman of the IASB, addresses the Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament, on 10 April 2007. This text is available at: 
http://www.ifrs.org/news/iasb+chairman+addresses+european+parliament.htm 
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Ghani, 2005). Furthermore, financial scandals in the USA and Asia have focused 
attention onto the regulatory bodies (Mitton, 2002; Baek et al., 2002; Tweedie, 2007; 
Trott, 2009; Bushman & Landsman, 2010). As the IASB possesses no powers of its own 
to enforce the adoption of its standards, it has to rely on persuading national 
jurisdictions or national regulators (Banerjee, 2002; Ball, 2006; Ahmed, 2010; Siddiqui, 
2010). The relevant EU regulation
2
 (1606/2002 of July 19, 2002) requires that all listed 
EU companies from January 1 2005 onwards must prepare their consolidated accounts 
to conform to mandatory IFRSs, representing considerable progress towards the goal of 
global adoption of the IASB’s common financial reporting language (i.e. IFRSs) 
(Hodgon et al., 2009). This announcement has prompted developing countries to think 
about their position with regard to IFRSs compliance (Tyrrall et al., 2007).  
 
There is an increasing amount of literature on compliance with IFRSs, in particular with 
regard to developed countries (Dumontier & Raffournier, 1998 [Switzerland]; Murphy, 
1999 [Switzerland]; Street et al., 1999, 2000 [Developed & developing countries]; 
Street & Bryant, 2000 [Companies with and without the US listings]; Glaum & Street, 
2003 [Germany]; Yeoh, 2005 [New Zealand]; Dunne et al., 2008 [UK, Italy & Ireland]; 
Tsalavoutas, 2009 [Greece]; Haller et al., 2009 [Germany]; Cascino & Gassen, 2010 
[Germany & Italy]; Tsalavoutas, 2011 [Greece]; Lama et al., 2011 [Spain & UK]). Most 
previous studies have been concerned with settings where the use of IFRSs is voluntary 
or not subject to national enforcement (Street et al., 1999; Tower, 1993). Following the 
widespread adoption of IFRSs, attention has turned to the extent to which companies 
comply with IFRSs in a mandatory setting (Schipper, 2005; Brown & Tarca, 2005).  
 
However, little attention has been paid to developing countries. Only eleven studies 
have been conducted on mandatory IFRSs compliance in developing countries (see 
Table 1-1). Table 1-1 shows that companies in these countries do not comply fully with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements and that low compliance levels are common. There are 
various reasons for IFRSs non-compliance: firstly, in terms of language familiarity, the 
levels of compliance with familiar aspects of the IFRSs disclosure requirements are 
significantly higher than the levels of compliance with relatively unfamiliar aspects of 
                                                 
2
 The IFRS Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 concerning the application of international accounting standards 
was adopted on 19 July 2002 by the European Parliament and the Council. The IFRS Regulation places 
an obligation on European companies whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market in 
the EU to prepare their consolidated accounts, as of 1 January 2005, in conformity with IFRS and 
SIC/IFRIC issued by the IASB and endorsed by the EU.  
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/ias/com-2008-0215_en.pdf 
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the IFRSs disclosure (Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003 in Egypt); secondly, from the 
view of regulatory aspects, significant changes are exhibited in the regulated 
environment (Al-Shiab, 2003 in Jordan; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007 in Egypt; Al-
Shammari et  al., 2008 in the GCC [The Gulf Cooperation Council] member states); for 
instance, corporate governance regulations are a very effective mechanism for the 
implementation of IFRSs (Al-Akra et al., 2010 in Jordan); thirdly, IFRSs compliance 
may be difficult due to poor levels of enforcement - an example of this is that no action 
has been taken against managers, directors or auditors for violating accounting rules and 
regulations in Jordan (Al-Shammari et al., 2008); Finally, in terms of cost-benefit 
analyses, big companies are inclined to comply with IFRSs, whilst small companies 
tend to decide that the costs exceed the benefits (Fekete et al., 2008, in Hungary). Omar 
& Simon (2011, p. 184) suggest that “Regulators should take into consideration the 
costs and the benefits associated with any plans to increase disclosure for firms which 
are small, not profitable, not listed in the first tier, in the services sector and not audited 
by the Big Four”.  
 
It is also found in prior research that Bangladesh has the lowest level of disclosure in 
terms of IFRSs mandatory disclosures (see Table 1-1). These mandatory studies did not 
reveal the reasons for non-compliance and have not yet reached any comprehensive 
conclusions, either in a comparative study or in a single country study. The findings 
provide solid grounds for concerns regarding the implementation of IFRSs in a 
developing country such as Bangladesh where the level of disclosure is so low. It is 
therefore important to study the factors which are affecting the implementation of 
IFRSs in Bangladesh, as an example of a developing country. 
 
Section 1.2 describes the motivation of the study. Section 1.3 presents the research 
questions. Section 1.4 outlines the research methods to be used in the study. Section 1.5 
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Author(s) Country No. of Comp. Average Disclosure Sources 
 
Ahmed & 
Nicholls (1994)  












Jordan 50 (300 firm-
years) 
1998: 51%; 1999: 
54%; 2000: 56% 
Table 6.23, 
 p. 338 







India [79%]; Pakistan 
[81%] 
Range: 78% - 81% 




  (2005)  
Bangladesh 94 43.53% 
[Range:17% -71.5%] 





Egypt 1991-92: 20 & 
1995-96: 72 
1991-92: 76%  
1995-96: 84%  
Tables 4-5, pp. 
93-94 
Hasan et al. 
(2008) 













Kuwait [72%]; Oman 
[65%]; Saudi Arabia 
[75%]; Qatar [69%]; 
UAE [75%] 
Range: 56% - 80% 
Table 8,  p. 17 
Fekete et 
al.(2008) 
Hungary 18 62% Table 4,  p. 8 
Al-Akra et al. 
(2010) 
Jordan 80 1996: 54.7% 
2004: 79% 
Table 5, p. 182 
Omar & Simon 
(2011)
 ii






Range: 63.87% - 
93.75% 




Between 1995-1997 IFRSs are voluntary; therefore, the disclosure levels from 1998-2000 are 
shown. 
ii 
The mandatory disclosure items are based on IFRSs and the SEC Law. 
 
1.2 Motivations of the study 
 
Bangladesh has received considerable attention from international investors following 
its adoption of an ‘open door’ economic policy aiming to encourage investment. The 
country’s economy has been described as one of the fastest growing markets in 
emerging nations (International Financial Review, 2008; World Bank, 2010). Over the 
past decade (2000-2010), two reports (i.e. Report on the observance of standards and 
codes, ROSC) have been published by the World Bank regarding accounting and 
auditing practices in Bangladesh. In the first report, the World Bank (2003, p. 1) states 
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that: “…Accounting and auditing practices in Bangladesh suffer from institutional 
weaknesses in regulation, compliance, and enforcement of standards and rules”. The 
report also notes that Bangladesh lacks quality corporate financial reporting. After six 
years had passed, in the follow up report, the World Bank (2009, p. 25) provided the 
same sentiments regarding low compliance with accounting standards. The World Bank 
(2009, p. 10) observed that “Efforts to implement IFRS for listed companies and other 
public interest entities should be accelerated. This will require either more frequent 
updating of BAS or simply adopting IFRS explicitly. ..Full implementation will also 
require that current donor assistance to ICAB be maintained, to allow for much needed 
professional development and expansion in the number of trained auditors and 
accountants”. World Bank Newsletter (2009, p. 1) noted that “With a population of 150 
million, Bangladesh has only 750 Chartered Accountants; far too few to meet the needs 
of the growing economy”. 
 
Bangladesh is one of the world’s poorest countries, ranking third after India and China 
in the extent of its poverty levels (The International Fund for Agricultural Development 
-IFAD, 2006). With an estimated population of over 150 million and per capita income 
of US$444, Bangladesh has the highest density of population in the world (948 per sq. 
km.). More than 63 million people live below the poverty line (The United Nations 
Population Fund, UNFPA, 2008). Bangladesh faces the challenge of achieving 
accelerated economic growth and alleviating the massive poverty that afflicts nearly 
two-fifths of its people (UNFPA, 2008). Accordingly, the motivations of this thesis, on 
implementing IFRSs in developing countries with special reference to Bangladesh, are 
given below: 
 
(a) Globalisation and the mobilisation of capital markets: Bangladesh as a country 
possesses distinct features which are relevant in consideration of harmonisation and 
global convergence issues, including the effects of globalisation and the 
mobilisation of capital markets. The concept of globalisation may be considered to 
represent the emergence of an international community where interests and needs 
can be shared from the developed world (Grieco & Holmes, 1999). Despite the 
challenges and obstacles of achieving targeted economic growth, Bangladesh made 
liberal market reforms in the mid 1980s, during the military-backed government 
(Ahmed, 2010). The aim was to move towards an open economic regime and 
integrate with the global economy. During the 1990s, notable progress was made in 
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economic performance and, therefore, foreign aid dependency was significantly 
decreased. For instance, the annual economic growth rate (GDP %) increased during 
the democratic era; in the 1990s, it was 5.2%, compared to 1.6% during the military 
era in the mid 1980s (World Bank, 2011) (see also Chapter Four). 
 
The stock market in Bangladesh has existed for more than 55 years and has 
experienced rapid growth
3
 (e.g. the price indices have increased 104.42% compared 
to other stock markets in South Asia; see Table 1-2). Significant growth in the 
numbers of listed companies and their volume of trading has been evident from 
1998-2010 (see Figure 1-1). As of 30 June 2011, the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) 
had 232 listed companies, with a market capitalisation of US$28501.70 million, 
whereas the market capitalisation of 31 December 1998 was just US$1034.00 
million with around 150 listed companies (source: http://www.dsebd.org/). While 
global stock markets have taken a beating, the DSE has performed reasonably well; 
it was the sixth best performing exchange in the world on a currency adjusted basis 
and Asia’s best-performing benchmark after China’s CSI 300 Index in 2008 
(Bloomberg, 2008; The Financial Express, 2008). Despite the fact that market 
capitalisation has been increasing significantly since 1998, the size of the country’s 
capital markets remains low (World Bank, 2011).  
 







































































































Note: The closing values of indices from 2008-2010 in South Asian Stock Markets.  
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges and http://econstats.com/ 
                                                 
3
 After India, the stock market of Bangladesh is second in the South Asia in terms of turnover (US$ m), 
market capitalisation (US$ m) and parentage of GDP in 2011 (see Table 1-2). 
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Note: This figure presents the monthly DSE GEN index’s closing values over the period 1998 




(b) The opportunity for FDI: Unlike in many other developing countries, FDI is not a 
major source of investment in Bangladesh. Indeed, FDI reduced by 16% from 2006 
to 2007 (UNCTAD, 2008). The net FDI turned negative in 2009 (US$110 million) 
(World Bank, 2011). This is possibly because of the adverse impact of various 
economic and political factors, including weak macroeconomic conditions, the 
predominance of public sector enterprises, a small domestic market, and political 
instability (The Financial Express, 2011). TIB (2005) noted that corruption is the 
main obstacle to attracting FDI into Bangladesh. Moreover, foreign investment has 
not increased since the 1970s (The Financial Express, 2011). Foreign investors hold 
only one percent shares of the DSE market (World Bank, 2011). In this regard, if 
companies in Bangladesh were to implement IFRSs effectively, then this practice 
may attract foreign investors who rely on financial information provided according 
to international standards (i.e. IFRSs). 
 
(c) Development towards a strengthened regulatory framework: A World Bank 
report (2009, p. 4) has stated that “[The] ICAB has incorporated a number of 
international standards, but not all have been adopted, and some that have not been 
updated. The CA [Companies Act] and other legislation also contain provisions that 
are not consistent with IFRS. Legally, these provisions are superseded by securities 
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regulation, but in practice they still hinder IFRS implementation by companies. For 
example, many companies do not prepare consolidated accounts because of the 
general belief that it is not required under the CA”. At least eight major 
developments towards strengthening regulatory frameworks (directly or indirectly 
relevant to the corporate financial reporting issues in Bangladesh) are worth noting:  
 
(1) The Bangladesh Chartered Accountants Order, 1973 (P.O. No. 2 of 1973) 
came into force after independence, for the creation of better professional bodies 
in Bangladesh. The ICAB was established in 1972 under the Chartered 
Accountants Order, 1973.  
 
(2) Almost 16 years after independence, Bangladesh formulated its own 
Securities and Exchange Rules, in 1987. The Securities and Exchange Rules 
became effective in September that year. These superseded the Securities and 
Exchange Ordinance, 1969 and the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1971 (S.R.O. 
92 (I)/71): In exercise of the powers conferred by section 33 of the Securities 
and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 (XVII of 1969), and the Ministry of Finance 
Notification No. S.R.O. 261(I)/79, dated the 26th October, 1970. The Securities 
and Exchange Rules of 1987 emphasised maintaining books of audited accounts 
and other documents both by the stock exchange and its members (Rules 5, 7 
and 8) and a requirement to submit annual and half-yearly reports by the issuers 
(Rules 12 and 13).  
 
(3) The Government of Bangladesh (GOB) enacted the Securities and Exchange 
Commission Act 1993 which took effect on 8 June 1993. The SEC is a statutory 
body and is attached to the Ministry of Finance, part of the government of 
Bangladesh. Its functions are intended to protect the interests of securities 
investors, and monitor securities markets.  
 
(4) The Companies Act was enacted in 1994 (Act XVIII of 1994) and came into 
force on 1 October 1995, replacing the old Companies Act of 1913. The 
Companies Act constitutes the main component of the financial reporting 
regulatory framework in Bangladesh. The Companies Act 1994 preserves the 
provisions of the 1913 Act with regard to a 9-month time limit within which 
companies are required to furnish their financial statements before their AGM. 
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However, the new Act increases the penalty for non-compliance with relevant 
provision (Tk.
4
 5,000) (Part IVA, Sec. 181, 192). 
 
(5) The stock market crash in July and mid-November 1996 saw both the Dhaka 
and Chittagong Stock Exchanges experiencing an unprecedented boom and a 
subsequent collapse (The Daily Star, 1996). During this period, market 
capitalisation increased by 265% and the average daily turnover increased by 
over 1000%. There were about 192 securities listed in total in the two stock 
exchanges at the time. The share price index at the DSE increased by 281% and 
by 258% at the Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE). Then share prices of both the 
stock exchanges dropped by 25% from the peak in mid-November (The Daily 
Star, 1996). One of the reasons for this unusual rise and fall in securities prices 
was the artificial manipulation of securities prices carried out by a number of 
securities dealers and issuers in the absence of timely provision of reliable 
financial information in the market (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994). After this market 
crash, the SEC insisted that the listed companies hold regular AGMs and publish 
annual reports complying with IFRSs. Therefore, the SEC (No: SEC/Section-
7/SER/03/132, dated 22 October 1997) amended the Securities and Exchange 
Rules of 1987 and required the listed companies to prepare financial statements 
in compliance with IFRSs, as adopted by the ICAB. 
 
(6) The SEC requires that companies listed with any stock exchange in 
Bangladesh should be subject to certain further conditions, on a ‘comply or 
explain’ basis with regard to reasons for non-compliance, in order to improve 
corporate governance in the interest of investors and the capital market (Order 
No. SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin/02-06 dated 9 January 2006, Condition 
No. 5, section 2CC of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 [XVII of 
1969]). This was later amended by the SEC order No. SEC/CMRRCD/2006-
158/Admin/02-08, dated 20 February 2006.  
 
(7) To strengthen accounting and auditing practices in Bangladesh, the SEC 
(SEC order No: SEC/CMRRCD/2008-181/53/Admin/03/28), dated 4 June 2008, 
under section 2CC of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 (XVII of 
                                                 
4
 The values given are in Bangladeshi currency, i.e. the Taka (Tk.). The exchange rate on 31.03.2012 was 
[Tk. 1 = £0.0083 or £1 = Tk. 119.815]; source: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/exrate/bangladesh.htm 
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1969) requires that issuer companies shall include the following 
statements/explanations in its yearly and periodical financial statements: (a) a 
clear and unambiguous statement of the reporting framework on which the 
accounting policies are based; (b) a clear statement of the company’s accounting 
policies on all material accounting areas; (c) an explanation of where the 
accounting standards that underpin the policies can be found; (d) a statement 
confirming that the financial statements are in compliance with IFRSs issued by 
the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), if this is the case; and (e) a 
statement explaining how the standards and reporting framework used differ 
from those of IFRS, as issued by the IASB, if this is the case.  
 
(8) The World Bank made initiatives aimed at improving financial reporting 
practices in Bangladesh under the Economic Management Technical Assistance 
Program (EMTAP, called a ‘Twinning Project’) in 2006. Under this project, 
some professionals and academics from Bangladesh were sent to London for the 
ICAEW’s IFRS certificate
5
 (ICAEW, 2008). Further, the ICAB and Ministry of 
Finance signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the ICAEW to 
develop a new syllabus in line with the IFAC requirements in 2009 (source: 
http://www.icaew.com/).  
 
(d) Political regimes in Bangladesh (1971-present): There have been two political 
patterns in Bangladesh, i.e. democratic and military eras. In 40 years of 
independence, the military-backed government ruled for 19 years and democratic 
government for the other 21. 
 
To sum up, for the above significant reasons, Bangladesh is considered to be an ideal 
setting to study the implementation of IFRSs. It is anticipated that an effective 
implementation of IFRSs would allow the provision of transparent information and may 
therefore attract FDI. 
 
1.3 Research questions 
 
Taking into consideration the above motivations for research, as well as the brief 
background provided here of the context of IFRSs implementation in Bangladesh, this 
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thesis addresses a ‘motivating research question’ to examine what factors have been 
affecting the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh from 1998 to 2010. The definition 
of ‘implementation’ in the context of the present research is: the actual observed 
outcomes of introducing and monitoring the standards. These outcomes will include the 
actions of the government, the SEC, ICAB, ICMAB, DSE, and Bangladesh Bank. 
‘Effective implementation’ means the positive outcomes of introducing and monitoring 
the standards. 
 
In line with the motivating research question and the background of IFRSs 
implementation in Bangladesh, this study will explore the following Research Questions 
(RQs): 
 
RQ-1: What is the relative impact of accounting regulatory frameworks and politico-
institutional factors on the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh as an example of a 
developing country? 
 
RQ-2(a): How do (i) training opportunities in the accounting profession and (ii) the 
state of corruption, as outcomes of culture in Bangladesh, affect the implementation of 
IFRSs? 
 
RQ-2(b): What other country specific factors are affecting implementation of IFRSs? 
 
RQ-3: How does a study of implementing IFRSs help to build an understanding of a 
theory of the role of the state in accounting change in a developing country such as 
Bangladesh? 
 
The term ‘accounting regulatory frameworks’ means relevant regulations with respect to 
accounting (the Companies Act 1994, the SEC Rules 1987 & 1997, the Banking 
Companies Act 1991, Dhaka Stock Exchange Listing Rules 1998, Listing Regulations 
of the Chittagong Stock Exchange and the Income Tax Ordinance 1984) for non-
banking and banking sectors in Bangladesh. The term ‘politico-institutional factors’ in 
this study means politics and co-operation among state institutions and professional 
bodies impacting on the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh. 
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In this study, the term ‘state-society’ means the relationship between external (i.e. the 
role of the state) and internal forces (i.e. individual organisations). This term has been 
used to explain how external and internal forces have influenced IFRSs implementation, 
as an example of accounting change in Bangladesh. 
 
 
1.4 Research methods: an overview 
 
In terms of research design, a ‘deductive approach’ (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Bryman, 
2008) is employed in the present study, because the focus of the study is on testing the 
theory of the role of the state. The objective of this research is to explore the 
implementation of IFRSs in a developing country, emphasising the impact of 
accounting regulatory frameworks, politico-institutional factors, cultural factors (e.g. [i] 
training opportunities in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption) and other country 
specific factors. Given this consideration, the choice of research methods used in the 
present study has been informed by the research objectives and research questions (see 
section 1.3).  
 
Prior research argues that when theoretical expectations exist but the appropriate 
propositions need to be developed, mixed methods can be a useful tool for 
understanding and validating those theories (Colignon & Covaleski, 1991; Bennett & 
Braumoeller, 2006; Fuentes, 2008; Hesse-Biber, 2010). These mixed methods have 
been utilised for three reasons: firstly, a theoretical framework can be developed 
(Neuman, 2000); secondly, the complementary principle or the acceptability of mixed 
methods is better than a single method (Tarrow, 2004); thirdly, in terms of the 
generalisation of the conclusions, mixed methods are likely to contribute towards richer 
conclusions (Jick, 1979; Maxwell & Loomis, 2003); and finally, in relation to the 
philosophical views of the research, the present study uses ‘critical realism’ as a 
philosophical stance for choosing mixed methods. Critical realism supports mixed 
methods (Bhaskar, 1978; Archer, 2002; Sayer, 2004; Modell, 2010).  
 
The two phases of the data collection process are used to achieve the objectives of the 
study. 
 
(a) Semi-structured interviews were conducted over a twelve-week period, from June to 
August 2010, during a field trip. A total of 27 interviewees participated in the 
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research. Miles & Huberman (1994) and Patton (2001) argue that six to eight 
interviews are enough to justify the results of a study. The length of most of the 
interviews here ranged from 60 minutes to 90 minutes. The interviewees were 
selected using a non-random stratified sampling method (Gibbs, 2008). The idea is 
to select interviewees purposively, identifying those who can help the researcher to 
understand the specific problem and the research question, in this case IFRSs 
implementation issues in Bangladesh (Creswell, 2007, p. 178). This study therefore 
employed a broad spectrum of respondents, grouped into four defined groups for the 
interviews, as follows: (a) seven policy makers; (b) twelve accounts preparers and 
professionals; (c) six users; and (d) two academics/researchers.  
 
The study also conducted a follow up to the first round of interviews in order to 
investigate IFRSs implementation issues in more depth. In particular, the aim was to 
discover the consistency of the interviewees’ views, because the present democratic 
government was in its third year of power. Therefore, a gap of more than a year 
existed between conducting the two round of interviews ( June 2010 – September 
2011). Although the researcher contacted 27 interviewees (i.e. the 1
st
 round 
interviewees), only 12 agreed to follow ups: (a) four policy makers; (b) four 
accounts preparers and professionals; (c) two users; and (d) two 
academics/researchers). The follow-up interviews were conducted in September 
2011. In general, follow-up interviews help researchers to obtain detailed and in-
depth data (Yin, 2003; Creswell, 2007). The interview questions for the second 
round of interviews in this study were prepared based on the findings of the first 
round of interviews. 
 
(b) In the second stage of data collection, the study examines the enforcement notices 
(e.g. those that relate to violations of SEC rules and accounting regulations) issued 
by the SEC from the beginning of 1998 through the end of 2010. This period of 
study was selected because of the availability of data and because the SEC 
mandated IFRSs from the beginning of 1998. The enforcement notices contain a 
very limited number of IFRSs-related violations. After carefully reviewing the SEC 
announcements, I eliminate 57 observations that are repeated from an earlier press 
release; 24 are not accessible from the website; and so the final sample consists of 
1,647 unique observations. However, only 42 of 1647 enforcement notices are 
IFRSs related. The data analysis
 
in this study follows the procedure of prior research 
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on enforcement notices (Bremser et al., 1991; Feroz et al., 1991; Campbell & 
Parker, 1992; Rollins & Bremser, 1997; Chen et al., 2005; Files, 2012).  
 
1.5 Research contributions 
 
Some studies have been conducted to examine the application of disclosure 
requirements in Bangladesh (e.g. Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Ali et al., 2004; 
Akhtaruddin, 2005; Hasan et al., 2008). There have not been studies on wider 
implementation issues in Bangladesh. Although this study is specific to Bangladesh, the 
research contained within it provides findings and conclusion which may be relevant to 
other developing countries. The results may be useful to other developing countries 
wishing to implement IFRSs and to donor agencies supporting developing countries in 
implementing IFRSs. Researchers can use the results from this study as a guideline for 
the implementation of IFRSs in a developing country. The contributions arising from 
the three research questions in this research are given below. 
 
(a) In terms of RQ-1 (see section 1.3), this research discusses the relative impact of 
accounting regulatory frameworks and politico-institutional factors on the 
implementation of IFRSs in a developing country. The contributions are: firstly, the 
study finds that politico-institutional factors are stronger and more dominant factors 
than accounting regulatory frameworks in impeding IFRSs implementation in 
Bangladesh; secondly, a lack of co-operation among the institutional bodies has 
existed in both democratic and military-backed government eras. However, the 
military-backed government was effective than the democratic government in terms 
of taking action against companies identified as being corrupt. Thirdly, there is 
evidence of ‘blaming culture’ (Hood, 2007, 2009; O’Neill, 2002) with the state 
institutions and professional bodies blaming each other regarding the IFRSs 
implementation process. This is possibly because ‘the blame game’ may be aimed at 
attempting to remove power and responsibility from other institutions in order to 
facilitate the legitimacy and increase the scope of government bureaucracy. Finally, 
unlike prior research (e.g. La Porta et al., 1998; Kothari, 2000; Ball et al., 2000, 
2003; Leuz et al., 2003) who argue that common-law origin is more transparent in 
terms of setting accounting standards, in this research, the country’s common-law 
origin has little or no influence on implementing IFRSs in Bangladesh. This is 
possibly because Bangladesh contains an unique environment which may be 
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explained via [a(i)] training opportunities in the accounting profession, [a(ii)] 
corruption and [b] other country specific factors. 
 
Some policymaking actions should be taken to facilitate an effective implementation 
process: the contradictions between the local laws and the requirements of the 
IFRSs should be eliminated by incorporating IFRSs in the Companies Act; the 
stakeholders should participate in the setting of standards and in publishing 
exposure drafts and consultation papers on standards at regular intervals; tightened 
enforcement mechanisms (e.g. penalty criteria) should be introduced; and political 
lobbying and government intervention in the SEC and the ICAB should be 
minimised by establishing an independent oversight board, e.g. a Financial 
Reporting Council.  
 
(b) With respect to RQ-2(a) and (b) (see section 1.3), the contributions of this study are 
as follows: firstly, this study finds that deficiencies in the training opportunities in 
the accounting profession itself are impeding IFRSs implementation. This finding 
differs from prior studies in developing countries (Parry & Groves, 1990; Abayo & 
Roberts, 1993; Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002), who find that 
training opportunities in the accounting profession has no impact. According to the 
interviewees, the professional curricula contain limited content on IFRSs, while the 
universities’ curricula is without IFRSs content at all. Further, the limited training 
facilities available to accountants are inhibiting IFRSs implementation. With the 
exception of ‘big 4’ and other large companies, the majority of companies are not 
providing training facilities for their company accountants. Secondly, high levels of 
corruption in Bangladesh have a negative influence in implementing IFRSs. Given 
the fact that Bangladesh was top of the list of the most corrupt countries in the world 
for five consecutive years (2001-2005), the present study’s findings reveal that 
corruption is deeply rooted in Bangladesh’s society. Similar to Hofstede et al. 
(2010)’s index of Bangladesh, the World Bank’s Governance Indicators Data (2010) 
and La Porta et al. (1998)’s data [see also Leuz et al., 2003; Han et al., 2012], this 
study reveals lower rates of enforcement in Bangladesh compared with India and 
Pakistan. This is due to higher levels of corruption, a factor which weakens 
enforcement of laws and is marked by a secretive culture. In South Asia, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan have experienced political instability due to military 
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intervention and both of these countries have worse than average secrecy and 
enforcement scores. However, interestingly, corruption was measured as being 
lower in both countries during periods of military-backed government. 
 
Some policy making issues can be noted: the professional and universities curricula 
should be updated in line with IFRSs; the salary structure of CAs in Bangladesh 
should be made much more competitive, similar to India, Pakistan or Sri Lanka; the 
current democratic government should introduce a culture of transparency in the 
public and private sector, through a de-politicised Anti-Corruption Bureau to stop 
wide spread corruption; the SEC and the ICAB should pressure company 
management to comply with IFRSs; the copying extracts from the notes to the 
financial statements (e.g. accounting policies) of big companies’ financial 
statements should be subject to higher penalties as imposed by the ICAB; state 
owned enterprises should not be given the privilege of optional non-compliance 
with IFRSs, and the SEC should follow stringent enforcement of the laws. While 
most listed companies in Bangladesh are family led businesses and are politically 
connected, the SEC should make sure that politicians and their associates are not 
extending their powers in order to violate the SEC rules; the SEC and the ICAB 
should emphasise the cost-benefit issues for small companies, and, shareholders’ 
activism and demand regarding the quality of annual reports available to them 
should be prioritised by the companies.  
 
(c) In relation to RQ-3 (see section 1.3), the contributions are as follows: firstly, this 
study contributes to IFRSs implementation as an example of accounting change in a 
developing country by applying the Weberian view of the theory of the role of the 
state; secondly, unlike prior research which did not consider the state-society 
relationship (i.e. external and internal forces) in accounting change in both 
developed and developing countries, in this study, the adoption of the concept of 
institutional dynamics (Dillard et al., 2004) allowed me to provide broader 
understanding of the theory of the state and to overcome some of the limitations of 
previous studies by considering accounting change in two levels (e.g. external and 
internal forces). In particular, the outcomes of accounting change in Bangladesh are 
observed from the state and individual organisation levels. However, the influence 
of the organisational field level is unknown in this research. Extending Weber’s 
(1958)[1904], (1968)[1922] argument on state-society, the study finds that for a 
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state in an era of democratic government, politico-institutional factors and 
corruption (as an indication of societal values) may be more important and 
concentrated factors than for a state under a military-backed government in terms of 
impeding IFRSs implementation. The study reveals that all roles of the state have 
negative influences on accounting change. However, interviewees’ initial concerns 
about the roles of donor agencies are transformed into concerns about the 
democratic government’s failure to implement IFRSs. Lastly, since the role(s) of the 
state are vague in prior accounting research, this study discusses roles of the state 
(i.e. the state approves experts to write rules; it consults with various stakeholders; it 
enforces outcomes; it is accountable to its citizens; and it engages with donor 
agencies) in a developing country’s experience during the process of accounting 
change.  
 
1.6 Organisation of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is organised into nine chapters, informed by the research questions. The 
details of the following chapters of the thesis are given below. 
 
Chapter Two presents some interesting areas in the existing literature, since there is no 
single theory explaining IFRSs implementation in developing countries and most of the 
studies on adoption and implementation issues are based on developed economies. In 
particular, theories of the role of the State (RQ-3) identify various key factors, for 
instance, accounting regulatory frameworks, politico-institutional factors, cultural 
factors (e.g. [i] training opportunities in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption) 
and other country specific factors. These factors are discussed to develop some 
interesting questions around implementing IFRSs in developing countries. 
 
Chapter Three discusses fifteen key papers on theories of the role of the state (in 
particular the Weberian view of the state) in relation to accounting change. The chapter 
helps to develop a theoretical framework (RQ-3) from which to examine RQ-1 and RQ-
2(a). More specifically, the role of the state and institutional dynamics are discussed in 
order to understand the links between the state and individual organisations. Based on 
the drivers of accounting change (i.e. the most discussed issues in the literature - 
accounting regulatory frameworks, politico-institutional factors, and cultural factors 
(e.g. [i] training opportunities in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption), three 
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propositions were developed in Chapter Two. The theory of the role of the state helps to 
plan the investigation of the three propositions. 
 
Chapter Four provides some background information on Bangladesh. The chapter 
describes the political regime in Bangladesh, accounting regulatory frameworks for 
financial and non-financial companies, the accounting standard setting process, 
including the status of the adopted accounting standards in Bangladesh, and South 
Asian regional efforts to implement IFRSs. Cultural factors (e.g. accounting profession 
and corruption issues) in Bangladesh are also outlined and analysed. 
 
Chapter Five describes the research methodology and method employed in this thesis. A 
discussion of research methods is also provided in this chapter (see section 1.4). 
 
Chapter Six presents the results for RQ-1 (the relative impact of accounting regulatory 
frameworks and politico-institutional factors). Based on the interview findings and the 
documentary evidence, two propositions (as developed in Chapter Two) are discussed 
in this chapter. The first proposition relates to the effectiveness of accounting regulatory 
frameworks and the second proposition relates to politico-institutional factors in relation 
to IFRSs implementation in Bangladesh.  
 
Chapter Seven presents the results for RQ-2(a) (i.e. [i] training opportunities in the 
accounting profession and [ii] corruption) and RQ-2(b) (i.e. other country specific 
factors). Drawing upon the interviews as well as on documentary analyses, the chapter 
answers proposition three and analyses issues around other country specific factors. The 
third proposition was developed in Chapter Two.  
 
Chapter Eight presents the results of RQ-3 (i.e. the theory of the role of the state in 
accounting change). Based on the interviews and enforcement documents, the chapter 
discusses insights which provide a broader view of the theory of the role of the state and 
institutional dynamics in explaining the implementation issues for a developing country 
such as Bangladesh. In particular, the chapter provides theoretical implications in order 
to gain an understanding of the role of the state and individual organisations, or between 
external and internal forces (i.e. the state-society relationship).  
 
Chapter Nine provides a summary of the key findings and the contributions of this 
thesis. The chapter also highlights limitations and suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter Two 
Review of Literature 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The central aim of this chapter is to discuss the research questions, i.e. RQ-1: What is 
the relative impact of accounting regulatory frameworks and politico-institutional 
factors on the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh as an example of a developing 
country?; RQ-2(a): How do (i) training opportunities in the accounting profession and 
(ii) the state of corruption, as outcomes of culture in Bangladesh, affect the 
implementation of IFRSs; RQ-2(b): What other country specific factors are affecting 
implementation of IFRSs?; and RQ-3: How does a study of implementing IFRSs help to 
build an understanding of a theory of the role of the state in accounting change in a 
developing country such as Bangladesh? More specifically, the chapter seeks to achieve 
two goals. Firstly, the chapter will help to identify unexplored areas in the existing 
literature, since there is no single theory explaining IFRSs implementation in 
developing countries. Secondly, as most of the studies on adoption and implementation 
issues so far have been based on developed economies, the present study therefore 
considers some interesting questions around implementing IFRSs in developing 
countries. A detailed structure of the review of literature is shown in Figure 2-1. In 
terms of the sequence of the section, theories of the role of the State (RQ-3) precede 
RQ-1 and RQ-2 because RQ-3 helps to identify various key factors, for example, 
accounting regulatory frameworks as well as politico-institutional factors, cultural 
factors and other country specific factors. Further, RQ-3 will help to test a theoretical 
framework through RQ-1 and RQ-2. 
 
The chapter is organised into seven sections. Section 2.2 evaluates the application of 
theories of the role of the state to a study of IFRSs in developing countries; sections 2.3 
and 2.4 review the impact of accounting regulatory frameworks and politico-
institutional factors on IFRSs implementation respectively; section 2.5 outlines the 
cultural factors (e.g. [i] training opportunities in the accounting profession and [ii] 
corruption); section 2.6 reviews other country specific factors that may have an impact 
on IFRSs implementation; and section 2.7 summarises the discussions and concludes 
the chapter. Summaries are also provided at the conclusions of sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 
and 2.6. The propositions are developed in the summary sections of 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. 
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section 2.5 and 
Proposition III  
(2.5.3) 
 
Summary of  
section 2.6  
(2.6.4) 
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2.2 Theories of the Role of the State in relation to 
accounting 
 
This section aims to explore the role of the state and to examine factors causing 
accounting change
6
. The section also seeks to understand the underlying problems of 
IFRSs implementation. Section 2.2.1 presents an overview of the state and Section 2.2.2 
presents the definition of the state for this study. Section 2.2.3 then focuses on the 
relationship between the role of the state and accounting change. The literature on the 
role of the state and accounting change is enormous. In this study, I have undertaken a 
survey of the prior literature, mainly emphasising accounting journals using version 4 of 
the Association of Business School Academic Journal Quality Guide, UK (source: 
http://www.the-abs.org.uk/files//Combined%20Journal%20Guide.pdf, 17 November 
2010). The 45 journals (see Appendix 2-1 for ABS ranking accounting journals) from 
the ABS ranking and 2 journals
7
 including Research in Accounting Regulation and 
Research in Third World Accounting (retitled Research in Accounting in Emerging 
Economies in 1995) have been used to locate the relevant articles on the role of the state 
in relation to accounting change. Then, the focus turns to the e-journals available in the 
university integrated database
8
 (see Appendices 2-2 and 2-3). Further, the present study 
employs Google Scholar (http://scholar.google.co.uk/) (accessed on 10 February 2012) 
using ‘role of the state in relation to accounting change’ as keyphrase; the initial 
electronic trawl through the literature reveals 1,540,000  published ‘works’ by early 
2012, a count that includes editorials, some newspaper articles, conference papers works 
with no named authors, and duplicates. To simplify this complexity, I have used the 
following criteria to exclude papers from the analyses: 
a. Published working papers which lack author(s) name; 
b. Duplicate articles (e.g. articles that have already selected from ABS ranking 
accounting journals); 
c.  Editorials and newspaper articles; and 
d. Articles whose main focus is other than accounting. 
Therefore, this study concentrates on articles, book chapters and conference papers. 
From a survey of Google Scholar, I found  23 papers including 11 articles from other 
journals, 6 working papers, 5 book chapters and one research report (see Table 2-1).  
 
                                                 
6
 Accounting change means the outcome of IFRSs implementation.   
7
 The two journals are not included in the ABS Ranking. 
8
 The University of Edinburgh Database (http://small.lib.ed.ac.uk). 
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From both of these surveys (56 papers are from the ABS and 23 are from Google 
Scholar), I find that a range of disciplines have contributed to the literature on role of 
the state and accounting change (see Appendices 2-4(a) and 2-4(b)). I found that 49 
papers dealt with theoretical explanation, from a total of 79 papers. More specifically, 
only 15 out of 49 papers are in relation to the theory of the role of the state and 
accounting change (see Table 2-2). Three papers have solely focused upon developing 
countries. Finally, the investigation is confined to frequent discussed issues
9
 that are 
discussed in the literature rather than delving into other areas of enquiry.   
 
Table 2-1: Articles, working papers, book chapters and research reports on the role of 





























Note: The author(s) & citations in italics indicate papers from book chapters, working 
papers and research reports.  
 
 
                                                 
9
 I use the term frequently discussed issues as the drivers of accounting change. 
10
 The article also appeared in 2010: The British Journal of Sociology, 61(s1): 271–303 (Special Issue: 
The BJS: Shaping sociology over 60 years). 
Author(s) Cited by [times] 
Watts (1977) 3,770 
Hoogvelt & Tinker (1978) 35 
Solomons (1978) 155 
Streeck & Schmitter (1985) 1,274 
Rose & Miller (1992)[2010]
10
 1,855 
Walker (1992) 2 
Napier & Noke (1992) 33 
Stiglitz (1993) 1,028 
Zeff (1993) 65 
Walker & Robinson (1993) 66 
Miller (1994) 309 
Saudagaran & Diga (1998) 24 
Klumpes (1998) 2 
Faccio (2002) 26 
Ordelheide (2004) 19 
Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee (2006) 148 
Zeff (2006) 59 
Perry &  Nӧlke (2006) 64 
Leuz & Wysocki (2008) 187 
Nobes & Zeff (2008) 7 
Alexander & Servalli (2010) 3 
Königsgruber (2010) 10 
Zülch & Hoffmann (2010) 0 
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Hoogvelt & Tinker (1978) 35 Google Sierra Leone 
Tinker (1984) 105 ABS N/A 
Streeck & Schmitter (1985) 1,274 Google N/A 
Miller (1990) 176 ABS France 
Jonsson (1991) 30 ABS Sweden 
Rose & Miller (1992)[2010] 1,855 Google UK 
Krzywda et al. (1995) 28 ABS Poland 
Caramanis (2002) 54 ABS Greece   
Constable & Kuasirikun (2007) 6 ABS Thailand 
Moran (2010) 2 ABS USA  & UK 
Alexander & Servalli (2010) 3 Google EU & IASB 
Kurunmaki et al. (2011) 2 ABS N/A 
Liguori & Steccolini (2012) 0 ABS Italy 
Norton (2012) 0 ABS UK & USA 
Oehr & Zimmermann (2012) 0 ABS Germany, 
Canada & UK 
 
   Note: The itailcs indicate that these articles are based on developing countries. 
 
2.2.1 Overview of the State  
 
 The concept of the state is very puzzling
12
 and difficult to explain (Alexander & 
Servalli, 2010). Mann (1986, p. 112) argues that ‘state is undeniably a messy concept’. 
It is frequently observed that the concept of the state is confused with the government, 
with a nation-state or country, and with a given type of political regime. In particular, 
the state is often viewed as a synonym of government in the Anglo-Saxon tradition 
(Miliband, 1969). Government is regarded as the political elite that occupies the top 
positions of power in the state (Poulantzas, 1975, 1978). Cassese (1986)
13
 indicates that 
the state has at least 145 different meanings. The evolutionary concept of  the ‘state’ 
                                                 
11
Not Applicable [N/A] means that these articles are purely theory based.  
12
Graf (1995, p. 140) argues that “If the mainstream development literature of the 1960s and 1970s 
presupposed a ‘modernising’ or ‘developmental’ state and the Marxist approaches of the same period 
invoked the ‘strong’, ‘overdeveloped’ and (relatively) ‘autonomous’ postcolonial state; and if the eighties 
produced rather more ambiguous concepts such as the ‘rentier state’, the ‘peripheral state’ or the 
‘bureaucratic-authoritarian state’; then in the nineties the imagery has turned relentlessly negative as 
expressed in such coinages as ‘vassal state’, ‘predator state’, ‘vampire state’, ‘receiver state’, ‘prostrate 
state’ and even ‘fictitious state’, ‘show of state’ or ‘collapsed state’”. Beyme (1986, p. 115) also observes 
that ‘American scholars have sometimes argued that the state is either a legal or a Marxist term’. 
13
 Cassese (1986, p.120) offers the view that “Since 1931, when 145 usages of it were found, the word 
‘state’, like all terms with too many meanings, has ceased to distinguish any concept useful for purposes 
of study”. 
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emerged in the sixteenth century
14
 and developed through to the nineteenth century 
(Chabod, 1964).  
 
The debate around the concept of the state has been quite lively (Miliband, 1969; 
Poulantzas, 1975; Taylor, 1975; Mann, 1986). Hegel, in his work Philosophy of Right
15
, 
provides the broader view, that “[State] is the culmination of the appearance of 
freedom and reason in the relationships which man always has with those who surround 
him”. Hegel distinguishes between three levels of social interactions: the family, the 
civil society, and the state (Avineri, 1972, p. 80). However, Lewin et al. (2010, p. 5) 
argue that the concept of the state is not sufficiently defined in Hegel’s writings. The 
critique of Hegel by Marx is that “the state becomes the private property of officials in 
their struggle for self advancement” (Jessop, 1977, p. 354) and this predates the 
development of a class theory of the state. According to Marx, the state is part of the 
superstructure and reflects of the economic base (Mann, 1986). Dusza (1989, p. 71) 
argues that “…. the term ‘state’ lived on in Marxism, but the class of objects that it 
denoted was not identified exactly; it was used only as a catchword for the designation 
of the ‘political superstructure…Recent works by the so-called neo-Marxists have not 
gotten farther than attributing to the state a greater degree of ‘autonomy’ than was 
proposed by Marx and Engels”. Marx completely rejected the cultural dimension of the 
state (Tilly, 1973). Tinker (1984, p. 61) also criticises Marx’s view and argues that the 
conceptual categories of the political economy of Marxism are specific to capitalism 
and thus neglect the social essence. Both groups start from what Poulantzas (1975) calls 
the ‘relative autonomy’ of the state and both naturally reject liberal theories of the state 
as a neutral political agent (Carnoy, 1984; Hoffman, 1995; Hay, 1996).  
 
Max Weber’s (1968)[1922] concept of the state predominantly focuses upon 
institutions. For Weber, “the state can be defined in terms of what it looks like, 
institutionally and that the state is also inclusive of functional institutions within the 
market and civil society” (Mann, 1986, p. 112). A neo-Marxist like Jessop (1977) 
agrees that Weber acknowledges the positive effects of strengthening markets (e.g. 
institutions). Skocpol (1985) strongly argues that the state should be taken seriously as a 
macrostructure and should be differentiated from liberal and Marxist approaches (i.e. 
                                                 
14
 Chabod (1967, p. 605; cited in Cassese, 1986) studies different meanings of state, such as dominion, 
institution and political lordship in the sixteenth century. 
15
 Cited in Avineri (1972, p. 80). 
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Marxism is fundamentally based on legitimate authority). Focusing on social norms and 
social conflict (in a ‘Tocquevillian’ sense after the French thinker), Skocpol (1985) 
argues that social norms change over time and culture is seen as a primary determinant 
of the state. More precisely, the spirit of the Weberian perspective is reflected by 
Williamson (1985)
16
 who argues that to mix state and society represents ‘new 
institutionalist’ assertions. From this point of view, the state is a combination of the 
macro-micro structure of a country.  
 
Using a Weberian view (1968)[1922] on state-society, Mann (1986, p. 112) argues that 
the state contains four elements: “(a) A differentiated set of institutions and personnel, 
embodying; (b) centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a 
centre to cover a; (c) territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises; (d) a 
monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the means 
of physical violence”. The state must have a monopoly on the use of force, must be 
considered to be legitimated by the civil society, and must have the capacity to run a 
country (Mann, 1986). Explaining the basic functions of a state, Tinker (1984, p. 67) 
argues that “The function’ of the state is ‘contract enforcement’ in this view; politics is 
‘the struggle over the law’ and over the state’s prerogative over legal compulsion (or 
‘the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’ to use Weber’s famous phrase)”. 
However, debates on power
17
 still remain within Weber’s concept of the state (Dusza, 
1989). The socio-cultural or extra-societal allegiances
18
 can tighten the relationship 
between ‘state’ and ‘society’ within social relationships (Robertson, 1990, p. 19). The 
World Bank (1997) in a world development report, The State in a Changing World, 
provides practitioners’ views of the Weberian concept: “State in its wider sense, refers 
to a set of institutions that possess the means of legitimate coercion, exercised over a 
defined territory and its population, referred to as society. The state monopolizes rule 
making within its territory through the medium of an organized government” (p. 20).      
 
                                                 
16
 Although the Williamsonian perspective has acknowledged macro & micro institution, his works are 
limited to analyses of the relations of micro institutions (Evans & Rauch, 1999, p. 749). 
17
 Weber (1968, p. 152, cited in Uphoff, 1989, p. 295) defines power as “Herrschaft ist, wie gleich zu 
erortern, ein Sonderfall von Macht (Authority is, as will be discussed, a special kind of power)”. Mann 
(1986) believes that four sources of power (ideological, economic, military and political) underpin the 
development of the state.   
18
 According to Mann (1986), this process, termed ‘diffused power’, e.g. social norms, is a subtler, more 
normalised power where individuals follow social norms either because they are natural, moral or arise 
from self interest. 
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In accounting literature, the meaning of the state is ambiguous (Jonsson, 1991; Rose & 
Miller, 1992[2010]; Moran, 2010; Kurunmaki et al., 2011; Norton, 2012; Alexander & 
Servalli, 2010; Liguori & Steccolini, 2012), and most of the literature (Hoogvelt & 
Tinker, 1978; Krzywda et al., 1995; Caramanis, 2002; Constable & Kuasirikun, 2007; 
Oehr & Zimmermann, 2012) ignores any exploration of the meaning of the state. A few 
studies, like Tinker (1984), Streeck & Schmitter (1985) and Miller (1990) argue that the 
meaning and application of the state depend on the context of the study. 
 
2.2.2 Definition of the state for this study  
 
The state in this study means a set of institutions and role (rules and actions over a 
territory or society) in the processes of accounting change (i.e. the actual observed 
outcomes of introducing and monitoring the standards). There are different meanings of 
institutions. Institutions are governance structures based on rules, norms, values and 
systems of cultural meaning (North, 1990). Institutions are defined by Ostrom (1990, p. 
51) as “the set of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make 
decisions in some arenas, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation 
rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what information must or must 
not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their 
actions”. Jepperson (1991), on the other hand, defines institutions to be any social 
pattern characterised by standard sequences of interactions. In economics, institutions 
serve to minimise market transaction costs (North, 1990). In sociology, institutions are 
social structures which come to be sanctioned by norms and values, facilitate political 
co-operation, and reduce uncertainties (Hopwood, 1990, 1999). In this study, I focus 
upon state institutions and professional bodies (i.e. the government, ministerial bodies, 
accountancy professional bodies, the stock exchange, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the central bank). Based on the concept of this section, the next section 
will discuss the role of the state in accounting change.  
 
2.2.3 Role of the State and Accounting Change 
 
I have used a particular definition of the state for this study (as mentioned in the 
previous section, 2.2.2) because this particular meaning signifies the role of the state 
and accounting change within a society. Since the accounting literature suggests 
different meanings of the state, and the meanings depend on the purpose of the study, I 
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follow the definition for three reasons: (a) the state is linked with the market and society 
(Weber, 1968[1922]); (b) it helps to understand the role of the state (World Bank, 
1997); and (c) the concept can inform policymakers and practitioners as to why some 
states are more effective than others (World Bank, 1997). One implicit caution is that 
this study focuses on role of the state, but not to find out the meaning of the state. 
 
In terms of accounting change, Napier (2006, p. 445) states that: “Accounting has 
changed, is changing, and is likely to change in the future”. This statement might 
almost be regarded as a truism (Constable & Kuasirikun, 2007). Accounting methods, 
techniques, ideas and practices differ in 2005 from those which were prevalent in 1975 
or earlier (Napier, 2006). The state’s role regarding accounting change has been largely 
ignored by historians, accountants and social scientists (Constable & Kuasirikun, 2007, 
p. 574). In a recent study, Liguori & Steccolini (2012, p. 28) argue that accounting is 
recognised as playing a fundamental role in organisational change. They demonstrate 
different outcomes of accounting change in the presence of similar environmental 
pressures. Aaccounting researchers are devoting greater attention to the social, political, 
and economic forces influencing accounting change (Parkinson, 1984; Pushkin & 
Pariser, 1991; Napier, 2006; Liguori & Steccolini, 2012). Prior studies have established 
some links between the role of the state and accounting change (e.g., Tinker, 1984; 
Streeck & Schmitter, 1985; Miller, 1990; Moran, 2010; Alexander & Servalli, 2010). 
Roles of the state include: 
a. State approves experts (e.g. professional bodies) to write rules (Tinker, 1984; 
Jonsson, 1991; Alexander & Servalli, 2010; Moran, 2010; Norton, 2012); 
b. State consults with various stakeholders (e.g. investors, professionals and 
researchers) for the validation of rules (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985; Rose & 
Miller, 1992[2010]; Kurunmaki et al., 2011; Oehr & Zimmermann, 2012);  
c. State enforces outcomes (Hoogvelt & Tinker, 1978; Krzywda et al., 1995); and  
d. State initiates change because the state is accountable to its citizens (Miller, 
1990; Constable & Kuasirikun, 2007); 
 
In order to explore the role of the state and accounting change, I have used articles from 
several sources, in particular, the ABS and Google Scholar (as mentioned in section 2.2) 
and focused upon the most frequently discussed issues in the literature (the process of 
selecting articles is described in section 2.2). As indicated in section 2.2, only 15 key 
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papers are identified in relation to the theory of the role of the state and accounting 
change. The most frequently debated issues
19
 (drivers of accounting change) from 79 
papers, namely accounting regulatory frameworks, politico-institutional factors, and 
cultural factors, are discussed in sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5.  
 
2.2.4 Summary of section 2.2 
 
This section has provided a generic discussion of the theories of the role of the state in 
relation to accounting change. As discussed in section 2.2.1, ‘the state’ has many 
meanings and these can depend on the purpose of a study. Further, theories of the role 
of the state have been employed in relatively limited areas of accounting research and 
therefore, the theoretical literature implies that there is a gap in the application of the 
theories in relation to IFRSs implementation. In the present study, I follow the 
Weberian concept of state (see section 2.2.2) (which will also be discussed in Chapter 
Three, relating to the theoretical framework).   
 
Section 2.2.3 indicates that I have identified the three most frequently discussed issues 
in the literature in terms of the role of the state in relation to accounting change (i.e. 
accounting regulatory frameworks, politico-institutional factors, and cultural factors). 
These three issues will be discussed in sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. More specifically, 
theories of the role of the state will be discussed in Chapter Three, in order to develop 
the theoretical framework for the present study. 
 
2.3  Accounting Regulatory Frameworks 
 
As mentioned in Chapter One, ‘accounting regulatory frameworks’ in this study means 
relevant regulations with respect to accounting (the Companies Act 1994, the SEC 
Rules 1987 & 1997, the Banking Companies Act 1991, Dhaka Stock Exchange Listing 
Rules 1998, Listing Regulations of the Chittagong Stock Exchange and the Income Tax 
Ordinance 1984) for non-banking and banking sectors in Bangladesh. The classification 
of accounting systems may differ because of various factors: legal, political, 
institutional and cultural (see Chapter One). This section provides the extant literature 
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 The most-argued issues will be also be discussed in sections 2.3.4, 2.4.3 and 2.5.3 in order to develop 
three propositions. 
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on accounting regulation
20
 with specific focus on the regulatory process, the standard 
setting process and its implementation and the ‘enforcement’ mechanism of regulation 
into practice. The literature on ‘accounting regulation’ is vast, and prior research 
focuses on different dimensions of regulation. However, the questions of particular 
interest to this section are: “how does the regulatory process and standard setting 
process emerge?” and, “with regard to its impact on IFRSs implementation, what 
actions may be taken to ensure compliance with the standards as ‘enforcement 
mechanisms’?”. 
 
2.3.1  Accounting Regulatory Process  
 
Studies of the regulatory process have highlighted the changing relationships and 
tensions between the state and the profession, and how these vary according to national 
contexts (see Appendix 2-4a). From a historical point of view
21
, researchers show that 
the state in Anglo-American countries (excluding the UK) has had a longstanding 
involvement with the development of accounting rules. The state agencies help to create 
a demand for general financial management services, particularly within regulated firms 
(Jones, 1981). But this political involvement raises questions around the existence of a 
transparent regulatory process (Zeff, 2007).  
 
Various empirical studies have employed the legal framework of La Porta et al. (1998) 
to examine the impact of the legal environment on the properties and quality of financial 
reporting. Most studies confirm the usefulness of such legal frameworks. Some of them, 
particularly, employ a legal system dichotomy, code law versus common law, to 
examine the association of legal systems with financial disclosure (Solomons, 1978; 
Bloom et al., 1998; Ball et al., 2000; Jaggi & Low, 2000; Naciri & Hoarau, 2001). 
Kothari (2000) presents a ‘demand-supply argument’. Kothari (2000, p. 91) argues that 
“a demand, and therefore supply, of quality financial information will be high in a 
common-law legal system”. Alexander & Archer (2000, p. 550) put it: “..common law 
tradition coupled with private sector standard setting leads to a more flexible and 
                                                 
20
 The definition of regulation is: “The intentional restriction of a subject’s choice of activity, by an entity 
not directly party to or involved in the activity” (Mitnick, 1980, p. 5). The definition of accounting 
regulation is: “...the imposition of constraints upon the preparation, content and form of external financial 
reports by bodies other than the preparers of the reports, or the organisations and individuals for which 
the reports are prepared” (Taylor & Turley, 1986, p. 1). The definition of accounting regulatory 
frameworks is: “a mandatory call for information that the preparer may have not voluntarily provided” 
(Taylor & Turley, 1986, p. 7). 
21
 See Zeff (1972), Loft (1994), Miranti (1986) & Previts & Merino (1998). 
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responsive system for accounting regulation”. Ball et al. (2003) provide an 
‘irregularities argument’ with respect to four East Asian common law countries. In 
terms of ‘irregularities argument’ (i.e. common-law vs. code-law approach), Ball et al. 
(2003, p. 235) argue that the IASB’s standards derive from common law sources (UK, 
US, and IFRS) which are widely viewed as being of a higher quality (e.g. ‘common-law 
approach of IFRSs is transparent’- Ball et al., 2000, p. 47) than code law standards. Ball 
et al. (2003) find that a common law legal system has a very detailed, prescriptive set of 
accounting standards that have little to do with the nature of the legal system.  
 
By contrast, a codified law system made by the statute law to promulgate accounting 
rules leaves considerable scope for flexibility (Parker & Nobes, 1994). The common 
law tradition tends to protect investors more than code law (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999). 
Inchausti (1997) argues that it may not be possible to leave disclosure to the market 
alone, and it may be necessary to regulate accounting in order to ensure that firms 
satisfy the information needs of different users in Spain.  
 
The prior literature provides contradictory views regarding the impact of governments’ 
involvement in the accounting regulatory process. Firstly, government involvement can 
be seen as positively influential towards the regulatory process (Carpenter, 1991). For 
example, Masel (1983) feels that government authority is usually the only acceptable 
form of coercion in a standard setting process. Saudagaran & Diga (1997) find that in 
all five ASEAN countries, both government agencies and professional accounting 
bodies are well represented and actively involved in the formulating and enforcing of 
accounting regulations. Taplin et al. (2002) examine the extent of IFRSs compliance in 
six Asia Pacific countries
22
 and find that companies in the four Asian countries 
(Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore) with British colonial links have higher 
levels of disclosure. They call for more direct government intervention in achieving de 
facto harmonisation (Taplin et al., 2002, p. 172).  
 
Secondly, research into the ‘politics’
23
 of the accounting regulatory process reflects not 
just social and economic developments, but also the view of national power (Moran, 
2010). National accounting has been characterised as closely linked to the exercise of 
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 Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore & Thailand. 
23
 Watts & Zimmerman (1978), Hussein & Ketz (1980), Newman (1981), Hope & Gray (1982), Lowe et 
al. (1983), McKee et al. (1991) and Walker & Robinson (1993). 
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national power (Miller, 1986). Consequently, the interrelations between accounting and 
the state have been viewed as central to the understanding of accounting change (Miller, 
1990). In this context, Puxty et al. (1987) highlight the point that the institutions and 
processes of accounting regulation in different nation-states cannot be understood 
independently of the historical and politico-economic contexts of their emergence 
within these respective states. So, it is a strange irony that while accounting in the 
former socialist countries is developing in the context of moving from a command 
economy, accounting in the advanced capitalist countries is increasingly being 
influenced by state regulation (Puxty et al., 1987). Cooke & Wallace (1990) conclude 
that the level of corporate financial disclosure regulation in many developed countries is 
more likely to be determined by internal factors, and that most developed countries are 
highly regulated, whereas regulation in many developing countries is more likely to be 
determined by external factors. Willmott et al. (1992) examine four capitalist 
countries
24
 and find that accounting regulation in those countries is shaped by the 
disciplinary effects of hierarchical control (social order organised through bureaucratic 
agencies). Alexander & Micallef (2011, p. 19) argue that “..the clarity of the applicable 
financial reporting regulatory framework, and the practical application of it, are of 
utmost importance. This is because a clear regulatory framework is needed to act as a 
central source of reference of the accounting principles requiring adherence to, and for 
a system of enforcement of, those principles. Consequently, greater specification and 
precision is required when amending an existing regulatory framework”. 
 
To overcome the structural weaknesses in developing countries, Banerjee (2002) 
proposes that the direct government intervention is necessary to reform the accounting 
regulation. In a Hungarian study, Boross et al. (1995) conclude that, while the impact of 
the move to the market economy is a visible factor, both in the drafting of the law and in 
the perceptions of the likely users of the financial statements, the influence of state 
regulation still remains. Zeff (1995) suggests collaboration between a private-sector 
standard setting body and a government regulatory body. Whilst the importance of 
accounting regulations in the internationalisation of policy regimes is now seen almost 
as a cliché (Jessop, 1990), many studies at the international level tend to focus upon one 
particular ‘international’ institution or standard: much less attention is given the 
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 Sweden, the UK, the USA and Germany. 
Chapter Two – Review of Literature                                                                           32 
polycentric, network or co-ordinated character of ‘regulation work’ and the complexity 
of relations between national agencies (Caramanis, 2002). 
 
2.3.2  Standard setting process and its implementation 
 
States have been taking an increased interest in accounting standards, seeing them as an 
important element of their financial policies (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Laughlin, 2007). 
Whittington (2005, p. 151) argues that “Implementation of standards is of critical 
importance to the success of international standards …. if this is not achieved, 
international standards will not command respect, however good their intrinsic 
quality”. The need to understand the process of accounting standard setting and its 
implementation in different countries is widely recognised (Choi & Mueller 1978). It is 
essential to consider the influence of the nation-specific environment on that process in 
each case (Previts, 1975; Nair & Frank, 1980). Miller & Redding (1988, p. xi) note that 
“By its very nature, standards setting is very much a matter of politics”. Alexander & 
Archer (2000, p. 555) argue that “The future of accounting standard setting at the 
national level may be in question”. The inevitably political nature of standard setting 
has been considered over many years by researchers across various jurisdictions.  
 
The political nature of accounting standards setting has long been recognised (Moonitz, 
1974; Fogarty, 1992) and there has been continued debate on the subject. Over the 
years, the accounting profession has sought to control the regulatory process as part of 
maintaining its authority within the traditional boundaries of its discipline, but at the 
same time, other interested parties and professions have seen opportunities therein to 
expand their spheres of influence (Perry & Nӧlke, 2006). In particular, governments 
have found wider benefits by granting, in the name of consensus, privileged access to 
the policy-making process to certain interest groups (Lehmbruck & Schmitter, 1982) 
which raises questions around the government’s role in standard setting. However, the 
issues underpin the government’s influence and position on the adopted standards in 
line with the terms of local national standards handling (Saudagaran & Diga, 2000). 
Walton (2009, p. 4) strongly criticises politicians’ involvement in the standard setting 
process and argues that “accounting standard-setting achieves nothing when politicians 
take it over. You wouldn’t ask politicians to design a car for you, because they do not 
have the necessary knowledge and experience. Why would they be competent to write 
standards?”. 
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It has been recognised that accounting information affects behaviour (Zeff, 1978). Watts 
(1977, 1980) argues that financial statements are products both of markets and of 
political processes (the interactions between individuals and interested groups). This 
implies that accounting standards are not ‘neutral’ with respect to political, economic 
and cultural factors (Leuz et al., 2004). The politics of setting standards is a principal 
concern in a developing country such as Armenia (Bloom et al., 1998). Stoddart (2000) 
finds evidence of lobbying actions by standard-setting bodies which are part of a much 
wider political process in Australia. He argues that the structure of setting accounting 
standards in Australia has substantially shifted in terms of power from the two 
professional accounting bodies (ICAA and ASCPA) to the government. Despite the 
existence of governmental influence on accounting standard setting in Australia, Miller 
(1996) claims that accounting standard setting in Australia is open, neutral and 
independent because all stakeholders have a chance to make submissions on accounting 
issues within the ‘due process’ so that an equilibrium outcome is achieved. Similar 
findings are reported by Naciri & Hoarau (2001) who argue that the French standard 
setting system is ‘political’.   
 
In China, Ezzamel et al. (2007) have analysed the relationship between political-
economic factors and accounting standards setting during the transition from a state 
controlled economy under Mao to a ‘socialistic market economy’ under Deng and they 
find that in both eras, accounting is construed as a malleable object shaped by the force 
of the dominant political discourse. Peng & Bewley (2009) also find evidence that 
Chinese standard setting is controlled, directly or indirectly, by powerful interests and 
the state, for example the Ministry of Finance. On the EU experience, Whittington 
(2005) documents that “President Chirac of France wrote a much publicised letter to 
President Prodi of the EU expressing anxiety that the IASB standards were not sensitive 
enough to European interests and that, in particular, volatility resulting from 
application of the standards would be damaging to the European economy” (p. 143). 
Zülch & Hoffmann (2010) illustrate evidence of linkages between parliamentarians and 
interest groups in the course of accounting standard setting in Germany.  
 
In a similar vein, Königsgruber (2010) argues that if the relevant standard setters wish 
to achieve a harmonisation of accounting standards between the EU and the US, 
European companies have more lobbying leverage than their American counterparts 
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because there are more political lobbying groups in the EU. Similar findings are 
reported by Chiapello & Medjad (2009). Mixed evidence exists within the USA. Whilst 
Naciri & Hoarau (2001) argue that accounting standards are based on a structure of 
‘coordinated concepts’ in the USA, Zeff (2002) finds that political influence occurs 
because three actors are involved in the accounting legislative process (i.e. the Senate, 
the House of Representatives, and the President). In a cross country study, Ball et al. 
(2000) conclude that in code-law countries, the comparatively strong political influence 
on accounting occurs at national and firm levels because the government establishes and 
enforces national accounting standards, typically with representation from major 
political groups. By contrast, the demand for accounting income under code law is 
influenced more by payout preferences, and less by a demand for public disclosure. 





Setting standards which are inconsistent with users’ expectations could undermine the 
viability of a new regulatory system in a developing country (Bloom et al., 1998). To 
implement standards, accounting standards must fit the social, economic, and political 
climate of their countries (Naciri & Hoarau, 2001). Prior research offers a way to 
establish effective accounting standards setting body (Jonsson, 1991; Laughlin, 2007; 
Christensen et al., 2010). For instance, Jonsson (1991) calls for an extended form of 
consultation before legal texts (e.g. accounting regulations) are formulated. This process 
of formulating regulation will then become public and the state may be said to have 
earned this legitimacy. Laughlin (2007) argues that “accounting, and, by implication, 
accounting regulation, needs to serve the accounting information needs of all 
stakeholders and not just shareholders and other finance providers”. He further 
emphasises that ‘freedom guaranteeing’ (i.e. amenable to substantive justification) 
mechanisms should always be viewed as the ideal model to aspire to in formulating 
regulations than ‘freedom reducing’ ones (i.e. those which are ‘legitimised only through 
procedure’). In recent study, Kvaal & Nobes (2012, p. 367) report that the persistence of 
national patterns of policy choices makes it likely that there is persistence of 
international difference on IFRSs topics. Zeff (2012, p. 833) argues that “There is a 
great deal of variability in the effectiveness of regulator performance even within the 
EU…especially in emerging economies and developing countries”. 
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 Nobes (1998) proposes a general model of the reasons for international differences, based on culturally 
self-sufficient (CS) and culturally dominated (CD) countries. 
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2.3.3  Enforcement Mechanism of Regulation 
 
Hail et al. (2010, p. 575) argue that “The implementation and enforcement aspects of 
global accounting convergence are largely missing from the IFRS debate, which we 
view as a serious shortcoming”. Christensen et al. (2010) point out that the effects of 
accounting regulation depend, crucially, on implementation and enforcement. To 
understand the ‘enforcement mechanism’, Foucault (1977, p. 23) offers a theory of 
power (the ‘panopticon’
26
) which is laid out in the introductory section of the book 
‘Discipline and punish’. Foucault (1977, p. 47) draws down the principle of Bentham, 
that power should be visible and unverifiable
27
. Zimmerman (1998) argues that the 
panopticon idea becomes more powerful because power becomes more efficient through 
the mechanisms of observation available in modern society. A possible criticism of the 
idea of panopticon is that “it is at once too little, for what matters is that he knows 
himself to be observed; and too much, because he has no need in fact of being so” 
(Butler, 1997, p. 35).  
 
In terms of accounting regulation, the panopticon metaphor sheds light and aims at 
identifying and preventing irregularities. Consequently, law enforcement mechanisms 
control all sorts of irregularities (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1995, p. 362). Without 
enforcement “the production of accounting rules will be nothing more than symbolic 
behaviour” (Walker, 1985, p. 12). Parker (1986) suggests that the enforcement stage 
should be given to the entity equipped with the power to enforce, i.e. the government.  
Zeff (1988, p. 20) supports this, view that the government agency is in a much better 
position to enforce compliance with accounting standards. Walker (1990, p. 543) 
strongly argues that “A serious weakness encountered by any private standard-setting 
agency may be the lack of true authority to enforce accounting standards”. Watts & 
Zimmerman (1986) earlier pointed out that market failures can be reduced by 
government regulation. The government therefore needs to play a more direct role in the 
design and enforcement of accounting standards (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990; Tower, 
1993).  
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 The ‘Panopticon’ is a type of prison building designed by the English philosopher and social theorist 
Jeremy Bentham in 1785. The concept of the design is to allow an observer to observe (opticon) all (pan) 
prisoners without the prisoners being able to tell whether they are being watched, thereby conveying what 
one architect has called the “sentiment of an invisible omniscience” (Matthieson, 1997). 
27
 Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which 
he is spied upon and Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at any one 
moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so, and the presence or absence of the inspector 
should be unverifiable, so that the prisoners, in their cells, cannot even see a shadow (Foucault, 1977). 
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The prior studies have employed broad measures of legal enforcement, such as the 
efficiency of the judicial system (Hope, 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Norton, 2012; Zeff, 
2012). Jaggi & Low (2011) suggest that strict securities regulations in weak investor-
protection countries play an important role in audit pricing because of higher effort and 
risk being involved in audits. Zeff (2012, p. 833) points out that “A commitment by a 
country that its listed companies are required to use IFRS lacks credibility if it is not 
backed up by a vigilant and proactive regulator, whether in the private or public 
sector”. In a recent study, Houqe et al. (2012) highlight the importance of investor 
protection for financial reporting quality.  
 
However, Coffee (2007, p. 80) observes that “The United States employs an inefficient 
regulatory model, by allocating disproportionately high resources to enforcement of the 
law and punishment of securities fraud after it has occurred and been detected”. Later, 
Ball (2009, p. 316) confirms that there is a considerably lower frequency of reporting 
fraud in the UK, where the FSA regulates securities markets in a more consultative 
fashion and with less emphasis on enforcement after the fact, and there is a noticeable 
comparative success for the US system in detecting and correcting financial reporting 
fraud, but not in deterring it in the first instance. Nevertheless, reporting and disclosure 
would be very likely to be less adequate in developing countries because of the political 
nature of the enforcement (Belkaoui, 1983).  
 
Researchers like Wagenhofer (2011), Leuz (2010) and Rahman (2000) argue that more 
regulation increases reporting quality. Wagenhofer (2011, p. 230) argues that regulators 
should delegate standards setting to the independent standards board. The standard 
setters then receive more weight of public trust than political trust. Ernstberger et al. 
(2010) report that regulatory reforms in enforcement have increased the degree of 
enforcement in Germany. Similarly, Hitz et al. (2012, p. 276) find that the two-tier 
enforcement systems (Die Deutsche Prüfstelle für Rechnungslegung [DPR] & 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht [BaFin]) are working closely towards 
strong enforcement in Germany since 2005. The quality of accounting information is a 
function of both the quality of accounting standards and the enforcement of those 
standards, and therefore high quality accounting standards with wide acceptance and 
effective enforcement mechanisms are necessary to create a transparent environment for 
investors (Rahman, 2000; World Bank, 2000; ADB, 2001).  
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Accounting standards on their own are ineffective mechanisms of regulation (Kothari, 
2000). Kothari (2000, p. 90) argues that “Demand, and therefore supply, of quality 
financial information will be high if corporations are best described as owned by widely 
dispersed, individually atomistic shareholders…..high-quality investor protection laws, 
good enforcement of these laws”. This argument is important in terms of distinguishing 
between the quality of law and effective implementation of the laws. For example, 
infrastructural arrangements for implementing and enforcing standards are important in 
giving accounting standards the capability to make accounting information relevant for 
capital markets (Hail et al., 2010). Saudagaran & Diga (2000) classify enforcement 
mechanisms into preventive and punitive enforcement mechanisms (preventive 
arrangements encourage and facilitate compliance, and punitive arrangements force 
compliance or lead to penalties for non-compliance). Thus, effective punitive 
enforcement will increase the confidence of investors in the credibility of financial 
reports, since any violation of standards would be punished (Rollins & Bremser, 1997). 
Saudagaran (2009) suggests that the government regulatory bodies and the accounting 
profession in developing countries suffer from structural weaknesses and often take a 
lenient attitude that results in inevitable non-compliance with standards, and calls for 
stronger enforcement mechanisms. For example, Karampinis & Hevas (2011) argue that 
in unfavourable economies like Greece with inadequate institutional infrastructures (e.g. 
a code-law tradition, bank orientation, concentrated corporate ownership, poor 
shareholders’ protection and low regulatory quality), the implementation of mandatory 
IFRSs are not effective. In contrast, in favourable economies like the USA, the findings 
of Files’ study (2012, p. 371) suggest that ‘firms are rewarded for co-operative 
behaviour, although the reward is manifested through lower penalties rather than a 
reduction in sanctions’. The result implies that the SEC’s criteria for leniency following 
a law violation in the USA means that even the market reacts negatively to news of an 
SEC enforcement action or investigation (Feroz et al., 1991). 
 
In order to have a sound financial system, high quality, generally acceptable accounting 
standards and an effective enforcement mechanism have to be presented concurrently 
(Zeff, 1988; Ball, 2001). Since the goal of uniform enforcement raises particular 
challenges, including coordination of enforcement activities and sanctions in the EU 
(Brown & Tarca, 2005, p. 204), the study by Berger (2010, p. 18) recommends 
delegation of authoritative power to the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
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(CESR) in the EU to ensure that effective enforcement is being implemented.  
Otherwise, the motivation of global IFRSs will not be achievable. Holthausen (2009,  p. 
457) therefore argues that “As such, the “standards” themselves will become less 
uniform over time ... which will lead to further differences in financial reporting over 
time, unless the underlying economic and institutional forces across countries become 
more similar”. To mitigate uniformity problems in global enforcement, Leuz (2010, p. 
252) recommends that “[The] key message is that there are substantial enforcement 
differences around the world. … Thus, I propose ….to create a GPS, in which firms play 
by the same reporting rules (i.e. IFRS), face the same enforcement, and are likely to 
have similar incentives for transparent reporting. The GPS could be created and 
operated by IOSCO or other supranational institutions. .. it would provide comparable 
enforcement across participating firms”.  
 
By contrast, Ball (2006) argues that “Despite increased globalization, most political and 
economic influences on financial reporting practice remain local…[a] toothless body of 
international enforcement agencies [is] currently in place” (p. 15). Christensen et al. 
(2010) find that the same forces that have limited the effectiveness of securities 
regulation in the past are playing significant roles when new rules are introduced. This 
has important implications for the expected outcomes of regulatory reforms across 
countries in the EU. 
 
2.3.4  Summary of section 2.3 and Proposition I 
 
In summary, the prior research suggests contradictory results with respect to accounting 
regulatory frameworks. As discussed in section 2.3.1, the literature suggests that 
government involvement positively/negatively influences the regulatory process. 
However, power struggles and conflicts of interest exist in the regulatory process. 
Researchers such as Boross et al. (1995), Zeff (1995) and Banerjee (2002) call for a 
collaboration between a private-sector standard setting body and the government 
regulatory body in order to create effective regulation (section 2.3.1). Further, the 
standard setting process has been evidenced as being political in nature, in both 
developed and developing countries (section 2.3.2). Without proper enforcement of the 
standards, the quality of accounting standards alone will not increase transparency. In 
developing countries, government regulatory bodies often take a lenient attitude towards 
creating effective enforcement mechanisms (section 2.3.3). The following questions still 
remain: firstly, do the regulatory and standard setting processes positively/negatively 
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influence IFRSs implementation in a developing country?; secondly, what effective 
enforcement mechanism(s) have been used by developing countries to implement 
IFRSs, and are the enforcement mechanism(s) (un)even in their implementation of 
IFRSs?  
 
The prior research provides the reasons for positive/negative influence being exerted on 
accounting change, including (a) the legal origins of the country (common-law/code-
law) (see section 2.3.1), (b) high/low quality investor protection laws (see section 
2.3.1), (c) stakeholders’ participation/non-participation in the standard setting process 
(see section 2.3.2) and (d) stringent/looser enforcement of the laws (i.e. the efficiency of 
the judicial system and punitive penalties/fines, and vice versa) (see section 2.3.3). 
Section 2.3 [specifically, sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3] leads to the first research 
proposition (PI) of this study: 
 
 
PI: Accounting regulatory frameworks will have a positive influence on 
implementation of IFRSs under the conditions of (a) common-law origin, (b) high 
quality investor protection laws, (c) stakeholders’ participation in the standard setting 
process and (d) stringent enforcement
28
 of the laws. 
  
‘or’ Accounting regulatory frameworks will have a negative influence
29
 on 
implementation of IFRSs under the conditions of (a) code-law origin, (b) low quality 
investor protection laws, (c) stakeholders’ non-participation in the standard setting 
process and (d) looser enforcement of the laws. 
 
2.4  Politico-Institutional factors   
 
As indicated in Chapter One, ‘politico-institutional factors’ in this study means politics 
and co-operation among state institutions and professional bodies on the 
implementation of IFRSs. With respect to ‘politico-institutional factors’, in this section, 
I discuss how government intervention and political lobbying will likely play an 
important role on the implementation of IFRSs.  
 
2.4.1  Government intervention30  
 
“…accounting is a big house that has accommodated many political regimes 
during the several hundred years of its existence without losing its identity…the 
                                                 
28
 In this study, stringent enforcement means the efficiency of the judicial system, and punitive 
penalty/fine . 
29
 In this study, ‘negative influence’ is equivalent to an impediment to accounting change. 
30
 The term ‘government intervention’ refers to the actions on the part of government that affect economic 
activity, resource allocation, and, especially, the voluntary decisions made through normal market 
exchanges. (Available at: www. encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com). 
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politics of accounting unquestionably played an important role” (Ordelheide, 
2004, p. 270).   
 
Government interventions are complex and varied (McKinnon, 1984). The socio-
political and socio-economic dimensions of accounting policy determination have 
emanated largely from Anglo-American nations, in particular the USA. Bushman & 
Piotroski (2006, p. 115) ask “Why would politicians care about accounting numbers? 
Accounting information is not the sole source of information of a company”. Explaining 
the different ways in which government intervention in the economy may emerge, the 
literature has been classified into two sets: public choice (Mueller, 1967) and theories of 
economic regulation (Posner, 1974). Buchanan (1962) argues that welfare economics 
and the public choice tradition can be a powerful tool for explaining government 
intervention. Watts & Zimmerman (1978) explain that certain groups of voters have an 
incentive to lobby for regulatory process. This idea that politicians seek to intrude into 
the affairs of corporations and redistribute wealth away from them comes from the 
earlier work of Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976) and Jensen & Meckling (1976). Further, 
politicians create crises and then come to the rescue with simple legislative solutions. 
For example, a crisis in which unions and monopolies are creating inflation requires 
price controls (Peltzman, 1976). These ‘solutions’ almost invariably increase the 
resources controlled by government and hence the resources controlled by the elected 
representatives who constitute the government (Meckling, 1976, p. 21). To counter such 
pressure from politicians, Watts & Zimmerman (1978, p. 115) suggest that “… 
corporations employ a number of devices, such as social responsibility campaigns in 
the media, government lobbying and selection of accounting procedures to minimize 
reported earnings... management can reduce the likelihood of adverse political actions 
and, thereby, reduce its expected costs. The magnitude of the political costs is highly 
dependent on firm size”. Cooper (1995, p. 179) argues that the state creates political and 
economic compromises and that these compromises are universal interests. 
 
In terms of political influence and accounting changes, prior studies suggest that politics 
are negatively associated with the development of accounting systems and accounting 
change. In a study of Japan, Reischauer (1977, p. 139) argues that the cultural attribute 
of Japanese society derives from the precept, from Confucius, of the natural existence of 
‘the ruler’ (bureaucracy) and ‘the ruled’ (the people). The role of the government in 
policy determination operates through a heavy reliance on bureaucracy (Fukui, 1981, p. 
186). McKinnon (1984, p. 318) provides several factors that contribute to the 
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intensification of government involvement in accounting policy determination in Japan: 
first, administration of corporate financial disclosure under the SEC Law is the direct 
responsibility of the Ministry of Finance; second, accounting standards in Japan are 
formulated by the Business Accounting Deliberation Council (BADC) but standards are 
issued and enforced as Ministry of Finance ordinances; and third, the Ministry of 
Finance, through its administration of the CPA Law, controls registration and 
deregistration and oversees the activities of the Japanese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (JICPA). Consequently, ‘blame’ for perceived ‘crises’ of inadequate 
financial disclosure at both national and international levels in Japan is channelled 
directly to the Ministry of Finance. In most Anglo-American nations, by contrast, this 
‘blame’ where necessary is typically spread more broadly across the accounting 
profession and independent or quasi-governmental regulatory authorities.  
 
Xiao et al. (2004) is one of the very first studies providing evidence of political 
influence on IFRS implementation in China. They conclude that the government of 
China is, in part, self-motivated and in part under external pressure to develop IFRSs for 
accounting harmonisation purposes. They claim that ‘Chinese people have political 
sensitivity regarding foreign accounting theory and practice’ (Xiao et al., 2004, p. 214). 
Political factors, in particular the direct involvement of the government in accounting 
regulation, have weakened the demand for, and supply of, accounting standards, making 
it difficult to adopt IFRSs. Chen et al. (2011) find that government intervention distorts 
firms’ investment behaviour and leads to investment inefficiency in China. This is 
because the majority of appointments of SOEs managers are political and their motive is 
political rather than for profit maximisation (Wu et al., 2012). The study by Leuz & 
Oberholzer-Gee (2006) can be viewed as claiming a greater influence of politics in 
developing countries like Indonesia. Their findings are consistent with an earlier study 
in East Asia by Knowles & Garces (2000) who reported that high level government 
intervention resulted in government owned firms which were less efficient.  
 
In terms of political institutions, Bushman & Piotroski (2006, p. 141) find that firms in 
common law based countries facing high state involvement in their economy tend to 
speed up recognition of good news. In contrast, in civil law based countries, high state 
involvement leads firms to speed up recognition of bad news. In a similar study, Ball et 
al. (2003) earlier document that only the institutional characteristic (i.e. common or 
civil law legal origin) is directly incorporated in accounting practices in four East Asian 
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economies. In a recent study, Oehr & Zimmermann (2012) find that the state’s 
involvement in accounting is much deeper in Germany (which has a civil law origin) 
and the regulative process is not only an outcome of the political process but is also 
consistent with national societal motives and values. Despite the legal classification, 
Bushman & Landsman (2010) strongly argue that political forces affect the regulation 
of firm-level information and accounting standard setting, in particular when accounting 
information is perceived to potentially affect the stability of the financial markets. 
 
Three studies find that government intervention has little or no influence in accounting 
disclosure. For instance, Giroux (1989) examine the disclosure quality relationships 
based on the political and economic incentives of the groups who are actively involved 
in governmental processes. The result suggests that each group in possession of political 
power has only a limited influence on the disclosure quality. Similarly, Nobes (1998, p. 
176) notes that political factors do not have major explanatory power to discuss the 
accounting systems in the developed Western countries. Later, Laughlin (2007, p. 280) 
argues that government interventions are not an essential factor, as, for example, “when 
there is no intervention it can be assumed that government is still watching but they are 
content that the current regulatory activities are working in their perception of the 
public interest”. 
 
By contrast, some studies strongly emphasise that government intervention is essential. 
For example, Jaggi (1975, p. 84) argues that “Interference by governments may be 
essential to ensure higher reliability (which is vital for the expression of industries in 
these countries), for creating public confidence and trust in corporations, for creating 
an atmosphere where industrialization can progress, and for making economic and 
social decisions”. Belkaoui (1983, p. 210) notes that the higher the level of government 
intervention, the more adequate reporting and disclosure are likely to be. He explains 
that government is assumed to be accountable to the people, and that therefore, 
intervention may be favorable to the development of an accounting profession and a 
disclosure tradition. He further offers that “The role of governments in developing 
accounting principles and providing legal authority is assumed to result in a higher 
reliability of financial disclosures in the developing countries” (Belkaoui, 1983, p. 
211). Carpenter (1991) finds that political competitions (e.g. interest groups, electoral 
and parliamentary competition) are positively related to state governments’ decisions to 
adopt generally accepted accounting principles in the USA. He observes that the 
Chapter Two – Review of Literature                                                                           43 
legislative branch is effective because their primary responsibilities towards monitoring 
the activities are transparent.  
 
2.4.2 Political lobbying  
 
Ordelheide (2004, p. 270) argues that “The usual model of interaction between politics 
and accounting is that the political process changes accounting practices”. Accounting 
has been seen as the outcome of complex interactions among parties interested in or 
affected by accounting standards (Kelly-Newton, 1980; Oehr & Zimmermann, 2012). 
Therefore, Watts & Zimmerman (1978, p. 115) note that “politicians have the power to 
effect upon corporations wealth re-distributions by way of corporate taxes, regulations 
etc”. There have been ample studies of political lobbying
31
 in accounting literature (see 
Appendix 2-4(a)). Political lobbying helps companies gain access to legislators and 
regulators to discuss their positions on proposed legislation, in an attempt to influence 
policy outcomes (Sunder, 1988; Ryan et al., 1999). According to Smith (2000, p. 39), 
“Political Access means that during deliberations leading to relevant legislative 
decisions,….Corporations giving political contributions…. gain a valuable opportunity 
to present their perspectives”.  
 
The prior studies examine the interactions between companies, business interest groups, 
and legislators as participants in a political market. It has been found that the 
participants in the lobbying process are viewed as actors motivated by self-interest 
where they intend to legislate on those issues which are beneficial to them (Cohen & 
Hamman, 2003). For example, Sutton (1984) demonstrates earlier evidence from the 
USA in which the CEO of Cisco, John Chambers, met with the SEC Chairman, Arthur 
Levitt, about the accounting for business combinations and ‘made it plain that if Levitt 
went ahead with his plans, he would have to contend with the substantial lobbying 
weight of Cisco and every other tech company’ (Beresford, 2001, p. 79). Beresford 
(2001) finds that Congressional (Parliamentary) hearings in the USA are only arranged 
when companies or industry associations have lobbied Congress, claiming that an 
                                                 
31
 Using Downs’ (1957) model of voting, Sutton (1984) identifies the conditions under which rational 
lobbying will occur. Given a choice between two alternative proposals, lobbying is predicted in those 
circumstances where the differential wealth effect associated with the two proposals, discounted by the 
perceived probability of influencing the outcome, exceeds the cost of lobbying. Hence, the propensity for 
lobbying is hypothesised to increase in both (i) the magnitude of the perceived wealth effect and (ii) the 
expectation of influencing the final decision. 
Chapter Two – Review of Literature                                                                           44 
accounting standard will cause economic harm. Ramanna (2008) similarly finds that 
firms which have incentives to lobby against the elimination of pooling as an acceptable 
accounting method for business combinations can be linked via political contributions 
to Congress representatives who then become involved against the FASB proposal. 
Georgiou (2004) gives some justification for a company’s overall lobbying posture and 
argues that “more lobbying may go on ‘behind the scenes’ and [it] provides monetary 
contributions to politicians as a proxy for political lobbying” (p. 233). In Germany, the 
industry lobby group representing preparers exerts the greatest influence on the 
decisions of the German legislature but the relative power of preparers is seen to be far 
lower (Leuz et al., 2004). In a study of Japan, McKinnon & Harrison (1985) find that 
corporate lobbying in Japan takes the form of a unified voice in Keidanren (The Japan 
Business Federation) in which Keidanren provides a powerful link between the 
corporations and the government ministries. In Indonesia, the adoption of IFRSs has 
changed a little image to protect the foreign investors’ right owing to the presence of 
high political ties (Rosser, 2003). 
 
The convergence process has been characterised by a ‘very skilful orchestration of the 
world-wide lobbying pressures’, particularly by multinational enterprises and 
international accounting firms (Hopwood, 1994, p. 245). Caramanis (2002) argues that 
multinational accounting firms, through their economic influence and brand power, 
have the authority to control accounting agendas, the primary aim of which is to 
enhance self-interest. In addition to multinational enterprises, the EU may influence 
accounting change. Whittington (2005) therefore argues that accounting has become an 
explicitly political issue. “It is, of course, a matter for the EU to choose what standards 
it wishes to adopt, and… whether they are designed to meet the perceived interests of 
the EU economy or particular groups within it” (p. 143). With potential for the 
diminution of state sovereignty under the conditions of globalisation, Risse (2004) 
questions the ability of states to make the best decisions for their citizens. Similarly, 
Chua & Taylor (2008, p. 462) argue that outsourcing the manufacture of accounting 
standards to a single private agency appears to be a lower cost option; however, such 
outsourcing must be perceived to be legitimate because it possesses potential impact on 
powerful interest groups/regulators and internationality. 
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The prior literature evidences that political lobbying is not only limited to the standard 
settings. Firms with political ties and lobbying power often receive cheap loans from 
state-owned banks so that they do not need to tap into foreign capital markets; they are 
likely to pay fewer taxes and have larger market shares (Faccio, 2002, 2010; Chaney et 
al., 2011). For example, Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee (2006) find that Indonesia has low 
levels of mandatory disclosure, suggesting that the firms which are closed to the 
Suharto regime are reluctant to follow regulations. It has been found that Asian firms 
with foreign securities, maintain higher-quality disclosures and transparency during the 
Asian financial crisis (Doidge et al., 2004). In a cross sectional study, Braun & Raddatz 
(2010, p. 234) show that the highest rank of political connectivity (e.g. Politician-banker 
connections) is in countries such as Myanmar, China, Bangladesh, India and Mexico. 
They note that this high level of political connectivity is strongly negatively related to 
economic development.  
 
The prior research offers some policy prescriptions to reduce the complexity of political 
lobbying. Belkaoui (1983, p. 209) suggests that the political freedom (i.e. democreacy) 
of a country is important to the development of accounting: “When people cannot 
choose the members of government or influence government policies, they are less likely 
to be able to create an accounting profession based on the principle of full and fair 
disclosure”. The OECD (2001) recommends that the principal ways for governments to 
engage with their citizens on policymaking to reduce lobbying are “an advanced two-
way relation between government and citizens based on the principle of partnership” 
(p. 18). So, participation rights are crucial to a healthy democracy (Frey & Stutzer, 
2001). Western economies follow a discursive democracy
32
, whereas developing 
countries are in the opposite direction (Risse, 2004). Similarly, some studies point out 
that institutional co-operation
33
 is essential to implement IFRSs effectively (Wallace & 
Briston, 1993; Mir & Rahaman, 2005; Zeghal & Mhedhbi, 2006). These studies argue 
that institutional co-operation will reduce the uncertainty of implementing IFRSs under 
the democratic government in which stakeholders’ rights are ensured. In a recent study, 
Hail et al. (2010, p. 575) argue that political independence is an important guiding 
                                                 
32
 Discursive democracy “is ultimately about involving the stake-holders, i.e., those concerned by a 
particular social rule, in a deliberative process of mutual persuasion about the normative validity of a 
particular rule” (Risse, 2004, p. 310). The basic legitimacy of a discursive political community is 
founded on its members’ general rights to exercise equal liberties, along with membership rights and 
guaranteed legal remedies (Habermas, 1988). 
33
 In this study,  institutional co-operation means collaboration among various state institutions and 
professional bodies to implement IFRSs. 
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principle in institutionalizing a standard-setting body that is responsive to the needs of 
investors and capital markets. Equally important is the role of an effective securities 
regulator that monitors the development, implementation, and enforcement of the 
national accounting standards (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008). Zeff (2007, p. 300) raises 
questions regarding the seriousness of lobbying by asking “Will the political lobbying 
which emanates from special interests within the EU be congruent, or clash, with the 
special interests of important companies and countries based elsewhere in the world?.. 
If a powerful company or group of companies do not like a draft standard, they will 
have an incentive to engage in politicking of the standard-setting body”. 
 
2.4.3  Summary of section 2.4 and Proposition II 
 
In summary, the prior research suggests conflicting results with respect to politico-
institutional factors. Section 2.4.1 shows that the literature provides contradictory views 
of government intervention; one group suggests that politics are negatively associated 
with the development of accounting systems and accounting change, while the other 
group suggests that politics have little or no influence. Some researchers even make 
strong calls for government intervention, seeing it as essential in developing countries 
(section 2.4.1). In terms of political lobbying, most researchers agree that the 
participants in the lobbying process and levels of political connectivity are viewed as 
grounded in self-interest and that, therefore, political independence or freedom (i.e. 
discursive democracy) is essential to reduce lobbying (section 2.4.2). There has been 
relatively little research on political influence in relation to IFRSs implementation in 
developing countries. Most notably, Xiao et al. (2004) and Chen et al. (2011) in China, 
and Ball et al. (2003) in Thailand report that the government is politically motivated in 
introducing accounting standards. The following questions still remain: firstly, does 
politics (e.g. government intervention, lobbying activities) positively/negatively 
influence the implementation of IFRSs in a developing country?; and secondly, to what 
extent is co-operation among institutions supportive or unhelpful in the implementation 
of IFRSs? 
 
Prior studies suggest that politics may have a positive/negative influence on accounting 
change because of several different factors, e.g. (a) the legal origin of the country 
(common-law/code-law) (see section 2.4.1), (b) a lower/higher level of government 
intervention (see section 2.4.1) and (c) a lower/higher level of political lobbying (see 
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section 2.4.2). Researchers agree that institutional co-operation may help the effective 
implementation of IFRSs. The impact of institutional co-operation on IFRSs 
implementation depends largely on (a) the democratic government/undemocratic 
government (see section 2.4.2) and (b) the participatory/non-participatory rights of the 
stakeholders (see section 2.4.2). Section 2.4, in relation to politico-institutional factors 
leads to the second proposition (PII): 
 
 
PII: Politico-institutional factors will have a positive/negative influence on 
implementation of IFRSs. 
 
PIIA: Politics will have a positive influence on implementation of IFRSs under 
the conditions of (a) common-law origin, (b) a lower level of government 
intervention  and (c) a lower level of political lobbying.  
 
‘or’ Politics will have a negative influence on implementation of IFRSs under 
the conditions of a) code-law origin, (b) a higher level of government 
intervention  and (c) a higher level of political lobbying.  
 
PIIB: Co-operation among institutions will have a positive influence on 
implementation of IFRSs under the conditions of (a) democratic government 
and (b) ensuring the participatory rights of the stakeholders.  
 
‘or’ Lack of co-operation among institutions will have a negative influence on 
implementation of IFRSs under the conditions of (a) undemocratic government 




2.5  Cultural Factors  
 
“..the technical and/or political dimensions of the debate, although essential, 
are not the only issues involved. Opposition to IFRS is not driven exclusively by 
contractual motives or a claimed technical superiority but also by diversity in 
cultural factors” (Ding et al., 2005, p. 343). 
 
Research addressing the wider social and political influences on accounting has been 
scarce (Hopwood, 1976, p. 3). Hopwood (1999, p. 378) provides specific national and 
cultural contexts of accounting, namely political dominance, religious dominance, class 
structures, or education systems which drive national differences. This may then lead to 
identifying why and how accounting is undertaken in a nation. According to Hofstede 
(2001, p. 1), “Culture is defined as collective programming of the mind; it manifests 
itself not only in values, but in more superficial ways: in symbols, heroes, and rituals”. 
Societal or national culture is shared among the groups within a social system and 
across social systems within a given society (Hofstede, 2001, p. 15). Prior research 
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suggests that the accounting practices of a country are highly influenced by cultural 
forces (Burchell et al., 1980; Lowe et al., 1983). Accounting is a product of its 
environment and a particular environment is unique to its time and locality (Perera, 
1989). It receives its inputs from the environment and produces outputs for the 
consumption of the environment (Radebaugh, 1975). The importance of culture in 
influencing the process of accounting policy formulation in any nation and in explaining 
the diversity of accounting policy across nations is well documented (Jaggi, 1975; 
Zeghal & Mhedhbi, 2006). For example, using a change framework
34
 (Source, diffusion 
and reaction phases of each change), Harrison & McKinnon (1986) analyse the process 
of corporate reporting regulation change in Japan. They conclude that different phases 
of change indicate how culture influences the system of corporate reporting regulation 
in a specific nation. Later, Gray (1988, p.1) argues that “There have been claims that 
national systems are determined by environmental factors. In this context, cultural 
factors have not been fully considered”. Although he does not empirically test the 
hypotheses, he proposes a theory of cultural influence in accounting change. Based on 
Hofstede’s (1980) country-based indices (i.e. Power distance, Individualism, 
Masculinity, and Uncertainty avoidance), Gray (1988) hypothesises that financial 
disclosures will be negatively influenced by the cultural dimensions of uncertainty 
avoidance (UAI) and power distance (PDI) and positively by individualism (IDV) and 
masculinity (MAS). Gray (1988) suggests that “…in interpreting the results of 
empirical research relating to culture, the influence of any change factors will also 
need to be taken into account” (p. 14). However, Lee (1997, p. 20) argues that Gray 
(1988) ignores other factors, such as political systems and legal systems, which have 
significant power in shaping accounting systems. Wickramasinghe & Hopper (2005) 
argue that how and why cultural and political factors are relevant to accounting change 
in a developing country like Sri Lanka. They point out that ‘accounting change cannot 
be explained by culture alone and outcomes were contingent’ (p. 503).  They further 
call for research on accounting and culture would benefit by adopting a cultural political 
economy to understand accounting practices. 
 
                                                 
34
 The framework allows examination of the system’s norms and values; the nature of its 
interdependencies both internally and with other social systems; the factors to which the system is 
especially sensitive: and the way in which culture influences the form and functioning of the system’s 
elements (Harrison & McKinnon, 1986, p. 233). 
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Some studies
35
 have also been carried out to examine IFRSs’ practices and cultural 
influences. For example, Sudarwan & Fogarty (1996) find that an empirical relation 
exists between the change in cultural factors and the change in accounting values in 
Indonesia. They suggest that the conflicting influences of extensive government 
involvement in the economy and market competition are a possible explanation of the 
results. Dahawy et al. (2002) argue that socio-economic factors affect the 
implementation of IFRSs in Egypt and that the inclination for secrecy that is embedded 
in Egyptian culture overrides the IFRSs requirements. Therefore, the disclosures reports 
by the sample companies are considerably decreasing. Choi (2002) concludes that 
corporate financial disclosures are deeply imbedded in cultural norms in Korea and, for 
that reason, change in accounting practices may take a long time to fully implement. 
Abdelsalam & Weetman (2007) similarly note that the economic changes of 1991–1992 
can be contrasted with the previous era of central planning in Egypt where accounting 
was characterised by conservatism, secrecy, a relatively weak profession, and 
subsequently, the move to IFRSs therefore requires a change of culture as well as a 
change of law. Ding et al. (2005, p. 325) suggest that “IAS is not exclusively driven by 
contractual motive ... but also by diversity in cultural factors”. Dima & Cristea (2009) 
propose that culture is relevant to the national characteristics of IFRSs implementation. 
In recent, Samuel & Manassian (2011, p. 622) argue that ‘culture could be an 
impediment to development of accounting’. In the case of developing countries, 
accounting information is seen as both passive and active; passive in the sense that 
financial reporting practices may be explained by a country’s particular cultural history 
or stage of development (Mueller, 1967; Bloom et al., 1998; Naciri & Hoarau, 2001; 
Wu et al., 2012), and active in that a nation’s choice of financial reporting practices 
shapes its economic development (Enthoven, 1965). In recent, using the Hofstede-Gray 
framework, Perera et al. (2012) have found that there is a link between cultural values 
and accounting professionalism in Samoa and New Zealand. They conclude that their 
study may have implications for the application of IFRSs and the analysis of differences 
in the judgements of professional accountants on measurement, disclosure, and ethical 
issues.  
 
Researchers suggest that increasing ‘democratic or sectarian cultural biases’ in western-
type societies since the 1960s have created more pressure to blame those who are at the 
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 Sudarwan & Fogarty, 1996; Choi, 2002; Dahawy et al., 2002; Ding et al., 2005; Abdelsalam & 
Weetman, 2007; Dima & Cristea, 2009. 
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top of powerful institutions and organisations for the harm they are perceived to do to 
the powerless (Douglas, 1982). Watts (1977, p. 66) points out the blaming culture by 
politicians in the USA and argues that “ Many crises which led to corporate regulation 
and, in particular, to regulation of corporate financial statements were blamed by 
political entrepreneurs on the lack of adequate corporate disclosure or misleading 
corporate disclosure…. [the] US politicians claimed that inadequate corporate 
disclosure was partially to blame for the stock market crash of 1929”. Hood et al. 
(1999) similarly argue that an ‘audit society’ is developing, in which declining popular 
trust in formerly respected professionals and institutions produces increasing support for 
formal audit, inspection and oversight systems to replace an older pattern of self-
regulation by mutuality (Power, 1997; O’Neill, 2002). Later, Hood (2004) documents 
that public management reform takes place in a social and political context due to 
falling levels of trust in government and institutions, highlighting an increased 
negativity bias
36
. The negativity bias is the commonly-observed tendency to pay more 
attention to negative than to positive information (Hood, 2007). The causes of 
negativity bias are debated in politics and government and in most cases outcomes are 
higher levels of dissatisfaction. Hood (2007) therefore claims that the pervasive 
prescription of transparency as a key to good governance meets the widely observed 
behavioural tendency of blame avoidance in politics and public administration. He 
concludes that “the tension between the pursuit of transparency and the avoidance of 
blame is at the heart of some commonly observed problems. .. something other than the 
‘bureaucratic’ strain of transparency may be called for when those problems are 
serious” (Hood, 2007, p. 191).  
 
Studies such as Larson (1993), Larson & Kenny (1995) and Perera (1989) strongly 
point out that the complete implementation of IFRSs in developing countries is near 
impossible because the IASB mainly focuses on developed nations’ cultures (especially 
the USA and the UK) when they promulgate standards. Nobes (1984, 1998) identifies 
that no cultural influences exist. Jaggi & Low (2000) argue that cultural values have an 
insignificant impact on financial disclosures by firms in common law countries. 
Although researchers such as Hofstede (1980, 1987) and Gray (1988) provide a good 
foundation for incorporating culture as one of the explanatory variables in determining 
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 Negativity bias denotes a commonly-observed cognitive tendency for more attention to be paid to 
negative than to positive information and for losses to be valued more highly than gains which are of an 
equivalent amount (Hood, 2009). 
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accounting system differences and the recognition of its importance (Ding et al., 2005), 
the key problem is that the research in this area fails to explore cultural factors (Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2002). Haniffa & Cooke (2002, p. 317) conclude that “There have been calls 
for research to look at the peculiar cultural characteristics inherent in a country”.  
 
Prior research provides various proxies for choosing the relevant cultural factors in 
accounting research.  In this study, training opportunities in the accounting profession 
(Perera, 1989; Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Zeghal & Mhedhbi, 
2006; Perera et al., 2012) and corruption (Rock & Bonnett, 2004; Wu, 2005 and 2009; 
Wu et al., 2012) have been used as proxies for cultural factors. In the next section, I 
have outlined the prior research on the accounting profession and corruption. 
 
2.5.1  Training Opportunities in the Accounting Profession 
 
Accounting education is the pillar for modern, complex accounting systems (Zeghal & 
Mhedhbi, 2006, p. 377) because “an increase in the level of education in a country may 
increase political awareness and demand for corporate accountability” (Cooke & 
Wallace, 1990, p. 84). The prior research finds that education can be an important 
cultural determinant of disclosure practice (Zarzeski, 1996; Bloom et al., 1998; Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2002). Belkaoui (1983, p. 208) strongly argues that “A well-developed 
accounting profession and system for accounting education in a given country lead to a 
tradition and/or effort of providing adequate reporting and disclosure”. Similarly, 
Perera (1989, pp. 151-152) says that “the deficiencies in accounting education and 
training in developing countries are fairly well known”; it cannot therefore be expected 
that accountants will always exercise appropriate judgments if the level of accounting 
education is low. He further emphasises that a country with a shortage of skilled 
accounting personnel should adopt a mandatory IFRSs system and this uniformity 
system will help them to improve the overall usefulness of accounting information. 
Gray (1988) earlier identifies education as one of the institutional consequences 
affecting accounting values and practices.   
 
It has been argued that not only education but also the professional status of accountants 
is important in explaining accounting systems. Perera (1989, p. 152) argues that “If, in a 
society, accounting is not regarded as a profession of high public esteem, and 
accountants are not trusted for their honesty and integrity, then accounting uniformity 
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may seem to be a better alternative for the protection of that society”. This proposition 
has been supported by the some researchers, for instance, Radebaugh (1975), who finds 
that accounting is not recognised as a profession and even has a low status in Peru; Var 
(1976) reports that the profession in Turkey is faced with a credibility problem; and 
Choi (1979) finds that the accounting profession in Thailand with respect to the 
proliferation of accounting standards is very weak. Therefore, Cooper & Robson (2006, 
p. 431) argue that the proliferation of both Non-Governmental Organisations (such as 
the IASB, IFAC, ASB, FASB, IOSCO, UN, EU and WTO) and Government networks 
has had profound effects upon the co-ordination of accounting policies, in particular 
accounting education developments in developing countries. Neu et al. (2006) 
demonstrate that accounting education has been central in recent years and that is why 
the World Bank has made attempts to reform educational practices and systems all over 
the world. 
 
There is mixed evidences of the relationship between accounting education and 
corporate disclosure practices. One group finds that a positive relationship exists. For 
example, Gernon et al. (1987) find that there is a positive relationship between the 
education level and the competence of professional accountants. Grace et al. (1995) 
propose that if the board of directors of a firm have an academic background in 
accounting, then they may choose to disclose more information (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984). It may be argued that a western influence in education in developing countries 
will lead to a ‘homogeneous effect’ and result in higher corporate disclosure (Merchant 
et al., 1995). Adoption and implementation depend on the high level of education, 
competence, and expertise required to be able to understand and interpret accounting 
information (Doupnik & Salter, 1995). Dahawy et al. (2002) support Hofstede & Gray’s 
hypotheses and find inadequate disclosure practices in Egypt because of Egypt’s 
secretive culture. Later, Zeghal & Mhedhbi (2006) find that the countries with the 
highest education levels proceed with the adoption of IFRSs. Lower levels of education 
lead to lower expertise and real barriers to the adoption of IFRSs (Bloom et al., 1998) 
and therefore, Abdelsalam & Weetman (2007, p. 96) suggest that “Achieving education 
and training success is likely to be more problematic in developing countries where 
there are limitations on financial and technical resources”. In recent, Chand et al. 
(2012, p. 153) show that national culture has a significant effect on the judgments of 
accounting students when interpreting and applying selected IFRS containing 
uncertainty expressions. They conclude that Chinese students exhibit greater 
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conservatism and secrecy compared to Australian students. They suggest that global 
accounting education systems may influence in implementing IFRSs. 
 
Another group finds that accounting education is less useful (Nobes, 1998) and even 
that a negative association exists between accounting education and corporate 
disclosure. Nobes (1998, p. 168) opines that “In particular…level of education and 
stage of economic development are not necessary”. He notes that “[This factor] may be 
a result of accounting differences rather than their cause” (p 168). Moreover, the 
findings of Ahmed & Nicholls (1994) and Parry & Groves (1990) suggest that there is 
no impact on the quality of financial reporting through having qualified accountants. 
Similarly, Abayo & Roberts (1993) find that accounting education and qualifications 
alone are not the solution to problems faced by developing countries, at least with 
respect to Tanzania and inadequate accounting disclosure practices there. Similar 
findings come from Haniffa & Cooke (2002) who show that disclosure behaviour in 
Malaysia is not affected by culture. Their findings are contrary to the Hofstede & Gray 
hypotheses because Hofstede & Gray propose that societal values (meaning that they 
best described the accounting value of being highly secretive in terms of the accounting 
practice known as disclosure) of the bumiputra/Malay are in congruence with the level 
of secrecy in disclosure.  
 
2.5.2  Corruption 
 
Defining corruption as cultural norm, Sandholtz & Koetzle (2000, pp. 33-34) argue that 
“[The] definition of corruption that is portable across cultures. ….corrupt acts are, in 
every definition, improper or illegitimate”. The region specific and country case 
literatures suggest that politics and corruption affect accounting (Whitehead, 1989, 
2000; Rock & Bonnett, 2004). The reasons for high-level political corruption arise from 
substantial government intervention in the economy (Weyland, 1998). Some studies 
have argued that high level corruption can be explained through analysis of double 
transitions: (a) from authoritarianism to democracy and (b) from interventionist to 
market-oriented economic policies, which have commonly been accompanied by even 
higher levels of political corruption (Geddes & Ribeiro-Neto, 1999). Cooke & Wallace 
(1990, p. 84) argue that “In societies where a strong oral tradition exists or where 
corruption is endemic, the development of accounting may be impeded”. In an African 
study, Sandbrook (1993) argues that Africa’s post-colonial governments have often 
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emerged under extremely inauspicious circumstances. He criticises that “Given the deep 
mistrust among Africans of markets, trade, and foreign investment, it is not surprising 
that both market-oriented and socialist-oriented governments adopted highly 
interventionist (policies)... these strategies ultimately failed” (Sandbrook, 1993, p. 22). 
However, there is little evidence that such high-level corruption increases either 
investment or growth (Lopez, 1998; Schneider, 2002). In Latin America, the role of 
hyper presidentialism is very costly high-level political corruption. Whitehead (1989, p. 
783) observes that “the whole apparatus of the state (is geared) to the task of their 
personal enrichment”. High-level political corruption has been seen in Mexico and 
Brazil (Geddes & Ribeiro-Neto, 1999; Manzetti, 2000). In Eastern European study, 
Bloom et al. (1998) argue that corruption is widespread and secrecy has long been a 
tradition in Armenia. Accounting is cash-based and oriented to the stewardship needs of 
the government and the non-compliance of standards reflects its culture. 
 
In Asian study, Rock & Bonnett (2004) demonstrate the comparative politics of 
corruption on accounting in the East Asian Paradox, and find that corruption slows 
growth and/or reduces investment in most developing countries. Wu (2005) confirms 
the corporate sector as the main source of corruption problems in Asia, and argues that 
“High quality accounting standard(s) alone will not automatically bring down the level 
of bribery in Asian firms” (p. 57). Wu (2009) further reports that Bangladesh is one of 
the most corrupt countries in Asia, where “96% of firms report that they regularly bribe 
public officials” (p. 82).  In a study of China, Wu et al. (2012) conclude that politically 
connected managers of firms can help their firms to obtain tax benefits. In a 
comparative study (covering both developed and developing countries), Sandholtz & 
Koetzle (2000) argue that corruption poses fundamental challenges both to democratic 
governance and to market economies, and find that there is a significant relationship
37
 
between corruption and accounting quality. 
 
Besides government intervention, Lessmann & Markwardt (2010) argue that corruption 
crucially depends on the effectiveness of the monitoring bureaucrats’ behaviour. They 
argue that the benefits of decentralisation only occur if there is a supervisory body; this 
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 They hypothesise that levels of corruption are higher: (1) the lower the average income level, (2) the 
greater the extent of state control of the economy, (3) the weaker the democratic norms and institutions, 
(4) the lower the degree of integration in the world economy, and (5) the lower the share of the population 
with a Protestant religious affiliation. 
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is often lacking in a substantial number of developing countries. Similarly, Arikan 
(2004) concludes that the levels of corruption are lower in decentralised countries. 
These results are supported in studies by Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya (2007), and 
Lederman et al. (2005). In contrast, in line with Shleifer & Vishny (1993), Fan et al. 
(2009) find a negative impact of decentralisation (in terms of vertical government tiers) 
on corruption. They conclude that a lack of co-ordination of government institutes 
increases with the complexity of government structures.  
 
2.5.3  Summary of section 2.5 and Proposition III 
 
In summarising the literature on cultural factors’ influences on accounting change 
(specifically IFRSs implementation), the empirical evidence suggests that cultural 
characteristics change over time, and that the cultural factors rely on a particular 
country’s environment (see sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2). Most of the studies support a 
statistical association between culture and corporate reporting requirements, yet they 
also acknowledge an inability to explain the nature of that association. It is observed 
from the literature that very few studies have measured cultural factors in implementing 
IFRSs, yet negativity bias and blame cultures are ignored by the researchers in 
interpreting the relationship between culture and IFRSs implementation. Because 
conflicting evidence exists both in country specific and cross-sectional studies, the 
question arises as to whether [i] training opportunities in the accounting profession and 
[ii] corruption have positive or negative associations with IFRSs implementation. 
 
The prior research provides some suggestions for inconclusive (i.e. positive/negative 
influence on accounting change) evidence; for example, (a) an effective/ineffective 
development of training opportunities in the accounting profession (see section 2.5.1) 
and (b) low/high levels of corruption (see section 2.5.2). Researchers suggest that 
effective/ineffective development of training opportunities in the accounting profession 
depend on higher/lower standards of education, effective/ineffective accounting 
education policy and high/low professional status in society, whilst low/high levels of 
corruption depend on a culture of transparency/secrecy. Section 2.5 [in particular, 




PIIIA: Effective development of the training opportunities in the accounting profession 
will have a positive influence on implementation of IFRSs. 
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‘or’ Ineffective development of the training opportunities in the accounting profession 
will have a negative influence on implementation of IFRSs. 
 
 
PIIIB: Low levels of corruption will have a positive influence on implementation of 
IFRSs. 
 
‘or’ High levels of corruption will have a negative influence on implementation of 
IFRSs. 
 
2.6  Other influences; Country Specific Factors38 
 
Despite a large literature on accounting regulatory frameworks, politico institutional 
factors and cultural factors, the prior research suggest that some other country specific 
factors exert influences on financial reporting practices (see Appendix 2-4a). In this 
section, I outline various factors highlighted by the prior research, namely colonial 
power, multinationals, transfers of technology and foreign aids, and public sector 
dominance, all of which may influence financial reporting practices.  
 
2.6.1  Colonial Power 
 
Most developing countries have a common feature of past colonial rule and their level 
of political institutions and culture are largely influenced by the socio-political 
traditions and culture of the previous colonial power (Verma & Gray, 2009; Al-Akra et 
al., 2009). When the colonial powers acquired their colonies, there were no formal 
accounting systems in most of these countries, and thus, the prevailing accounting 
vacuum was typically filled by accounting systems introduced by the colonial masters 
(Briston, 1990; Saudagaran & Diga, 1998). Examples of such introduction may be 
found in the promulgation of the Indian Companies Act 1913, drafted in accordance 
with the English Companies Act 1908
39
, the modelling of Moroccan and Algerian 
financial reporting systems on the French standardised accounting system, (Hagigi & 
Williams, 1993) and the predominant influence of the Dutch accounting system in 
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 ‘Other country specific factors’ is a term I use in this study to explain any other factors outside 
accounting regulatory frameworks, politico-institutional and cultural factors (i.e. [i] training opportunities 
in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption), which may have an influence on IFRSs implementation. 
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  The early history of company law in India was laid down in the British Companies Act 1844 on the 
basis of which the Joint Stock Companies Act 1850, the first company law for the sub-continent, was 
formulated. This act was based on 'unlimited liability'. Through a major amendment in the Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1850 in 1857, the provision of unlimited liability was replaced by 'limited liability' and 
the act was renamed as the Companies Act 1857. With the expansion of trade and commerce, the 
Companies Act 1857 was amended in 1860, 1866, 1882, 1887, 1891, 1895, 1900 and 1908. The Indian 
Companies Act of 1913 was actually the amended and reformed version of The English Companies Act 
of 1908 (Available at: http://www.legalserviceindia.com/articles/eocindia.htm). 
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Indonesia (Briston & Hadori, 1993). During the British colonial period, for example, 
British accounting traditions spread to many countries, so that British rule could be 
employed in managing British business interests (Perera, 1975). In a study on the 
colonial experience in Fiji, Davie (2007) claims that Fijian experience of accounting 
practices is very much historical in nature because they are still following the British 
rule. Al-Akra et al. (2009) argue that the reasons for Jordan’s attitude towards full 
adoption of IFRSs are grounded in their strong colonial experiences. 
 
Saudagaran & Diga (1998, p.1) suggest that the early evidence of accounting practices 
in the ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) countries is heavily 
influenced by colonial experiences, but the post-independence history of the dominance 
of banks and financial institutions is conducive to adopting a macro-user oriented 
accounting system dominated by the needs of government users
40
. Similarly, 
Wijewardena & Yapa (1998) conclude that after fifty years of independence, Sri Lanka 
is still following the colonial system to produce its accounts whereas Singapore moved 
away from the colonial system within four years of independence. In south Asia, 
Banerjee & Iyer (2005) point out that Bangladesh, India and Pakistan were under 
British colonial rule for around 200 years. The British rule in India
41
 (i.e. in the central 
part of the former British colony), extended from 1757 to 1947. After independence, 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh establish different accounting systems mixing the UK 
GAAP, US GAAP, and IASs/IFRSs. For example, India adopted mandatory 
IASs/IFRSs in 2012 (source: http://www.iasplus.com/en/jurisdictions/asia/country9), 
Bangladesh did so in 1998 (source: The Securities and Exchange Commission Rules 
1987) and Pakistan in 1997 (source: Section 234 of the Companies Ordinance 1984, 
http://www.secp.gov.pk/corporatelaws/pdf/CompaniesOrdinance984-17-03-2011.pdf). 
Banerjee & Iyer (2005) raise the question of the colonial impact on accounting systems.   
 
Studies like Bloom et al. (1998) and Naciri & Hoarau (2001) believe that the historical 
and social background of a country influences its accounting practices. For example, 
Bloom et al. (1998, p. 641) point out that “No accounting system can be judged 
superior to any other without considering how the system serves society in a specific 
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 For example, accounting regulation in Thailand traditionally prefer a more conservative, creditor-
oriented and tax-driven accounting system, similar to Germany and Japan; (Yunus, 1988). 
41
 Bangladesh, India and Pakistan were ruled through the same central administration until the 
independence period, with Bangladesh and Pakistan breaking from India in the late 1940s and Bangladesh 
eventually splitting from Pakistan in the early 1970s (Lange, 2004). 
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country. Given the totalitarian history of Armenia and its linkage to the former Soviet 
Union, it is not surprising that Armenia clings to a Soviet chart of accounts. The 
government has long dominated and controlled the Armenian economy, and thus has 
been the “user” of accounts”. Naciri & Hoarau (2001, p. 235) show that American and 
French philosophies of financial reporting diverge from each other. While the American 
system is influenced by the very positive financial and economic environment of the 
19
th





2.6.2 Multinationals, Transfers of Technology and Foreign Aid 
 
Multinational companies (MNCs) have been one of the most powerful channels of 
technology transfer, including accounting technology, for host countries (Wilkinson, 
1965; Chandler & Holzer, 1984). Seidler (1969, pp. 36-37) explains that “The strongest 
vehicle for the current international dissemination of accounting information is the 
Multinational Corporation and its associated activities”. The main concern of the 
MNCs, though, is to make money, and they have little regard for the domestic 
requirements of the host countries because they see the elimination of dissimilarities in 
local practices purely as a means to facilitate their operations (Needles, 1976; Nair & 
Frank, 1981). Wallace & Briston (1993, p. 215) express reservations that “the media of 
transfer may not always have similar effects on recipient countries, because of the 
differences in economic conditions, levels of preparation, willingness to account, skills, 
behaviour and culture of the people, training methods adopted and complexities of 
accounting legacies inherited. Some countries may be successful in the transfer of 
accounting technology; others may not”. Perera (1975) attempts to portray the complex 
links between the various channels used to transfer accounting technology in Sri Lanka. 
He concludes that almost all the joint stock companies are owned by British investors 
and accountants who have come from the UK. Therefore, even though these firms are 
actually located in Sri Lanka, they are managed as though they are based in Britain. 
Despite this, no attempts are made to develop the accounting systems so that they are 
more suitable for local conditions. 
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In the same way, the professional accounting bodies
42
 have played a significant role in 
the process of transferring accounting technology to the developing countries, 
particularly to the former British colonies. British accountants immigrated to the 
colonies and formed the nucleus of the establishment of the professional bodies in the 
developing countries (Hove, 1986). Although these professional bodies in the 
developing countries were granted autonomy, the British accountancy bodies continue 
to exert considerable influence in both the general administration of professional bodies 
in developing countries, and in the style of their examining processes (Saudagaran & 
Diga, 1998). Neu et al. (2006) document that the World Bank increases its legitimacy 
with other potential borrower countries on accounting/financial practices and in this 
way it ensures its continuing influence.  
 
Further, foreign aid plays a vital role in the process of developing accounting systems 
and transferring technology from the developed donor countries to the developing 
countries (Perera, 1985; Rahaman, 1997). The World Bank, the IMF, and other donor 
agencies require financial statements explaining the ways in which aid has been utilised 
by recipient countries (Mir & Rahaman, 2005). Hoarau (1995) argues that “Imperialist 
institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have become 
major active agents responsible for the proliferation of IASs in developing countries”. 
The financial statements have to be prepared on the basis of the procedures followed by 
the donor agencies (Mir & Rahaman, 2005). Although Wilkinson (1965, p. 11) argues 
that “the accounting principles and practices of Western capitalist countries were never 
‘sold’ to developing countries on the basis of convincing arguments in support of their 
superior quality in terms of local needs”, Points & Cunningham (1998) observe that 
foreign donor agencies (e.g. the World Bank and the IMF) are continuously trying to 
impose the IASB standards instead of assisting real accounting reforms within the 
developing countries.  
 
Discussing the donor agencies’ attempts to assist the development of accounting 
systems in developing countries, Wallace & Briston (1993, pp. 216-217) argue that 
“Donor agencies should collaborate more closely with the recipient country to ensure 
that their assistance is delivered only in accordance with national accounting 
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 The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland (ICAS), The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), and The 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA). 
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development plans”. Problems with the transfer of accounting practices from developed 
countries to developing countries are manifold. First, no attention is given to 
ascertaining the needs of domestic users, resulting in an inappropriate accounting 
practice with limited usefulness (Mir & Rahaman, 2005). Second, the developing 
countries cannot modify their accounting practices in response to the changing needs of 
the corporate environments (Points & Cunningham, 1998). Third, it is very difficult to 
implement micro and macroeconomic goals on the basis of reported financial 
statements, and it must be kept in mind that every society contains unique features in 
terms of its social, cultural, economic and political aspects (Belkaoui, 1983, 1985). 
Finally, international lending agencies have become a major influence upon government 
policies (Uddin & Hopper, 2003). For example, the World Bank’s enhanced authority 
has emerged from the economic dependence and political weakness of Bangladesh, in 
particular because, “Military leaders in Bangladesh turned to Western ideologies, 
especially Thatcherism and Reaganism, to legitimise their undemocratic actions” 
(Uddin & Hopper, 2003, p. 741). Despite the wide-spread corruption of the Colombian 
government, the World Bank provides financial support for accounting education and 
does not question the state’s ability to implement the programmes (Neu et al., 2006). 
 
2.6.3  Public Sector Dominance 
 
The prior research finds that modern accounting concepts and principles are not being 
implemented adequately in most developing countries, in part at least because of the 
dominant public sector
43
. In Egypt, the government controls approximately 80 percent 
of economic resources (Amer, 1969); In East-Central Europe
44
, the state controls over 
85 percent of production (Dobosiewicz, 1992). Perera (1975) reports that Sri Lankan 
companies are more interested in preparing tax returns than accounting reports. Abu-
Nassar & Rutherford (1995) find that users of annual accounting reports in Jordan doubt 
their reliability and credibility. It has been argued that governments of developing 
countries review and redefine the role of accounting under the new order in a way 
which is more supportive to their public sectors (Briston, 1978; Samuels & Oliga, 
1982). Accounting transparency becomes irrelevant in state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
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 For example, Ghafur (1976) & Ahmad (1976) in Bangladesh; Briston (1978) in Indonesia, Sri Lanka 
and Tanzania; Samuels & Oliga (1982) in Egypt; and Perera (1985) in Sri Lanka. 
44
 Albania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia. 
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because political influence over decisions outweighs formal accountability within the 
systems (Jones & Sefiane, 1992).  
 
Increasingly, attention has been paid to raising accounting standards in developing 
countries where it is considered to be a prerequisite of granting FDI. This raises the 
question of the role of financial reporting in developing countries - is the dominant 
public sector supportive to the implementation of IFRSs? This is because some 
researchers find that public sectors (e.g. SOEs) are not transparent. For example, Wang 
et al. (2008) find that compared with non-state-owned firms, Chinese state-owned 
enterprises are controlled by province, city, and county governments (local SOEs) who 
are more likely to hire small auditors within the same region (small local auditors) 
because the tendency is to hide information. Similar findings are also observed in 
Armenia (Bloom et al., 1998). Despite the Armenian privatisation movement, adopted 
in 1997, the country’s public sector is reluctant to disclose information (Bloom et al., 
1998).  
 
There are already many developing countries with dominant private sectors, reported by 
Cairns (1990) & Gernon et al. (1990) who find that some countries adopt the IFRSs 
standards as national standards. Bennell (1997, p. 1801) argues that “The World Bank, 
IMF, and most of the major aid agencies are significantly increasing the pressure on 
governments to privatize, and wherever possible sell, most SOEs …consequently, 
meeting privatization targets is becoming an increasingly central feature of the 
performance”. Although the public sector controlled about 350 SOEs (92%) in 1974 in 
Bangladesh, Uddin & Hopper (2003) provide evidence of a trend of highly concentrated 
family ownership patterns during the 1980s. Ahmed & Nicholls (1994) find significant 
evidence of non-compliance by Bangladeshi listed companies within the dominant 
private sector and only 63 company reports are available out of a sample of 95 
companies for the fiscal year 1987-88. Similar findings are reported by Farooque et al. 
(2007) and Khan et al. (2011) in Bangladesh, Ghazali & Weetman (2006) in Malaysia 
and Abd-Elsalam & Weetman (2003) in Egypt. In India, Narayanaswamy (1996) reports 
that the quality of financial reporting disclosure remains low, despite widespread 
regulatory reforms aiming to internationalise and liberalise business. These arguments 
contradict the findings of Bennell (1997) who reports that privatisation improves the 
fiscal situation in developing countries and improves their efficiency. Therefore, 
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Siddiqui (2010, p. 260) argues that public sector dominance and private sector 
dominance can be explained by ownership structures and views that “Like many other 
developing countries, most companies in Bangladesh are either family owned or 
controlled by substantial shareholders (corporate groups or government)”. 
 
2.6.4  Summary of section 2.6 
 
In summary, the prior literature provides diverse evidence on colonial power, 
multinationals, the transfer of technology and foreign aid and the public sector.  Section 
2.6.1 shows that the prior research provides inconclusive evidence regarding accounting 
practices and colonial influence. For instance, some countries’ accounting practices are 
(heavily) influenced by colonial experience, whilst others are not (see section 2.6.1). 
Section 2.6.2 shows that prior research argues that multinational companies’ efforts to 
transfer accounting technology in developing countries are complex processes. Prior 
studies raise questions around foreign professional bodies and donor agencies’ influence 
in transferring accounting technology and in particular, accounting practices in 
developing countries. Section 2.6.3 shows that the researchers suggest that the IFRSs 
are not being effectively implemented in most developing countries, at least in part 
because of their dominant public sectors. They raise questions around the privatisation 
programmes and the issue of the effective implementation of IFRSs. However, little 
attention has yet been given to the work of other country specific factors in the 
implementation of IFRSs, nor has much research attempted to examine these factors, 
therefore it will be interesting to examine the impact of other country specific factors in 
the implementation of IFRSs in a developing country. 
 
2.7 Summary and Conclusion 
 
The overall discussion of this chapter leads towards the consideration of some research 
gaps which exist in the literature of IFRSs implementation. As discussed in section 
2.2.4 (RQ-3), there has been relatively limited research into theories of the role of the 
state in relation to accounting change (e.g. implementation of IFRSs) in accounting 
literature. Additionally, the notion of the ‘state’ has many meanings, which can 
themselves depend on the purpose of the study. I have chosen to employ a Weberian 
concept of the state in the present study (see section 2.2.2). The analysis of the literature 
identifies that the most frequently discussed issues in terms of role of the state and 
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accounting change are accounting regulatory frameworks, politico-institutional factors 
and cultural factors (see section 2.2.3). Answers regarding the theory of the role of the 
state’s application in a developing country still remain elusive, and the question 
therefore remains: How does a study of implementing IFRSs help to build an 
understanding of a theory of the role of the state in accounting change in a developing 
country?  
 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 (RQ-1), in considering the relative impact on accounting regulatory 
frameworks and politico-institutional factors, observe that the government involvement 
is not conducive to creating effective accounting regulatory frameworks. It has been 
argued that collaboration or co-operation between the private-sector standard setting 
body and the government regulatory body is essential in creating effective regulatory 
frameworks. Further, most researchers agree that standard setting is political in both 
developed and developing countries, but they raise the question of how best to create 
effective enforcement mechanisms in developing countries. Therefore, the researchers 
suggest that accounting regulatory frameworks may either help or hinder accounting 
change. In terms of accounting regulatory frameworks (see section 2.3) the following 
questions still remain: (a) do the regulatory and standard setting processes 
positively/negatively influence IFRSs implementation in a developing country? (b) what 
enforcement mechanism(s) have been used by developing countries to implement 
IFRSs? and (c) are the enforcement mechanism(s) (un)even in implementing IFRSs? 
Based on the prior literature reviewed in section 2.3, the first proposition (PI) of the 
present study was developed, in section 2.3.4. 
 
Section 2.4 (RQ-1) shows that opinions vary regarding politics, because some 
researchers find that politics have a negative impact on accounting change, while others 
find that politics do not have any notable influence; In particular, section 2.4.1 showed 
that opinions vary regarding government intervention because one group finds that 
government interventions are negatively associated with the development of accounting 
systems and accounting change, while the other group argues that intervention has little 
or no influence. Some researchers call for government intervention in developing 
countries. Most agree that participants in the lobbying process and those with political 
connectivity are (viewed as being) self-interested and, therefore, guarantees on political 
independence and freedom are essential to reduce lobbying. Because of the existence of 
mixed evidence in the literature on politico-institutional factors (see section 2.4.3), the 
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literature identifies the following questions: do politics (e.g. government intervention, 
lobbying activities) positively/negatively influence the implementation of IFRSs in a 
developing country?; and secondly, to what extent is co-operation among institutions 
supportive or unhelpful in relation to the implementation of IFRSs? Based on the prior 
literature in section 2.4, the second proposition (PII) of the present study was developed, 
in section 2.4.3. 
 
As discussed in section 2.5 [RQ-2(a)], researchers are divided on the impact of cultural 
influences on accounting change, because one group finds a positive association 
between cultures and accounting change while the other group finds no significant 
relationship. One possible explanation for this is that cultural characteristics change 
over time and depend on a particular country’s environmental characteristics. Most of 
the studies are, as yet, unable to explain the nature of a positive association, or 
alternatively, the lack of association (see section 2.5). In this study, [i] training 
opportunities in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption have been used as proxies 
for cultural factors (see section 2.5.3). Because conflicting evidence exists both in 
nation specific and cross-sectional studies, the following question still remain: do [i] 
training opportunities in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption 
positively/negatively influence the implementation of IFRSs; Based on the prior 
literature in section 2.5, the final proposition (PIII) of the present study was developed, 
in section 2.5.3. 
 
Section 2.6 [RQ-2(b)] suggests that not only do accounting regulatory frameworks, 
politico-institutional factors and cultural factors influence accounting change, but also 
that other country specific factors, such as past colonial power, multinationals, transfer 
of technology and foreign aid and public sector dominance also have impacts on 
financial reporting in developing countries. Prior studies report mixed findings. 
Therefore, it will be interesting to examine the impact of these other country specific 
factors and their influence on the implementation of IFRSs in a developing country. 
 
This research attempts to fill the gaps by adding to the existing body of knowledge 
concerning the problems of implementing IFRSs from a developing country’s 
perspective. Keeping these key research gaps in mind, the study’s theoretical framework 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 






This chapter will help to develop the theoretical framework consistent with RQ-3: How 
does a study of implementing IFRSs help to build an understanding of a theory of the 
role of the state in accounting change in a developing country such as Bangladesh? As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, there is no single theory which explains accounting change 
in a developing country in a broader context; therefore, a review of theories of the role 
of the state is offered, in order to predict accounting changes (i.e. the implementation of 
IFRSs). 
 
In Chapter Two, the propositions of this study have been developed. The drivers of 
accounting change have been selected, by employing a systematic review of literature 
on the role of the state and accounting change (see section 2.2.3). It has been shown that 
three frequently discussed issues in the literature are accounting regulatory frameworks, 
politico-institutional factors, and cultural factors (with specific selection for this thesis 
of training opportunities in the accounting profession and the presence of systematic 
corruption). Based on the drivers of accounting change, three propositions have been 
developed in sections 2.3.4, 2.4.3 and 2.5.3.  
 
Chapter Three is organised as follows: section 3.2 discusses key papers on theories of 
the role of the state in relation to accounting change. In particular, I discuss the role of 
the state in section 3.2.1. Section 3.2.2 discusses institutional dynamics in order to 
understand a link between the state and individual organisations and gain an in-depth 
understanding of IFRSs implementation issues in a developing country. In this section, I 
discuss the fact that the state is not solely responsible for accounting change, as 
lobbying groups and individual companies are also responsible. Finally, section 3.3 
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3.2 Key papers on theories of the role of the state in 
relation to accounting 
 
The selection process of choosing fifteen key papers in relation to the theory of the role 
of the state and accounting change has been described in Chapter Two (see section 
2.2.3). In particular, of the 15 papers, nine of them focus on developed countries, three 
of them are purely theory centred and a further three of them are based on developing 
countries. The theoretical framework of this study has been developed based primarily 
on these fifteen papers (see Table 2-2).  
 
3.2.1 The role of the state (External Forces) 
 
Prior research has identified that a state framework is based upon external forces. For 
example, Miller (1990) criticises Marxist views of the state and stresses the importance 
of a socio-historical approach to accounting change. Miller (1990) uses a state 
theoretical framework by following two basic approaches, ‘functional’ and ‘external 
factors’. The implicit assumption of Miller’s framework is that external factors can 
explain broader changes in accounting. Liguori & Steccolini (2012) argue that the prior 
research on the role of the state has primarily focused upon external forces, but change 
is not a simple matter of adjustment to external pressures. Researchers like Tinker 
(1984) proposes that theories of the role of the state may be applied to more specific 
accounting questions and may have greater implications in research in accounting and 
public policy. Tinker (1984, p. 71) identifies some questions and argues that 
neoclassical thought excludes such questions as, for example, “What underlies major 
shifts in the regulatory practices of the state and how much importance should 
accountants attribute to these changes? What determines the state’s level of autonomy 
vis-a-vis advantaged and disadvantaged groups and, in this regard, how much credence 
may be attached to the views of writers, such as Benston [1976], that disclosure 
regulations are captive of vested interest? Does the degree of state autonomy vary 
across regulatory spheres of interests? What stance should the accounting profession 
take in relation to the “contested terrain” of state regulation? Who are the sides in the 
struggle for control over the state’s regulatory apparatus, and how should accountants 
choose a side to support?”. 
 
Although the outcomes of accounting change can be investigated at different levels of 
analysis, most studies explicitly employ external or macro level analysis. Hence, I will 
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explore how the state behaves and its role in accounting change emphasising external 
forces. As derived from section 2.2.3, the roles of the state are outlined below (see 
sections 3.2.1.1-3.2.1.4). 
 
3.2.1.1 State approves experts to write rules 
 
The state approves experts (e.g. professional bodies) to write rules (Tinker, 1984; 
Jonsson, 1991; Alexander & Servalli, 2010; Moran, 2010; Norton, 2012). Prior research 
argues that state intervention in regulatory processes means a questioning of the state’s 
role. Jonsson (1991) proposes that state intervention should be avoided or minimised in 
order to formulate independent accounting rules and norms. Accounting finds a role 
through regulation. He further points out that “The state may grow stronger by not 
intervening” (Jonsson, 1991, p. 521).  
 
Alexander & Servalli (2010) examine the extent to which, and in what ways, the state 
should be involved in the regulation of financial accounting and reporting using 
historical and conceptual analyses of ‘the state’ and ‘accounting’. They further explore 
accounting regulation in the Anglo-Saxon (common law) and Continental (Roman law) 
traditions, considering political polemics relating to the role of, and inter-relationships 
between, the IASB and investor/creditor/fiscal/legal/prudential regulation stakeholders. 
They conclude that “self-interested interference is endemic, is actively facilitated by 
’due process‘, and that, crucially, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of 
effectively dealing with this problem is to ensure that ‘the State’, whilst maintaining an 
essential overall monitoring role on the fundamental effectiveness of the process, is 
allowed, whether in the guise of elected representatives or otherwise, zero influence in 
the details and operational content of financial accounting and reporting regulations 
for market-based resource-allocation-focussed information” (Alexander & Servalli, 
2010, p. 2). The theoretical underpinnings of their findings are ‘conceptually distinct, 
but a connection exists in that state involvement may, or may not, be conducive to more 
effective achievement of the purposes of financial reporting’ (Alexander & Servalli, 
2010, p. 35).   
 
Moran (2010) argues that “Making sense of the political economy of regulation involves 
making sense of national patterns of regulation….the application of these social 
technologies is inevitably a political matter, and is therefore shaped by the political 
setting – institutional and cultural - in which it operates accounting practice is a 
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critical arena where politics and economics meet - and is therefore critical to the 
political economy of the market system” (Moran, 2010, p. 274). He differentiates 
between the US (which is the single most important national system of capitalist 
democracy) and the EU regulatory systems using the political economy of accounting 
analyses. The US capitalist democracy has been distinctive not only in its scale and 
global influence but also as it has established a special kind of state-business 
relationship, and this American regulatory state has a number of distinctive features. 
Since the Reagan revolution of the 1980s, these contradictory aspects of the state have 
struggled for supremacy (Moran, 2002, 2010). Moran (2010) suggests that the state is a 
manager of the market system, but a manager that intervenes only to return it to a point 
of equilibrium. The political leadership, the language of the ‘pilot’ of society in the 
democratic arena, can also mean that “[one of] the authoritarian governing systems of 
the 20
th
 century, (China) celebrated the leadership of the 'Great Helmsman', Mao 
Zedong - one of the most savage tyrants in a century of savage tyrants” (Moran, 2010, 
p. 216). This argument questions the political economy of regulatory aspects within 
authoritarian (i.e. military) and democratic regimes respectively. In a theory based 
paper, Tinker (1984, p. 56) criticises Stigler’s (1971) view
45
 of the role of the state by 
arguing that:“There is no mention of the supply mechanisms that generate regulations 
(that is, little consideration is given to the various pressure groups, institutions, 
incentives, and other forces that combine to bring regulations into being)”. However, 
he does not explore this view by providing empirical evidence. Theorising about 
minimising state intervention in the accounting regulatory process, Norton (2012, p. 
119), using a Hegelian perspective, suggests that “separation of functions between the 
executive branch of government and the judiciary is an essential prerequisite to the 
legitimacy of the state’s claim to the wealth and income of the individual and the use of 
coercion when that claim is resisted”.  
 
Prior studies provide ‘mixed evidence’ (as indicated in figure 3-1) of state intervention 
in the accounting regulatory process. For instance, the first group finds that state 
intervention should be minimised or even avoided (Jonsson, 1991; Norton, 2012), while 
the second group finds that state intervention may or may not be helpful in having an 
effective regulatory process (Alexander & Servalli, 2010); and the third group finds that 
                                                 
45
 According to Stigler (1971, p. 3), “The central tasks of the theory of economic regulation are to 
explain who will receive the benefits or burdens of regulation, what form regulation will take, and the 
effects of regulation on the allocation of resources”.  
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political economy may influence the regulatory process, depending on whether a regime 
is authoritarian or democratic (Tinker, 1984; Moran, 2010). 
 
3.2.1.2  State consults with various stakeholders 
 
The state consults with various stakeholders (e.g. investors, professionals and 
researchers) on the validation of rules (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985; Rose & Miller, 
1992)[2010]; Kurunmaki et al., 2011; Oehr & Zimmermann, 2012). Streeck & 
Schmitter (1985, p. 120) argue that “a state without some kind of spontaneous solidarity 
among its citizens is no more than a bureaucratic or military conspiracy, and modern 
communities without a state would always be in danger of losing their identity and 
independence”. They suggest that state may increase its effectiveness by involving the 
market and the community, whilst state intervention may distort markets. By 
distinguishing between two types of welfare states, residual
46
 (e.g. the United Kingdom, 
the United States and Canada) and institutional
47
 (e.g. Germany, France and Japan), 
Oehr & Zimmermann (2012) find that state involvement in the standard setting process 
is a political process in institutional welfare states.  
 
By contrast, Rose & Miller (1992, p. 173)[2010, p. 271] investigate problems of 
government and demonstrate welfarism as a mode of ‘social’ government. They criticise 
the rhetoric of the welfare state because the welfare state depends on bureaucracy and is 
subject to constant pressure from bureaucrats wishing to expand their own empires. 
They point out that “the welfare state has a morally damaging effect upon citizens, 
producing ‘a culture of dependency’ based on expectations that government will do 
what in reality only individuals can” (p. 198 [296]). In terms of a neo-liberal state, they 
argue that “the central mechanisms of neo-liberalism is the proliferation of strategies to 
create and sustain a ‘market’, to reshape the forms of economic exchange on the basis 
of contractual exchange. The privatization programmes of the new politics have formed 
perhaps the most visible strand of such strategies, and one most aligned with the 
political ideals of markets versus state” (p. 198 [297]). Kurunmaki et al. (2011, p. 1) 
                                                 
46
 In the residual welfare state, ‘accounting is designed to maintain the efficiency of markets’ (Oehr & 
Zimmermann, 2012,  p. 139). 
47
 In the institutional welfare state, ‘the rules and standard setting at large will generally be state 
organised, state involvement in accounting runs much deeper, and this is in line with the societal motives 
and values’ (Oehr & Zimmermann, 2012,  p. 139). 
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emphasise that “Much is missed if we neglect the interaction between these [accounting 
& the state] twin poles”.  
 
These studies imply that accounting operates both within and beyond the state. 
Accounting involves calculative practices, but it should be noted that the ways in which 
these are mobilised depend on the nature of the state within which they are operating. 
The above studies provide ‘mixed evidence’ (as indicated in figure 3-1). For instance, 
one group finds that the state [e.g. a residual and neo-liberal state] consults with various 
stakeholders (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985; Rose & Miller, 1992[2010]; Oehr & 
Zimmermann, 2012) while the other group finds that the state [especially welfare states, 
and in particular, institutional welfare states] usually does not consult stakeholders, 
because of the complex political process and bureaucracy (Oehr & Zimmermann, 2012).   
 
3.2.1.3  State enforces outcomes 
 
The state enforces outcomes (Hoogvelt & Tinker, 1978; Krzywda et al., 1995). The 
prior literature identified a lack of regulatory enforcement in developing countries. For 
instance, Hoogvelt & Tinker (1978) assess the changing role of the state in Sierra 
Leone. They find that the “post-colonial period is characterised by a further recursion 
in the relations of exploitation: this time, a decline in returns to the state and an 
increase in allocations” (Hoogvelt & Tinker, 1978, p. 67). Through a periodisation 
analysis, they find that the government lacks regulatory enforcement. According to 
Hoogvelt & Tinker (1978, p. 69), “Political sovereignty, however, permits the state to 
demand an increasingly higher price for its ‘comprador role’
48
: when this finally 
outweighs the attractions of low wage costs and ground rents, a company will pack up 
and cease their activities”. They argue that historical and political influences may help 
or hold back regulatory enforcement (p. 75).  
 
In a Polish case study, Krzywda et al. (1995) find that the existence of Soviet-era 
traditions prevents the functioning of fully transparent accounting systems; hence, this 
influence may inhibit enforcement activities. The Soviet-era traditions includes ‘the 
continuing influence of the Ministry of Finance in accounting regulation and the 
continuation of state authorisation of accountants as members of the Chamber of 
                                                 
48
 Early colonial (1930-47); late colonial (1948-61) and post-colonial (1962-75). Each of these periods 
reflects the underlying socio-political realities in Sierra Leone (Hoogvelt & Tinker, 1978, p. 75). 
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Auditors and as the foundation of the audit profession’ (Krzywda et al., 1995, p. 651). 
Further, a lower rate of privatisation and a higher rate of subsidisation of state-owned 
enterprises undermine the emergence of transparent accounting practices (Krzywda et 
al., 1995, p. 652). One limitation is that this study will not implicitly examine whether 
the state is accountable to its citizens in Bangladesh.   
 
3.2.1.4 State is accountable to its citizens 
 
The state initiates change because it is accountable to its citizens (Miller, 1990; 
Constable & Kuasirikun, 2007). Miller (1990) argues that political machineries provide 
the mechanisms whereby government, the state, or businesses can be held accountable 
to society. He further emphasises that “Accounting can be understood through such a 
model by reference to the role it plays in assisting corporate accountability, installing 
monitoring systems within firms, contributing to the overall maximization of welfare in 
society, or even obviating the need for politico-regulatory mechanisms” (Miller, 1990, 
p. 319). Constable & Kuasirikun (2007) argue that power and dominance play a critical 
role in political identity and nation-state formation in a developing country like 
Thailand.  
 
The two studies outlined above suggest that the state’s accountability to its citizens 
depends on the nature of the country and therefore the evidence is ‘mixed’ (as indicated 
in figure 3-1). For example, in developed countries, the state is accountable to society, 
given that the state dispenses justice and protects equality, usually within an established 
tradition (Miller, 1990) whereas in developing countries, due to the power and 
dominance of the state, its accountability to its citizens may not be so guaranteed 
(Constable & Kuasirikun, 2007).  
 
3.2.1.5  Role of donor agencies 
 
Prior research has identified that the presence for donor agencies’ assistance and 
collaboration with the state may help in producing better outcomes of accounting 
change. For instance, Krzywda et al. (1995, p. 652) call for future research into donor 
agencies’ roles in accounting change in a developing country. Irvine (2008, p. 128) 
argues that there has been an increase in interaction between states and donor agencies 
such as the World Bank, the IMF and the ADB. She finds that the adoption of IFRSs 
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was mediated through the World Bank in the UAE. She further raises the question of 
the donor agencies’ ‘pushed down’ effort for IFRSs adoption in developing countries. 
Researchers such as Points & Cunningham (1998), Mir & Rahaman (2005) and Uddin 
& Hopper (2003) were critical about donor agencies’ efforts in reforming financial 
reporting regimes in developing countries. Wallace & Briston (1993) propose 
collaboration between the state and donor agencies as the best way to move towards 
effective reforms of accounting. Since prior research provide mixed evidence (as 
indicated in figure 3-1) regarding donor agencies’ efforts in reforming accounting in 
developing countries, in this study I will explore the donor agencies’ influences on 
accounting change. I therefore wish to modify proposition two (PIIA), which was 
initially developed in section 2.4.3:  
 
PIIA: Politics will have a positive influence on implementation of IFRSs under 
the conditions of (a) common-law origin, (b) a lower level of government 
intervention (c) a lower level of donor agencies’ pressure and (d) a lower level 
of political lobbying.  
 
‘or’ Politics will have a negative influence on implementation of IFRSs under 
the conditions of a) code-law origin, (b) a higher level of government 
intervention,  (c) a higher level of donor agencies’ pressure and (d) a higher 
level of political lobbying.  
 
3.2.1.6  The proposed initial theoretical model 
 
The prior research called for future research into the interrelations between accounting 
and the state, because an examination of this relationship may offer the possibility of 
identifying the key factors which define the nature of accounting change.  
 
The proposed initial theoretical model of the role of the state and accounting change can 
be expressed diagrammatically (see Figure 3-1); in figure 3-1, the state (see sections 
3.2.1.1-3.2.1.4) is accountable for the outcome of accounting change. In this process, 
the one-directional dotted line represents donor agencies (see section 3.2.1.5) who 
indirectly assist the government in making active decisions for the protection of 
stakeholders’ interests. In terms of the ‘drivers of accounting change’, as I have already 
demonstrated in Chapter Two (see sections 2.2.3, 2.3.4, 2.4.3 and 2.5.3), accounting 
change can be explained through accounting regulatory frameworks, political-
institutional factors and cultural factors (exemplified in this study through training 
opportunities in the accounting profession and through the presence of systematic 
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corruption). The prior studies suggest that the drivers of accounting change may either 
help or impede the outcome of accounting change (see the propositions development set 
out in Chapter Two). In figure 3-1, the donor agencies, the state and drivers of 
accounting change in relation to the outcomes of accounting changes are indicated by 
‘E’ (i.e. external forces). The one-directional arrow shows how the state is directly 
influencing accounting change through drivers of accounting change.  
 
Figure 3-1: Proposed Initial Theoretical Framework (The role of the state and 
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3.2.1.7  Weberian view of the state-society 
 
The diagram (3-1) expresses a general model of accounting change. Internal forces are 
missing in the model, since they were not indicated by the prior research. It is therefore 
important to pay attention to the Weberian view of state, in which Weber (1968)[1922] 
clearly demonstrates the relationship between the state and society (i.e. involving 
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external and internal forces). A view of culture in relation to the role of the state can be 
derived from Weber (1958)[1904], and Weber (1968)[1922]. In terms of the state-
society argument, Weber (1968, p. 156)[1922] stresses that the role of the state through 
parliamentary process and democracy is intended to deliver power to all citizens 
through the creation of meaning in everyday life, and that power is ultimately social. 
Skocpol (1985, p. 7) points out the need for “a fundamental rethinking of the role of 
states in relation to economies and societies”. For Weber, “human beings are 
motivated by ideal and material interests.... social systems exist to realize their core 
values, and values explain why different actors make different choices even in similar 
situations” (Swidler, 1986, p. 274). Weber (1958)[1904] acknowledges that cultural 
values are not immutable, as “they will change as the environment facing the society 
changes” (Richardson, 1987, p. 344), and “culture should have enduring effects on 
economic action” (Swidler, 1986, p. 278). The Weberian view of the state-society will 
be discussed in Chapter Eight (see sections 8.3.6 and 8.5.6). 
 
The next section addresses the linkages between the roles of the state and society (i.e. 
between external and internal forces). 
 
3.2.2 Institutional Dynamics (A link between the role of the 




“…. [The] regulation of any domain of economic life is a political affair. And 
since it is a political affair at its heart lies a set of relationships between 
business interests and the state. Disentangling those relationships - making 
sense of that grand phrase ‘the political economy of regulation’ - involves close 
attention to territorial patterns of regulation, since states inhabit a world of 
territory” (Moran, 2010, p. 224). 
 
A link between the theory of the role of state and institutional dynamics can be derived 
from Moran’s (2010) argument on the relationships between business interests (i.e. 
internal forces) and the state (i.e. external forces).  He views accounting as being shaped 
by the political setting (institutional) in which it operates. He further argues that 
“Accounting practice is a critical arena where politics and economics meet - and is 
therefore critical to the political economy of the market system” (Moran, 2010, p. 224). 
However, he did not implicitly explore business interests in the study and calls for 
                                                 
49
 In this study, ‘internal forces’ means micro processes of accounting change (i.e. individual organisation 
and organisational field levels of institutional dynamics). 
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further research. In a recent study, Liguori & Steccolini (2012) argue that external 
forces fail to fully explain the final outcome of accounting change and, hence, internal 
forces (i.e. micro-processes or individual organisation and organisational field level of 
institutional dynamics) are seen to be important in driving accounting change in Italy. 
They argue that the internal forces occurring within organisations are significant in 
determining “how the environment is interpreted and how organisations respond” 
(Liguori & Steccolini, 2012, p. 30). Although these two studies (Moran, 2010; Liguori 
& Steccolini, 2012) analyse the role of state and individual organisations, neither 
provides any explicit model (i.e. the relationship between the state and society or 
between external and internal forces) to support their arguments. Therefore, to explore 
the relationship between the external and internal forces, I rely on Dillard et al.’s (2004) 
institutional dynamics model
50
. Drawing upon Weber (1958[1904], 1961[1927] & 
1968[1922]), Dillard et al. (2004) propose an articulation of institutional dynamics 
indicating how criteria and practices are linked over three levels of social systems. Their 
model postulates that “action is changed but constrained by structure to develop a 
recursive institutionalisation model that prioritises processes over outcomes” (Dillard 
et al., 2004, pp. 512-513). The institutionalisation, transposition and 
deinstitutionalisation of practices (P) are continual and dynamic, and involve actors’ 
power and interests (Dillard et al., 2004, p. 513). The overarching political and 
economic level (PE) or state level establishes general, widely taken-for-granted norms 
(CPE). These norms are disseminated to society and the organisational field level (OF), 
which translates into the individual organisation level (IO) (Hopper & Major, 2007). 
Different actors influence proceedings at different levels; for example, government 
officials, regulators and legislators do so at the PE/state level; industry leaders and trade 
unions at the OF level; and managers and workers at the IO level (Irvine, 2008). 
Considering institutional dynamics, the prior literature discusses two issues - actors and 
their interests, and politics and power.  
 
Firstly, actors and their interests constitute an imperative issue in institutional dynamics 
(Burns & Scapens, 2000). Scapens (1994, p. 147) identifies the state and the professions 
as the primary modern shapers of institutional forms. Burns (1996, p. 28) argues that 
rules constitute a power resource and that social agents act in their own interests. 
                                                 
50
 Moran (2010) did not use Dillard et al.’s (2004) model. He emphasises the political economy of the 
market system. Dillard et al. (2004) provide a model to discuss the practice of accounting in 
organisations. 
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Therefore, it should not be assumed that the nation state and the professions will share 
the same interests (Scott, 1987). The state officials are more likely to create bureaucratic 
arrangements that centralise discretion at the top of the structure (Simon, 1983). By 
contrast, professional bodies will generally prefer more decentralised administration 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991). Subsequently, state actors are more likely to employ 
coercion in pursuing their ends, whilst the professions attempt to create cultural forms 
and beliefs (Moran, 2010). DiMaggio (1988, pp. 4-5) emphasises (1) norms or taken for 
granted assumptions “that make actors unlikely to recognize or to act upon their 
interests”, and (2) behavioural constraints or cognitive limitations “that cause actors 
who do recognize and try to act upon their interests to be unable to do so effectively” 
(p. 5). Taking a contrary view, Scott (1987) identifies the missing point of the ‘common 
utilitarian position’ as being that actors attempt to pursue their interests. Extending the 
work of Friedland & Alford (1991), Scott (1987, p. 508) argues that “Institutional 
factors determine that actors in one type of setting, called firms, pursue profits; that 
actors in another setting, called agencies, seek larger budgets; that actors in a third 
setting, called political parties, seek votes”. In terms of changing accounting practice, 
Carpenter & Feroz (2001) identify the factors that may lead to initial resistance to the 
adoption of GAAP and argue that, if accounting bureaucrats are not active in 
professional associations, then powerful interest groups may impede GAAP. Therefore, 
Coad & Herbert (2009, p. 190) offer the view that individual organisational actors and 
their interests are regarded as having a mutually constitutive nature of structure and 
agency.  
 
Secondly, politics and power
51
 play a central role in institutional dynamics, where 
complex processes of change exist through time (Dawson, 1994). The politics can take 
place at various hierarchical institutional levels and the power refers to the means 
through which powerful individuals’ desires are exerted on others (Buchanan & 
Badham, 1999, p. 11). In essence, power and politics are interconnected in an 
institutional analysis (Pfeffer, 1981). Power is intended “to produce intended effects” in 
line with perceived interests (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995), whereas politics is “the 
practical domain of power in action” (Buchanan & Badham, 1999, p. 11). Pfeffer 
(1981,  p. 7) states that “..politics involves those activities or behaviours through which 
                                                 
51
 Over the last few decades, research into the dimensions of politics and power has blossomed within 
institutional dynamics analysis (Pettigrew, 1973, 1990; Pfeffer, 1981; Mintzberg, 1983; Burns & Scapens, 
2000; Perry & Nölke, 2006). I use the term politics and power in an analysis of the state level (PE), the 
organisational field level (OF) and the individual organisation level (IO). 
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power is developed”. However, power in itself is not necessarily sufficient to achieve 
intended outcomes; it is important that individuals act (Mintzberg, 1983). Analyses of 
power and politics have been utilised by various researchers in the accounting domain. 
For example, Covaleski & Dirsmith (1988, p. 562) show that the process of 
institutionalisation appears to be infused with power and self-interest. Fogarty (1992, p. 
348) documents that the structure of the FASB reflects the extensiveness of 
institutionalised involvements (Mezias, 1990, p. 455). Similarly, Bealing et al. (1996, p. 
318) conclude that the SEC is a political institution because of the SEC’s efforts and 
lack of success in terms of preserving the status quo in power relations among the 
business and political communities. Later, Hardy (1996, p.11) develops a power 
mobilisation framework with regard to the processes of accounting change but raises 
questions around the three forms of power’s roles as facilitators /barriers
52
 in accounting 
change. 
 
As previously mentioned, Weber emphasises the state’s role in politico-cultural terms in 
shaping a particular form of society. Colignon & Covaleski (1991, pp. 154-155) hint 
that “Theoretically, Weber's framework provides a critical and political basis for 
evaluating accounting.......Weber's use of accounting indicates that although accounting 
calculation may be considered neutral in its execution, accounting is not neutral in its 
consequences, which raises the issue of the social impact of accounting practices on 
organizations, industries, and society. On the other hand, this tension suggests 
accounting practices and procedures are mechanisms of domination and objects of 
struggle among social groups”. It has also been argued that the Weberian framework 
provides “a more specific and heterogeneous view of the socio-historical context of 
accounting and the contingent relations of accounting to organizations and society” 
(Colignon & Covaleski, 1991, p. 155).  
 
3.2.2.1  The proposed new theoretical model  
 
Most studies have utilised Weber’s works in gaining a perspective of developed 
countries. More specifically, only three studies (Hoogvelt & Tinker, 1978; Krzywda et 
al., 1995; Constable & Kuasirikun, 2007) have focused upon developing countries’ 
                                                 
52
 (1) Power over resources refers to instances where actors deploy (or restrict) key resources to modify 
the behaviour of others; (2) Power over decision making refers to an exerting of influence over 
subordinates' participation in decision-making processes; (3) Power over meaning means influencing 
actors’ perceptions and/or preferences so that they accept the status quo. 
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experiences. None of these studies focused on the state-society relationship (i.e. 
between external and internal forces). Therefore, in the present study, I use Weber’s 
framework to provide a broader understanding of the role of the state and the 
relationship between the state and society in accounting change. In doing so, I want to 
explore whether there is a link between the state’s role and that of individual 
organisations in the process of accounting change.  
 
Drawing upon Dillard et al. (2004)’s study of institutional dynamics (i.e. the 
relationships between the state, the organisational field level and the individual 
organisation level), I have developed a proposed new theoretical framework which is 
shown as Figure 3-2. This figure is the extended form of the proposed initial theoretical 
framework, Figure 3-1. Figure 3-2 contains three levels: firstly, the state level includes 
government, ministerial bodies, regulatory bodies and donor agencies; secondly, the 
organisational field level includes trade unions and industry leaders, and finally, the 
individual organisation level includes individual organisations/companies listed in stock 
exchanges. In this model, the organisational field level and the individual organisation 
level are defined as internal forces (as indicated by ‘I’ in Figure 3-2) whilst state and 
donor agencies are defined as external forces (as indicated by ‘E’ in Figure 3-2). The 
one directional dotted lines (in black for donor agencies and in red for lobbying 
groups/organisational field levels) in Figure 3-2 represent indirect influences on 
accounting change.  The one-directional straight line indicates that state and individual 
organisations directly influence the outcome of accounting change through the drivers 
of accounting change. As mentioned in 3.2.1.6, the drivers of accounting change are 
depicted as discussed in sections 2.2.3, 2.3.4, 2.4.3 and 2.5.3 in Chapter Two. 
 
The role of the state is to make rules and enforce those rules (E), but lobbying groups or 
bureaucrats and individual organisations (I) may influence these processes. Specifically, 
at the organisational field level, “the bureaucracy is a means of domination whose use 
and direction is distinct and whose consequences for social action are ...accounting 
practices are key elements of the bureaucratic means of domination” (Colignon & 
Covaleski, 1991, p. 150; Dillard et al., 2004). It will be interesting to investigate, via 
this framework, whether state actors are pursuing individual interests, bureaucratic 
interests and/or political power in shaping accounting change. At the individual 
organisation level, I will investigate whether individual organisations/companies are 
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following social norms, or regulation imposed by the state. This framework will be 
discussed in Chapter Eight (see sections 8.2-8.5). 
 
Figure 3-2: Proposed New Theoretical Framework (linking the State and individual 
organisations through institutional dynamics) 
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3.3 Summary and Conclusion 
 
In summary, this chapter has developed a generic theoretical framework of the role of 
the state in relation to accounting change. The relatively limited previous research has 
been conducted employing theories of the role of the state in accounting change (see 
section 3.2). Section 3.2 describes key papers with reference to their theories of the role 
of the state in accounting change, and further describes the external forces 
characteristics of the state, based on fifteen selected papers, as mentioned in Chapter 
Two. 
 
The majority of papers (as discussed in section 3.2) call for further research to broaden 
understanding of the Weberian view of the state, and in particular, the link between the 
state and society. Section 3.2.2 therefore illustrates institutional dynamics, drawing 
upon Dillard et al. (2004)’s framework. In this section, I have discussed the relationship 
between the state and individual organisations in order to develop a proposed modified 
theoretical framework. This section also shows that the state alone is not solely 
responsible for accounting change; the outcome of change can be explained by (1) 
actors and interests, and (2) politics and power. It is assumed that theory of the role of 
the state may explain the different forces that bear on individuals acting within social 
organisations. The prior literature provides different opinions; for example, one group 
argues that actors are acting in their own interests, while the other group suggests that 
actors are unlikely to act primarily upon their own interests. Most researchers agree that 
power and politics hinder accounting change. The proposed theoretical model in the 
present study will be used to justify the research methods set out in Chapter Five. The 
framework will also be employed in the findings section in Chapter Eight (see sections 
8.2-8.5). 
 









The purpose of this chapter is to provide, evaluate and contextualise background 
information on Bangladesh, including its political regime, accounting regulatory 
frameworks, cultural factors and corruption problems. The information discussed in this 
chapter can help when analysing findings and answering the following research 
questions: RQ-1: What is the relative impact of accounting regulatory frameworks and 
politico-institutional factors on the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh as an 
example of a developing country?; RQ-2(a): How do (i) training opportunities in the 
accounting profession and (ii) the state of corruption, as outcomes of culture in 
Bangladesh, affect the implementation of IFRSs; RQ-2(b): What other country specific 
factors are affecting implementation of IFRSs?; and RQ-3: How does a study of 
implementing IFRSs help to build an understanding of a theory of the role of the state in 
accounting change in a developing country such as Bangladesh?.  
 
Section 4.2 describes the political regime in Bangladesh. Section 4.3 discusses the 
accounting regulatory frameworks for financial and non-financial companies. Section 
4.4 describes the accounting standard setting process including the status of the adopted 
accounting standards in Bangladesh, and South Asian regional efforts to implement 
IFRSs. Section 4.5 explains cultural factors, and section 4.6 summarises the chapter. 
4.2 Political Regimes in Bangladesh 
 
4.2.1 Chronological political regimes [1971-present] 
 
[The] Bengal was absorbed into the Mughul Empire in the 16
th
 century, and Dhaka, the 
seat of a nawab (the representative of the emperor), gained some importance as a 
provincial centre (Ghafur, 1976). Portuguese, Dutch and French traders were the first 
westerns to reach Bengal in the latter part of the 15
th
 century. In 1859, the British 
Crown directly took the place of the East India Company, extending British dominion 
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from Bengal, which became a region of India (Jahan, 2003; Ahmad, 1976). After the 
partition of British India in 1947, the independent states of India and Pakistan were 
created. It is argued that the government of West Pakistan contributed very little to the 
development of East Pakistan (Khan & Husain, 1996). Ahmad (1950, p. 194) argues 
that “Industrialization of East Bengal [East Pakistan] .... showed signs of an initial 
unbalanced development”. In 1948, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman formed a students’ 
organisation, the ‘Chhatra League’, to protest against inequality and injustice in 
comparison with West Pakistan (Jahan, 2005). In 1966, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
became president of the Awami League (AL) and emerged as leader of the Bengali 
autonomy movement (Ahmad, 1976). On March 26, 1971, following a bloody attack by 
the Pakistani Army, Bengali nationalists declared an independent ‘People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh’. There were an estimated three million people killed during the fight 
between the army and the Bengali Mukti Bahini/Freedom Fighters. On 16
th
 December 
1971, Pakistani forces surrendered, and Bangladesh - meaning ‘Bengal country’ -  
emerged as an independent state. The new country became a parliamentary democracy 
under a 1972 constitution (Jahan, 2003). The first government of the new nation of 
Bangladesh was formed in Dhaka with Justice Abu Sayeed Choudhury as President and 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as Prime Minister (Jahan, 2005). The successive political 
regimes in Bangladesh (see Figure 4-1) are described as follows: 
 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1972-1975):  Sheikh Mujibur Rahman came to office with 
massive personal popularity levels, and he created a new constitution on a modified 
Westminster model which came into force in December 1972 (Ghafur, 1976). In March 
1973, the first parliamentary elections were held under the 1972 constitution and the 
Awami League won with a massive majority. No other political party in Bangladesh's 
early years was able to challenge the Awami League's popularity (Ahmad, 1976). In 
December 1974, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman decided to establish a one-party system, the 
Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL) (Ahmed, 1998). In August 
1975, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and most of his family were assassinated by army 
officers (Ahmad, 1976).  
 
Ziaur Rahman (1975-1981): Successive military coups resulted in the emergence of 
Army Chief of Staff General Ziaur Rahman as a strongman leader (Halim, 2005). He 
used Martial Law Administration (MLA) and banned political parties (Jalal, 1995). In 
November 1976, he became Chief Martial Law Administrator (Jalal, 1995). In elections 
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in June 1978, he won a 5 year term with a 76% majority (Ahmed, 2003). In May 1981, 
Ziaur Rahman was assassinated in Chittagong by the military (Khan & Husain, 1996). 
In accordance with the constitution, Vice President Justice Abdus Sattar became the 
president and the army stepped in once again (Jalal, 1995). 
 




















H.M. Ershad (1982-1990): Army Chief Lt. General H.M. Ershad assumed power in a 
bloodless coup in March 1982 (Ahmed, 1998). He suspended the constitution and 
declared Martial Law (Jahan, 2003). He sought public support for his regime in a 
national referendum on his leadership in March 1985 and after winning overwhelmingly 
he designed new party named the ‘Jatiya Party’ (Zafarullah, 1999).  In 1986 elections, 
he won a majority of the 300 parliamentary seats and in July 1987, the government 
began to arrest scores of opposition activists under the Special Powers Act of 1974 
(Jahan, 2005). He then dissolved Parliament and scheduled fresh elections for March 
1988 (Jalal, 1995). On December 6, 1990, H.M. Ershad offered his resignation and in 


















1972-1975: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman [Awami League] 
1975-1981: Ziaur Rahman [Military Government] 
 
1982-1990: H.M. Ershad [Military Government] 
 
1991-1996: Khaleda Zia [BNP] 
 
1996-2001: Sheikh Hasina [Awami League]  
 
2001-2006: Khaleda Zia [BNP] 
 
2006-2008: Fakhruddin Ahmed [Caretaker Government] 
 
2009-Present: Sheikh Hasina [Awami League] 
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Shahabuddin Ahmed, conducted the country’s most free and fair parliament elections to 
date (Ahmed, 2003). 
 
Khaleda Zia (1991-96): The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won a plurality of 
seats and formed a government with support from the Islamic party Jamaat-I-Islami. 
The BNP leader Begum Khaleda Zia (widow of President Ziaur Rahman) became Prime 
Minister. The former President, General H.M. Ershad, served out a prison sentence on 
corruption charges (The Bangladesh Observer, 1991). In October 1991, MPs elected a 
new head of state, President Abdur Rahman Biswas, and re-created a parliamentary 
system. They also bestowed power to the office of the prime minister similar to that of 
Bangladesh’s original 1972 constitution (Zafarullah & Akhter, 2000; The Daily 
Inquilab, 1991). In March 1996, following escalating political turmoil, the sitting 
Parliament enacted a constitutional amendment to allow a neutral caretaker government 
(Chief Justice Mohammad Habibur Rahman was the Chief Adviser, a position 
equivalent to Prime Minister) in order to conduct new parliamentary elections (Halim, 
2005). 
 
Sheikh Hasina (1996-2001): Under the caretaker government, new parliamentary 
elections were held in June 1996. The AL won a majority and formed a government 
with support from the Jatiya Party, led by former President H.M. Ershad (Jahan, 2003). 
The AL party leader Sheikh Hasina (The daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman) became 
Prime Minister and formed a ‘Government of National Consensus’. In September 1997, 
the Jatiya Party withdrew its support from the government (Zafarullah & Akhter, 2000) 
and a four-party opposition alliance was formed at the beginning of 1999 (Ahmed, 
2003). In July 2001, the AL government stepped down to allow a caretaker government 
to preside over fresh parliamentary elections (Halim, 2005). The caretaker government 
was successful in holding a parliamentary general election on 1
 
October 2001 (Ahmed, 
2003). 
 
Khaleda Zia (2001-2006): The four-party alliance led by the BNP won more than a two 
thirds majority in Parliament (Jahan, 2005). Begum Khaleda Zia became Prime Minister 
for the second time (the first was in 1991). However, Sheikh Hasina rejected the results 
and boycotted Parliament (Halim, 2005). During 2005, an extremist Islamist group 
named Jama’atul Mujahideen, Bangladesh (JMB) claimed responsibility for bomb 
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blasts in 63 districts. In February 2006, the AL returned to Parliament and demanded 
early elections. 
 
Caretaker Government [Military-backed government] (2006-2008): The 13
th
 
Amendment to the constitution required the President to offer the position of Chief 
Adviser to the last Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Knox, 2009). The AL opposed 
Justice K.M. Hasan and claimed that Justice Hasan became the Chief Adviser in order 
to help the BNP win the parliamentary elections. On January 11, 2007, President 
Iajuddin Ahmed declared a state of emergency, resigned as Chief Adviser and 
indefinitely postponed parliamentary elections (Alamgir, 2009). On January 12, 2007, 
former Bangladesh Bank governor Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed became the new Chief 
Adviser. Under emergency provisions, the government suspended certain fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the constitution and detained a large number of politicians and 
others on suspicion of involvement in corruption and other crimes (Alamgir, 2009). The 
government arrested the former Prime Ministers Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia on 
charges of corruption and, after western pressure, the government eventually decided to 
step down, and the Election Commission then declared that parliamentary elections 
would take place (Ahmed, 2010). 
 
Sheikh Hasina (2009-Present): In 29 December 2008, parliamentary elections were 
held and the AL leader, Sheikh Hasina, became Prime Minister for the second time (the 
first had been in 1996). As Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable countries in terms 
of climate change, Sheikh Hasina has been a vocal advocate for mitigation and 
adaptation, aligning with the Copenhagen Accord in January 2010 (The Daily Star, 
2010). During her term, in February 2009, there was a mutiny by Bangladesh Rifles 
(BDR)
53
 in which more than 50 army officers were killed (The Guardian, 2009). 
 
4.2.2 How do political regimes and the country’s political 
history interact with business? 
 
During the first democratic era (1972-1975), Bangladesh followed a socialist economic 
model by nationalizing all industries. The government took various positive steps 
regarding the capital markets: Firstly, the government establishes the Institute of 
                                                 
53
 Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) was renamed Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB) in 2010. 
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Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB), the Institute of Cost and Management 
Accountants of Bangladesh (ICMAB), the National Board of Revenue (NBR), and 
Bangladesh Bank. Secondly, in order to ensure stability in all legal spheres in the newly 
independent country, the Laws Continuance Order 1971, Presidential Order No. 5 of 
1972, Presidential Order No. 91 of 1972 and the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh were 
introduced (Chowdhury, 2002). 
 
In the second democratic era (1991-2006), the major regulatory reforms of the early 
1990s were aimed particularly at moving towards an open economy. Examples include 
the announcement of a flexible market-oriented interest rate policy in January 1990 by 
Bangladesh Bank, the Financial Sector Reforms Programme (FSRP) in 1990, the 
establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1993, the 
Privatisation Board in 1993, the Privatisation Commission in 2000, the SEC Act 1993, 
the Companies Act of 1994 replacing the older Companies Act of 1913, the Money 
Loan Court Act 1990, the Bank Companies Act 1991; the Financial Institutions Act, 
1993, the Bankruptcy Act 1997, the Banking Reform Committee (BRC) in 1996, and 
the Securities & Exchange Rules in 1997 requiring the mandatory compliance of IASs. 
A major scam in the share market then took place, in 1996. Those who were involved in 
the scam were bailed from the high court through political connection (The Economist, 
1997).  According to the ADB (2005, p. 7), “The share scam cases lodged by the SEC 
after the 1996 market manipulation remain unresolved”. 
 
During the first military regime (1975-1990), socialist concepts were abandoned. Some 
positive contributions were made by the government during this regime. Firstly, 
institutions like the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association 
(BGMEA), the Law Committee and the Board of Investment (BOI) were established. 
The ICAB became a member of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
and started working on the adoption of IASs in 1983. Secondly, the financial and capital 
market liberalisation trends of the 1980s brought increasing volatility into global 
financial markets and increased the need for information as a means to ensure financial 
stability (Chowdhury, 2002). More specifically, a privatisation programme was started 
in 1982, with the privatisation of two nationalised commercial banks, and the country 
entered into the IMF/World Bank adjustment programs. The financial sector’s reform 
agenda was launched in 1984. Finally, development of the legal system took place; for 
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example, the Ombudsman Act 1980 (Act XV of 1980), the Administrative Tribunals 
Act 1980 (Act VII of 1981), the Income Tax Ordinance 1984 (Ordinance XXV of 
1984), the Land Reforms Ordinance 1984 (Ordinance X of 1984), the Family Courts 
Ordinance 1985 (Ordinance XVIII of 1985) and the Law Reform Ordinance 1978. 
During the second military era (2006-2008), the corporate governance codes (comply or 
explain) ordinance was introduced (in 2006). The government proposed the Financial 
Reporting Ordinance 2008 in order to implement IFRSs (Hasan et al., 2008).  
 
Additionally, economic development in terms of the Annual Growth Rate of GDP (%), 
from 1972-1975 was -0.35; in 1975-1990: 3.39; in 1991-2006: 5.01; in 2006-2008: 6.41 
and in 2009-2010: 5.9 (World Bank, 2011). These figures indicate that the highest GDP 
(%) was during the second era of military government (2006-2008). Surprisingly, 
Pakistan also experienced its highest growth rates (6.7%) during military rule (Khan, 
2011). According to World Bank’s Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2010) (see 
Table 4-1), Bangladesh experienced significant deterioration in political stability. 
Deterioration continued in terms of government effectiveness, control of corruption and 
voice and accountability (see Table 4-1). The regulatory quality and the rule of the law 
improved slightly. During the military government in 2008, the implementation of law 
was better than it was under the democratic government (see Table 4-1). It is observed 
that comparing years in the period 2000-2008, government effectiveness and control of 
corruption were better in the military government period (see Table 4-1). However, 
Barkat et al. (2004) argue that the militarily led government can be denoted as 
vulnerable to attracting foreign capital inflows, whilst mis-governance and a legitimised 
civil system of military rule are the de facto situation in Bangladesh. This evidence 
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Table 4-1: World Bank’s Governance Indicators
54



































































Regulatory Quality 16.18 17.65 18.63 18.14 13.24 18.14 18.93 21.53 







































Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/wgidataset.xls [Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. 
and Mastruzzi, M. (2010). ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators: A Summary of 
Methodology, Data and Analytical Issues’. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.  
5430]  




4.3 Accounting Regulatory Frameworks  
 
4.3.1 Accounting Regulatory Frameworks for Non-financial 
Companies 
 
According to the World Bank (2009,  p. 19)  “Bangladesh is a common law country and 
has been influenced by British, and to a lesser extent, Indian and Pakistani law and 
legal tradition. The Companies Act (CA) and other legislation are based on dated UK 
equivalents. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have used their regulatory 
authority to compensate for this dated legal structure; however, key gaps remain in the 
                                                 
54
 “The six aggregate indicators are: Voice and Accountability, which reflects perceptions of the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media; Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism, which reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilised 
or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and 
terrorism; Government Effectiveness, which reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies; Regulatory Quality, which reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development; Rule of 
Law, which reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in, and abide by the rules 
of, society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; and finally, Control of Corruption, which reflects 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (World Bank, 
2010). The rank ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) rank. The data are only available from 1996. 
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current framework”. The accounting regulatory frameworks for non-financial 
companies in Bangladesh can be found in the following sources: The Companies Act 
1994
55
 (for all companies, except public enterprises); The Securities and Exchange 
Rules 1987 (for listed companies in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and the Chittagong 
Stock Exchange (CSE)); Dhaka Stock Exchange Listing Rules 1998 (for companies 
listed with the DSE); Listing Regulations of the Chittagong Stock Exchange
56
 (for 
companies listed with the CSE), and Income Tax Ordinance 1984 (for all companies). 
For financial companies, the regulatory frameworks are: The Bank Companies Act 1991 
(for banking companies) and The Insurance Act 1938 (for insurance companies). The 
accounting rules and guidelines governing Bangladesh have been inherited from the 
period of British rule, and exhibit a pattern similar to those in the UK (Ahmed, 2006). 
Bangladesh’s progress regarding corporate disclosure has been comparatively very slow 
due to inconsistencies between the regulatory frameworks (Ahmed, 2010; World Bank, 
2009; Solaiman, 2006; Azizuddin, 2006; World Bank, 2003). 
 
The Companies Act 1994 provides basic requirements for financial reporting by all 
listed companies in Bangladesh. Yet, the Companies Act 1994 is silent
57
 about 
Bangladesh Financial Reporting Standards (BFRSs)/IFRSs (World Bank, 2009). The 
Companies Act 1994 lacks clarity with regard to statutory requirements on disclosures 
in the financial statements (World Bank, 2009). Moreover, some accounting 
requirements prescribed by the Companies Act 1994 are incompatible with IFRSs.
  
Several examples can be given; firstly, contrary to IAS 21 (The Effects of Changes in 
Foreign Exchange Rates), the Companies Act 1994 (Sec. 185, Schedule XI, Part I) 
requires that capitalisation of gains and losses arising from changes in foreign exchange 
rates will be adjusted in Balance Sheets (see, for example, X Limited
58
 which is a ‘A 
                                                 
55
 The Act was originally formulated by the British authorities in India on 27 March 1913 and came into 
force on 1 April 1914. The Act has been amended on a number of occasions, once quite extensively, in 
1936, in order to bring it into line with the British Companies Act of 1929. This Act was eventually 
adopted in Pakistan in 1949 and in Bangladesh in 1972 after these two countries became independent in 
1947 and 1971 respectively. Finally, the Companies Act 1913 was extensively amended in 1994 and 
enacted as a new act, the Bangladesh Companies Act 1994. Since Bangladesh is a former British colony 
and the legal system of Bangladesh is influenced by the British legal system, Bangladesh is a common-
law country. (Hasan et al., 2008). 
56
 The year of listing regulations is unknown (i.e. the year is not indicated in the CSE or SEC publications 
or websites) (See: http://www.cse.com.bd/listing-regulation.php). 
57
 The Companies Act 1994 does not contain any provision for mandatory IFRSs. 
58
 http://www.summitpower.org/update%20info/Audited%20Financial%20Statements%20-%202010.pdf 




 company in the DSE, and which complied with the Companies Act 1994 
instead of IFRSs in 2010). Secondly, the Companies Act 1994 does not require 
consolidated statements for a group
60
 (Sec. 186), but this is required under the IFRSs. 
According to Section 186, the Act requires that a set of financial statements for each 
subsidiary, together with some additional statements, be annexed to the holding 
company’s balance sheet. World Bank (2003, p. 3) mentions that “Companies Act 
provisions are not fully in line with IAS requirements on preparing consolidated 
financial statements”. Thirdly, Sections 210 (3a, b & c) and 211 of the Companies Act 
1994 support the long-term employment of an auditor. In accordance with the Act, if the 
company auditor is appointed through a resolution passed at the AGM, the auditor will 
be guaranteed for an unlimited period unless the auditor is proven to be dishonest or 
unqualified or they resign. Fourthly, a Cash Flow Statement is not mandatory under the 
Companies Act 1994.  
 
Section 183(4) provides that the financial year of a company may be more or less than a 
calendar year but shall not exceed fifteen months. It may, however, be extended to 
eighteen months with a Special Resolution/ Extraordinary Resolution of the Registrar of 
Joint Stock Companies (Form VII of RJSC). Section 185 (Schedule XI, Part I) 
recommends the format and the content of the balance sheet but not the format of the 
profit and loss account (Schedule XI, Part II). The provisions of this section, however, 
shall not apply to banks, insurance companies or electricity companies, because forms 
of balance sheets have been specified elsewhere, in the respective laws governing such 
companies. 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission Rules 1987 require compliance with IFRSs 
as adapted by the ICAB in Bangladesh (these are known as Bangladesh Financial 
Reporting Standards or BFRSs) (see also section 4.4 for accounting standard setting 
process in Bangladesh). The rules which are relevant to the preparation of financial 
statements are: “All listed companies’ financial statements shall be prepared in 
accordance with the requirements laid down in the Schedule and the IFRSs as adopted 
by the ICAB” (Amended SEC/Sec-7/SER-1987/03/132 dated 22.10.1997). In this sub-
                                                 
59
 The DSE introduced ‘A’ Category Companies from July 2, 2000. The category is introduced based on 
the company’s financial strength and performance (i.e. holding Annual General Meetings regularly & 
declaring dividends at the rate of 10 percent or more in the English calendar year) to give clear 
information to the investors (DSE Annual Report, 2009-10). 
60
 The Companies Act 1994 requires separate financial statements for each company. 
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rule, IFRSs refers to the accounting standards issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board. However, the SEC Rules of 1987 suffer from a few shortcomings, for 
example, that no disclosure of significant accounting policies is required (IAS 1); and a 
statement of changes in financial position is not required (IAS 1).  
 
Inconsistencies are also found between the Income Tax Ordinance 1984 and IFRSs. For 
example, provisions are not allowed under the Income Tax Ordinance, and therefore 
provisions are not tax deductible, but according to IAS 37, provisions are mandatory; 
some expenditures, for instance, amortisation and entertainment expenses are handled 
differently (Tax ordinance requires the limit of the expenses but according to IFRSs, an 
actual amount should be presented) (Section 30, Ordinance No. XXXVI of 1984); the 
tax authority also believes that the company should have the predetermined rate of gross 
margin which is quite unusual and is contradictory to IFRSs (Section 53DD, Ordinance 
No.  XXXVI of 1984) (Azizuddin, 2006). 
 
Despite the comments of various researchers (Ahmed, 2010; Solaiman, 2006; 
Azizuddin, 2006) and World Bank Reports (World Bank, 2009; World Bank, 2003) 
regarding inconsistencies in accounting regulatory frameworks, no real change has 
taken place. The former president of the ICAB, Azizuddin (2006, p. 3) states that 
“Though the requirements of mandatory rules and non-mandatory guidelines need to be 
improved to attract foreign investors, the main problem is the implementation and 
compliance of the rules and guidelines ..... the real problem lies regarding avoidance of 
laws and the annual reports, particularly the financial statements, are no exception”. 
He strongly recommends that the Companies Act 1994 and the Securities & Exchange 
Commission Rules 1987 should be modified.   
 
4.3.2 Accounting Regulatory Frameworks for Banks  
 
The Bangladesh Bank Order, 1972, states that: “Central Bank in Bangladesh [is]to 
regulate the issue of currency and the keeping of reserves and manage the monetary 
and credit system in Bangladesh with a view to stabilizing domestic monetary value; 
preserving the par value of the Bangladesh Taka; promoting and maintaining a high 
level of production, employment and real income in Bangladesh; and fostering growth 
and development of the country’s productive resources in the best national interest” 
(Government of Bangladesh 1972, President’s Order No. 127, p. 4). The Bangladesh 
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Bank Order, 1972 and the Bank Companies Act, 1991
61
 empower the Bangladesh Bank 
to regulate and supervise the banking sector of Bangladesh (World Bank, 2003, 2009). 
As mentioned in section 4.3.1, the Securities and Exchange Commission Rules, 1987, 
the Companies Act 1994, listing requirements of the DSE & the CSE, and adopted 
accounting standards by the ICAB are the main basis of the financial reporting practices 
for banking companies in Bangladesh. However, complexities in banking regulation 
exist in Bangladesh (World Bank, 2009; Sobhan & Werner, 2003) (see Table 4-2 for 
various regulations in relation to banking companies). Therefore, disclosure of 
information for the banking sector in Bangladesh has not been increased over the last 
two decades (Ahmed, 2010). The regulatory frameworks set minimum legal 
requirements as to the disclosure of accounting information in corporate annual reports 
and are likely therefore to produce statements which are confined only to concepts of 
‘minimum disclosure’ (Ahmed, 2006).  
 
The Companies Act 1994 does not contain any provision for mandatory observance of 
the adopted IFRSs and ISAs in practice (Siddiqui, 2010). For Insurance companies, the 
Insurance Act 1938 does not mandate compliance with BFRSs/IFRSs. For other 
unlisted companies, neither the law nor the by-laws of the ICAB mandates compliance 
with BASs (Ahmed, 2006). This shows that different companies (in different sectors) 
are using different accounting policies and procedures in the preparation and 
presentation of their financial statements within annual reports (ADB, 2007). As a result 
of the diversified use of accounting practices, a meaningful comparison of financial 
position as well as performance among the companies becomes difficult to interpret on 
the part of the users of accounting information for their decision-making purposes 
(Siddiqui, 2010). To ensure more transparency in financial institutions in Bangladesh, 
the Central Bank (i.e. Bangladesh Bank) issued a circular BRPD Circular No.14
62
, dated 
25 June 2003, for the mandatory adoption of IAS 30
63
 (Bangladesh Bank Annual 
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 IAS 30 (BAS30) is superseded by IFRS 7 (BFRS 7) Financial Instruments: Disclosures effective from 
1 January 2010. 
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Table 4-2: Relevant Regulations for Banking Industry in Bangladesh  
 Bangladesh Bank Order No. 127, 1972 
 Bangladesh Bank (Amendment) Act, 2003 
 Banking Companies Act No. 14, 1991 
 Bank Company (Amendment) Act No. 13, 1993 
 Banking Companies (Amendment) Act No. 25, 1995 
 Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 2003  
 Companies Act No. 18, 1994 
 Money Laundering Prevention Act No. 7, 2002 
 Bangladesh Bank Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations 
 Bangladesh Bank Guidelines for Merger/Amalgamation of Banks/Financial Institutions 
 Bangladesh Bank Prudential Regulations for Banks, 2007 
 Bangladesh Bank Guidance Notes on Prevention of Money Laundering (Act No. 8 of 
2009) 
 Bank Regulation and Policy Department Circular No. 5, 2006 
 Bank Regulation and Policy Department Circular No. 14, 2007 
 
4.3.3 Major Institutions involved in accounting regulatory 
frameworks 
  
(a) The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): The Commission was 
established in 1993 under the provisions of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 
1969. The functions of the Commission as laid down in the SEC Act 1993 are to 
ensure proper issuance of securities, to protect the interests of investors in securities, 
and to promote the development of, and regulate, the capital and securities market 
(Akhtaruddin, 2005). The SEC issued Corporate Governance (CG) Guidelines (to 
comply or explain) in 2006 during the Caretaker [Military-backed] Government; it 
has not issued any guidelines or taken any steps so far toward the implementation of 
IFRSs. Siddiqui (2010) argues that although, similar to many other developing 
nations, Bangladesh has also adopted the Anglo-American shareholder model of 
corporate governance, and such adoption may be prompted by exposure to 
legitimacy threats rather than being for valid efficiency reasons. There are some 
contradictory issues between the SEC rules and Companies Act 1994. For example, 
the Companies Act 1994 (Section 210) allows both sole practitioners and 
partnership firms to act as auditors. However, according to the SEC rules 1987, only 
partnership firms with seven years experience in professional practice are allowed to 
audit listed companies (World Bank, 2009). The SEC also requires that auditor 
rotation takes place once every three years, except where the company declares 
dividends at a rate prescribed by the SEC, in which case the same auditor can 
continue in office (Azizuddin, 2006). The practice of linking auditor rotation with 
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the company’s dividend declaration is highly unusual, and it is not clear what 
purpose it serves or is intended to serve (World Bank, 2003). World Bank (2003, p. 
2) also points out that “The SEC claims that its February 2000 rule on audit reports 
has mandated full compliance with IFRS, although this requirement does not appear 
to have the force of law. To ensure compliance and clarify its position, the SEC 
should issue a rule for mandatory observance of IFRS in preparing statutory 
financial statements”.   
  
(b) The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB): The ICAB is the 
national professional accounting body of Bangladesh. The Institute was established 
in 1973 and given its legal status by the Bangladesh Chartered Accountants Order 
1973 (Presidential Order No. 2 of 1973). The ICAB is an active member of various 
International and Regional accounting bodies such as The International Federation 
of Accountants (IFAC), The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), The 
Confederation of Asian and Pacific Accountants (CAPA) and The South Asian 
Federation of Accountants (SAFA). The institute circulates all IFAC releases in 
relation to IFRSs to its members. The problem, though, is that the institute cannot 
enforce the accounting standards unless the standards are incorporated in the 
Companies Act 1994 or the institute is given legal power to do so by the SEC 
(Hasan et al., 2008). Until this happens the institute is limited to an advisory role 
rather than an enforcing role. Nevertheless, in the absence of an accounting 
standards board in Bangladesh, the ICAB acts as the standard setting body in most 
cases where there is a need for standards (Akhtaruddin, 2005). There are some 
major problems, including a shortage of CAs, and the audit fees structure may 
impede the ICAB’s objective to implement IFRSs:  
 
Firstly, with regard to the shortage of CAs, the ICAB was founded with only 80 
members (Siddiqui, 2010). The institute had 610 members in 1992 and 700 in 2000 
(Ahmed, 2006). Of these 700 members, 565 were resident in Bangladesh and 135 
were resident abroad; 274 were practicing as public accountants and the rest were 
serving in various sectors (Azizuddin, 2006). In 2009, the institute had a total of 914 
members, of which 662 were fellow members and 252 were associate members. In 
2010, the number had grown up to 1,200, of which 300 are in practice and the 
remainder are serving the Government, public enterprises, NGOs, donor 
organisations and different corporate sectors (Siddiqui, 2011). According to Ahmed 
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(2010), Pakistan had over 3,000 Chartered Accountants, Sri Lanka had over 2,700 
and Nepal had around 270 Chartered Accountants (CAs), while Bangladesh had 
around 1,200 CAs. This indicates the shortage of CAs in Bangladesh. Since the 
economy of Bangladesh is expanding rapidly, it is estimated that the actual number 
of qualified accountants needed is more than 12,000 (Siddiqui, 2011). In 2010, 
among the four nationalised commercial banks in Bangladesh, two of them did not 
have any CAs; around 90 banks and insurance companies had only 15 CAs; 14 out 
of 52 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) had CAs; and 35 out of 250 listed companies 
had CAs (Ahmed, 2010). The government of Bangladesh does not employ any 
professional accountants in managing its budget of over Tk. 1,150 billion (Siddiqui, 
2011). Therefore, transparency in both the public and private sectors is questionable 
(The Daily Star, 2011).  
 
To increase the number of CAs in Bangladesh, the World Bank and the ICAEW are 
working together with the ICAB. For example, the ICAEW was awarded a contract 
under the Economic Management Technical Assistance Program (EMTAP) called a 
‘Twinning Project’, funded by the World Bank, to strengthen accounting and 
auditing standards practices in Bangladesh (ICAEW, 2008). In 2009, the ICAB 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the ICAEW to develop a new 
syllabus in line with the IFAC requirements and the new syllabus has been drawn up 
to increase the pass rate of candidates, meeting the local and international demand 
for accounting professionals (Siddiqui, 2010). 
 
Secondly, with regard to the Audit Fees structure, audit fees of public sector 
enterprises were fixed during the Pakistani era and have continued in this way with 
only slight/nominal increases (Siddiqui, 2011). The audit fees in Bangladesh are 
very low compared to those in India and Pakistan. The audit fees of the Central 
Bank of Pakistan are Rs. 3,500,000
64
, the Reserve Bank of India are Rs. 4,500,000 
and in Bangladesh they are Tk. 7,200,000. In Bangladesh, the Audit fees of state-
owned commercial banks are less than Tk. 1,000,000 for portfolios of more than Tk. 
                                                 
64
 The Bangladeshi currency is Taka (Tk.), the Indian currency is the Indian Rupee (Rs.) and the 
Pakistani currency is the Pakistani Rupee (Rs.). The exchange rate on 31.03.2012 was [£1 = Bangladeshi 
Tk. 119.815, £1 = Indian Rs. 75.634 & £1 = Pakistani Rs. = 138.963]: Source: 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/exrate/bangladesh.htm 
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100 billion to 200 billion, and the other SOEs are no exception to this
65
. Even the 
audit fees of private sector foreign banks are much lower compared with India, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka (Siddiqui, 2011). Therefore, overall, the audit fees of India 
and Pakistan are substantially higher than those of Bangladesh. 
 
(c) The Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Bangladesh (ICMAB): 
The ICMAB was established in 1973 under the Cost and Management Accountants 
Ordinance (1977) and is attached to the Ministry of Commerce (MOC). The primary 
objective of the institute is to develop and train cost and management accountants. 
The fellows qualifying from ICMAB are not required to go through practical 
accounting and auditing training with a professional accounting firm (Solaiman, 
2006). The ICMAB’s capacity is constrained by the shortage of well-trained 
instructors and resources (i.e. a lack of high-quality training programs on the 
practical application of IFRSs) (Hasan et al., 2008). The institute has no auditing 
power, and hence does not play any role regarding financial accounting standards 
(Akhtaruddin, 2005).  
 
(d) The Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE): The Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE)66 is 
registered as a Public Limited Company and its activities are regulated by its 
Articles of Association rules & regulations and bye-laws along with the Securities 
and Exchange Ordinance 1969, the Companies Act 1994 and Securities and 
Exchange Commission Act 1993. The volumes of transactions and the number of 
quoted companies in the DSE have increased significantly (Siddiqui, 2010). There 
are 250 companies quoted in the Dhaka Stock Exchange (source: 
http://www.dsebd.org/). While accounting has little use for individual investors, it is 
widely used by the institutional investors (Mir & Rahaman, 2005). For instance, 
there is no professional advisory service by financial analysts in the market, but 
institutional investors have their own financial analysts (Imam & Malik, 2007). The 
DSE mainly requires the submission of past financial statements but does not call 
for financial a disclosure checklist (the disclosure requirements are covered by the 
                                                 
65
 For example, the audit fee for the Power Development Board is less than Tk. 7,500,000 to audit a 
Balance Sheet of more than Tk. 260 billion; for the T&T Board it is Tk. 170,000 for a Balance Sheet of 
Tk. 50 billion and BTCL (formerly BTTB) has discontinued their private sector audit since 1997 and no 
financial statements have been prepared or audited (Ahmed, 2010).  
66
 The DSE was incorporated in 1954 (East Pakistan) and formal trading was started in 1956 at 
Narayanganj, Bangladesh.  
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Securities and Exchange Rules 1987, the Companies Act 1994 and IFRSs) (Hasan et 
al., 2008). Consequently, the stock exchange does not regard the monitoring the 
quality of published accounts to be part of its function (Ahmed, 2010).   
 
(e) The Registrar of Joint Stock Companies (RJSC): The function of the Registrar is 
to grant registration to new incumbents (Hasan et al., 2008). The Companies Act 
1994 requires that every joint stock company obtains a registration from the 
Registrar and files a copy of their annual report, including audited accounts, with the 
Registrar (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994). However, the Registrar's role is reduced to one 
of routine licensing of companies, in exchange of a specified fee and housing the 
files of companies’ accounts (World Bank, 2009; Ali et al., 2004). Parry (1989) 
earlier opined about the physical environment, mentioning “[The RJSC]…the 
shabby conditions of the office” (p. 65). In addition, bribery has become a must for 
all applicants obtaining registration within a reasonable time and without bribery it 
may take months or even years to obtain a registration (Ahmed, 1996). The 
Registrar admitted that hundreds of companies have not filed annual accounts for 
years, and no action other than sending reminders has so far been taken against 
companies failing to file accounts with the Registrar (Hasan et al., 2008). The 
World Bank (2003, p. 3) questions the activities of the RJSC by stating that “The 
directors of limited companies both private and public are responsible for filing 
annual audited financial statements with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies 
within 30 days of the annual general meeting. An annual general meeting should be 
held within 15 months of the previous annual general meeting. However, it is 
possible to get permission from the Registrar for a three-month extension”.  
 
(f) The National Board of Revenue (NBR): The NBR was established by President's 
Order No. 76 of 1972, under the Internal Resources Division (IRD) of the Ministry 
of Finance (MOF). The NBR is the central authority for tax administration in 
Bangladesh and is responsible for the formulation and continuous re-appraisal of 
tax-policies and tax-laws, negotiating tax treaties with foreign governments and 
participating in inter-ministerial deliberations on economic issues which have a 
bearing on fiscal policies and tax administration (Ahmed, 2006). The main task of 
the NBR is to collect domestic revenue (primarily Import Duties and Taxes, VAT 
and Income Tax) for the government (source: http://www.nbr-bd.org/). However, 
the World Bank (2003, p. 2) criticises its operation by saying that “Taxation 
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authorities do not accept some IFRS-compatible accounting treatments for 
determining taxable profit, for example, recognizing finance leases, prior period 
adjustments, and expensing of pre-operation costs. Although there is no legal 
requirement on observance of tax accounting rules in external financial reporting, 
those who prepare and audit financial statements generally ensure that the 
accounting treatments that are acceptable to the taxation authorities are used not 
only for tax reporting purposes but also for preparing the general-purpose financial 
statements”.  
4.4 Accounting standard setting process 
 
The accounting standards and particularly, disclosure standards in Bangladesh originate 
from a combination of legal, institutional, and professional bodies providing rules and 
guidelines (Parry, 1989; Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Hasan et al., 2008). As discussed in 
section 4.3, the professional responsibilities and conduct of Chartered Accountants are 
governed by the Bangladesh Chartered Accountants Bye-laws 1973 (Solaiman, 2006). 
These Chartered Accountants Bye-laws 1973 have not been amended to require 
mandatory compliance of the adopted standards by ICAB members (Farooque et al., 
2007). IASs (BASs) and IFRSs (BFRSs) are developed by the ICAB and based 
specifically on the original versions of IFRSs (Solaiman, 2006). Since the updated 
version is not mentioned in the SEC Rules of 1987 or 1997, the company is allowed to 
use the original version. From Figure
67
 4-2, it is observed that the Technical and 
Research Committee (TRC)
68
 of the ICAB proposes the standards.  
 
The adoption of standards requires the approval of the ICAB Council and adopted 
BASs/BFRSs are legally enforceable for the listed companies (ICAB Annual Report, 
2010-11; Deloitte & Touche Tohmatsu, 2007). However, these standards are not 
mandatory or enforceable through the ICAB by-laws 1973 (Siddiqui, 2011). The 
question may arise of ‘whether there are significant departures from the requirements of 
                                                 
67
 The Accounting standard setting process is very vague and no information is provided in the ICAB 
websites or any of their publications. Therefore, I conducted an interview with the TRC of the ICAB on 
August 25, 2010. 
68
 The TRC consists of a Vice-President and not more than five other members of the council. The 
council may co-opt such number of members of the Institute as it sees fit. The TRC performs various 
functions, including research in accounting, auditing, and framing recommendations on technical and 
professional matters for the ICAB members and Articled students, reviewing the latest national and 
international pronouncements of accounting standards on a regular basis, and carrying out technical 
reviews for the adoptability and acceptability of these in the country’s context. They arrange at least four 
technical CPE seminars in a calendar year for members. However, the Council shall always have the 
power to review any decision/recommendation of the TRC, in exercising its aforesaid functions. 
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IASs/IFRSs?’ while formulating the accounting standard, i.e. whether the TRC of the 
ICAB’s Council consider the IFRSs’ compatibility with local laws, conditions and 
practices (Hasan et al., 2008). Implementation of the adopted standards are neither 
backed by law (as in Pakistan & Sri Lanka) nor professionally mandatory (as in 
Pakistan & Sri Lanka) (Ahmed, 2010). Hence, the auditor’s report and basis of 
presentation notes only refer to conformity with IFRSs instead of full compliance with 
IFRSs in Bangladesh (Hasan et al., 2008).  
 














































[Source: prepared by the researcher, based on the interviews with ICAB officials in 25 August, 
2010] 
Identification of the broad areas for formulating the accounting standards by the 
Technical & Research Committee (TRC)                                                                                                                                             
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB) 
Constitution of the study groups by the TRC for preparing the preliminary drafts of the 
proposed accounting standards  
Consideration of the preliminary drafts prepared by the study groups of the TRC and 
revision, if any, of the drafts on the basis of deliberations at the TRC  
Circulation of the drafts, so revised, among the Members Council-ICAB for comments  
Meetings with the representatives of specified outside bodies on a necessary basis to 
ascertain their views on the drafts of the proposed accounting standards 
Finalisation of the Exposure Drafts (ED) of the proposed accounting standards, on the 
basis of comments received and discussions held with specified outside bodies, if 
required 
Issuance of the Exposure Drafts inviting the ICAB members’ comments 
Consideration of the comments received on the Exposure Drafts and finalisation of 
the drafts of the accounting standards on the basis of the same for submission to the 
Council-ICAB for consideration and approval 
Consideration of the draft accounting standards by the Council-ICAB and, if deemed 
necessary, modification of the drafts in consultation with the TRC 
The accounting standards, so finalised, are issued under the authority of the Council-
ICAB as Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BASs)                                                                                                                                             
Chapter Four – Financial Reporting Environment in Bangladesh                        100 
 
4.4.1 Status of Adopted Accounting Standards in Bangladesh 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), through its Gazette Notification of 
December 1997, amended the Securities and Exchange Rules 1987, whereby all listed 
companies in Bangladesh are required to comply with the requirements of all applicable 
IASs, as adopted by the ICAB, in the preparation and presentation of their Financial 
Statements [Rule 12(2)]. The SEC, in its Gazette Notification of February 2000, then 
has further amended the statutory rules to require conformity with all applicable IFRSs 
– deleting the ICAB adoption reference (Hasan et al., 2008). The ICAB Council 
decided to amend its By-laws in 2001 to mandate the ‘professional enforceability’ of 
adopted IFRSs and ISA among its members (Solaiman, 2006). This step is a positive 
one towards full implementation of IFRSs and audit practices in Bangladesh. However, 
there are no separate standards for small and medium-sized entities (SMEs) (Imam & 
Malik, 2007). Bangladesh has adopted the original version of 28 IASs out of 29 IASs 
(see Table 4-3). The reason for non adoption of the one remaining standard is that IAS 
29 (Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies) is not applicable in the 
context of Bangladesh (Ahmed, 2010). In addition, 8 IFRSs were adopted in 2008, and 
these became effective from January 2010. However, no amendments of IASs/IFRSs 
have been made since the ICAB adopted the original version of the standards. After the 
SEC Gazette Notification in 1997, the caretaker government proposed a Financial 
Reporting Ordinance in 2008 and urged the future democratic government to pass a 
Financial Reporting Act and Financial Reporting Council in order to implement IFRSs 
effectively (Hasan et al., 2008). Hasan et al. (2008) argue that the establishment of the 
FRC is essential to implement IFRSs because of the need for stakeholders’ engagement 
and an effective monitoring policy. The present democratic government is still 
considering the proposal (see Figure 4-3 for IASs/IFRSs time frame under different 
political regimes). 
 
Figure 4-3: IASs/IFRSs Time Frame in Bangladesh 1998-2010  
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Table 4-3: Status of Bangladesh Accounting Standards 2009-2010  



















01.07.98 Adopted original version, 






01.01.95 Adopted original version, 
revised in 1993 








Accounting Policies, Changes 







Adopted original version 
 




01.01.99 Adopted original version, 
revised in 1999 
11 Construction Contracts 1993 01.01.95 Adopted original version 




01.01.00 Adopted original version 
Subsequently amended 
16 
Property, Plant & Equipment 1997 










01.12.98 Adopted original version, 






01.01.95 Adopted original version 
Subsequently amended 








Adopted original version, 
approved in 1998 
20 Accounting for Government 





01.01.95 Adopted original version 
21 The Effects of Changes in 
Foreign Exchange Rates 
1993 
 




23 Borrowing Costs 1993 01.01.95 
Adopted original version, 
revised in 1993 






01.01.95 Adopted original version, 
revised in 1994 
26 Accounting and Reporting by 
Retirement Benefit Plans 
1987 
 
01.01.95 Adopted original version 




01.01.98 Adopted original version, 
revised in 2003 
28 Investments in Associates 
 
1998 
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 SIC-6 Cost of Modifying Existing Software; SIC-14 Property, Plant and Equipment- Compensation for 
the Impairment or Loss of Items; and SIC-23 Property, Plant and Equipment - Major Inspection or 
Overhaul Costs. 
70
 SIC-11 Foreign Exchange-Capitalisation of Loss Resulting from Severe Currency Devaluations; SIC-
19 Reporting Currency-Measurement and Presentation of Financial Statements under IAS 21 and IAS 29; 
and SIC-30 Reporting Currency-Translation from Measurement Currency to Presentation Currency. 
71
 SIC-3 Elimination of unrealised Profits and Losses on Transitions with Associates, SIC-20 Equity 
Accounting Method-Reconnection of Losses; and SIC-33 Consolidation and Equity Method - Potential 
Voting Rights and Allocation of Ownership Interests. 
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01.01.99 Adopted original version, 
revised in 2000 
32 Financial Instruments: 
Presentation 
1995 












34 Interim Financial Reporting 1998 01.01.99 Adopted original version 
36 Impairment of Assets 1998 01.07.99 Adopted original version 
37 Provisions, Contingent 




01.07.99 Adopted original version 
38 Intangible Assets 1998 01.07.99 Adopted original version 
39 Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement 
2000 
 
01.01.01 Adopted original version 
40 Investment Property 2000 01.01.03 Adopted original version 





4.4.2 South Asian Regional efforts to implement IFRSs 
 
The Institutes of Chartered Accountants in Bangladesh (ICAB), Pakistan (ICAP), India 
(ICAI) and Sri Lanka (ICASL) are engaged in the adoption and implementation of 
IFRSs in their respective countries (Ahmed, 2010). Pakistan has incorporated the 
standards that are relevant in its particular environment into its laws for listed 
companies; India recently adopted the IFRSs as the major component of its financial 
reporting standards; In Sri Lanka, the accounting standards are formulated by the 
ICASL (The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka), but their statutory 
compliance is laid down by the Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standards Act. The 
                                                 
72
 SIC-5 Classification of Financial Instruments-Contingent Settlement Provisions; SIC-16 Share Capital 
Required Own Equity Instruments (Treasury Shares); and SIC-17 Equity - Costs of Equity Transition. 
73






Adoption Status of ICAB 
1 
First-time adoption of International 
financial Reporting Standards 
01.01.2010 Adopted as BFRS on 21 
April 2008 
2 Share-based Payment 
01.01.2010 Adopted as BFRS on 05 July 
2006 
3 Business Combinations 
01.01.2010 Adopted as BFRS on 15 
December 2005 
4 Insurance Contracts 
01.01.2010 Adopted as BFRS on 23 
October 2008 
5 
Non-current Assets Held for Sale and 
Discontinued Operations 
01.01.2010 Adopted as BFRS on 15 
December 2005 
6 
Exploration for and Evaluation of 
Mineral Resources 
01.01.2010 Adopted as BFRS on 05 July 
2006 
7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures 





01.01.2010 Adopted as BFRS on 21 
April 2008 




 (South Asian Federation of Accountants) announced the establishment of a 
Technical Directorate to ensure and monitor IFRSs with regard to requirements, 
contents and consistent application in the region. The process of adopting and issuing 
Accounting and Auditing Standards in the four
75
 SAARC (The South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation) countries are substantially similar (Siddiqui, 2010). The 
relevant council committee from SAFA critically scrutinises the IFRSs in line with local 
laws and regulations, and recommends them to their Councils for adoption, with or 
without modification (Ahmed, 2010).  
 
A significant aspect of progress in the direction of implementation is reflected by the 
Best Presented Published Accounts Competition organised in Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
India and Sri Lanka (Ahmed, 2010).  Since 1997, this competition has been launched by 
the SAFA as a regional competition and has generated substantial interest among 
leading companies in the region in the presentation of audited published financial 
statements in the financial and non-financial sectors (Imam & Malik, 2007). In 1995, a 
regional WTO (World Trade Organisation) sub-committee was formed in the SAFA 
regions to ensure standardisation in professional accountancy qualifications, experience, 
and ethics, aimed at posing a united regional and cross-border practice of accountancy 
(Hossain, 1999). 
 
4.5 Cultural Factors 
 
4.5.1 Hofstede’s model, Gray’s model, the World Bank’s 
Governance Indicators data and La Porta et al.’s data 
 
The initial study by Hofstede (1980)
76
 did not include Bangladesh, although two 
neighbours, India and Pakistan, were included in his study. Bangladeshi culture is quite 
similar to Indian and Pakistani culture, due to historical and religious ties among the 
people of these three countries (Abdullah et al., 2011). Observations of commonalities 
between these countries have been made in the experiences of the researchers through 
their personal interactions with citizens of the countries, and field observations. This 
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The SAFA was established in 1984 and its motivations are: (i) improvement in the regional 
comparability of Financial Statements by narrowing areas of difference in accounting and audit practices; 
(ii) improvement in the principles and conceptual approach to financial reporting and audit practices and 
influencing future professional developments in the region; and (iii) contribution to enactment of new 
laws and regulations concerning accounting and auditing practices aimed at regional harmonisation. 
75
 Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka. 
76
 Hofstede et al. (2010) include Bangladesh (see Table 4-5). 
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can be explained through a number of historical facts. Bangladesh was once part of the 
undivided Indian subcontinent and, for a time, a part of Pakistan (1947-1971). Pakistan, 
a predominantly Muslim country (about 90% of the population are Muslim), has many 
common practices with Bangladeshi Muslims in terms of their societal practices (CIA 
Factbook, 2008). As India has large representations of both Islam and Hinduism, it too 
possesses cultural similarity with Bangladesh (Hossain, 1999). The cultural score of 
Bangladesh, based on Hofstede’s model (1980) and Gray’s model (1988), are shown in 
Table 4-4. 
 
Table 4-4:  Cultural values based on Hofstede’s Model (1980) and Gray’s Model 
(1988) in Bangladesh, India & Pakistan 
 
 





































Secrecy Secrecy Secrecy 
Uniformity vs. 
Flexibility  
Uniformity Uniformity Uniformity 
Conservatism vs. 
Optimism 
Conservatism Conservatism Conservatism 
 
[Source: Author, (emphasis added for Bangladesh) based on Hofstede (1980) & Gray (1988)] 
 
Table 4-5:  Cultural Scores based on Hofstede et al. (2010) Model  
 
 
 Bangladesh India Pakistan 
Power Distance Index (PDI) 80 77 55 
Individualism (IDV) 20 48 14 
Masculinity (MAS) 55 56 50 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI)  60 40 70 
Long-Term Orientation (LTO) 47 51 50 






Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G.J. and Minkov, M. (2010). Cultures and Organizations: Software of 
the Mind. 3
rd
 Edition.  New York: McGraw-Hil] 
[see Appendix 4-2 for copyright permission regarding cultural scores from Geert Hofstede 
B.V.] 
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 The score was 0 because of the influence of fundamentalist religious views. 
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As mentioned, Hofstede et al. (2010) include Bangladesh to explain cultural dimensions 
(see Table 4-5). In the case of Bangladesh, the high score of PDI indicates a high level 
of inequality of power and wealth within the society. The high UAI indicates the 
society’s low level of tolerance for uncertainty and that the society does not readily 
accept change (i.e. a society may be more, or less, open to unstructured ideas and 
situations) (Sudarwan & Fogarty, 1996). The combination of these two high scores 
(UAI) and (PDI) create a society that is highly rule-oriented, with laws, rules, 
regulations, and controls in place to reduce the amount of uncertainty, while inequalities 
of power and wealth have been allowed to grow within the society (Abdullah et al., 
2011, p. 198) . The culture in Bangladesh is more likely to follow a caste system (e.g. 
the ruling class social group) that does not allow significant upward mobility for its 
citizens (Uddin & Hopper, 2001). This could be due to a combination of these two 
dimensions creating a situation where leaders have virtually ultimate power and 
authority, and the rules, laws and regulations developed by those in power, reinforce 
their own leadership and control (Dahawy et al., 2002). This condition is not necessarily 
subverted upon the population, but rather it is accepted by the population as a cultural 
norm. 
 
Bangladesh’s LTO score is 40, but a higher LTO score can be indicative of a culture 
that is parsimonious in which a society that is ready to adapt change (Hofstede et al., 
2010). With respect to MAS, India’s MAS score is 56 which is the third highest ranking 
in Hofstede’s dimension, with the world average just slightly lower at 51. A similar 
picture is found in Bangladesh. The higher the country ranks in this dimension, the 
greater the gap between the score of men and women. In terms of IDV, Bangladesh is in 
the collectivist side, meaning that people are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups 
from birth onwards; these are often extended families (Abdullah et al., 2011). The word 
collectivism in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group, not to the state. 
Again, the issue addressed by this dimension is an extremely fundamental one, relatable 
to all the societies in the world. Finally, the lower score of IVR indicates that 
Bangladesh’s society suppresses its gratification of needs and instead regulates it by 
means of strict social norms. In particular, natural human drives in relation to enjoying 
life and having fun are missing in a restraint society (Hofstede et al., 2010).  As 
mentioned, Bangladesh is a Muslim dominated country
78
 and therefore it is not 
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 Hofstede et al. (2010) argue that the lower score of LTO & IVR are found in Muslim world. 
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surprising that low scores for IVR and LTO are found.  It is important to mention that 
the cultural scores have not changed from 1980 to 2010 in comparison with the 
Hofstede (1980) & Hofstede et al. (2010) studies. Based on Hofstede’s (1980) data, Han 
et al. (2012, p. 38) find that ‘Pakistan is one of the most secretive
79
 countries’. They 
argue that firms in more secretive countries tend to disclose less. Further, investor 
protection in Pakistan is weaker than it is in India. To explore the secrecy culture of 
Bangladesh, I use Hofstede’s scores from 1980 and 2010. The comparison of India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh is shown in Table 4-6. Unsurprisingly, the scores for 
Bangladesh and Pakistan are almost the same in 2010. This means that Bangladesh and 
Pakistan have more secretive cultures, while India follows weak uncertainty avoidance 
and hence has a more transparent culture. 
 
 Comparing the enforcement data, the present study finds that a lower rate of 
enforcement is seen in Pakistan and Bangladesh compared with India (see Table 4-7). 
This is because both Bangladesh and Pakistan have higher levels of corruption, a factor 
which weakens enforcement mechanisms. According to Leuz et al. (2003, p. 516), 
“Legal Enforcement is measured as the mean score across three legal variables used in 
La Porta et al. (1998): (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) an assessment of rule 
of law, and (3) the corruption index”. Han et al. (2012) and Leuz et al. (2003) use the 
data presented by La Porta et al. (1998, p. 1142). In this research, I use the World 
Bank’s Governance Indicators Data (2010). The data from the World Bank ranges from 
0 to 100, while La Porta et al.’s data ranges from 0 to 10. 
 
Table 4-6:  Secrecy Culture in India, Pakistan & Bangladesh 
 
 






Bangladesh N/A 120 
India 77 69 
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 Han et al. (2012, p. 37) defined a secrecy culture score as UAI + PDI - IDV. UAI, PDI and IDV scores 
derived from Hofstede (1980).  
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Table 4-7:  Enforcement in India, Pakistan & Bangladesh 
 
 
 World Bank’s Governance Indicators Data (2010) La Porta et al. (1998) 
 1998 2010 1998 
  J R C Avg. J R C Avg. J R C Avg. 
Bangladesh 17.65 19.62 38.54 25.27 21.53 26.54 16.27 21.45 N/A
80
 N/A N/A N/A 
India 34.80 61.72 43.41 46.65 39.23 54.50 35.89 43.21 8 4.17 4.58 5.6 
Pakistan 27.94 26.79 15.61 23.45 30.14 25.59 11.96 22.57 5 3.03 2.98 3.7 
 
Notes: J = The efficiency of the judicial system/Regulatory quality; R = the rule of law; C= 
control of corruption; Avg. = average of judicial system, the rule of law and control of 




[see Appendix 4-1 for copyright permission regarding Governance Indicators Data from the 
World Bank; and Appendix 4-3 for copyright permission regarding La Porta et al.’s data from 
the University of Chicago Press] 
 
Focusing upon corporate culture, Uddin & Hopper (2003, p. 767) reveal that privatised 
companies in Bangladesh are reluctant to disclose financial information due to a tax 
avoidance culture and the weakness of regulatory frameworks and lack of enforcement 
culture. They raise questions around the veracity of financial data disclosed and the 
difficulties of using it. Donor agencies like the World Bank have made great efforts to 
create an ‘enabling environment’ for privatisation in Bangladesh by financing but 
paying little attention to regulatory frameworks and enforcement issues that facilitate 
transparent capital markets (Uddin & Hopper, 2001; Uddin & Choudhury, 2008). 
Akhtaruddin (2005, p. 402) supports that ‘Cultural value is no less important a 
determinant of disclosure or transparency’. For example, Bangladesh has a high sense 
of secrecy in its culture and, therefore, management is less likely to pursue a high level 
of disclosure. He concludes that “The lacklustre disclosure performance by 
Bangladeshi firms can be attributed to organizational culture, poor monitoring, and 
lapses in enforcement by the regulatory body... Disclosure decisions are culture-
driven”(p. 415). Mir & Rahaman (2005, p. 832) also note that “India, next door to 
Bangladesh, which has cultural and economic similarities with Bangladesh, did not go 
for the wholesale adoption of IFRSs”. However, the corporate sectors in India are more 
transparent compared to Bangladesh (Banerjee, 2002). One reason for this might be 
weak professionalism; for instance, classifying those countries which fall behind in 
terms of professionalism and rely on statutory controls. Askary (2006) finds that 
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 La Porta et al. (1998) did not include Bangladesh. 
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Bangladesh has a tendency toward statutory control and the lowest professionalism 




Corruption is perceived as most rampant in Bangladesh, which is one of the poorest
81
 
countries in the world (Knox, 2009; Riaz, 2006). Therefore, corruption remains a major 
obstacle to fully addressing developmental issues. For five consecutive years (2001-
2005), Bangladesh topped the list of the most corrupt nations in the world on the 
Corruption Perception Index (TIB, 2005). Huque (2010) explains that corruption has 
taken many forms in the public sector, and has rendered the framework of 
accountability very weak. Corruption has progressively intensified since the gaining of 
independence in 1971. Some of the key agencies of government such as the police, 
customs, taxation and the central secretariat are among the most corrupt departments 
(Riaz, 2006). Key politicians, including the former Prime Minister and the current 
Prime Minister, have been charged with corruption (Knox, 2009). The political parties 
in power initiate cases of corruption against those in opposition (Huque, 2010). 
Choudhury (2008) argues that the MPs/legislators are corrupt and encourage corrupt 
people to be involved in politics. For example, Article 66 of the Constitution of 
Bangladesh states that “A person shall be disqualified for election as, or for being, a 
member of Parliament, who has been convicted for a criminal offence involving moral 
turpitude, or sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than two years, unless a 
period of five years has elapsed since his release”. These ideas appear to be based on 
unreasonable assumptions and might encourage corrupt personalities to run for 
membership of the legislature (Knox, 2009). Ministers and public officials become 
partners in corrupt deals, and avoid practices that would potentially make the country’s 
administrative systems more transparent (Riaz, 2006; The Daily Star, 2009; 
Banglanews24.com, 2012). The decisions are made by people in authority without 
consulting stakeholders, and the network of corruption protects its members from being 
exposed or prosecuted (Ahmad, 2002; New Age, 2012). Consequently, accountability 
suffers, as the existing channels and frameworks are never put to use (IMF, 2005, 
2010).  
 
                                                 
81
 Almost half the population living on less than one dollar per day (Oxford Economics, 2008). 
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In terms of accountability and transparency, Mir & Rahaman (2005, p. 832) find that 
some companies have taken it for granted that their auditors will fulfil the directors’ 
wishes and there are a large number of malpractices in the corporate sectors including 
(and linked to) insider trading and unacceptable profit manipulations. However, the 
auditors have provided qualified audit opinions. These malpractices have been 
overlooked by the SEC. They warn that “Corruption is becoming endemic in the 
Bangladeshi culture and should be the main focus, if accountability is required. Without 
eradicating the culture which enhances corruption, accountability would continue to be 
seen as rhetoric” (pp. 832-833). The IMF (2010, p. 20) suggests that “Bangladesh Bank 
banking supervision needs to implement a model anti-corruption program for its staff, 
both protecting staff from corruptive incentives and making known the high integrity of 
its personnel”.  
 
To tackle the widespread corruption, the Government of Bangladesh has established 
institutions and laws over the years. The key initiatives have been (1) Prevention of 
Corruption Act, 1947; (2) Anti-Corruption Act, 1957; (3) Criminal Law Amendments 
Act, 1958; and (4) Anti-Corruption Tribunal Ordinance, 1960. However, the TIB (2005) 
criticises the transparency of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, since the bureau has been 
established within the Prime Minister’s Department. On 26 April 2010 the democratic 
government amended the relevant legislation to require the Commission to seek the 
government‘s approval before initiating a case against any government official (The 
Daily Star, 2010). Therefore, the Anti-Corruption Bureau needs to make such an 
institution clearly independent of the executive. While the necessary laws and 
institutions seem to be in place, their effectiveness in curbing corruption is limited in 
practice, in part because of the widespread prevalence of non-transparent practices in 
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4.6 Summary and Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described the political regimes, accounting regulatory frameworks, 
accounting standard setting process and cultural factors in Bangladesh. In summary, 
firstly, with regard to the political regimes in Bangladesh, there are two political 
patterns, i.e. democratic and military eras. In 40 years of independence, the military-
backed government ruled for 19 years and democratic government for the other 21. 
During both the democratic and the military eras, many initiatives have been introduced 
including the Companies Act 1994, the adoption of IFRSs, the proposed Financial 
Reporting Act and development of the private sector. Questions still remain about the 
implementation of these paper based laws because of the scarce application of their 
rules and regulations in different political eras in practice (in particular from 1998-2010: 
RQ-1, Proposition PI & PIIA). The political regimes were not covered by the interview 
questions, and the interviewees mentioned that the nature of the two different regimes 
may have an impact on the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh.  
 
Secondly, in relation to accounting regulatory frameworks, the Companies Act 1994 
provides the basic requirements for financial reporting by all listed companies, and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission Rules of 1987 and 1997 require that financial 
statements shall be prepared in accordance with the ICAB adopted IFRSs. However, 
some contradictions exist between the Companies Act 1994 and IFRSs. The 
inconsistencies are observed in the SEC Act 1993, The SEC Rules 1987 & 1997, the 
Income Tax Ordinance 1984, and the Banking Companies Act 1991 (see section 4.3). 
The World Bank (2003 & 2009) has criticised the current regulatory frameworks. Major 
institutions like the SEC, the ICAB, the ICMAB, the DSE, the RJSC and the NBR are 
involved in the accounting regulatory process in Bangladesh. The ICAB is responsible 
for adopting IFRSs but the standards setting process is not co-operative or fully engaged 
with the stakeholders. This study therefore investigates how the slow pace of the 
accounting regulatory reforms and the standard setting process influences the 
implementation of IFRSs (RQ-1, Proposition PI).  
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Finally, with respect to cultural factors in Bangladesh, the chapter discusses Hofstede’s 
model, Gray’s model
82
’s, the World Bank’s Governance Indicators data and La Porta et 
al.’s data (see section 4.5.1). As has been mentioned in section 4.5.1, the cultural score 
for Bangladesh has not significantly changed over the last 30 years (Comparing 
Hofstede’s (1980) & Hofstede et al. (2010) model). It has also been argued that 
negative aspects of the corporate sector, e.g. a secrecy culture, low levels of 
professionalism and a lack of consistent enforcement, remain common in Bangladesh; 
corruption spreads every corner of society and hinders the country’s economic 
development (see section 4.5.2). Legislators, the major political parties and auditors are 
involved in corrupt activities to some extent (i.e. at least some members of each are 
involved) (see section 4.5.2). Unfortunately, the Anti-Corruption Bureau is acting as no 
more than a political institution. As has been mentioned in Chapter Two, the present 
study concentrates on [i] training opportunities in the accounting profession and [ii] 
corruption in relation to cultural factors in Bangladesh. The question remains as to how 
[i] training opportunities in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption in Bangladesh 
can affect the implementation of IFRSs (RQ-2a, Proposition PIIIA & PIIIB). These issues 
will be used to discuss the findings in Chapters Seven and Eight.  
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 In line with, Hofstede’s (1980) & Hofstede et al. (2010) cultural perspectives, Bangladesh’s culture is 
based on: collectivism, Large power distance, Strong uncertainty avoidance, Masculinity, Short-term 
oriented & Restraint; According to Gray’s Model (1988) model, Bangladesh’s culture is based on: 
Statutory control, Secrecy, Uniformity & Conservatism. 








The objective of this chapter is to discuss the research methodology and method used to 
achieve the research objectives set out in Chapter One. It attempts to provide a 
comprehensive description of the mixed methods employed (interviews and 
documentary analyses) and the philosophical justification of using these methods in the 
present study. Firstly, qualitative methods using primary data sources are suitable for 
answering research questions and interviews have therefore been used to gather the 
information necessary to study the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh. Secondly, 
documentary analyses (e.g. of enforcement data) are used to justify the regulator’s role 
in the compliance of IFRSs in a developing country.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Sections 5.2 and 5.3 describe 
research design and mixed methods. Qualitative interviews are then discussed in section 
5.4. Section 5.5 discusses the documentary analyses (e.g. enforcement actions by the 
SEC), and section 5.6 contains a summary and the conclusion of the chapter. 
 
5.2 Research Design 
 
According to De Vaus (2001, p. 9), “The function of a research design is to ensure that 
the evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial question as unambiguously as 
possible”. It has also been argued that a research design should minimise any incorrect 
causal relation between a theory and research question (Bryman & Bell, 2007). There 
are two types of research approaches to research design; deductive and inductive. The 
deductive approach
83
 is a method employed by researchers who are concerned with 
developing hypotheses in a form which is testable in the real world (Bryman, 2008). 
With inductive approaches
84
, on the other hand, researchers “begin with detailed 
observations of the world and move toward more abstract generalisations and ideas” 
(Neuman, 2000, p. 49). Unlike a (positivist) deductive approach, the theory is 
inductively derived from the observations/findings of the inductive approach.  
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 Theory  --------------›  Observations/findings [Deductive] 
84
 Observations/findings  ---------------------› Theory [Inductive] 
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In the present study, the focus is on testing the theory of the role of the state. Given this 
consideration, the choice of research methods to be used in the present study is 
informed by the research objectives and research questions. The objective of this 
research is to explore the implementation of IFRSs in a developing country, 
emphasising accounting regulatory frameworks, politico-institutional factors, cultural 
factors (e.g. [i] training opportunities in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption) 
and other country specific factors. This objective can be achieved through qualitative 
research. Because the present study is explorative in nature, a deductive approach fits, 
as a theory is to be tested rather than generated. The initial phase of the research, as set 
out in Chapter Two (see sections 2.3.4, 2.4.3, 2.5.3 and 2.6.4) help to identify various 
issues in relation to IFRSs implementation, and Chapter Three (containing the 
theoretical framework) creates a general theoretical framework. In the second phase of 
the research, the first and second round of interviews, and documentary analyses will 
help in testing the theory of the role of the state. The theoretical framework in the 
present study informs the paradigm of research design, and in particular the usage of 
mixed methods. The Weberian notion of the state suggests that ‘the development of 
accounting is not an evolutionary or holistic process, but emergent, open-ended and 
contingent’ (Mommsen, 1987, p. 35). It therefore provides a methodological strategy for 




5.3 Mixed Methods 
 
The strengths of one method can be balanced by the weaknesses of the other method 
(Bennett & Braumoeller, 2006). Fuentes (2008) argues that mixed methods provide 
“richer detail than either method can generate alone” (p. 1592). The prior literature 
illustrates some of the advantages of mixed methods in their studies. Firstly, when some 
theoretical expectations exist but appropriate propositions need to be developed, mixed 
methods can be a useful tool for understanding and validating those theories (Hesse-
Biber, 2010) (see section 5.2). Secondly, the complementary principle or the 
acceptability of mixed methods is better than a single method
86
. Finally, in terms of the 
generalisation of the conclusions, mixed methods provide evidence which contributes 
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 According to Colignon & Covaleski (1991, p. 154), “Weber’s advocacy of multiple methodologies, 
alternatively employing nomothetic institutional analysis with more ideographic historical and cultural 
features, provides the guidelines for bringing sociology and history together for the study of accounting”.  
86
 The weakness of single method usage will be overcome through mixed methods (the complementary 
principle) (Jick, 1979; Tarrow, 2004). 
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towards richer conclusions and a wider set of plausible explanations (Maxwell & 
Loomis, 2003). In terms of ‘philosophical issues’ (with regard to mixed methods), the 
traditional view of ontological and epistemological approaches to social sciences is as a 
differentiation between two schools of thoughts. A critical debate exists when choosing 
paradigms (ontology and epistemology), and evaluating their validity and ability to 
generate an understanding of the social system (Bhaskar, 1978; Sayer, 2004). Watts & 
Zimmerman (1990, p. 149) argue that “... debating methodology is a “no win” situation 
because each side argues from a different paradigm with different rules and no common 
ground”. Therefore, ‘critical realism’ as a philosophical stance can explain the reasons 
for choosing mixed methods (Archer, 2002; Llewellyn, 2007). This view is also 
supported by Modell (2010, p. 125), who argues for “Critical realism as a more 
appealing foundation for mixed methods research providing some paradigmatic ‘middle 
ground’ entailing clearly articulated analytical procedures”.  
 
It has been stated in Chapter One that the research methods employed in this research is 
determined by the research questions and research objectives (see Table 5-1). One of the 
purposes of this research is to explore the problems experienced in IFRSs 
implementation in a developing country such as Bangladesh. This aim can be achieved 
using interviews because constructing a social reality is a characteristic of this area of 
research. Another specific objective of the present research is to explore the evidence of 
the regulator’s role in IFRSs compliance over a period of time, and the documentary 
analyses will help in achieving this objective. It may be argued that the survey 
questionnaire and disclosure studies could be used as an alternative method in this 
research. However, these will overlap with the findings, because prior research already 
informs of the poor level of IFRSs compliance in Bangladesh. 
 
Table 5-1: Research Questions and how to investigate RQs (Mixed Methods) 
  
RQs How to investigate 
RQ-1: What is the relative impact of accounting 
regulatory frameworks and politico-institutional 
factors on the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh, 
as an example of a developing country?  
 
Interviews & Documentary 
analysis  
(The SEC Ordinance, 
Company Act, Stock 
Exchange Regulations, DSE 
SEC & ICAB Library)  
RQ-2(a): How do (i) training opportunities in the 
accounting profession and (ii) the state of corruption, 
as outcomes of culture in Bangladesh, affect the 
implementation of IFRSs; RQ-2(b): What other 
 
Interviews & Documentary 
analysis  
(Newspapers, Comments, 
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RQs How to investigate 
country specific factors are affecting implementation 
of IFRSs?; 
 
DSE, SEC & ICAB Library) 
RQ-3: How does a study of implementing IFRSs help 
to build an understanding of a theory of the role of the 
state in accounting change in a developing country 




 Documentary analysis 
 
5.4 Interviews  
 
5.4.1 Semi-structured interviews [1st Round] 
 
A total of 27 semi-structured interviews were conducted over a twelve-week period 
from 3
rd
 June 2010 to 30
th
 August 2010 during a field trip. Communication with all 
interviewees was done through e-mail regarding the date of the interview (see Appendix 
5-1). A letter of introduction and interview questions were sent in advance before the 
interview (see Appendices 5-2 and 5-3). The researcher’s initial motivation was to 
record all interviews. However, 13 of the interviewees (4 policy makers, 7 account 
preparers & professionals, and 2 users) were not convinced about recording the 
interview. Therefore, extensive notes were taken during the interview. The length of 
most of the interviews ranged from 60 minutes to 90 minutes. In addition, notes were 
taken on the major issues raised by respondents, not only for back-up purposes but also 
as a quick reference during subsequent interviews. Then, the interviews were 
transcribed through coding and respondent anonymity was guaranteed based on the 
interviewees’ permission.  
 
The study uses a non-random stratified sampling method, often used in qualitative 
research, to select the interviewees (Gibbs, 2008). The idea behind the qualitative 
research is to purposively select interviewees who can help the researcher to understand 
the specific problem and the research question (Creswell, 2007, p. 178). Qualitative 
research does not necessarily suggest a large number of participants, as are found in 
quantitative research (Patton, 2001). Therefore, Miles & Huberman (1994) suggest six 
to eight interviews are enough to justify the results. Similarly, the present study 
considers 27 interviews consisting of four groups. Street (2002, p. 218) argues that “Yet, 
this final [implementation of IFRSs] step will represent a long process and significant 
progress will require a joint effort in each country by the government, stock market 
regulators, preparers, users and standard setters, and the accounting profession. 
Achieving the Vision is dependent on various parties, including accounting educators, 
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contributing their resources and expertise to this important effort”. Consistent with this 
comment, in the present study a broad spectrum of respondents, grouped into four 
defined groups [(a) policy makers, (b) accounts preparers & professionals, (c) users and 
(d) academics & researchers)] were selected for the interviews (see Table 5-2 for the 
summary of the interviewees and Appendix 5-4 for the detailed summary of the 
interviewees). These interviewees were chosen because they play important roles in the 
implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh. The selection criteria for the four groups were 
as follows: 
 
a. The policy makers, including the ICAB (The Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Bangladesh) officials, the ICMAB (The Institute of Cost and Management 
Accountants of Bangladesh) officials, the SEC (The Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Bangladesh) official, the World Bank liaison personnel, a 
Bangladesh Bank (the central bank of Bangladesh) official and a Ministry of 
Finance official were selected because they were directly and closely involved in the 
decision making processes of the adoption and implementation of Bangladesh 
Accounting Standards (BASs) and IASs/IFRSs. These seven interviewees from the 
ICAB, ICMAB, SEC, World Bank, Bangladesh Bank, and Ministry of Finance were 
responsible for standard setting and for monitoring the compliance with the 
standards. 
 
b. Accounts preparers & professionals (e.g. auditors and company accountants) were 
chosen because they were responsible for following/complying the mandated 
standards in the financial statements. This group includes twelve interviewees, 
selected based on their experience (at least 5 years) preparing accounts and auditing. 
 
c. Users87 (e.g. bank managers, credit rating agency officials and stock brokers) were 
chosen because they could voice their opinions on the adoption and the 
implementation process. In this study, I have used a bank manager, a credit rating 
agency official and a stock broker as a proxy of users because some users in 
developing countries like Bangladesh would have no direct knowledge of IFRSs. I 
selected six interviewees based on their experience (of at least 5 years) in banks, 
credit rating agencies and stock broking houses. 
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 The researcher gratefully acknowledges Professor David Alexander & Brian Singleton-Green 
(ICAEW) for commenting on the selection of users in the study (BAFA Colloquium 2010, Cardiff, UK). 
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d. The academics and researchers were selected because they have been researching 
the adoption and implementation of IFRSs issues in Bangladesh and have formed 
opinions on this issue. Two interviewees were chosen based on their experiences (of 
at least 10 years) in researching accounting standards issues in Bangladesh. 



















PM1 ICAB  (The Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Bangladesh ) 
26 
PM2 ICAB  (The Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Bangladesh ) 
10 
PM3 ICMAB (The Institute of Cost & Management 
Accountants of Bangladesh) 
30 
PM4 SEC (The Securities & Exchange Commission of 
Bangladesh) 
11 
PM5 World Bank 14 
PM6 Bangladesh Bank 40 





















AP1 Big 4 Accountancy Firm in Bangladesh  32 
AP2 A Pharmaceutical company 24 
AP3 Big 4 Accountancy Firm in Bangladesh 9 
AP4 Small Accountancy Firm  10 
AP5 Bank  10 
AP6 An Engineering company 8 
AP7 Bank  15 
AP8 Small Accountancy Firm 5 
AP9 Small Accountancy Firm 20 
AP10 Multinational company 11 
AP11 A Pharmaceutical company 7 








US1 Bank 10 
US2 Stock Broker and Central Depository Bangladesh 
Limited (CDBL) participatory 
9 
US3 Financial Institution and Central Depository 
Bangladesh Limited (CDBL) participatory 
8 
US4 Bank  10 
US5 Credit Rating Agency of Bangladesh  5 


















A Public University, Bangladesh 10 
 
 
Chapter Five – Research Methodology                                               118                                 
 
In addition to the planned interviews, informal discussions with senior executives and 
directors of government departments provided informal initial briefings for this study. 
These included personnel from the Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh, the Technical and 
Research Committee of the ICAB, the Credit Rating Agency of Bangladesh, senior 
officials from the Bangladesh Bank, the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Bangladesh and various university academics in Bangladesh. 
 
All of the interview questions were open-ended and semi-structured in order to allow 
respondents to provide their views through a ‘free-flowing’ discussion. Cottle (1977, p. 
27) argues that “Without allowing people to speak freely we will never know what their 
real intentions are, and what the true meaning of their words might be”. In order to 
prepare the interview questions, Wengraf (2006, p. 75) suggests that the interview 
questions should follow sequences starting from the theory research question, research 
propositions and follow up questions (reflections) (Kvale, 1996). This approach is also 
discussed by Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) who argue that the interview questions should 
include open/commenting questions that allow the interviewees opportunities to remark 
on the particular issues they feel important (Healey, 1991; Jankowicz, 2005). In the 
present study, I use Wengraf’s (2006) sequential pyramid model to prepare the 
interview questions (see Figure 5-1). However, Beardsworth & Keil (1992, pp. 261-
262) expressed the view regarding the sequential approach that “The semi-structured 
interviews programme should not be based upon a set of relatively rigid pre-determined 
questions and prompts. Rather, the open ended, discursive nature of the interviews 
permitted an iterative process of refinement, whereby lines of thought identified by the 
earlier interviewees could be taken up and presented to latter interviewees”.  
 
The interview questions (IQ) in the present study are prepared based on the prior 
research on the role of the state and accounting (see section 2.2.3), propositions 
development (see sections 2.3.4, 2.4.3 and 2.5.3), and the theoretical framework (see 
section 3.2.2.1). IQ1 and IQ2 are related to accounting regulatory frameworks 
(proposition one). IQ3 and IQ4 are related to politico-institutional frameworks 
(proposition two). IQ5, IQ6 and IQ7 concern [i] training opportunities in the accounting 
profession and [ii] corruption (proposition three). IQ8 refers to other country specific 
factors while IQ9 concerns interviewees’ further comments regarding IFRSs 
implementation. Figure 5-2 provides a link between the first round interview questions 
and the present study’s theoretical framework. 
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The general interview guides
88
 for the study are shown in Appendix 5-5; these guides 
are modified because the study includes four different groups (i.e. policy makers, 


















                                                 
88
 This approach is suggested by Creswell (2007). 
Accounting Regulations (RQ-1) 
 
Politico-Institutional Factors (RQ-1) 




Opportunity of the interviewees to 
explore any other relevant issues  
 
Cultural factors (e.g. [i] Training 
opportunities in the accounting profession 




Theory of the Role of the state (RQ-3)  
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                                                                                        1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8: First Round IQs 
         1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7: Second Round IQs   
M:  Mixed Evidence from Prior Literature 




Role of the State 
  State approves experts to 
write rules? [M] 3.2.1.1 
 Consults with  various 
stakeholders on validating 
rules[M] 3.2.1.2 
 Enforces the rules 3.2.1.3 
 State’s accountability to 
citizens? [M] 3.2.1.4 
 
Implementation of 
IFRSs as an example 





Field Level (OF) 
 Trade Unions 












frameworks (PI) 2.3.4 
 
Politico-institutional 
factors (PII) 2.4.3 [3.2.1.5]  
 
Cultural factors (e.g. [i] 
training opportunities in 
the accounting profession 
& [ii] corruption) (PIII) 
2.5.3 
 







1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 
7, 8 
1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 
7 
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5.4.2 The 2nd Round Interviews  
 
I decided to follow up the first round of interviews in order to investigate IFRSs 
implementation issues in more depth. 27 interviewees (i.e. 1
st
 round interviewees) were 
therefore contacted for follow-up interviews via e-mail and telephone, but only 12 of 





 of September 2011. Creswell (2007) argues that follow-up interviews help 
researchers to obtain detailed and in-depth data. They also provide some useful 
information for the development of an analytical framework (Yin, 2003). The interview 
questions for the second round interviews are prepared based on the findings of the first 
round interviews (see Appendix 5-6 and Figure 5-2). Figure 5-2 provides a link between 
the second round interview questions and the theoretical framework. This systematic 
process has been used to validate the propositions and theoretical framework of the 
present study.  
 
Table 5-3 shows that AP and US groups represent 33% of the sample when comparing 
the 2
nd
 round interviews to the 1
st
 round interviews. The follow-up rate was below 50% 
but selection bias was minimised by ensuring that interviewees from all the groups were 
seen. Wrate et al. (1985, p. 622) argue that well standardised measures can minimise 
selection bias. Myers & Newman (2007, p. 22) also note that representing a variety of 
voices can overcome various biases (e.g. selection bias) and researcher(s) should 
therefore include a variety of subjects in their sample at various organisational levels, if 
this is possible and appropriate. Hayes & Walsham (2001, p. 265) view that “Given the 
number of interviewees (33 in total) it is most likely that there were a variety of voices 
represented”. However, no articles in financial reporting research have reported on 
follow up interviews’ selection bias
89
. The findings from the 2
nd
 round interviews in the 







                                                 
89
 In financial reporting literature, although Illés et al. (1996, p. 531) comment on selection bias based on 
the first round interviews and opine that “Respondents were generally very cooperative. Consequently 
respondent bias is not thought to be a problem in these particular cases....Crosschecking the overall 
attitudes to the specific responses on any accounting issues did not reveal any significant bias”, they did 
not conduct 2
nd
 round interviews or, therefore, encounter the risk of follow up selection bias. 
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PM AP US AR Total 
2
nd





















  Round  2010 7 12 6 2 27 
2
nd
 Round Interviews to  
1
st











5.4.3 Ethical Issues 
 
The study includes consideration of the human participants’ involvement (in the semi-
structured interviews). With regard to research questions 1, 2 and 3 (see Table 5-1), 
confidentiality (Elliot & Judy, 1997) and informed consent (Esterberg, 2002) are 
rigorously maintained. The participants of the interviews are guaranteed that their 
involvement of the study will not be disclosed and that their anonymity will be 
preserved as well (Henslin, 1995). In addition, debriefing (Lincoln & Guba, 1989) 
means that the interviewees involved the study are assured that they will have a 100% 
right to withdraw from the participation at any time (Kvale, 1996). The study also 
follows the research ethics guidelines of the University of Edinburgh Business School 
(see Appendix 5-7). The data that the researcher collects are kept confidential. 
Information about the participants which has been collected during the research is put 
away and access restricted so that no-one but the researcher is able to consult it. Any 
information about the participants has a code number instead of the participant’s name 
and/or their organisation’s name.  
 
The data are managed on the researcher’s personal laptop, with password protection and 
a firewall system installed. Only the researcher has access to the laptop. File sharing 
services have not been used by the researcher, since sharing services such as Google 
Docs or Dropbox may not be completely secure. So, the data are not shared with, or 
given to, anyone. The data are not sent via email or by any other file transfer means 
without encryption. It is also assured that no names will be identified or preserved by 
the researcher and that the data will be destroyed after 10 years.  
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5.4.4 Coding and analysing 
 
Three main methods for developing themes and codes are the theory-driven approach, 
the prior-research-driven approach and the data-driven approach (Boyatzis, 1998). For 
the purposes of this research, the main methods used are prior-research-driven and 
theory-driven. With regard to Chapter Two (previous research) and Chapter Three 
(theoretical papers), these are used to develop the theoretical framework which is to be 
used as coding schemes for the propositions. Three propositions (i.e. accounting 
regulatory frameworks, politico-institutional factors and cultural factors) and other 
country specific factors are used as the main themes in the coding. Data from the 
interviews is analysed using the coding, which constitutes “two simultaneous activities: 
mechanical data reduction and analysis categorisation of data into themes” (Neuman, 
2000, p. 421). In this research, the main aim is to summarise data and categorise it into 
information relating to different themes. Two types of coding are used in this research. 
The first type is open coding (policy makers [PM]; accounts preparers & professionals 
[AP]; users [US]; and academics & researchers [US]), which condenses the bulk of the 
data into manageable categories (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).  
 
In this research, the open codes consist of four themes (the three propositions, and other 
country specific factors). The second type of coding is axial coding (Jankowicz, 2005), 
which the researcher uses for  the additional coding of sub themes (quality of investor 
protection laws, stakeholders’ participation/non-participation in the standard setting 
process and stringent/looser enforcement of the laws are all sub-themes of accounting 
regulatory frameworks). Appendix 5-8 shows the open and axial coding of a transcribed 
interview. With reference to coding bias, it is worth mentioning that non-coded texts 
(i.e. texts in black font) have been excluded for consistency with the research questions. 
For instance, out of 27 interviewees, only one interviewee, a policymaker, mentions 
trade unions (see Appendix 5-8) by stating “I think [that] there should be some kind of 
discussion and all that. But to implement or formulate IFRSs, you cannot please 
everyone. So it is not like an open ended participatory approach because trade bodies 
and business people will object so many things specially some of the regulatory laws” 
[PM6: Q4]. Hence, this issue has been excluded from coding. 
 
Creswell (2007, p. 57) states that qualitative interview data can be analysed using 
several generic processes. With regard to analysis, this research therefore employs 
coding schemes to analyse data from the interviews, using several generic processes 
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(Creswell, 2007, p. 185) (see Figures 5-3 and 5-4). In this study, the interviews are 
translated into English, as most of the interviewees responded in Bengali (see Appendix 
5-8 for an example of the transcription). The text data generated from the first round of 
27 and the second round of 12 interviews comprised 253 pages (in Bengali and English 
versions). Secondly, the data are organised and highlighted. Thirdly, from the interview 
data, the four themes are classified into sub-themes. Fourthly, any information that 
would not fit within any of the four themes, such as opinions/suggestions, is also 
highlighted using colour. Lastly, the researcher reread the transcript in order to ensure 
consistency and validity. One limitation of this analysis is the fact that the interviews 
are time consuming, because all conversations require translation into English. 
Therefore, a computer aided software programme is not used to analyse data in the 
present study. Some researchers point out that software can make the analysing process 
faster and more efficient (Bryman & Bell, 2007). Wengraf (2006) suggests that a 
researcher may analyse qualitative information into a quantitative form. However, if the 
sample size is small, the researcher can use descriptive statistics to analyse data 
(Boyatzis, 1998). Since the number of interviewees in the present study is only 27 and 
this does not represent a very large data set; the data are therefore analysed manually. 
 




     Source: Adapted from Creswell (2007, p. 185). 
Interpreting the meaning of various themes in IFRS 
implementation in Bangladesh 
Interrelating the themes of IFRSs implementation 
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Themes [Figure 5-4] 
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Reading through all the interview data 
Coding the Data [PM, AP, US & AR] 
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Figure 5-4: Data analyses relationships (Drivers of accounting change and interview 
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5.4.5 Limitations of interviews 
 
Some limitations arise from conducting the interviews in Bangladesh, as an example of 
a developing country. Firstly, some of the interviewees cancel their appointments, and 
in some cases the waiting time
90
 is too long. Some interviewees are attending to phone 
calls, having conversations with their colleagues and background noise during the 
interviews. Secondly, some interviewees answer with ‘yes/no’ and/or ‘no comment’ and 
are reluctant to explain much. Thirdly, as most of the interviewees explain their answers 
in Bengali, it is time consuming to translate all the conversations into English. I rely on 
the behaviour, tone and intentions of the interviewees and on extensive note taking 
during the interviews. Finally, there are a number of technical difficulties observed 
when transferring information from Bengali to English. Some words have the same 
meanings, a different meaning or no equivalent meaning. For example, ‘democracy’ or 
‘democratic’ have been used to explain ‘co-operative’ purposes, ‘gravity’ to explain 
‘nature’; and there is no equivalence for the Bengali words ‘sailab’, or ‘sairachar’, etc., 
in English. Grammatical and syntactical structures also vary; for example, the majority 
of interviewees’ responses are a mix of Bengali and English, and also often feature 
incomplete sentences, overlapping speech and a lack of clear-cut endings in speech. 
This is understandable because the official language of the interviewees is Bengali and 
therefore they feel comfortable speaking Bengali. Allowing interviewees to respond in 
their primary language increase the interviewees’ comfort levels with the researcher 
(Edwards, 1998). Further, the researcher as translator/interpreter and sharing the cultural 
background of the participants’ country may minimise the problems with language 
barriers to some extent (Williamson, 2011, p. 391). This process helps the researcher to 
obtain richer data from first language responses (Esposito, 2001). 
 
5.4.6 Reliability and validity 
 
Neuman (2000, p. 170) defines reliability as ‘dependability and consistency’. During 
the research process, some concerns may arise, such as errors and bias. Audiotape and 
videotape recording are important methods of recording information (Boyatzis, 1998). 
In this study, an audio recorder (Digital Stereo Recorder) is used to record the 
interviews, together with manual note taking during the interviews. During the 
interviews, cross-checked questions are helpful in ensuring reliability. For example, the 
                                                 
90
 For example, the initial appointment time was 10:00 am and on one occasion I waited until 3:00 pm to 
conduct the interview. 
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researcher asks the same questions more than once. The consistency
91
 of the coding is 
thereby maintained. The researcher checks the transcripts twice to make sure that no 
mistakes were made during the transcription. 
 
Qualitative validity means that researchers check the accuracy of their findings by 
employing certain procedures (Gibbs, 2008). So, validity is based on determining 
whether the findings are accurate from the standpoint of the researcher, the participant 
or the readers (Creswell & Miller, 2000). However, Neuman (2000) argues that 
qualitative researchers are more interested in authenticity
92
 than in validity. In the 
present study, 12 second round/follow up interviews (i.e. interviews from each 
category: PM, AP, AR & US) help the researcher to gain confidence in the 
generalisablity of the findings (Internal validity: the selection of interviewees; External 
validity: generalisablity of the conclusion; and Construct validity: reflection of theory 
concepts) (Jick, 1979; Miles & Huberman, 1994). In addition, different data sources and 
comparison of people with different points of view from each category (triangulation
93
) 
are used to build a coherent justification of themes (Ryan et al., 2002; Modell, 2005; 
Gibbs, 2008). The researcher uses the SEC enforcement data to confirm information 
that the researcher has received from the interviews.  
 
5.5 Documentary Analyses  
 
The study examines the enforcement notices issued by the SEC from the beginning of 
1998 through the end of 2010, that relate to violations of accounting regulations. The 
period of study is selected because the SEC began taking a more proactive role in the 
monitoring of those involved in the disclosure process during this period because  the 
SEC mandate IFRSs compliance from 1998. In addition, this time period corresponds 
with a period of significant change which has occurred within the market and the 
political regime including comments from the ICAB on the quality of annual reports, 
the SEC Corporate Governance Ordinance 2006, recommendations for Financial 
Reporting Act, the establishment of an independent oversight board, recommendations 
                                                 
91
 Miles & Huberman (1994) recommend that the consistency of the coding means at least 80% of the 
time for good qualitative reliability. 
92
 Authenticity means giving a fair, honest, and balanced account of social life from the viewpoint of 
someone who lives it every day. 
93
 Campbell & Fiske’s study (1959, p. 83) defines triangulation as “use of multiple methods”. Later, 
Patton (1999, 2001) argues that the issues of reliability and validity can be maintained by triangulation.     
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for education requirements for the accountancy profession, significant changes in the 
overall practice of accounting firms (e.g. quality control and the scope of services of 
audit firms) and different government systems (democratic and military-backed 
government). 
  
The enforcement notices during this period are SEC releases which address a number of 
accounting, auditing and reporting concerns. However, few of these releases involve 
SEC enforcement action on accounting standards. The researcher has hand-collected 
information from the SEC website (http://www.secbd.org/). Each SEC filing is carefully 
reviewed to ensure consistency (Rollins & Bremser, 1997; Chen et al., 2005). I 
carefully review SEC announcements and eliminate 57 observations that are repeating 
from an earlier press release; 24 are not accessible from the website
94
. The 1,647 
enforcement actions are not equal to the number of releases, because, as mentioned, 
some of the releases contain more than one enforcement action. Bremser et al. (1991), 
Feroz et al. (1991), Campbell & Parker (1992) and Files (2012) also address the fact 
that some releases repeat enforcement actions. The data analysis
95
 in this study is based 
upon the examination of these enforcement actions, as contained in the releases of the 
SEC during the study period. My final sample consists of 42 unique observations 
because these enforcement notices are related to specific violations of accounting 
regulations. 
 
There are some limitations in terms of the data collection and analyses: first, some of 
the enforcement actions in Bengali and part of the notices are not readable. Second, the 
information given in some of the notices is not available on the website. The researcher 
contacted the SEC by e-mail and with a personal visit but was unable to collect the 
information. It can be understood that since the SEC is a state institution, it is likely to 
be highly bureaucratic and its employees may be uncomfortable or even afraid to 
disclose the information. Third, a few of the releases contain repeated information on 
the same enforcement actions. Fourth, manually retrieving the press release 
announcements is time consuming because the bandwidth of the website they are posted 
on is very low. For example, the SEC does not maintain a fully computerised database 
                                                 
94
 For example, Sl. No. 3, Date: 09/02/2010, Subject: Warning: Non-compliance of securities laws: 




 In the study, the data is analysed following the procedure of Campbell & Parker (1992) & Files (2012). 
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system for enforcement systems and is still maintaining a manual filing system.  Fifth, 
no full record of enforcement documents was available; for instance, data related to 
thirteen years ago was not available. Sixth, there was a lack of co-ordination among the 
staff. The researcher had to get signatures from all the staff in the Enforcement 
Department of the SEC. Seventh, there was a tendency to frequently cancel meetings 
with the researcher. Finally, the study follows a subjective analysis of the SEC 
enforcement releases. The material does not lend itself to quantitative analysis. 
Nevertheless, this limitation is mitigated by the fact that a substantial number of 
enforcement releases are analysed. Thus, subjective interpretations are reinforced 
throughout the study period in reviewing all the actions taken by the SEC. As a result of 
this analysis additional research avenues are identified, in particular regarding the role 
of the SEC in developing countries.  
 
5.6 Summary and Conclusion 
 
To recap, this chapter has focused on the research methods involved in the study. The 
deductive approach has been used in this research to achieve the closely related 
objectives set out in chapter one (e.g. the specific objective of this research is to study 
the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh) (see section 5.2). This research is designed 
as a combination of interviews and documentary analysis (i.e. mixed methods) (see 
section 5.3). The critical realism philosophy justifies the reasons for choosing the mixed 
methods (see section 5.3). With regard to qualitative analyses (see section 5.4), 27 semi 
structured interviews (1
st
 Round) and 12 second round interviews are conducted (see 
sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2). In order to analyse data from the interviews, coding schemes 
are developed using Creswell’s (2007) generic approach (see section 5.4.4). The 
limitations of conducting interviews are also reported (see section 5.4.5). The reliability 
and validity issues involved in qualitative interviews are discussed (see section 5.4.6). 
The results of the interviews are reported in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight.  
 
The second method employed is documentary analyses (see section 5.5). The study 
examines 42 IFRSs related enforcement notices issued by the SEC from the beginning 
of 1998 through to the end of 2010, relating to violations of accounting regulations. In 
order to analyse the data, the study uses manual analysis.  
Chapter Five – Research Methodology                                               130                                 
 
Mixed methods employed in the study will help in discussing the findings of research 
questions in the next three chapters respectively. Firstly, in chapter six (RQ-1), the main 
objective is to provide findings on the relative impact of accounting regulatory 
frameworks and politico-institutional factors on the implementation of IFRSs. Secondly, 
in chapter seven, the impact of [i] training opportunities in the accounting profession 
and [ii] corruption [RQ-2(a)] and other country specific factors [RQ-2(b)] in the 
implementation of IFRSs will be discussed. Finally, in chapter eight (RQ-3), the theory 
of the role of the state in accounting change will be explored based on the findings from 
the interviews and the enforcement data. More specifically, this mixed methods will 
generally attempt to evaluate three propositions and their theoretical application in 
terms of IFRSs implementation in a developing country such as Bangladesh.  




Relative Impact of Accounting Regulatory 
Frameworks and Politico-Institutional 




The chapter presents the results of RQ-1: What is the relative impact of accounting 
regulatory frameworks and politico-institutional factors on the implementation of IFRSs 
in Bangladesh as an example of a developing country? The principal objective is to 
ascertain interviewees’ views regarding the implementation of IFRSs. Based on a 
review of prior literature, I developed three propositions with regard to the discussion of 
IFRS implementation in Bangladesh (see sections 2.3.4, 2.4.3 [3.2.1.5] and 2.5.3). The 
interview questions are developed in section 5.4.1. These questions cover the three 
propositions and request information about how the four groups of interviewees 
perceive the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh. In this chapter, based on an 
analysis of the interview data
96
, I will emphasise the first two propositions (i.e. 
accounting regulatory frameworks and politico-institutional factors). A limitation of the 
interviews is that most of the interviewees explained their answers in Bengali (see 
details in section 5.4.5). As mentioned in section 5.4.4, I rely on the tone of the 
interviewees and on extensive note taking. In this research, the italics in the interview 
quote indicate that the interviewee strongly emphasised the specific issue (i.e. I have 
tried to convey the interviewees’ tone by use of italics). 
 
The first proposition relates to the effectiveness of accounting regulatory frameworks 
(see section 2.3.4). Accounting regulation and its effect upon IFRSs implementation is 
the central issue to be considered. The second proposition relates to politico-
institutional factors, including governmental intervention in terms of IFRSs 
implementation, and the degree of co-operation between other institutional bodies in 
ensuring effective implementation of IFRSs. I used enforcement documents from 1998-
2010 available from the SEC websites (see section 5.5). Firstly, the documentary 
evidence will offer insights into trends in accounting standards-related violations in 
                                                 
96
 The details of the interview data analyses process are provided in Chapter Five (see section 5.4.4).  
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Bangladesh. Secondly, the issue of a lack of regulations to carry out the regulators 
activities is discussed. Thirdly, I ask: is there any political influence in monitoring 
violations of accounting rules, and is there any co-operation between different 
institutional bodies in support of the regulator’s activities? 
 
Section 6.2 reports the interview findings and the documentary evidence on accounting 
regulatory frameworks. Section 6.3 presents the findings on politico-institutional 
factors. Section 6.4 reflects on the relative impact of accounting regulatory frameworks 
and politico-institutional factors, and Section 6.5 contains the summary and 
conclusions.  
 
6.2 Accounting Regulatory Frameworks (Proposition I) 
 
In this section, I will explore the following proposition: 
 
PI: Accounting regulatory frameworks will have a positive influence on implementation 
of IFRSs under the conditions of (a) common-law origin, (b) high quality investor 
protection laws, (c) stakeholders’ participation in the standard setting process and (d) 
stringent enforcement of the laws. 
  
‘or’ Accounting regulatory frameworks will have a negative influence on 
implementation of IFRSs under the conditions of (a) code-law origin, (b) low quality 
investor protection laws, (c) stakeholders’ non-participation in the standard setting 
process and (d) looser enforcement of the laws. 
 
In doing so, I will analyse whether Bangladesh’s accounting regulatory frameworks will 
have a positive/negative influence on implementation of IFRSs under four conditions. 
As mentioned in Chapter Four (see section 4.3.1), Bangladesh has common-law origins, 
the following sections will discuss the conditions of (b), (c) and (d) to analyse 
proposition I.  
 
The interviewees were asked: How would you describe the accounting regulatory 
frameworks in relation to the existing laws for investor protection, standard setting 
process and enforcement issues in Bangladesh? (see section 5.4.1). As reported in 
Table 6-1, out of 24 respondents who are negative, nine interviewees believe that solid 
regulations are essential because of low quality ‘investor protection laws’; four believe 
that the standards setting process should be more participatory, democratic, engagement 
and transparent rather than having a ‘closed door policy’, and 11 argue that enforcement 
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is questionable because of apparent looser outcomes of the laws. Only three 
interviewees are convinced that the current regulations are satisfactory. The following 
sections (6.2.1-6.2.5) will evaluate the accounting regulatory frameworks for 
implementing IFRSs in Bangladesh in line with proposition I.  
 







PM AP US AR Total % 











0 9/27 33% 
 
Stakeholders’ non-
participation in the 







































0 0 3/27 11% 
 























Notes: Code (Interviewee): PM: Policy makers; AP: Preparers & Professionals; US: Users; AR: 
Academics & Researchers; and *
a
: The interviewee mentions more than one issue; the less discussed 
issue = ‘0’, otherwise ‘1’. 
 
6.2.1 Quality of investor protection laws  
 
6.2.1.1 The 1st round interviews 
 
Nine interviewees (four policy makers, two account preparers and three users) are 
sceptical about the corporate motives behind the need for regulations (see Table 6-1). In 
their opinions, the regulations are not satisfactory and there is a need to establish 
efficient regulations for improving the transparency of corporate reporting to gain the 
public trust. They question the intentions and motivations behind creating an effective 
regulatory system. According to interviewees, effective regulations are a prerequisite of 
the implementation of solutions for any accounting issues; effective regulatory 
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mechanisms will ensure transparency of information provided by companies. The 
following comment is representative of those made by the interviewees regarding the 
need for regulation:  
 
“I think that many international investors really require transparent information 
in financial reporting, and corporate sectors recently realised that unless they 
produce good financial standards with all disclosures and compliance with the 
IFRSs, they will not be able to please the investors [or] make them happy. So, 
the motivations are to make sound regulatory systems for providing transparent 
and detailed information” (PM1). 
 
The users and account preparers are also sceptical about the current state of regulations. 
They argue that the inconsistencies between local laws and IFRSs are overlooked by the 
regulatory bodies and need much more attention to make the regulatory systems 
effective (see also sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). One account preparer expressed the 
following view: 
 
“Well, I would say it’s not very satisfactory because there is lack of consistency 
between the Companies Act 1994 and IFRSs. This inconsistency has not yet been 
resolved by the ICAB or the SEC for the last 13 years. To be honest, the 
accounting profession and sectors like the ICAB, SEC, DSE, and CSE do not 
care to resolve this matter” (AP5). 
 
To make effective regulations, the policymakers (four interviewees) believe that the 
most effective way to improve corporate accountability is through public pressure 
exerted by domestic and international organisations. The following comment represents 
the sentiments of these interviewees: 
 
“Yes, the government has already made a commitment to international 
authorities such as the World Bank, the ADB and other donor agencies, that they 
will take steps to implement IFRSs. That’s why the interim government has 
already enacted one provision under the Financial Reporting Ordinance which 
is supposed to supervise the implementation of status of IFRSs” (PM3). 
 
The interviewees from the AP group see the recent move  (i.e. best published annual 
reports award in Bangladesh and the South Asia) by the ICAB and the SAFA as 
encouraging and an excellent way of potentially improving the quality of financial 
reporting. The motivating factors for companies to make competitive reports include 
greater initiatives taken by the ICAB and SAFA. Two interviewees from the AP group 
supported the ICAB: 
 
“I think [that] introducing best published accounts [by the] ICAB really 
motivates companies to follow IFRSs. I also think [that] the more you make it 
competitive, the more [there will be] compliance with IFRSs. So, the motivation 
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is basically [as to] how to make this published accounts good to enhance the 
image of the company and the investors” (AP1). 
 
“Three years ago, the financial regulation situation in Bangladesh was not good. 
But in [the] last two to three years the scenario has changed. The ICAB provides 
rewards to local companies for better compliance with accounting regulations. 
Companies who get reward[s] from the ICAB can qualify for a SAFA award. So, 
it becomes very important for the competitive image of companies to comply 
with IFRSs [for example, Bangladeshi companies have received the best annual 
report practice award within the SAFA]” (AP5). 
 
However, according to the interviewees, legal and corporate governance reforms that 
are beneficial to less powerful stakeholders may be difficult to implement because of 
relatively high levels of government corruption in Bangladesh. It is hard to anticipate 
whether or not accounting professionals will do their jobs in creating a transparent 
corporate environment. The interviewees feel that the fundamental problems lie in the 
fact that accountants are fulfilling the wishes of directors, and most privatised 
companies in Bangladesh are closely family-led businesses. Hence, those companies do 
not want to disclose confidential information. Questions are raised by three interviewees 
(two policy makers, and one academic & researcher) about the professional ethics as 
well. One interviewee expressed this sentiment: 
 
 “I don’t think it is very satisfactory, because CAs are paid fees for their audit 
services and they submit the reports to the companies and regulatory bodies. The 
CA firms are obligated to the clients [companies]. They should give a 
completely impartial view but I have seen, in my past experience as a Governor,  
that many of the reports [by] companies, banks or financial institutions [sent] to 
Bangladesh Bank and different regulatory agencies only reflect their [company 
directors] wishes… So, there is no impartiality or professionalism in preparing 
the reports..... there is a large scope for improvement of accounting regulations 
of Bangladesh” (PM6). 
 
The evidence from the 1
st
 round interviews (see section 6.2.1.1) suggests that the 
importance of high quality investor protection regulations which can play a positive role 
in the development of financial reporting in Bangladesh, especially regarding the 
implementation of IFRSs. However, in order to effect meaningful change, the 
interviewees suggest that reforms to existing corporate laws and corporate governance 
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6.2.1.2 The 2nd round interviews 
 
The interviewees were asked: 1(a). How would you describe the accounting regulatory 
process in Bangladesh? (see section 5.4.2). Eleven interviewees (92%) feel that there is 
a need for regulations in order to implement IFRSs because of the existing low quality 
investor protection laws (see Table 6-2). The only interviewee from the SEC believes 
that there are enough regulations already (see Table 6-2). This is an understandable 
view of Bangladesh because the SEC official is linked with the Ministry of Finance. 
Two out of the eleven interviewees also feel that some contradictory regulations exist 
between the Bangladesh Bank and IFRS 7 (BFRS 7), explained as follows: 
 
“There are some contradictory issues between the BRPD Circular No.14 and 
IFRS 7. ….. if the company follows BRPD Circular No. 14, the true profit (held 
for maturity) of the company will not be shown” (PM5). 
 
“BRPD circular no. 14 contradicts the financial instrument valuation…this 
means that fair value accounting is not applicable in Bangladesh” (AP5). 
 





 PM AP US AR Total % 



















0 0 0 1/12 8% 
 
6.2.2 Stakeholders’ participation/non-participation in the 
standard setting process  
 
6.2.2.1 The 1st round interviews 
 
Four interviewees (three account preparers and one academic & researcher) express 
disappointment regarding the accounting standard setting process in Bangladesh (see 
Table 6-1). They state that the standard setting process should be more transparent (e.g. 
stakeholders’ participation in the standard setting process) than it is at present. The 
current practice of standard setting in Bangladesh is viewed as far from satisfactory and 
does not promote the desired levels of transparency and accountability. One interviewee 
states this clearly: 
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“It is very important that a form of the Bangladesh Accounting Standard Board 
(BASB) be established under the statute by virtue of the Securities Commission 
Act. The accounting professions (the ICAB and the ICMAB), the regulatory 
agencies (for example, SEC), stock exchanges, chamber of commerce and major 
users of corporate annual reports should participate [in] reviewing accounting 
standards. The standard-setting should be broad-based, with legal backing and 
punitive measures in respect of non-compliance” (AR1). 
 
In line with accountability and transparency, accounts preparers are also supportive of 
creating a Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and enforcing it through a Financial 
Reporting Act (FRA). However, this is a political process, since the caretaker 
government made the encouraging step of the Financial Reporting Ordinance of 2008; 
the present democratic government is reluctant to make this Ordinance an Act. The key 
advantage of making FRC and FRA are engagement and an effective monitoring policy, 
rather than having too many key actors in the regulatory process (see section 4.4.1). One 
interviewee expressed this sentiment: 
    
“I suggest that if the MOC can really asks professional bodies to fully comply 
with IFRSs, as to what needs to be done and how we can get the task done, 
…..then we should work out together towards an action plan so that full 
compliance and monitoring responsibilities can be given to the proposed 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC). Once the FRC is in place [then] they can 
monitor. So, one step is to establish the FRC and another is to make the FRC 
fully effective and functional…….Therefore, the MOC should include the 
preparers and accountants in the standard setting process in order to 
accommodate the problems we are facing in practice”” (AP10). 
  
The interviewees in the study also reveal that the standard-setting process
97
 in 
Bangladesh is highly political in nature. The interviewees criticised the standard setting 
process, seeing it as ‘political’, for various reasons including the fact that there is no 
exposure draft, and that the members of the standards setting committee change when a 
new democratic government comes into power. 
 
The interviewees are asked: Who really regulates accounting issues in the country 
[Bangladesh] today? (see section 5.4.1). It is found that 26 of the 27 respondents 
perceive ICAB to be the regulator of accounting issues in Bangladesh (see Table 6-3). 
The majority
98
 of interviewees strongly believe that the ICAB is the key regulatory 
body. In reality, there are other regulatory bodies [e.g. SEC, BB, ICMAB, MOC, MOF 
                                                 
97
 The ICAB has a standard-setting committee that selects particular IFRSs as the basis for drafting BASs. 
The BAS are prepared by adapting IFRS to reflect specific local requirements under Bangladesh laws and 
regulations. The draft versions of the BASs are then submitted to the Council of the ICAB for discussion, 
finalisation, and adoption (see section 4.4). 
98
 A majority simply means more than 50% of the interviewees’ perceptions are in agreement. 
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and DSE/CSE] which are also involved in the accounting regulatory process. The 
interview findings reveal that the ICAB is restricted to supervising different accounting 
issues rather than having any overall enforcement power enabling it to take action 
against companies violating accounting rules. If ICAB is the real regulatory body, their 
activities and powers should fundamentally shape organisational behaviour to gain 
legitimacy. But, does the ICAB [as a real regulator] cover major accounting issues? 
This sentiment is captured in the following quote given by one of the policymakers:  
 
 “There are three accounting regulatory institutions: the SEC, the ICAB and the 
BB. [The] SEC is a regulating authority for [the] listed companies. Rule 12 
state[s] that only financial statements should be prepared on the basis of IFRSs 
and IFRSs which [are] adopted by the ICAB. The ICAB only gives license to the 
CA firms [which have] authority to do statutory audit jobs, and Bangladesh 
Bank monitors the banking sector. The ICAB is indeed the regulatory body of 
accounting issues in Bangladesh” (PM2). 
 
Table 6-3: Perceptions of the real regulators of accounting issues in Bangladesh 
 
 PM AP US AR Total % 
ICAB [The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Bangladesh] 
7/27 12/27 5/27 2/27 26/27 96% 
SEC [The Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Bangladesh] 
4 3 2 2 11 41% 
BB [Bangladesh Bank] 2 2 0 0 4 15% 
ICMAB [The Institute of Cost and 
Management Accountants of 
Bangladesh] 
2 1 1 0 4 15% 
MOF [Ministry of Finance] 1 0 0 0 1 4% 
MOC [Ministry of Commerce] 1 0 0 0 1 4% 
DSE  [Dhaka Stock Exchange] 0 1 0 0 1 4% 
 
Hence, the comment represents the narrow scope of ICAB’s activities. One of the users 
extends the policymaker’s views: 
 
“There are two accounting regulatory bodies: ICAB and ICMAB. The 
accounting regulations are basically published in the first instance by the ICAB. 
They are the real authority which regulates the accounting profession in 
Bangladesh….either by adoption of IFRSs or in advising the SEC to issue 
circulars or guidelines with regard to the IFRSs” (US1). 
 
Five interviewees (three policy-makers and two academics and researchers) demonstrate 
the centrality of regulators in the implementation of IFRSs. They also feel that the need 
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for ‘regulators’ is exacerbated especially because of the lack of engagement with the 
companies listed in the DSE and CSE, lack of enforcement, and particularly following 
the lack of initiative in making sure that companies are following rules and regulations 
including IFRSs. The following opinion demonstrates the emerging realisation of the 
need for real regulators. One of the policy makers is very critical about the ‘regulators’: 
 
“Strictly speaking, there is no ‘real’ regulatory body as such to oversee [the] 
implementation of accounting regulations. What happens is [that] the regulatory 
bodies like Bangladesh Bank and SEC require some kind of financial statements 
formats which are mandatory....companies must submit their quality report to 
the respective regulatory bodies. However, IFRSs are not strictly being 
examined by any particular body ... As you know [that] no particular body cares 
much....ICAB should give orientation and guidelines. ICAB is supposed to really 
look into this matter. But I don’t think [that] ICAB is competent or that they 
have the mandate to do that” (PM6). 
 
This interviewee, from a policy-making group, thus enthusiastically acknowledges the 
need for real regulators. However, my interpretation is that most of the interviewees (i.e. 
20 of 27) from the other interviewee groups are reluctant to express their views 
regarding real regulators because of the perceived ‘threat and fear’ towards a company’s 
reputation.  
 
6.2.2.2 The 2nd round interviews 
 
The interviewees were asked: 1(b). How would you describe the accounting standard 
setting process in Bangladesh (see section 5.4.2). Ten interviewees (83%) feel that the 
standard setting process is not transparent and is non-participatory (see Table 6-4). An 
account preparer commented that: 
 
“Nobody knows what the standard setting committee is. It is awful that this 
committee has not produced any consultation paper(s) on any standards as yet” 
(AP12). 
 
Table 6-4: Perceptions of the stakeholders’ participation/non-participation in the 
standard setting process in Bangladesh [The 2
nd
 round interviews] 
 
 
 PM AP US AR Total % 
Stakeholders’ non-
participation in the 















participation in the 




0 0 0 2/12 17% 
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On the other hand, two of the policy makers (17%) from the ICAB think that the 
standard setting process is a very authentic and democratic process in which 
stakeholders’ actively participate (see Table 6-4). In the 1
st
 round of interviews, only 
four interviewees (15%) commented on the standard setting process (see Table 6-1). 
 
6.2.3 Stringent/looser enforcement of the laws  
 
6.2.3.1 The 1st round interviews 
 
As explained in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.3), the sharing of responsibility by a number of 
government agencies (e.g. ICAB, DSE, SEC, RJSC, MOC & MOF) complicates the 
enforceability of corporate regulations and reduces overall effectiveness. The SEC is to 
be the main institution for enforcement issues. Interviewees explained that enforcement 
mechanisms that encourage and facilitate compliance, and ‘punitive arrangements’ that 
force compliance, are, to a great extent, absent in Bangladesh. To make enforcement 
mechanisms more effective, interviewees hinted that the SEC and other regulatory 
bodies might be ‘stricter’.  The only AR is very sceptical about the SEC’s enforcement 
role: 
 
“The enforcement issue is indeed frustrating. Companies are not following 
mandatory IFRSs...The adoption of the accounting standards did not bring any 
remarkable changes in the financial reporting practices of Bangladesh. What is 
the role of SEC? The SEC did not constitute a separate Financial Reporting 
Council or take any punitive measures against the directors of the respective 
companies in order to revise financial statements (those who do not follow 
IFRSs in the preparation of their Financial Reports). Again, disciplinary action 
is simply not taken if any accountant fails to comply with IFRSs or audit ethics 
(for example, a fine, or expulsion from the respective professional bodies). That 
is why Bangladesh has had to wait a long time to achieve the target of 
compliance with IFRSs - because regulations and enforcement [are] not linked 
as they should be in the requirements” (AR2). 
 
The interviewees feel that that tightening the enforcement culture will create high 
quality financial reporting that will also ensure investors’ faith and trust in a firm’s 
fundamental soundness.  All three users who respond are very critical about the current 
scenario of enforcement. One of the users observes that:  
 
“The regulation and accounting standards are there but there is no enforcement. 
.... You will be amazed to hear that the authority doesn’t care enough to make it 
enforceable. My question is: What benefit do they [the monitoring bodies] gain 
from not enforcing the rules?” (US2). 
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Although the SEC’s enforcement role in the context of IFRSs implementation is 
unclear, there are some infrastructure problems which are not supportive of the SEC’s 
functions. As mentioned in Chapter 4 (see section 4.3.3), there are no qualified 
accountants in the SEC commission and salary structures are not competitive. The SEC 
lacks sufficiently trained staff to conduct detailed analyses to monitor compliance with 
accounting and financial reporting requirements. There are mixed opinions of the SEC’s 
role in implementing IFRSs among accounts preparers. Two interviewees feel that the 
SEC’s infrastructure problems are key problems in monitoring compliance issues:  
 
 
“The SEC has no qualified accountants to oversee IFRSs disclosures. So, the 
enforcement solely relies upon other aspects [for example] AGMs, Interim 
Reporting etc.” (AP4). 
 
“Why does the government not recruit qualified accountants into the SEC? The 
answer is that the salary is only TK. 15,000 [£150] to 20,000[£200] monthly. 
Do you think any qualified accountant would be interested in joining the SEC 
with this salary structure? Obviously, the answer is ‘No way’. So, the 
government should appoint qualified accountants otherwise ‘dreams of 
implementing IFRSs will never come true’!” (AP12). 
 
Two interviewees comment that the SEC is more active now in comparison with prior 
years: 
 
“Before 2003, the regulatory systems were less strict. Nowadays, it is strictly 
regulated. However, I feel [that] this trend should be further improved soon. 
What is the benefit of those regulations if there is no enforcement?” (AP7). 
 
“To an extent, the SEC [is] working on enforcement and monitoring whether full 
compliance exists in disclosures [or not]” (AP11). 
 
One policy maker from the ICAB tried to push the full burden to the SEC and believed 
that the SEC should take the responsibility of all blame not assumed by the ICAB. This 
represents a perspective that conflicting interests exist between the regulatory bodies in 
Bangladesh. The majority of the interviewees agreed that the ICAB had not made an 
effective effort to review the practices of the auditors and audit firms and to evaluate the 
existing degree of compliance with the auditing requirements. Such efforts will require 
the unhealthy rivalry between the members of ICAB and SEC to be set aside in the 
interests of accounting development in the country. He emphasises that: 
 
“The current situation of accounting is a controversial issue. How can I answer? 
ICAB is trying to regulate but I don’t know to what extent the SEC is 
contributing. So, the SEC is fully responsible for this controversy around 
regulatory aspects” (PM2). 
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The reason for blaming the SEC is so that they (the ICAB) take the power and 
responsibility to monitor the compliance with IFRSs. A policy maker phrases this in the 
following way: 
 
“The accounting regulations are obligatory for listed companies, not others [non-
listed companies]. If any listed company doesn’t prepare accounts according to 
guidelines [the] ICAB provides, then the ICAB can’t take any legal action 
against them. The SEC and the Bangladesh Government have no guidelines for 
IFRS and therefore they should delegate the ICAB to monitor the 
implementation issues. The preparation of financial statements according to 
IFRS is the task of the company; the CA firm can’t do this if the company does 
not want it to be done” (PM5). 
 
Interviewees from the AP and US groups also stress the usefulness of regulating 
professional bodies to improve the current enforcement mechanisms. These 
interviewees express concerns with the professional bodies and their role as regulators, 
often viewing conflicting roles among different institutions and political pressures as the 
most likely causes of difficulties in implementing IFRSs. One AP commens that: 
 
“Professional bodies are not regulated enough in Bangladesh. If you look at the 
ACCA and ICAEW in the UK, they have disciplinary committees, whereas in 
Bangladesh this sort of disciplinary practice is very rare and minimal. There is 
no compliance watchdog committee to oversee professionals” (AP8). 
 
In order to make enforcement activities more proactive, the interviewees from the US 
group focus on the need for a depoliticised regulatory body. This sentiment is critical 
since the regulatory body needs to be stable rather than to make radical changes at 
frequent intervals. This culture (i.e. frequent changes of regulatory body) fundamentally 
weakens effective enforcement in Bangladesh. One user said that:  
 
“To be honest the regulatory body is not stable. If the government changes, the 
regulatory staff will change. Even [if] any company violates the regulatory 
requirements and is linked with the political party in government, the authority 
won’t take any action against them. The government is aware of this fact but 
chooses to ignore it” (US6). 
 
According to two policymakers, the culture of changing regulatory body can be 
resolved through concerted efforts by the government, the accounting profession and the 
Chamber of Commerce in Bangladesh (see Table 6-1). A policy maker (PM3) strongly 
adds that the government, the SEC and the ICAB are not involved as much as they 
should be, and that their involvement is essential to reform the regulation. He 
commented that: 
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“The main problem is the lack of enactment of the appropriate legislation 
because it has not been made compulsory to follow the same principles in 
preparing the accounting statements and there is no clear central regulatory 
body in Bangladesh to supervise or oversee the implementation of IFRSs and 
that’s why ICMAB is always advocating the establishment of one supervisory 
oversight board in Bangladesh” (PM3). 
 
For unlisted companies, the financial reporting formats and disclosure requirements set 
out by the Companies Act 1994 are mandatory, but these requirements are not 
consistent with IFRSs. For listed companies, the SEC requires full compliance with 
IFRSs. Only interviewee (AR2) points out that there are some contradictions between 
the Companies Act 1994 and IFRSs: 
 
“This is the right time for Bangladesh [to] modify the Companies Act 1994, 
Securities Exchange Regulations and Ordinances…..including standards setting 
and implementation guidelines” (AR2). 
 
 
6.2.3.2 The 2nd round interviews 
 
In the second round interviews, the interviewees were asked: 2. How effective is the 
enforcement mechanism in implementing IFRSs? (see section 5.4.2). Most of the 
interviewees (i.e. 11 out of 12) believe that enforcement is not effective in Bangladesh 
(see Table 6-5). Only one interviewee from the SEC chooses not to make any comment 
on enforcement issues (see Table 6-5). This quite possibly means that the SEC official 
does not wish to take any blame for their enforcement activities. However, interviewees 
from all groups feel that the SEC should be responsible for non-compliance of the 
IFRSs. The SEC is lenient in taking action against nationalised organisations. The 
following comment is representative of the interviewees’ sentiments:  
 
“The SEC cannot identify corrupt CA firms for non-compliance with IFRSs, 
because the SEC itself does not have qualified accountants. For example, in 
2009, Janata Bank provided ‘miscellaneous earnings’ which were equivalent to 
80% of their total income but there is no explanation of these miscellaneous 
earnings…in their cash flow statement, they provided 15 billion interest received 
and in their income statement 14.8 billion as interest income. How can they 
recover 105%? It is shocking that the SEC did not take any appropriate action 
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Looser enforcement 














No comment on 




0 0 0 1/12 8% 
 
6.2.3.3 Documentary analyses 
 
This section will emphasise enforcement in relation to violations of accounting 
standards.  
 
The distribution of regulatory enforcement actions by year is shown in Figure 6-1. The 
number of enforcement actions peaked in 2006 and 2007. The number of enforcement 
actions in 2006 and 2007 totalled about four times those taken in 1999 and 2000. 
During the period 1998-2010, there were 1647 market enforcement actions and of these 
documents, 42 are related to IFRSs (see Appendix 6-1). The accounting standards were 
not addressed in the enforcement documents and hence in reading all enforcement 
documents, I found only 42 enforcement notices which were IFRSs related. In relation 
to enforcement actions based on IFRSs, 42 actions started from the year 2006, 
representing 2.6% (42/1647) of the total of enforcement actions, which is a very low 
proportion (see Appendix 6-1). Appendix 6-1 shows that the enforcement notices are 
based on fifteen accounting standards, namely, IAS 1 (30 times
99
), IAS 2 (11 times), 
IFRS 7 (three times), IAS 12 (four times), IAS 16 (nine times), IAS 17 (once), IAS 19 
(once), IAS 23 (once), IAS 24 (once), IAS 34 (four times), IAS 36 (once), IAS 37 (two 
times), IAS 38 (once), IAS 39 (two times), and IAS 41 (once). It is clear that the most 
of the violations are based on IAS 1, IAS 2, IAS 12, IAS 16, IAS 34 & IFRS 7.  
 
In my opinion, one possible explanation for the SEC’s lack of identifying violations 
regarding IFRSs compliance is a lack of personnel. As mentioned in Chapter Four, they 
have no qualified accountants. This means that the enforcement department of the SEC 
relies heavily on basic accounting requirements like inventories amounts or methods, 
                                                 
99
 Number of times indicates the number of violations which have occurred against each standard. 
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the formats of the balance sheets, income statements and cash flow statements, 
depreciation methods, disclosures of true and fair view.  
 
Figure 6-1: Comparing Total Enforcement Actions vs. IFRSs Related Enforcement 




The fine amount also varied. For example, the minimum issued was a warning and a 
fine of Tk. 0.10 million, the maximum was Tk. 15 million and the average was Tk. 1.61 
million (Tk. 1,607,143). 25 of the 42 enforcement notices imposed a penalty of less than 
a million. Further, the lack of regulatory frameworks regarding penalty criteria possibly 
encourages companies not to comply with the SEC regulations (or at least, nothing 
exists to discourage them). For instance, Appendices 6-2 and 6-3 show that penalty 
amounts for violating regulations (in particular, the Companies Act 1994 and the SEC 
Act 1993) and even for providing false information in statements are not more than Tk. 
200 (or less than £2). Therefore, the lack of regulation regarding stringent enforcement 
mechanisms (e.g. punitive fine/penalty) may impede the implementation of IFRSs in 
Bangladesh.    
 
6.2.4 Reflecting on section 6.2 
 
The results show that in Bangladesh, accounting regulatory frameworks have a negative 
influence on implementation of IFRSs under the conditions of (b) low quality investor 
protection laws, (c) stakeholders’ non-participation in the standard setting process and 
(d) looser enforcement of the laws. This section brings together the arguments of 
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interviewees that effective regulations for investor protection, stakeholders’ 
participation in the standard-setting process and stringent enforcement of the laws are a 
prerequisite for the effective implementation of IFRSs. 
 
In relation to the quality of investor protection laws (condition b), negative perceptions 
are observed with regard to the current regulations (see section 6.2.1.1). The interview 
findings reveal that there are contradictions between the local laws and IFRSs. For 
instance, the Companies Act 1994 does not require mandatory IFRSs compliance or 
compliance with BRPD Circular No.14 and IFRS 7 (see sections 6.2.1.1 and 6.2.1.2). 
Although the ICAB encourages companies to follow IFRSs fully, in reality, accountants 
are fulfilling directors’ wishes (i.e. usually not to follow IFRSs). The interviewees 
mention that most companies are closely family led and their cultural instinct remains 
one of hiding information in Bangladesh (see section 6.2.1.1). The majority of 
interviewees in the 2
nd
 round interviews also question the quality of investor protection 
laws (see section 6.2.1.2). 
 
In terms of stakeholders’ participation/non-participation in the standard setting process 
(condition c),  the findings reveal that the standard setting process is not transparent (see 
section 6.2.2.1). According to some interviewees, the ICAB has a standard setting 
committee but this committee does not consult with stakeholders to make effective 
decisions regarding IFRSs implementation (see section 6.2.2.1). The interviewees also 
feel that the ICAB is developing and making comments on IFRSs/BFRSs in Bangladesh 
and therefore, the ICAB are the real regulators in Bangladesh (see section 6.2.2.1). In 
particular, the policy-makers strongly perceive a necessity for real regulators in 
Bangladesh. However, the findings suggest that the ICAB has not published any 
exposure drafts, consultation papers or even the standards setting committee’s reports 
(see section 6.2.2.1). The interviewees argue that the military-backed government’s 
proposals to set up an independent oversight body (i.e. FRC) and a Financial Reporting 
Act 2009 has been slowed down or even stopped completely by the present democratic 
government (see section 6.2.2.1). This raises questions around the democratic 
government’s intentions towards the full and effective implementation of IFRSs. There 




 rounds of interviews. 
For instance, in the second round interviews, most of the interviewees argue that the 
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regulations should be updated and that stakeholders should participate in the standard 
setting process to implement IFRSs effectively (see section 6.2.2.2). 
 
With respect to enforcement of the laws (condition d), the findings reveal that effective 
enforcement mechanisms are vital in effectively implementing IFRSs. The majority of 
the interviewees are negative about the SEC’s role regarding enforcement actions (see 
section 6.2.3.1). This is possibly because the enforcement mechanisms themselves are 
not tight enough to deal with the violators (i.e. those companies who are not complying 
with IFRSs). In the 2
nd
 round of interviews, the findings also question the current 
enforcement mechanisms (see section 6.2.3.2). They add that these enforcement 
mechanisms are very unclear and lack strict penalties/fines. In addition to the 1
st
 round 
of interviews, the interviewees in the second round generally feel that the political 
lobbying and government intervention in the SEC are impeding the enforcement 
process. The SEC should therefore be depoliticised, and the SEC should take action 
against nationalised organisations (see section 6.2.3.2). The interviewees (the AR and 
US groups) suggest that the SEC is itself a government institution and not inclined to 
take action against nationalised organisations’ violations (see section 6.2.3.2). The only 
interviewee in the PM group who has affiliation with the SEC denies any wrongdoing. 
The documentary analyses offer evidence that a lack of regulations may hinder the 
stringent enforcement of laws in Bangladesh (see section 6.2.3.3). It is found that a very 
limited number of IFRSs related enforcements (i.e. 2.6%) from 1998-2010 raises 
questions as to the effective implementation of IFRSs (see section 6.2.3.3). 
 
6.3 Politico-Institutional Factors (Proposition II) 
 
This section will explore the following proposition: 
 
PII: Politico-institutional factors will have a positive/negative influence on 
implementation of IFRSs. 
 
PIIA: Politics will have a positive influence on implementation of IFRSs under 
the conditions of (a) common-law origin, (b) a lower level of government 
intervention (c) a lower level of donor agencies’ pressure and (d) a lower level 
of political lobbying.  
 
‘or’ Politics will have a negative influence on implementation of IFRSs under 
the conditions of a) code-law origin, (b) a higher level of government 
intervention,  (c) a higher level of donor agencies’ pressure and (d) a higher 
level of political lobbying.  
 
Chapter Six – Relative Impact                                                           148                                 
 
 
PIIB: Co-operation among institutions will have a positive influence on 
implementation of IFRSs under the conditions of (a) democratic government and 
(b) ensuring the participatory rights of the stakeholders.  
 
‘or’ Lack of co-operation among institutions will have a negative influence on 
implementation of IFRSs under the conditions of (a) undemocratic government 
and (b) an absence of participatory rights for the stakeholders. 
 
In examining the above proposition, I will discuss findings concerning political pressure 
and co-operation among institutional bodies with regard to IFRSs implementation in 
Bangladesh. In relation to PIIA (Political influence), the conditions of the legal origin of 
the country (common-law/code-law) were mentioned in Chapter Four [i.e. Bangladesh 
is a common-law country] (see section 4.3.1), and therefore, the analysis of PIIA in this 
section is done under the conditions of (b) a higher/lower level of government 
intervention, (c) a higher/lower level of donor agencies’ pressure and (d) a higher/lower 
level of political lobbying. 
 
With respect to PIIB (co-operation among institutional bodies), the condition of (b) the 
participatory/non-participatory rights of the stakeholders was discussed in section 6.2.2, 
where the findings derived from the interviewees responses suggest that the 
stakeholders have no participatory rights in accounting regulatory and standard setting 
processes in Bangladesh. The analysis in section 6.3.2 will be carried out under the 
condition of (a) democratic government or undemocratic government. In particular, co-
operation/lack of co-operation among institutional bodies in implementing IFRSs will 
be discussed. 
 
6.3.1 Political influences 
 
 
In terms of political influences, the interviewees were asked: Is there any higher/lower 
level of political pressure (e.g. government intervention, donor agencies’ pressure and 
political lobbying) to implement or not implement IFRSs? (see section 5.4.1). 27 
interviewees express their sentiments on politics in ways which can be classified into 
five categories: (a) relating to a higher level of government intervention; (b) a higher 
level of donor agencies’ pressure (i.e. pressure from the World Bank, the IMF and the 
ADB); (c) a higher level of political lobbying; (d) no government intervention; and (e) 
no comment on politics (see Table 6-6). Of the 27 interviewees, two are critical of the 
government’s intervention, five feel that donor agencies’ efforts towards implementing 
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IFRSs are political pressure, and seven believe that a higher level of political lobbying 
are significant contributing factors in impeding the implementation of IFRSs (see Table 
6-6). However, 12 interviewees provided no comment at all on politics and only 
interviewee thinks that there is no government intervention in IFRSs implementation. 
My interpretation of this is that the main reason for avoiding comment on politics, 
especially by the accounts preparers and by members of professionals group is that the 
interviewees feel that doing so would pose a risk to their job security.  
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0 2/27 7% 
 



























0 7/27 26% 
 
Total (A) 6 4 3 1 14/27 52% 







0 0 0 1/27 4% 
Total (B) 1 0 0 0 1/27 4% 














Total (C) 0 8 3 1 12/27 44% 





: The interviewee mentions more than one issue; the less discussed issue = ‘0’, otherwise ‘1’. 
 
6.3.1.1 A higher/lower level of government intervention 
 
6.3.1.1.1   The 1st round interviews 
 
The respondents believe that ‘government intervention’ is one of the major problems in 
impeding IFRSs implementation in Bangladesh. They think that the government is ‘not 
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sincere’ about establishing an independent board and instead simply wants to keep 
bureaucratic control over the determination of accounting standards and monitoring 
processes in the country. No progress has been made towards the development of an 
independent board since then. Therefore, the bureaucracy of the government ministry 
has seemingly been deeply influenced by Bangladeshi culture’s reliance on 
secretiveness (see Chapter Four). One AP is highly sceptical in this regard: 
 
“Two to three years ago, there was a Financial Accounting Ordinance …I would 
not say it had gone through a proper political process as such.... Bureaucrats 
wanted to prevent the making of the Ordinance into an Act…...when the 
bureaucrats [e.g. government ministry] took an interest, they did not understand 
the standards, but they thought (they) could impose an Act of this nature and 
would exercise a controlling authority over the accounting professionals. 
Bureaucracy, you see, is a never ending process in Bangladesh, and they want 
to extend their influence everywhere” (AP1). 
 
The different government systems help to explain the issues with regard to high/low 
levels of government intervention. The only PM feels that a higher level of government 
intervention has existed under the democratic government in comparison to the military-
backed government. A military-backed government earlier took the initiative on FRA 
and finally it seems that full commitment will depend on a democratic government. He 
said that: 
 
“I really appreciate the initiative that the Caretaker government [i.e. the 
Military-backed government] took in producing the Financial Reporting 
Ordinance of 2008, but it has not been effectively enacted. I think this was 
initiated during the BNP Government when Mr. Saifur Rahman, the ex-Finance 
minister, being a chartered accountant, also felt the necessity for such an Act. 
But he was also influenced by political pressure not to run very fast.……When 
the caretaker government came to power… after taking the comments of the 
chartered accountants, business people and the trade bodies… they passed the 
principles but could not implement them... when the Awami League government 
came into power, they found it to be a very sensitive [in terms of being 
transparent] and loaded Act because lots of people in their party possibly, did 
not really want to go ahead with it” (PM6). 
 
The two respondents from the policy making groups deny that the existence of 
government intervention as such is responsible for implementing IFRSs. This is not 
surprising given the fact that some policy making interviewees represent government 
institutions or ministerial bodies. For instance, the SEC Executive Director (under the 
Ministry of Finance) and the Deputy Secretary (of the Ministry of Finance) are directly 
involved with the government. The interviewees do not really drill down to the question 
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of differences in the comments between some groups’ feelings about the importance of 
political pressure and some groups’ denials of the same. In fact, they focus on 
explaining non-political approaches. Only two interviewees (both policy makers) 
believe that politicians are unconcerned about accounting issues in Bangladesh. 
 
“I have not felt any political pressure by the government to implement it. ……You 
know [that] there are two groups of the government: one of them is demanding 
implementation of IFRSs while the other group is not. There is political 
competition among the government officials as to who will be the chairman of the 
SEC/DSE” (PM4). 
 
“I don’t think government intervention is impeding the implementation process. I 
am doubtful as to whether the politicians know what IFRS is and what the 
implication of IFRSs are…. Government intervention is immaterial. It is only the 
ICAB’s intention whether they will implement it or not (which matters)” (PM7). 
 
6.3.1.1.2   The 2nd round interviews 
 
The interviewees were asked to comment on the existence of political pressure to 
implement or not implement IFRSs in Bangladesh. Nine out of the twelve interviewees 
were of the opinion that politics within the government are responsible for intervening 
in implementing IFRSs (see Table 6-7). Consistent with the 1
st
 round interviews, all the 
interviewees from PM group agree that higher levels of government intervention 
impede the implementation process. They point out that auditors’ qualified opinions do 
not matter and carry no value for the regulators, and that even government departments 
are not following IPSAS. One PM stresses that: 
 
“The auditors provide emphasis of matter as qualified audit opinion. The 
presentation of financial statements by non-financial companies are not up to 
proper international market standards because the Board is in somebody’s 
control (for example, due to politics and/or family ties) and often tries to hide 
the true picture of the company” (PM1). 
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6.3.1.2 A higher/lower level of donor agencies’ pressure 
 
6.3.1.2.1 The 1st round interviews 
 
As mentioned in section 3.2.1.5, donor agencies play a key role behind the scenes in 
adopting IFRSs including during the implementation phase in developing countries. 
Developing economies like Bangladesh, which are in great need of external funds, have 
been forced to open up their economies as part of the donor agencies’ sponsored 
globalisation processes
100
. These donor agencies have encouraged the adoption of 
internationally accepted accounting and corporate governance practices as a prerequisite 
for obtaining loans, and the interviewees express their concerns about the roles of the 
donor agencies in terms of their influence on the development of accounting practices in 
Bangladesh. One interviewee sums up the IFRSs as a form of global political pressure:  
 
“For IFRS there is international pressure from donor agencies. I think it is like, ‘you 
are asking somebody to sing but he/she can’t’. ICAB already adopted some policies 
of IFRS but they converted those IFRS standards to Bangladeshi Standards. 
However, IFRSs in fact were not implemented” (PM7). 
 
The interviewees point out that there is an absence of private sector rule-making bodies 
in Bangladesh, something which creates a gap for the donor agencies to exploit, by 
intervening with pressure to implement their policy-making decisions through private-
sector think-tanks. Thus, decisions in favour of wholesale adoption and implementation 
of IFRSs have been prompted by exposure to threats to legitimacy, rather than by 
efficiency perspectives. The interviewees in the present study tend to believe that the 
whole process is very political and that the engagement of local professionals and 
corporate employees is being ignored in terms of decision making while the ‘donor 
agencies’ wishes’ is transformed through the government without considering local 
cultures. One of the policy makers strongly argues that: 
 
“…it is an injustice to the developing countries to implement the requirements of 
IFRSs, because they are not logistically prepared. Making it compulsory for 
everybody without any adequate training and support does not make sense to us. 
The IFAC and IASB are dominated by accounting firms based in developed 
industrialised countries [who] dominate these issues and even the development 
of any IFRSs. But in the cases of developing countries, they have their own 
problems….the developing countries’ unique characteristics are being ignored 
                                                 
100
 This is a specific concept which is being used in a generalised sense in the present study, because 
IFRSs are a global idea. 
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in reality. The IASB should consider the development of IFRSs in developing 
countries by engaging their (local) accountants and policy makers” (PM1). 
 
Three interviewees (two PM and one AP) feel that the political nature of the World 
Bank’s relationship with Bangladesh and the degree of aid dependence have been 
excessive and that these factors have therefore seriously distorted accounting 
development patterns. They recommend that donors take a long-term view of their aid 
commitments to Bangladesh and that aid funding should not involve any government 
intervention. Interviewees think that donor agencies are aware that the funds are not 
utilised efficiently, but they have been careless. It is argued that the aid provided by 
donor agencies to implement IFRSs in Bangladesh without considering the basic 
problems of accounting infrastructure and institutions, may produce negative outcomes 
in the near future. 
 
“We need technical assistance from [say] the ICAEW or AICPA or EAA for a 
project like this to teach us, not only for the qualified members but also for the 
SEC. We had a lecturer from Greenwich University, UK, under the World Bank-
Twinning Program….we enjoyed his visit very much and learned a lot from his 
lecture here. So, this should be a continuous process ……But the problem here is 
that the World Bank [and] ICAEW are heavily linked with the government, so they 
want to spend money to make the government’s bank balance healthier, not the 
country’s direct benefit. As you know, funds are transferred from them [World 
Bank] to the government and then the government tries not to spend them for the 
purposive issues” (AP1).  
 
Another interviewee from AP extended this issue that the World Bank is one of the key 
donor agencies for financing the diffusion of accounting practices in Bangladesh, but 
the actual usage of their funds is often questionable. Despite the World Bank’s role in 
encouraging the adoption of IFRSs in Bangladesh, the interviewee criticises the way in 
which the Bank’s lending activities are taking place:  
 
“The World Bank is pressuring for regulating as per westernised countries’ IFRSs. 
….although International Accounting Standards have been introduced -- there’s no 
implementation guideline from the World Bank. They need implementation but 
there’s no help for it. They are very careless about providing resources and help… 
giving foreign aid to implement it, but they do not care much where those funds are 
used and how effectively they are used” (AP2).  
 
The findings reveal that the behaviour desired by the World Bank becomes somewhat 
political in the context of Bangladesh. Arguably, these lending/donor agencies must 
have an interest in the exercise, and similar fashions are still practised now. Therefore, 
the influence of donor agencies in implementing of IFRSs (in terms of the political and 
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economic level of a country) varies, and is mixed in Bangladesh. For example, the only 
researcher (AR1) put it this way: 
 
“The ICAB received a grant totaling US$200,000 from the World Bank to 
facilitate the adoption process; however, this process is much more political 
than the establishment of legitimacy. The SEC also received technical as well as 
financial assistance from the ADB to support a number of projects for ensuring 
a smooth transition to the use of IFRSs, but the real motivations for those 
projects are unclear” (AR1).  
 
6.3.1.2.2   The 2nd round interviews 
 
The interviewees did not provide any comments on the donor agencies’ political 
pressure in the second round of interviews. This is possibly because the present 
democratic government has so far failed to introduce the Financial Reporting Act of 
2009, to tackle the stock market crash or to establish an independent supervisory board 
like the Financial Reporting Council. 
 
6.3.1.3  A higher/lower level of political lobbying 
 
6.3.1.3.1   The 1st round interviews 
 
Seven interviewees criticise the political lobbying involved in implementing IFRSs in 
Bangladesh (see Table 6-6). They provide different opinions as to how a higher level of 
political lobbying is negatively associated with the most needed goals, of transparency 
and the implementation of IFRSs.  
 
Firstly, they express concerns that some politicians do not actually want transparency in 
financial reporting. They hint that transparency (e.g. creating global standards) is a 
threat to politicians in continuing to receive corrupt money. An example is: 
 
“I am sure about the existence of political pressure….. there are some problems 
which lie with politicians and they fear that if it is implemented the true picture 
of the companies will be mirrored in the public sphere and they might have 
fewer options to make corrupt money” (US5). 
 
An account preparer and professional (AP2) provides an interesting example of the 
political lobbying taking place around IFRSs implementation: 
  
 “You know [that] the World Bank and ICAEW provided around £180,000 to 
support Bangladesh for implementing IFRSs….in August 2008, the Ministry of 
Finance sent 35 people from different sectors to London to study for the 
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ICAEW's IFRS certificate. On their return, the people planned to train others 
around the country.... But the political process is dominant in selecting those 
people……[which] is shocking…..the ministry selected 35 people from the 
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology and some tutors from a college level who have no knowledge of 
accountancy whatsoever, but they are politically involved in the government 
…..ultimately the government spent £180,000 for nothing and the country did 
not gain any benefit from this project” (AP2).   
 
Secondly, it is argued that the parliamentary process of passing or approving accounting 
related laws is political in nature in Bangladesh, since some MPs simply do not want to 
pass a Financial Reporting Act; the interviewees express a belief that the government is 
delaying the process because of political lobbying. The following two interviewees 
comment on this issue: 
 
“Political lobbying is one of the biggest obstacles to implementing IFRSs 
...there are some interested groups in the parliament who are directly involved 
in the corruption taking place, as they are directors of many companies. In 
addition, a majority of professionals (doctors, engineers, and solicitors etc.) 
exists in the parliamentary committee... So, they don’t want to pass the FR Act 
2009. The ICMAB is trying to amend the Income Tax Act, but because of those 
parliamentary members, it is delayed quite often” (PM3). 
 
“As far as I know, there is a bit of political pressure, although the terms are 
technical and only related professionals know about it. The interesting part is 
that the politics of implementation are a political process because some parts of 
the government and MPs do not want the IFRSs…..therefore, the government is 
not more focused on this issue” (US3). 
 
Thirdly, the government has a set of predetermined beliefs and a political manifesto 
which excludes accounting related issues and it prefers that the banking sector is the 
main driving force in improving the economy; and the government feels the banking 
sector should be more regulated than the non-banking sectors. The non-banking sectors 
are mostly run by the politicians (see Chapter Four). One user sums this up in the 
following way: 
  
“Under the same domain, the government is very conscious of the financial 
sector, where they think [that] the banks should follow strict laws and 
regulations, but it is careless about the non-financial sector...... [this] is the 
government’s pre-determined concept or how things should be. However, the 
non-financial sectors constitute half of the economy. The government thinks that 
losses in the non-financial sector are losses for shareholders, not for the 
economy. So, if you are only concerned about 50% of the economy, there will be 
scope for corruption and a non-disclosure tendency. That’s exactly what is 
happening in the non-financial sector. But, I think [you see] the garments sector, 
and jute, are doing really well and are potential industries for investment by 
foreign investors. If those industries do not represent the true picture by 
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following IFRSs, then Bangladesh is losing opportunities....the governmental 
body should come out from the pre-determined concepts and look more broadly 
than the current, narrow focuses allow” (US2). 
 
Although the 12 interviewees (i.e. eight AP, three US and one AR) are silent about the 
existence or otherwise of political pressures (see Table 6-6), three interviewees (from 
AP group) viewed political influences by the government, and in particular, government 
intervention and political lobbying, as indirect factors in implementing IFRSs. These 
three interviewees, who appeared most in favour of opposing direct political influence 
by the government, provide evidence about why political pressure is not important. The 
following two quotations are representative of this issue: 
 
“There is no direct political pressure. The issue of pressure comes when any 
company is involved with forgery. For instance, when any bank is involved with 
forgery then the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance try to control the 
situation …… politically connected Banks do not get any punishment or fine” 
(AP1). 
 
“I don’t see, or I have no idea, about political pressure because our politicians are 
mostly unconcerned about what is happening in the accounting world” (AP12). 
 
6.3.1.3.2 The 2nd round interviews 
 
Only one of the four APs thinks that political lobbying is a key problem, but the other 
three APs are silent on the issue (see Table 6-8). This evidence is similar
101
 to the 
findings of the 1
st
 round of interviews (see section 6.3.1.3.1).  The only AP5 argues that: 
 
“We follow IFRSs to satisfy only the SEC and the tax authority, and not 
shareholders. You know, only 10% of companies provide actual information in 
Bangladesh. The rest of them are heavily politically connected and they can 
easily satisfy the SEC and the tax authority” (AP5).   
 
All academics and users were critical regarding political lobbying. The views given by 
the two interviewees represent the political problem: 
 
“You see [that] the recent stock market crash (i.e. 2011) occurred due to political 
connections” (AR1). 
 
“I think [that] many companies are politically connected and therefore they do 
not feel scared of violating regulations” (US4). 
 
                                                 
101
 AP5 is crticial regarding political lobbying in the 1
st
 round of interviews. AP6 and AP10 are slient in 
the 1
st
 round of interviews.  
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Nine interviewees had emerging expectations of action from the present democratic 
government regarding the effective implementation of IFRSs. One of the policy makers 
commented that: 
 
 “Actually, within one year, no such improvement has happened. You see, 
political connectedness is a major problem in Bangladesh in implementing 
IFRSs. Because of political connectedness, the basic requirements, like trial 
balances and books of accounts, are not being properly followed. If the basic 
requirements are not followed, how can we expect compliance with IFRSs? To 
me it is like a dream. (PM5). 
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  3/12 25% 
 
6.3.2   Co-operation/lack of co-operation among institutional   
bodies 
 
6.3.2.1 The 1st round interviews  
 
In Bangladesh, the level of co-operation among the major institutional bodies who are 
involved in accounting regulatory frameworks, the standards setting process and in 
monitoring the capital market, are atrocious, according to respondents. All the 
interviewees agreed that implementation could be successful in Bangladesh through a 
huge improvement in co-operation among the major actors (see Table 6-9). The 
respondents suggest that all the actors (i.e. institutions) involved tend to blame one 
another in trying to maintain their individual positions. So, the implementation process 
seems to be focused on individual actors’ efforts, rather than the necessary team-
working and co-ordinated efforts. The majority respondents perceive that the whole 
exercise is flawed because of the undemocratic nature of the accounting standard 
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Table 6-9:  Perceptions of co-operation/lack of co-operation among institutional bodies 
[The 1
st




















































The policy making group (all seven interviewees) are critical of the current co-
ordination of decision making, consultation and monitoring issues regarding IFRSs 
implementation. One PM sums it up this way: 
 
“There is really no drive; A good mind-set among the professional bodies and a 
sufficient human resource base for making the system popular are essential. We 
have to have someone to deliver the reforms. I don’t know why the Ministry of 
Commerce is not in a position to lead professional bodies and there is really no-
one who can lead this agenda in the professional bodies. Basically there’s a lack 
of change agents in the institutions. There are of course many problems. We 
have a lack of institutional transparency and a lack of capacity to implement, 
and even when you accept new standards, there are lots to be adopted, and 
resource constraints exist. So, all of these issues need to be addressed” (PM7). 
 
The existence of a ‘blaming culture’ is something which is also strongly expressed by 
the respondents. The interviewees think that the two major institutions, i.e. the ICAB 
and the SEC, appear to be uncritically supportive of efforts by the World Bank and 
other donor agencies in the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh, without reflecting 
on the long-term implications of such proposals. As previously pointed out in section 
6.2.3.1, these interviewees are undivided in their opinions when it comes to blaming one 
another. They are in favour of their own institutional activities, and criticise other 
institutions’ activities. To co-operate with each other, this culture needs to end and 
achieving this might be a panacea for co-operation among them. The following 
comments from different institutions’ policy makers represent the frustrating scenarios 
which exist regarding non co-operation:  
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“Yes co-ordination is needed. We are basically working with SEC, MOF and 
professional bodies, on how you can create a congenial environment that allows 
the corporate sector to adopt and implement IFRSs. I believe [that] once the 
Financial Reporting Act (FRA) is implemented then it will, perhaps, create a big 
change in our corporate culture. So, we strongly encourage the Ministry of 
Finance to pursue IFRSs so that it can be enacted in the parliament” (PM5).  
 
“We developed a corporate governance code, in 2005-2006, which is mandatory. 
We also carried out an assessment in 2005 that brought out lots of issues facing 
the corporate sector in terms of compliance with IFRSs. The main findings 
concerned the lack of government support, and the professional bodies - the 
SEC and the MOF which are responsible for enacting laws governing financial 
reporting standards.... However in practice, government provides very little (or 
no) support to the corporate sector to strengthen audit and quality assurance 
projects. Therefore, the institutional bodies and the government should work 
together to come up with a solution” (PM2). 
 
“Our department has no role, as the role is reserved by the ICAB and the 
corporate world. However, with some World Bank finance project initiatives, 
we are trying to create a separate authority by enacting a new law, Financial 
Reporting Act. This is largely in line with the UK system in creating a separate 
independent council or FRC to issue, to implement and to oversee the 
accounting standards. In that reporting Act, we we will keep a provision which 
is in the line with international accounting standards. So, IFRS will be included” 
(PM4). 
 
Accounts preparers and professionals and researchers expressed many of the same 
sentiments. They strongly believe in a need for co-operation among institutions like the 
ICAB, the ICMAB, the SEC, and the Ministry of Commerce; the following two 
comments represent this issue: 
 
“…..they are trying but I must say that there is still scope for institutional bodies 
like the ICAB and the ICMAB to be more rigorous and careful about the 
adoption and implementation of IFRSs, through active and continuous 
monitoring systems” (AP1). 
 
Ten interviewees also explained what they felt were the reasons for non-cooperation 
among institutional bodies (see Table 6-9). They believe that the major actors could 
work together but that problems tended to occur owing to their conflicting interests. 
One policy maker views the problem in this way: 
 
“Obviously, the institutional and professional bodies can work together to better 
implement IFRSs. But the real scenario is complicated. The two professional 
bodies (the ICAB and the ICMAB) are very much conflicted. In recent times, to 
pass the Financial Reporting Ordinance 2008, the ICAB disputed the making of 
an Act. The professional bodies only care about their own interests, not the 
greater good of companies, or the country, or the stakeholders. This is a cultural 
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problem in our country, because we can’t accept that some companies are doing 
well and we are jealous about it” (PM3). 
 
The policy makers think that transparency among institutional bodies and a consultation 
process like the exposure draft in the UK or the USA should be conducted, which would 
engage corporate people. But actions are more important than discussion, otherwise the 
implementation process would be a ‘political manifesto agenda’ rather than a real 
agenda. One of the policy makers states that:    
 
“I think there should be some kind of discussions... But in implementing IFRSs, 
you would not please everyone. So, it is not like an open ended participatory 
approach, because trade bodies and business people will have objections to too 
many things especially in the cases of some of the regulatory laws. So, I think 
[that] if possible the ICAB, ICMAB, SEC, Bangladesh Bank, listed companies 
and the Government should take a lead in the implementation of IFRSs. They 
can take opinion from business people but I am doubtful about whether these 
could be implemented, because these people will give so many comments and 
you would not be able to implement them all. My comment would be that they 
can make a comprehensive report based on the comments received and, later on, 
they can incorporate and adjust. At the last stage, they can discuss with 
stakeholders and the discussion report can be passed to the cabinet. But what 
happens is that the more you discuss the matter, the less you will be able to 
implement it” (PM6). 
 
6.3.2.2 The 2nd round interviews  
 
As mentioned in section 6.3.2.1, all of the interviewees agree that co-operation among 
institutional bodies is essential in implementing IFRSs. In the first round of interviews, 
all of the AP and US interviewees (making a total of 18) agreed on co-operation but 
only two from the AP group provided any explanation of their views. In the second 
round of interviews, all of them agreed and provided explanations (see Table 6-10).  
 
Table 6-10: Perceptions on politico-institutional factors in relation to IFRSs 
implementation [2
nd
 round interviews] 
 



















Firstly, multiple regulators create problems because there is no unified and co-ordinated 
appreciation of the application of IFRSs between them. These multiple regulators fail to 
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consult with the professionals and therefore a communication gap (i.e. a lack of co-
operation) appears among different institutional bodies: 
 
“In the Companies Act 1994, IFRSs are not mandatory…there are multiple 
regulators like the SEC and Bangladesh Bank and they are not knowledgeable 
enough regarding the IFRSs. In my experience, if we follow IFRSs then 
Bangladesh Bank, the SEC and the NBR will create many problems” (US4).  
 
“There is no co-ordination among the policy makers. Most importantly, the 
ministry does not consult with the professionals and even they do not understand 
the standards. Whatever they think is the final decision” (AP5). 
 
Secondly, a ‘blaming culture’ is another key aspect of non-cooperation. For instance, 
the Credit Rating Agency of Bangladesh (CRAB) thinks that auditors should take the 
responsibility for non-implementation of IFRSs. Meanwhile, the SEC thinks that the 
DSE should be more accountable in overseeing implementation issues, and the ICAB is 
not co-operative because they (i.e. the ICAB) are reluctant to take action against their 
members (i.e. people who qualified through the ICAB). The following comment is 
representative of this issue: 
 
“Our (SEC) officials and the stock exchange in Bangladesh are working together 
to implement IFRSs. We believe [that] there should be a separate FRC, as in the 
UK, to oversee IFRSs implementation issues. I think [that] the Dhaka stock 
exchange should take responsibility for non-compliance with standards. Listed 
companies are the stock exchange’s children and therefore the DSE should take 
care of them….is not our responsibility to identify who are following or not. In 
addition, the ICAB is not co-operating. For example, if we identify any mistakes 
in annual reports and violations against CA firms, then we seek comments from 
the ICAB. But they don’t bother replying within six months, even after 
reminder(s) are sent. The ICAB is like a clubhouse in which the ICAB is very 
reluctant to take action against their club members” (PM4). 
 
6.3.2.3 Documentary analyses  
 
This section will discuss the enforcement actions taken under different political regimes 
in Bangladesh. 
 
With respect to these different political regimes, Table 6-11 shows that, in the 
democratic era, there have been 864 enforcement actions (representing 52% of the total 
of enforcement actions), while the military era saw 783 enforcement actions 
(representing 48% of the total of enforcement actions) (see Figure 6-2). This is 
surprising given that the military government ruled for only three years while the 
democratic government ruled for more than ten years. This fact raises questions around 
the efficiency of the democratic government. The relative failure of the democratic 
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government may well be due to the partisan political landscape and the tendency to 
politicise each and every sector when a new government comes to power (see sections 
6.2.2.1 and 6.3.1.3.1). For example, the normal practice of appointing the SEC chairman 
is that the chairman has political ties to the government (see section 6.2.3.1 and Table 6-
12).  
 




















Table 6-12: List of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Chairmen under 
different political regimes 
 
 
Sl. Period(s) Government Type
102
 
1. 1997 - 1998 Awami League 
2. 1999 - June 2003 Awami League & BNP 
3. July 2003 - Oct 2003 BNP 
4. 2003  Nov - Feb. 2006 BNP 
5. March 2006 - April 2009 Military 
6. May 2009 - May 2011 Awami League 
7. June 2011- Present Awami League 
 
Table 6-12 shows that different chairmen are appointed under different government 
regimes, meaning that each of the chairmen has been appointed by each successive 
government. This political connectedness may well slow down the enforcement 
activities of the SEC. The SEC Chairman has stated that: “The chairman and the 
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 The Awami League and the BNP are democratic governments.  
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members shall be appointed from amongst the persons of capability and standing who 
have shown capacity in dealing with problems relating to company matters, securities 
markets or have special knowledge and experience of law, finance, economics, 
accountancy and such other disciplines as, in the opinion of the Government, shall be 
useful to the Commission. According to the securities law, the Commission ensures 
proper issuance of securities and registers, supervises and regulates the stock 
exchanges, broker/dealers, merchant bankers, portfolio managers, mutual funds, asset 
management companies, trustees’, custodians, depository company and all other 
intermediaries, persons or institutions related with the capital market. The expenses of 
the Commission are met out of the fund contributed by the government as grants and 
money received from other sources viz. consent fees for raising capital, registration fees 
etc” (SEC Annual Report, 2004-2005, p. 5). This quotation emphasises that the role of 
the SEC is to efficiently monitor the market; in reality, the scenario is different. To 
illustrate this point, I find that 13 of 42 IFRSs related violations are cases in which 13 
companies have continuously violated regulations (see Table 6-13). Most notably, J Ltd. 
& N Ltd. violated six times in 2007, whilst C Ltd. did so three times, and L Ltd. four 
times, in 2007. It is found that the SEC has not taken significant action against any of 
them. This is possibly because of political connections between these violators and the 
SEC. This state of affairs may slow down the implementation of IFRSs. 
 
Table 6-13: Companies with Repeated Violations from 1998-2010 regarding IFRSs 
Compliance 
 
 A Ltd. (Textile): Once in 2008 & twice in 2009 
 B Ltd. (Textile): Once in 2009 & once in 2010 
 C Ltd. (Textile): Three times in 2007 & once in 2009 
 D Ltd. (Food & Allied): Twice in 2008 
 E Ltd (Food & Allied): Once in 2009 & once in 2010 
 F Ltd. (Food & Allied): Once in 2007 & once in 2008 
 G Ltd. (Food & Allied): Once in 2006 & twice in 2007 
 H Ltd. & I Ltd. (Food & Allied) [H-I Group]: Twice in 2007 
 J Ltd. (Tannery): Six times in 2007 
 K Ltd. (Tannery): Once in 2008 & once in 2009 
 L Ltd. (Cement): Four times in 2007 and once in 2010 
 M Ltd. (Miscellaneous): Twice in 2007 
 N Ltd. (Miscellaneous): Six times in 2007 and once in 2009 
 
Note: Company names have been anonymised. Detailed information is available on 
request from the author. 
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6.3.3 Reflecting on section 6.3 
 
The findings of proposition II (PII) show that politico-institutional factors have a 
negative influence on implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh. 
 
With respect to political influences (PIIA), the findings reveal that politics have a 
negative influence on the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh, under three 
conditions. This political pressure emerges from a higher level of government 
intervention (see section 6.3.1.1 for condition b), a higher level of donor agencies’ 
pressure (see section 6.3.1.2 for condition c) and a higher level of political lobbying (see 
section 6.3.1.3 for condition d). This study finds that higher levels of government 
intervention and political lobbying have negative influences on the effective 
implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh. The findings suggest that the government’s 
role is negatively associated with the potential for achievement of the most urgently 
needed goals of transparency in Bangladesh. The parliamentary process of approving 
accounting related laws is also political in nature. Hence, regulatory efforts often 
struggle in Bangladesh because business elites utilise their political connectedness in 
order to influence any progress. The 2
nd
 round of interviews (see sections 6.3.1.1.2 and 
6.3.1.3.2) confirm that companies are repeatedly violating the SEC regulations and that 
in doing so, they are protected from punishment by their political connections.  
 
The study finds that the donor agencies’ efforts regarding IFRSs adoption and 
implementation in Bangladesh are transformed through government intervention 
without considering local cultures. Since IFRSs implementation in Bangladesh depends 
highly on donor agencies’ funding, the country is exposed to diverse international 
pressures. The donor agencies’ funding processes towards the development of the 
financial reporting environment in Bangladesh are marked by a lack of consultation and 
transparency. However, the interviewees in the 2
nd
 round of interviews did not mention 
political pressure by donor agencies (see section 6.3.1.2.2). This is possibly because 
they may have an interest in, or expectations of, the current democratic government. As 
the year ended (i.e. 2010-11), no significant improvements had emerged and therefore, 
they felt frustration with the government’s role in IFRSs implementation. 
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In relation to co-operation/ non-cooperation among institutional bodies (PII) the findings 
reveal that the absence of co-operation among institutional bodies including state 
institutions and professional bodies (e.g. the ICAB, the ICMAB, the SEC, the MOC and 
the MOF) impedes the implementation process in Bangladesh (see section 6.3.2). The 
policy makers, who represent different institutions, were sceptical about non-co-
operation in implementing IFRSs. The reason for non-cooperation among institutional 
bodies was seen as being that major actors are working in their own self interests. For 
example, the ICAB disputed the creation of the Financial Reporting Act. A lack of 
transparency among institutional bodies is also observed. In Bangladesh, the ICAB’s 
standard setting body does not produce any exposure drafts or consultation papers 
whatsoever. Hence, the implementation process seems to come down to individual 
actors’ efforts rather than co-ordinated team-working efforts. An absence of co-
ordination
103
 is observed during the adoption process, which immediately results in 
dissension, confusion, and in the communication problems that stakeholders experience 





 round of interviews, agreed that in order to implement IFRSs effectively, co-
operation among institutional bodies needs to be established – this is a vital prerequisite 
for success (see sections 6.3.2.1 and 6.3.2.2). The findings reveal that the institutional 
bodies are eager to blame one another for the difficulties encountered so far in 
implementing IFRSs. The documentary analyses reveal that the military-backed 
government is surprisingly efficient in terms of the stringent enforcement, while a lack 
of co-operation among institutional bodies is found under both the democratic and 
military-backed government eras (see section 6.3.2.3). Ultimately, politicised 
government institutions are impeding the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh. 
  
6.4 Relative impact of accounting regulatory 
frameworks and politico-institutional factors 
 
To illustrate the relative impact of accounting regulatory frameworks and politico-
institutional factors, after reading and reflecting on the transcripts, I summarised the 
first and second round interviewees’ attitudes to IFRSs implementation, and set this 
                                                 
103
 For example, in an attempt to resolve the stalemate between the ICAB and the ICMAB, the Ministry 
of Commerce (MOC), acting on behalf of the Government of Bangladesh, issued a memorandum in 
October 1999 which proposed the establishment of a Bangladesh Accounting and Auditing Standards 
Monitoring Board involving all interested parties, but this proposal was rejected by the ICAB which 
perceives itself as ‘the only competent legal authority in the country to adopt IAS’ (ICAB Annual 
Report,1998-99, p. 19)] [Cited in Mir & Rahaman, 2005, p. 829] 
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information alongside each interviewee’s work experience and qualifications (see 
Appendices 6-4 and 6-5). I also developed ordinal categories for their responses 
regarding the main topics and questions that are asked. The view of each interviewee on 
a given topic is represented by one answer (see Q1 to Q4 in Appendices 6-4 and 6-5). 
This approach requires making a judgement about the interviewee’s primary opinion 
about a topic if he/she expresses positive/negative/no comment. This allowed me to 
detect any relationship between the four groups of interviewees’ perceptions on IFRSs 
implementation. In addition, this comparison helps to establish whether the 
interviewees’ background characteristics, such as their work experience and 
qualifications, are related to or influence their attitudes. However, there is relatively 
little opportunity to obtain cell sizes sufficiently large for a chi-square test and therefore 
the analysis concentrates on descriptions of the extent and cause of IFRSs 
implementation. The conclusions seek to draw out general factors influencing IFRSs 
implementation, but specific comments by the respondents are presented in sections 6.2 
and 6.3 to give the reader an indication of the breadth of reasons for poor 
implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh. 
 
Interview Questions 1 and 3 of Appendix 6-4 are examples of areas of IFRSs 
implementation upon which interviewees’ perceptions differ. Q1 is relevant to 
accounting regulations and Q3 is relevant to politico institutional factors. From the 
responses to Questions 1 and 3, it is found that there is a relationship between 
interviewees’ perceptions of accounting regulatory frameworks and political influence. 
The majority of interviewees who are disappointed with the accounting regulatory 
frameworks feel that there is a political influence in the implementation of IFRSs. 
However, some dissimilarities are observed. Firstly, two policy makers’ (PM4 and 
PM7) views are different on political issues and accounting regulation. For example, 
PM4 (an SEC Executive Director) is unhappy with current regulations but at the same 
time sees no political influence. This is understandable given that the interviewee’s 
position is closely related to the government’s Ministry of Finance. PM7 (Deputy 
Secretary, Ministry of Finance) is pleased with the accounting regulations but 
commented on politics. It is not surprising that this interviewee commented on donor 
agencies’ political influence rather than the government’s political influence. This is 
possibly because of his appointment in the current democratic government (i.e. the 
Ministry of Finance) which is a ‘political appointment’ (see section 4.2.2). Therefore, 
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this policymaker is cautious of talking about any possible negative role of the 
government. Secondly, while 52% respondents were negative about political influence, 
44% interviewees (12 out of 27) provided no comment on politics (see Table 6-14). In 
particular, the majority of the account preparers (9 out of 12) were hesitant to discuss 
politics. This could be due to feelings of insecurity towards their jobs (see section 
6.3.1).  
 
As mentioned in Chapters One and Five, the purpose of the second round of interviews 
was to test the reaction of the interviewees, as the second round of interviews took place 
a year after the first. The first round of interviews was conducted when the present 
democratic government was in its second year (2010) while the second round was 
conducted in its third year (2011). I assumed that the interviewees might change their 
attitudes because of the maturity of the democratic government (i.e. the democratic 
government has been in power for a longer period) and the interviewees are of course 
free to comment. In the 2
nd
 round interviews, the attitudes of interviewees were not very 
different from previous responses (see Appendix 6-5 and Table 6-15). In line with 
accounting regulatory frameworks, the majority of interviewees provide negative 
sentiments on accounting regulation, the standard setting process and enforcement 
issues. With respect to politico institutional factors, 75% of interviewees feel that 
political pressure by the government is impeding implementation of IFRSs whilst 100% 
of respondents say that institutional co-operation is also needed. Some similarities in the 
interviewees’ perceptions are observed; for example, 100% of interviewees feel co-




 Round of 
interviews. Some differences in the interviewees’ perceptions are observed: firstly, the 
2
nd
 interviewees were more critical, in particular, of the possibility of political pressure 
by the government (75% compared to 52%). Secondly, the lower level of ‘no comment’ 
(25% compared to 44%) on political influence add some confirmation to the greater 
critical sentiments of the 2
nd
 round respondents. This is possibly because the 
interviewees are more open to talking about politics in the 2
nd
 round interviews; thirdly, 
the 2
nd
 round interviewees only mention political pressure by the government, whilst in 
the 1
st
 round, the interviewees mentioned political pressure from other sources (e.g. 
donor agencies). PM1, PM2 & PM4 provided negative comments on accounting 
regulatory frameworks in the 1
st
 round of interviews. Surprisingly, in the 2
nd
 round of 
interviews, PM1 & PM2 both said that the standard setting process is already becoming 
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more co-operative, and PM4 is happy with current accounting regulations and the 
SEC’s enforcement actions. This is possibly due to the fact that PM1 & PM2 are 
officials of the ICAB (Under the Ministry of Commerce) and PM4 is an official of the 
SEC (under the Ministry of Finance), and they want to legitimise and justify their 
government’s position.   
    
A further observation from Appendices 6-4 and 6-5 is that there is no association 
between the interviewees’ work experience/qualifications and their attitudes. For 
example, based on similar work experiences (years), seven interviewees have 20 years 
and above, thirteen have 10-20 years and seven have 5-9 years’ experience. However, 
variations are observed in their perceptions. Similarly, based on the qualifications, 
eleven are qualified accountants, two are part qualified CA, three are PhD and eleven 
are postgraduates (e.g. MBA/MSc/MCom/MA in Accounting).  
 
The findings on the interviewees’ attitudes indicate that politico-institutional factors are 
stronger and more dominant factors than accounting regulatory frameworks. The 
findings reveal that political connectedness in the regulatory process and looser 
enforcement of the laws are hindering the effective implementation of IFRSs during the 
democratic government era, while the military government era is depoliticised and 
effective in terms of its stringent enforcement of the law. However, stakeholders’ non-
participation in policy making is evident in both the democratic and military 
government eras. Comparing the first and second round of interviews, nothing 
significant has changed in the interviewees’ attitudes. The second round interviewees 
were more negative about the current democratic government’s initiative regarding 
IFRSs implementation in Bangladesh. According to the majority of the interviewees, 
political pressure by the government is impeding IFRSs implementation, with the 
exception of the views of the policy making group. This is possibly because these 
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Table 6-14: Quantification of perceptions of interviewees [1
st








Q1 Q3 Q4 
PM1 0 0 1 
PM2 0 0 1 
PM3 0 0 1 
PM4 0 1 1 
PM5 0 0 1 
PM6 0 0 1 
PM7 1 0 1 
AP1 0 0 1 
AP2 1 0 1 
AP3 0 9 1 
AP4 0 9 1 
AP5 0 0 1 
AP6 0 9 1 
AP7 0 9 1 
AP8 0 9 1 
AP9 1 9 1 
AP10 0 9 1 
AP11 0 9 1 
AP12 0 0 1 
US1 0 9 1 
US2 0 0 1 
US3 0 0 1 
US4 0 9 1 
US5 0 0 1 
US6 0 9 1 
AR1 0 0 1 























Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
Notes: Code (Interviewee): PM: Policy makers; AP: Preparers & Professionals; US: Users; & AR: 
Academics & Researchers. 
‘0’ = negative perceptions, ‘1’ = positive perceptions & ‘9’ = no comment; 
Q1:  ‘0’ = negative (non-satisfactory) perceptions & ‘1’ = positive perceptions on accounting 
regulation; 
Q3:  ‘0’ = political pressure; ‘1’ = no political pressure & ‘9’ = no comment on political pressure;  
Q4:  ‘0’ = no need for co-operation & ‘1’ = need for co-operation among institutional bodies; 
Q2 [Regulators] cannot be quantified due to nature of the questions and perceptions of the interviewees. 
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Table 6-15: Quantification of perceptions of interviewees [2
nd








1st Round IQs Q1 Q3 Q4 
2nd Round IQs Q1(a) Q1(b) Q2 Q3 Q4 
PM1 0 1 0 0 1 
PM2 0 1 0 0 1 
PM4 1 0 1 0 1 
PM5 0 0 0 0 1 
AP5 0 0 0 0 1 
AP6 0 0 0 9 1 
AP10 0 0 0 9 1 
AP12 0 0 0 9 1 
US4 0 0 0 0 1 
US5 0 0 0 0 1 
AR1 0 0 0 0 1 



































Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Notes: Code (Interviewee): PM: Policy makers; AP: Preparers & Professionals; US: Users; & AR: 
Academics & Researchers. 
‘0’ = negative perception, ‘1’ = positive perceptions & ‘9’ = no comment; 
Q1(a):  ‘0’ = negative perception & ‘1’ = positive perception of accounting regulation; 
Q1(b):  ‘0’ = negative perception & ‘1’ = positive perception of standard setting process; 
Q2:  ‘0’ = negative perception & ‘1’ = positive perception of enforcement; 
Q3:  ‘0’ = political pressure; ‘1’ = no political pressure & ‘9’ = no comment on political pressure;  







Chapter Six – Relative Impact                                                           171                                 
 
6.5   Summary and Conclusions 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to reflect upon the evidence from the two rounds of 
interviews and on the available information regarding the enforcement actions in the 
implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh. Two propositions are discussed, involving 
accounting regulatory frameworks and politico-institutional factors. Proposition PI on 
accounting regulatory frameworks is examined in section 6.2. The evidence suggests 
that the current accounting regulatory frameworks in Bangladesh have a negative 
influence on the implementation of IFRSs (see section 6.2.4). 
 
In relation to the quality of investor protection laws (condition b), the findings confirm 
that low quality investor protection laws in Bangladesh are impeding IFRSs 
implementation (see section 6.2.1). The contradictions between local laws
104
 and IFRSs 
are delaying the implementation process, causing it to be less effective (see sections 
6.2.1.1 and 6.2.1.2). This implies that companies have some scope to decide not to 
comply fully with IFRSs, and can do so because the legal systems in Bangladesh are 
flawed and thus very unlikely to punish them.  
 
In relation to stakeholders’ participation/non-participation in the standard setting 
process (condition c), the findings reveal that the ICAB does not engage stakeholders in 
the standard setting process in Bangladesh (see section 6.2.2.1). The ICAB, as the real 
regulator, is seen as being responsible for accounting standard setting (see section 
6.2.4). The absence of any consultation with stakeholders and publishing exposure 
drafts calls into question the effectiveness of this institution (see section 6.2.2.1). This is 
because a government ministry is involved with the ICAB and the government is 
directly or indirectly intervening in appointing the chairman and the members of the 
standards setting committee (see sections 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2). In addition, the findings 
suggest that the present democratic government is not inclined to set up the FRC or 
FRA (see section 6.2.2.1).       
 
In relation to enforcement of the laws (condition c), the SEC, as the enforcer institution, 
is failing to perform effectively in Bangladesh (see section 6.2.3). The evidence gained 
from interviews and documentary analysis suggests that the SEC is not tightening its 
                                                 
104
 The Companies Act 1994 has not been updated, despite the formation of a government committee to 
update regulations (see section 4.3.1). 
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enforcement mechanisms to make sure that companies are bound by regulation to 
comply with IFRSs. This is likely to be due to political lobbying and government 
intervention in the SEC, which impedes the enforcement process (see sections 6.2.3.2 
and 6.2.4). The SEC is unable to identify IFRSs-related violations because there are no 
qualified accountants in the institution. Further, the penalty criteria for the violators are 
vague and insignificant. 
 
Section 6.3 presents evidence on politico-institutional factors in relation to propositions 
PII, PIIA and PIIB: The findings confirm that politico-institutional factors have a negative 
influence on implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh (see section 6.3.3).  
 
Taking first PIIA , Bangladesh is a common law country (condition a). In relation to the 
level of government intervention (condition b), the findings confirm that a higher level 
of government intervention in Bangladesh inhibits the implementation process (see 
section 6.3.1.1). In relation to the level of donor agencies’ pressure (condition c), 
interviewees mentioned a higher level of donor agencies’ pressure in Bangladesh (see 
section 6.3.1.2). The donor agencies are providing funding towards the successful 
implementation of IFRSs, but the funding is not utilised in appropriate ways (see 
section 6.3.1.2.1). The question has therefore been raised by the interviewees - if the 
donor agencies are aware of these corrupt activities, then why they are not taking action 
against the government? (see section 6.3.1.2.1).  
 
In relation to the condition of (d) a lower/higher level of political lobbying, the findings 
suggest that higher levels of political lobbying in Bangladesh are hindering the effective 
implementation of IFRSs (see section 6.3.1.3). Respondents give strongly negative 
sentiments regarding the government’s political influence. For example, the regulators 
(e.g. the SEC and the judiciary) are toothless in penalising companies which are 
politically well connected. Furthermore, the government has not legislated for new 
regulations, or even updated the existing accounting related regulations, for the last 14 
years. 
 
With respect to co-operation/lack of co-operation among institutional bodies (PIIB), it is 
found that a lack of co-operation among institutional bodies is slowing down the 
implementation process (see section 6.3.2). In relation to ensuring the participatory 
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rights/an absence of participatory rights for the stakeholders (condition a), the findings 
suggest that no participatory rights for the stakeholders exist in Bangladesh (see section 
6.3.3). In terms of democratic/undemocratic government (condition b), the study finds 
that a lack of co-operation exists among the institutional bodies which are responsible 
for the implementation process under both democratic and undemocratic governments 
(see sections 6.3.2.1 and 6.3.2.2). However, the military-backed government was more 
efficient in taking action against corrupt companies (see section 6.3.2.3). This is 
possibly because the implementation of law is seemingly better in military era, in 
comparison with the democratic era in Bangladesh. The institutions are blaming each 
other and this ‘blaming culture’ is not assisting the implementation process (see sections 
6.3.2.1 and 6.3.2.2). In my opinion, the blame is deployed as an attempt to remove 
power and responsibility from others in order to facilitate the legitimacy of, and increase 
the scope of, government bureaucracy.  
 
The overall conclusion to be drawn in this chapter is that, despite the fact that 
Bangladesh is a common-law origin country
105
 (condition a of each proposition) the 
findings of other conditions (in particular, conditions b, c, and d) of both propositions 
(PI and PII) reveal that common-law origin has minor or no influence on 
implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh (see sections 6.2 and 6.3). This is possibly 
because Bangladesh contains an unique environment which may be explained, via 
several factors (e.g. [a(i)] training opportunities in the accounting profession, [a(ii)] 
corruption and [b] other country specific factors). This study raises a question as to why 
a common-law origin country has no influence on the implementation of IFRSs or has 
moved toward code-law regarding the implementation of IFRSs.  
 
In relation to the relative impact of accounting regulatory frameworks and politico-
institutional factors, a comparison of interviewees’ perceptions and reflecting attitudes 
has been discussed (see section 6.4). The findings suggest that politico-institutional 
factors are stronger and more dominant factors than accounting regulatory frameworks 
with regard to the effective implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh. It is observed that 
there is a link between the interviewees’ views on accounting regulatory frameworks 
and political influences. However, the majority of interviewees are very concerned 
about the impact of the democratic government’s political influence in implementing 
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 As explained in Chapter Four (see section 4.3.1). 
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IFRSs (see section 6.4). The attitudes of the interviewees indicate that policy makers are 
keen to comment on donor agencies’ political influence, while denying the existence of 
government intervention or political lobbying. As mentioned earlier, this is likely to be 
because the policy makers represent different government institutions. In the first round 
of interviews, account preparers and professionals seem hesitant to talk about politics. 
One interpretation is that these interviewee groups feel too insecure to comment and 
believe that doing so may harm their livelihoods. But, in the second round of interviews, 
the interviewees are more critical of the present democratic government’s perceived 
attempts to apply political pressure. The persisting feeling expressed is that the 
interviewees are becoming more familiar with the present democratic government 
because the government is in its third year in power, so its methods are becoming 
clearer to observers. The interviews and documentary evidence collected in the study 
also reveal that in addition to politicised government institutions, outdated accounting 
regulatory frameworks are impeding the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh. This 
is an indication that accounting change has not taken place over the last decade. In 
particular, the accounting regulations are outdated even though the national political 
government has changed. This state of affairs also confirms the current democratic 
government’s failure so far to play a major role in driving the effective implementation 
of IFRSs in Bangladesh (see section 6.3.2.3). 
 




The Impact of [a(i)] training 
opportunities in the accounting 
profession & [a(ii)] corruption and [b] 
other country specific factors on the  





The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the second research question with 
reference to the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh, as follows: RQ-2(a): How do 
(i) training opportunities in the accounting profession and (ii) the state of corruption, as 
outcomes of culture in Bangladesh, affect the implementation of IFRSs; RQ-2(b): What  
other country specific factors are affecting implementation of IFRSs? In particular, the 
findings will answer proposition three and analyse issues around other country specific 
factors. As mentioned in section 2.2.3, the most frequently discussed issues in the prior 
literature on the role of the state and accounting change are accounting regulatory 
frameworks, politico-institutional factors and cultural factors (investigated here through 
training opportunities in the accounting profession and through corruption). In this 
chapter, drawing upon the 27 first round and 12 second round interviews as well as 
documentary analyses, I will discuss the third proposition which was developed in 
Chapter Two (see section 2.5.3) and other country specific factors. The third proposition 
relates to (i) training opportunities in the accounting profession and (ii) corruption, as 
proxies for cultural factors (see section 2.5).  
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, this research does not explore cultural values or beliefs, 
as proposed by Hofstede (1980, 1987), Hofstede et al. (2010) and Gray (1988) (see 
section 2.5). Although Weber (1958)[1904] argues that cultural changes played a 
critical role in the development of capitalism and its institutions, the Weberian view of 
the state is opposed to Hofstede’s model (Baskerville, 2001; Wickramasinghe & 
Hopper, 2005). Hofstede’s cultural dimensions model has been criticised in prior 
literature (Gernon & Wallace, 1995; Baskerville, 2001, 2003, 2005; Stulz & 
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Williamson, 2003; Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005). This is because Hofstede’s 
survey was limited to a single organisation and may not be applicable to other contexts 
(Gernon & Wallace, 1995). Baskerville (2001, p.3) also argues that “...the ‘dimensions 
of culture’ provided by Hofstede (or Gray) allows accounting researchers to sample 
and survey behaviour, and apply cultural indices to isolate the impact of the social 
environment...[and] could be attributed to non-cultural causes, such as corporate 
practices and ethics”. Another possible criticism comes from Wickramasinghe & 
Hopper (2005, p. 478) who argue that the cultural practices associated with accounting 
practices are “unlikely to be consistent within single national values (c.f. Hofstede, 
1980)..... culture, politics and the state, economics or accounting: they are intertwined 
and wax and wane according to contingencies”. An understanding of accounting 
practices cannot be obtained without reference to its cultural political economy, because 
culture will provide arguments that help to rationalise political arguments (Merryman, 
1985; Rajan & Zingales, 2000).   
 
The present study identifies some country specific factors that are impeding the 
implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh, which are as follows: a lack of qualified 
accountants, a lack of interest in IFRSs by managers of some companies, a culture of 
secrecy, a lack of research, public sector dominance and a predominantly family-based 
private sector. Some of these factors are supported by prior research (see section 2.6). 
The interview questions developed in section 5.4.1, include references to [i] training 
opportunities in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption, and other country specific 
factors. Enforcement documents from 1998-2010 available from the SEC websites have 
also been used in this study (see section 5.5). As mentioned in Chapter 4, Bangladesh’s 
culture is strongly ingrained, meaning that corruption
106
 is rife (both in the private and 
public sectors). Subsequently, the analyses will examine whether corruption is 
hindering the regulator’s attempts to enforce the regulations. 
  
Section 7.2 discusses [i] training opportunities in the accounting profession and [ii] 
corruption in relation to proposition three. Section 7.3 reflects on the influences of other 
country specific factors in the implementation of IFRSs in a developing country and 
section 7.4 summarises the chapter.  
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 Bangladesh topped the list of the most corrupt nations in the world for five consecutive years from 
2001-2005 (Transparency International Bangladesh, 2005).  
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7.2 (i) Training opportunities in the accounting 
profession & (ii) corruption (Proposition III) 
 
In this section, I will explore the following proposition: 
 
PIIIA:   Effective development of the training opportunities in the accounting profession 
will have a positive influence on implementation of IFRSs. 
 
‘or’   Ineffective development of the training opportunities in the accounting profession 
will have a negative influence on implementation of IFRSs. 
 
PIIIB:  Low levels of corruption will have a positive influence on implementation of 
IFRSs. 
 
‘or’   High levels of corruption will have a negative influence on implementation of 
IFRSs. 
I will analyse whether or not Bangladesh’s training opportunities in the accounting 
profession and levels of corruption are impeding the implementation of IFRSs.  
 
7.2.1  An effective/ineffective development of the training 
opportunities in the accounting profession 
 
In terms of an effective/ineffective development of the training opportunities in the 
accounting profession in Bangladesh, the interviewees are asked: Do you feel that the 
current syllabus of the professional accountancy qualification is suitable to 
implement IFRSs effectively? and Will the IFRSs be included in the universities' 
curricula? (see section 5.4.1). 18 of the 27 interviewees feel that the current 
professional exam syllabus is not suitable to better implement IFRSs (see Table 7-1). 
All the interviewees agree that university curricula should include IFRSs content.  
 
7.2.1.1 The 1st round interviews 
 
7.2.1.1.1    Professional and University curricula   
 
There is mixed evidence regarding the suitability of the current professional syllabus for 
implementation of  IFRSs. Nine out of 27 interviewees felt that the current syllabus is at 
an equivalent level to international standards (see Table 7-1). This view is summed up 
by the following comment by PM1, the president of the ICAB:   
 
“Of course, recently we have initiated a combined project known as the 
Twinning Project in which we have tried to match international accounting 
education standards. Further, members of the ICAB can be members of the 
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ICAEW and this is a milestone intended to encourage Bangladeshi students” 
(PM1).  
 
The majority of the interviewees (18 of 27) mention that the professional syllabus is not 
suitable to implement IFRSs (see Table 7-1). According to the interviewees, the 
syllabus
107
 do not contain related examples and applications of IFRSs, and the students 
gain inadequate knowledge on IFRSs from the teaching which is offered by the ICAB. 
Therefore, the quality of newly qualified auditors in Bangladesh still remains 
questionable. The following two comments summarise this view: 
 
“The syllabus of the professional bodies in Bangladesh does not include any 
courses on IFRSs that will help accountants in preparing annual reports which 
are based on mandatory accounting standards” (AR2). 
 
“I don’t think the ICAB’s syllabus is up to date enough to really implement 
IFRSs and Basel II......The ICAB should include IFRSs in their syllabus and also 
engage students in arranging regular seminars and workshops on IFRSs” (PM6). 
 
Table 7-1:  Views on Accounting Education’s (Professional and University Curricula) 
suitability towards IFRSs implementation [The 1
st
 round interviews] 
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All the interviewees comment that the universities’ curricula should include IFRSs 
content (see Table 7-1). The interviewees point out that none of the universities has an 
accountancy and finance programme linked with the professional bodies. Therefore, the 
accountancy graduates who become a company’s account preparers are unaware of 
                                                 
107
 With the agreement between the ICAB and the ICAEW in 2009, the syllabus has changed from 2010 
onwards (http://www.icab.org.bd/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=54&Itemid=64) (see 
Chapter Four also). 
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IFRSs. Consequently, they cannot prepare financial statements complying with IFRSs. 
For instance, one interviewee argues that: 
 
“The IFRSs content is missing in the universities curricula in Bangladesh. The 
public universities’ are inclined to incorporate IFRSs curricula. However, the 
private universities are reluctant to incorporate IFRSs content at all. More than 
55% students are studying at private universities” (AP8). 
 
However, the real problem of involving IFRSs content in the universities syllabus is the 
lack of qualified accountancy academics. There are about 82 universities with a total of 
19,409 academics in Bangladesh (source: http://www.ugc.gov.bd/reports/Part-2.pdf). 




“Yes, there is a global desire to include IFRSs in the universities curricula. 
However, there is a shortage of academics to teach the content” (AP11).  
 
“To be honest, there is a shortage of accounting academics. You know the 
method of teaching is different here because teachers only teach theoretical 
underpinnings, and ignore practical application” (PM7). 
 
7.2.1.1.2    Training and Development 
 
The interviewees are asked: What kind of training and development are you offering 
them (the preparers and professionals) to cope with IFRSs?
108
 (see section 5.4.1). Two 
PMs from the ICAB respond that they are providing training to cope with IFRSs (see 
Table 7-2). For instance, the ICAB arrange regular seminars on IFRSs which teach 
preparation of financial statements in accordance with IFRSs. In addition, they have 
included CPD hours for an accountant to participate in IFRSs seminars and discussions. 
However, the SEC, the ICMAB, the World Bank in Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Bank 
and the Ministry of Finance have no training opportunities. One interviewee from the 
World Bank reflects on that issue: 
 
“In the World Bank [World Bank’s Bangladesh office], there is nothing 
mentioned about IFRSs related training in Bangladesh. In 2006, the UN General 
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 This question was asked of the PM groups; the AP groups were asked: what training and development 
did you attain to cope with IFRSs? The US and AR groups were asked a question regarding the 
importance of training and development. 
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Table 7-2:  Views on Training and development from four groups of interviewees [The 
1
st
 round interviews] 
 
PM: Providing Training and development to cope with IFRSs (n=7) 
 PM1 PM2 PM3 PM4 PM5 PM6 PM7 Total % 
Provide training √ √      2/7 29% 
Not providing training   √ √ √ √ √ 5/7 71% 
 
AP: Atteneded Training to cope with IFRSs (n=12) 






















US and AR:  Training and development are essential to cope with IFRSs (n=8) 
Training is 
essential 
US1 US2 US3 US4 US5 US6 AR1 AR2 Total % 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 8/8 100% 
 
Secondly, three out of twelve APs say that they have attended IFRSs related training 
programmes (see Table 7-2). These three interviewees included two accountants from a 
‘big 4’ and one from a multinational company. This is a clear indication that 
multinationals and ‘big 4’ are aware of global standards. The training opportunities are 
also limited (e.g. IFRSs seminars and disclosure requirements). Nine interviewees did 
not attend any training programme. Four CA firms do not offer any training to their 
accountants. This view is summed up concisely by an accountant preparer:  
 
“I do not have any training at all. I am interested in attending the IFRSs training 
programme. However, the company is not in favour of it. The company doesn’t 
care, so why should I?” (AP11). 
 
Finally, all USs and ARs feel that training is very much essential (see Table 7-2). All 
the interviewees express the cynical view that the current culture of providing limited 
training to account preparers and professionals by the companies and professional 
bodies would not benefit the effective implementation of IFRSs at all. The following 
quotation from AR, is illustrative of this point of view: 
 
“I strongly believe [that] there is a need to train the trainers/teachers to comply 
with IFRSs. The ICAB is not doing such a remarkable job. The preparers [and] 
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7.2.1.2 The 2nd round interviews 
 
The interviewees are asked: Q5. How effective are accounting education and the 
profession in implementing IFRSs? (see section 5.4.2). Twelve interviewees agree that 
accounting education and the profession can be improved by including a syllabus of 
IFRSs contents in the universities’ and professional exams (see Table 7-3). In addition, 
they point out that syllabus should be more practical based rather than purely 
theoretically oriented.   
 
Table 7-3: Perceptions of effective/ineffective development of the training 





 PM AP US AR Total % 
Ineffective development 
of the training 


















 round of interviews, 67% interviewees said they felt that the current syllabus 
of professional exams is not suitable and all of them thought that the university 
syllabuses should include IFRSs related content (see Table 7-1). In the 2
nd
 round of 
interviews, 100% of the interviewees were concerned about the current syllabuses (i.e. 
both the professional exams and the universities’ curricula) (see Table 7-3). It can be 
argued that PM1, PM2, PM5, AP10 & AP12 feel that the current syllabus is suitable for 
the implementation of IFRSs, but in the 2
nd
 round they raise questions around the 
current syllabus. It is understandable that they change their views (June 2010 to 
September 2011) because very little progress has been made although the ICAB and the 
World Bank have signed a memorandum in 2009 to reform the syllabus. The 
interviewees feel that professionalism is not being practised by accountants. The most 
striking point is that the preparers do not know the standards. Two interviewees from 
the AR and AP groups extensively commented along the following lines: 
 
“There are no values of disclosure because it is not culturally accepted in 
Bangladesh. Companies are not following this because the preparers and even 
the auditors do not know the standards” (AR1). 
 
“There are around one hundred CA firms in Bangladesh. Apart from the big 
four, the others follow director’s wishes. Some CA firms are like a one man 
show, in which case quality assurance is not maintained at all. This is a 
deliberate negligence by the CA firms regarding IFRSs implementation” (AP6). 
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7.2.1.3 Documentary analyses 
 
In this section, I have examined CA firms’ violations from 1998 to 2010. Based on the 
analysis, approximately 36% of independent auditing firms (31 from a total of 86) have 
violated the SEC rules regarding IFRSs.  
 
Table 7-4 shows that enforcement notices were not released against the CA firms until 
2002. The largest number of violations was identified during the years 2006 and 2009. 
The findings reveal that none of the firms was penalised for violating the SEC’s rules, 
with the exception of two cases. This means that 36 violations were flagged (The SEC 
stated ‘Failure to comply with securities related laws regarding financial statements of 
the issuers’ [Warning]) and two of them were fined. In terms of the two exception 
cases, in 2008, the SEC stated a ‘Failure to submit qualified audit report of the issuer’ 
[Penalty] and in 2010, the SEC stated a ‘Failure to comply with securities related laws 
regarding financial statements of the issuers’ [Penalty]. None of these firms paid a 
penalty.  
 





Notes: O= Number of occurrences
109
; F= Number of CA Firms; Company names have 
been anonymised. Detailed information is available on request from the author. 
 
Certain audit situations were very common in many of the independent CA firms’ 
violations which were examined. For instance, some CA firms continuously violated the 
SEC rules; for example, A & Co. were warned for non-compliance with securities 
related laws in connection with the audited financial statements of Bangladesh X Ltd. 
for the years ended 30 June 2006, 2009 and 2010; and B & Co. were warned for non-
compliance with securities related laws in connection with the audited financial 
statements of Y Ltd.  for the years ended 30 June 2008, 2009 and 2010. Notably, B & 
Co. is one of the ‘big four’ companies in Bangladesh. This shows that not only small 
CA firms but also the ‘big four firms’ have violated the SEC rules. Further, the SEC 
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restricted access to the documentation on one CA firm in the SEC websites. The 
released information was a ‘Disposal of review petition against Penalty Order. In 
connection with auditor’s qualifications and Commission’s observations on the audited 
financial statements of Z Ltd. for the year ended June 30, 2006’ 
(http://www.secbd.org/List%20of%20Enforcement%20Actions%20for%20the%20mont
h%20of%20February%202010.htm) M/S C & Co. (http://www.secbd.org/April-27-
2010%20_Ms%20Mowla%20Mohammad%20&%20Co_.pdf). It also evident that the 
CA firms were retained for more than three years but the SEC did not penalise the 
companies; an example of this would be the auditors of XX Ltd. 
(http://www.secbd.org/Keya%20Cosmetics%20Ltd.%2026.04.11-458.pdf). This 
evidence raises a question as to why these corrupt practices are repeated. According to 
the perceptions of the interviewees, the ICAB interprets the matter in favour of the CA 
firms (see sections 6.2.3.1 and 6.2.3.2). Another possible explanation suggested by the 
interviewees is that the SEC suffers from a lack of professionals and therefore they 
cannot identify the CA firms’ violations or act upon these if they are discovered (see 
section 6.2.3.1).  
 
This study also finds that the SEC’s enforcement actions against CA firms do not 
convince companies to change auditors. Table 7-4 indicates that the ramifications of 
enforcement actions did not go beyond the impact of press releases. Further, the SEC 
did not identify any CA firms’ violations of auditing standards. Hence, the evidence in 
this study indicates that the SEC’s actions have no other market and economic 
consequences. One SEC official mentioned that when the SEC identifies any corrupt 
firms it then seeks comments from the ICAB. But the ICAB doesn’t reply to the SEC on 
time. There is a quality assurance committee of the ICAB for overseeing CA firms’ 
activities, but this committee is possibly not active in this regard. Another significant 
finding is that the identified CA firms are able to continue their work because of a 
culture of non punishment for violating rules. This indicates the absence of any reliable 
exercising of due care or professional ethics in Bangladesh. It also raises questions 
around the quality of annual reports and investors’ trust in the annual reports presented 







Chapter Seven – Training, Corruption & Country Specific Factors          184 
 
7.2.2     Low/high levels of corruption 
 
7.2.2.1 The 1st round interviews 
 
The interviewees are asked: How would you regard corruption as an issue in 
implementing IFRSs effectively? Twenty one interviewees comment regarding 
corruption in relation to IFRSs implementation (see Table 7-5). They feel that a high 
level of corruption is a big threat to the implementation of IFRSs.  
 
Table 7-5:  Negative perceptions of corruption from four groups of interviewees [The 
1
st
 round interviews] 
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Six interviewees from the policy making groups do not feel that corruption is a big 
problem (see Table 7-5). The majority of interviewees think that corruption is 
embedded in three sectors: governmental bodies, audit firms & professional bodies, and 
private companies. Ten out of the 21 interviewees feel that financial reporting practices 
are affected by the widespread corrupt practices of governmental bodies. Respondents 
agree that the governmental bodies have become the epitome of corruption, given the 
close relation between the business elite and the political class.  The only PM comments 
that: 
 
“I think [that] the government does not want to implement IFRSs fully. The 
government knows very well about the corrupt practices of its regulatory bodies 
but is reluctant to take action against them because of their political 
connections” (PM5). 
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 Six interviewees from the total of 27 do not feel that corruption is a threat to the implementation of 
IFRSs. 
 
Chapter Seven – Training, Corruption & Country Specific Factors          185 
 
Further, the regulatory bodies are themselves involved with corrupt practices. The 
interviewees express frustration regarding the regulator’s role in monitoring financial 
reporting practices. For instance, one AP said: 
 
“Sometimes, inspectors from the regulatory bodies like the SEC and the 
National Audit Office visit our office to verify our accounts. They ask some 
irrelevant questions on IFRSs but do not even give us an opportunity to explain 
things in detail. I have a feeling that they have no background in accountancy at 
all (e.g. they might have an MA in History, or an MA in Sociology) and simply 
want bribes. It seems like whatever you explain to them they will respond NO 
but if you bribe them, they will respond YES” (AP7). 
 
Respondents express that the corrupt auditors and professional bodies’ members can 
continue their activities because of their close proximity to politicians. Respondents also 
agree that implementers of IFRSs (i.e. the ICAB, the SEC, the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Commerce) are not necessarily honest and are likely to have high levels 
of corruption. None of the auditors comment on their corrupt practices. The following 
comments are representative of this issue: 
 
“The professional bodies have not taken any action against corrupt auditor(s) 
since the independence of Bangladesh” (US2). 
 
“You know, the rating agency decides the credit ratings through bribery. So, 
financially, the company is not strong enough but their credit rating is very high. 
How is this possible?” (AP10). 
 
Finally, corrupt practices are often found in companies. Five interviewees (two APs and 
three USs) believe that there is history of a considerable number of large scale frauds 
which have been carried out by managers and directors of listed companies (see Table 
7-5). According to a group of respondents, some companies hide true information to 
evade taxes and the tax authority is satisfied with bribery (see sections 6.3.1.3.1, 
6.3.1.3.2 and 7.2.2.2). One interviewee from the AP group in particular, commented: 
 
“The directors are very influential. So, the annual reports are being prepared 
according to the wishes of the directors. We are more concerned about the 
stability of our jobs and family than about IFRSs and honesty.  If we lose our 
jobs then who will feed our family?. You know [that] the tax authority does not 
care about IFRSs either and they are satisfied with bribery when it comes to 
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7.2.2.2 The 2nd round interviews 
 
The interviewees are asked: Q6. How does corruption affect effective IFRSs 
implementation? (see section 5.4.2). Nine out of 12 interviewees feel that corruption is 
impeding the IFRSs implementation process (see Table 7-6). Apart from the PM group, 
all the interviewees in the other groups (i.e. AP, US and AR) agree with this view. One 
interviewee sums up that: 
 
“To convince the Tax authority that you are complying with regulatory 
requirements, you have to bribe them” (US5).  
 
Table 7-6: Negative perceptions of corruption in relation to IFRSs implementation [The 
2
nd
 round interviews] 
 















The findings of the 2
nd
 round of interviews are similar to that seen in the 1
st
 round of 
interviews. For example, PM1, PM2 and PM4 feel that corruption is not a big issue in 
the implementation of IFRSs (see the similar findings in section 7.2.2.1). PM1, PM2 
and PM4 are linked with the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Finance 
respectively. Consequently they tend not to comment on governmental bodies’ 
corruption. According to the perceptions of the interviewees, during mid 2011, the 
country’s capital market experienced major turbulence which resulted in the collapse of 
several companies, and led to the attrition of investors’ confidence, leading to 
shareholder distrust and low confidence (see section 6.3.1.3.2). Only one PM is very 
critical about the corruption issue and expresses the opinion that: 
 
 
“Recently, I chaired the quality assurance board of the ICAB. I saw [that] many 
CA firms were identified as violating professional ethics, but they were not fined 
or penalised… the ICAB are taking membership fees from the violators. It means 
[that] they can carry out their job legally. It is a culture in Bangladesh to violate 
the rules because criminals know that nothing will happen to them. I do not 
know where it will end so how do you expect IFRSs implementation and 
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7.2.2.3 Documentary analyses 
 
This section of the present chapter examines enforcement releases during the period 
1998-2010. More specifically, violations across various industries and court cases, with 
reference to corruption, are examined.  
 
7.2.2.3.1 Violations across various industries 
 
 
The distribution of enforcement actions across various industries on the DSE’s list is 
shown in Tables 7-7, 7-8 and 7-9. These tables were created based on overall 
enforcement actions from 1998-2010 as depicted in Appendix 7-1. Table 7-7 shows that 
19 industries violated the SEC rules and that the number of occurrences has increased 
from 2006 onwards, and also specifies the number of years over which the wrongdoing 
took place. Most notably, in 2006, 174 companies were subject to a total of 326 
enforcement actions. This is possibly a reflection of the fact that, during the period 2001 
to 2005, Bangladesh was officially the most corrupt country in the world (TIB, 2005, 
see also section 4.5.2). As soon as the military-backed government took over from the 
democratic government, they tried to reduce corruption levels. For example, 
Transparency International Bangladesh TIB (2007) stated that corruption in Bangladesh 
was ranked seventh while in 2006 it had been ranked third. TIB (2007, p. 2) mentioned 
some reasons for the improvement of Bangladesh’s position by stating “It is quite likely 
that a perceived sense of insecurity and uncertainty that is widely believed to have 
prevailed among the business community in the wake of the post 1/11 [Military-backed 
Government]’s anti-corruption drive in Bangladesh may have prevented the possibility 
of a better score”. Table 7-8 shows that the highest number of occurrences was among 
Food and Allied, Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals, Textiles, and Miscellaneous 
industries. These industries are dominated by politicians. On average, 186% [1647/887] 
occurrences are reported in 19 industries from 1998 to 2010. This fact represents that 
the effort of IFRSs implementation may be slower if this practice is continual. 
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Table 7-7: Industry wise Total Number of Occurrences by Year (1998-2010)  
 
 
Industry 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 
  O C O C O C O C O C O C O C O C O C O C O C O C O C 
Cement 3 2 0 0 2 1 10 2 5 3 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Ceramics 5 3 4 1 2 1 9 2 7 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Engineering 12 6 4 4 5 5 10 7 10 10 10 7 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 






















































Fuel and Power 13 6 5 5 7 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 6 4 0 0 4 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jute 2 2 5 2 1 1 26 6 10 3 6 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Paper and Printing 9 4 14 6 4 4 6 4 12 6 2 2 6 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Pharmaceuticals and 
Chemicals 
20 9 7 6 11 7 21 11 21 12 15 6 3 2 1 1 6 3 2 2 2 2 5 5 1 1 
Services and Real 
Estate 
0 0 1 1 2 2 6 4 5 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tannery 4 3 8 4 6 4 17 6 13 4 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Textile 44 21 36 14 21 9 59 23 60 25 17 9 6 6 22 6 4 2 1 1 2 2 6 5 3 3 
Miscellaneous 19 9 9 4 6 5 32 10 19 10 8 4 1 1 5 3 5 1 1 0 0 0 49 13 50 17 
IT 5 1 6 1 4 2 8 2 3 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bank 5 4 4 4 14 10 10 7 26 6 9 7 5 4 3 3 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Brokerage 33 25 14 13 27 8 14 7 30 21 12 7 13 7 9 8 4 4 11 10 2 2 11 11 3 3 
Insurance 8 7 20 14 28 9 8 7 9 9 7 5 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Financial Institutions 5 4 6 4 5 1 2 2 8 7 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CA firms 3 3 8 8 5 3 6 4 8 6 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CDBL 13 9 0 0 12 1 4 0 19 18 18 16 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total year wise 239 137 172 101 176 83 281 120 326 174 135 86 62 38 57 36 29 14 24 22 10 10 77 40 59 26 
 
Total Number of Occurrences of Enforcement Actions (1998-2010):  1647; Total Number of Companies: 887 
 
 
Note: O= Number of occurrences; C= Number of Companies.
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Table 7-8: Total Number of Occurrences by Industry (1998-2010) 
 






Cement 24 12 200 
Ceramics 30 12 250 
Engineering 59 47 126 
Food and Allied 194 97 200 
Fuel and Power 48 33 145 
Jute 52 17 306 
Paper and Printing 55 31 177 
Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals 115 67 172 
Services and Real Estate 16 11 145 
Tannery 54 25 216 
Textile 281 126 223 
Miscellaneous 204 77 265 
IT 27 9 300 
Bank 78 47 166 
Brokerage 183 126 145 
Insurance 83 54 154 
Financial Institutions 29 21 138 
CA firms 38 31 123 
CDBL 77 44 175 
Total 1647 887 186 
 
Note: The italics indicate the highest number of occurrences by industry. 
 
Table 7-9 shows the number of occurrences in relation to IFRSs by industry. What is 
apparent from this table is that no occurrences in relation to violations of IFRSs were 
reported during the period 1998 to 2005. In total there were 42 enforcement actions by 
40 companies, and two companies had multiple violations. The main violations included 
a major failure to disclose information, false statements, and issues with true and fair 
views. The largest number of cited companies belonged to the Food and Allied, 
Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals, Textiles, and Miscellaneous industries which is 
consistent with the results for overall violations by industry, as mentioned in Table 7-8. 
Despite the fact that a limited number of enforcement releases were regarding IFRSs 
issues, it should be noted that Food and Allied and Textiles had instances of non 
compliance with IFRSs. One important observation is that the highest number of 
enforcement releases regarding IFRSs violations was seen in 2009 while the most 
enforcement releases with reference to SEC laws violations were seen in 2006. This is 
possibly because the SEC officials are becoming more concerned about IFRSs 
compliance in recent years than they had been in the past.  
 
Chapter Seven – Training, Corruption & Country Specific Factors          190 
                                                                     
 
Table 7-9: Number of Occurrences in relation to IFRSs, by Industry (1998-2010)  
 
Industry 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 Total 
  O C O C O C O C O C O C 
Cement 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 2 
Engineering 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Food & Allied 4 4 2 2 3 2 5 5 1 1 15 14 
Jute 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 


























Tannery 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 3 3 
Textile 1 1 6 5 1 1 1 1 0 0 9 8 
Miscellaneous 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 3 0 0 4 4 
Insurance 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Total year wise 9 9 14 13 7 6 11 11 1 1 42 40 
 
Notes: O= Number of occurrences; C= Number of Companies; The italics indicate the 
highest number of occurrences by industry. 
 
7.2.2.3.2 Court cases of enforcement actions 
 
The number of court cases regarding enforcement actions has been increasing year by 
year on a cumulative basis from 1998 to 2010 (see Figure 7-1). Table 7-10 shows that 
during 1999, 43 court cases took place whereas in 2010 the total reached about 332. It 
also shows that in the last three years, these cases have increased dramatically. One 
cautionary note is that these court cases are concerned with violations of the SEC’s 
rules. I tried to find out how many cases were specifically related to IFRSs. However, 
the SEC did not provide any information. My interpretation is that these cases, as 
indicated in Table 7-10, include IFRSs related violations (see sections 8.5.1-8.5.4). The 
cumulative increases of court cases weaken the SEC’s enforcement motivations. 
Companies can appeal regarding the SEC’s enforcement and go through various courts. 
Most cases are judged in the High Court Division, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate 
Court, the 5
th
 Joint District Judge Court and the General Certificate Court (see the 
judicial structure of Bangladesh and its functions, in Appendices 7-2 and 7-3). But, 
there are no specialised courts (lower court/higher court) regarding the SEC 
enforcements. In the High court and the District judge court, a money laundering bench 
exists but there are no SEC related benches and no Parliamentary Acts have been passed 
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since the emergence of the SEC. The common scenario in Bangladesh is that the guilty 
companies are reluctant to pay the penalty because the court cases normally take a long 
time to complete. This is not limited to the SEC’s enforcement related court cases but 
also applies to other cases
111
. After a case is filed in the court, nobody knows when it 
will end (The Daily Star, 2007). Barrister Moudud Ahmed (The former  Law Minister) 
argues that the present judicial system in Bangladesh is old fashioned, traditionalist and 
corrupt and needs reform; and that under existing procedures, a hundred years will be 
required for the disposal of ten million cases (The Daily Star, 2007). 
 
Corruption in the judicial system is a well-known phenomenon. Transparency 
International Bangladesh (TIB) in its ‘Global Corruption Report’ (2007, p. 15) 
mentioned that “Bangladesh failed to ensure full independence of the judiciary and the 
politicisation of the judiciary is one of the major reasons behind judicial 
corruption...Two thirds of the people who used a court in 2004 paid bribes, with the 
typical bribe amounting to 25 percent of average annual income”. This Judicial 
corruption allows criminals (e.g. corrupt companies) to go unpunished. According to the 
Former Chief Justice, “the corruption in the judiciary system has taken a turn into 
blood cancer and it will not be eradicated if nepotism and favouritism are not stopped” 
(The Daily Star, 2007). The politicisation of the judiciary strengthens judicial corruption 
(The Daily Star, 2004; Bhattacharjee, 2007). Under the provision of Article 94(4) of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh, the Chief Justice and the other Judges shall be independent 
in the exercise of their judicial functions. However, in reality, their appointments are not 
determined solely by their abilities, experience or professionalism but by the extent to 
which they have served the pecuniary and political benefit of the appointing party and 
supported its leaders and workers (The Dainik Ittefaq, 2007). Therefore, the outcome of 
the cases regarding the SEC rules or IFRSs non-compliance violation may be influenced 
by the political executive. It also may weaken the SEC’s enforcement effort towards 
IFRSs implementation in Bangladesh. 
 
                                                 
111
 There are approximately ten million (9,683,305) cases pending in different courts (4,946 in the 
Appellate Division; 127, 244 in the High Court Division; 344,518 civil cases  and 95,689 criminal cases 
in the Judges courts; 296,862 cases with Magistrate courts and 99,004 cases with the Metropolitan 
Magistrate courts (The Daily Star, 2003).   
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Table 7-10: The SEC Court Cases of enforcement actions (1999-2010) 
 
Sl.  Court 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 
1 
 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh  
- Appellate Division 
6 9 6 4 3 3 3 4 4 17 14 12 
- High Court Division 116 99 77 73 71 66 55 53 46 37 27 21 
2 District Judge Court, Dhaka 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0   0 1 0 
3 2
nd
 Addl. Metropolitan Session Judge Court, Dhaka 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
4 8
th
 Asst. Judge Court, Dhaka 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 9
th
 Asst. Judge Court, Savar, Dhaka 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 6
th
 Asst. Judge Court, Dhaka 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 
7 4
th
 Asst. Judge Court, Dhaka 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 0 0 0 1 1 
8 1
st
 Addl. Asst. Judge Court, Dhaka  0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 0 0 
9 Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Dhaka  10 9 6 7 6 6 0 4 4 7 0 0 
10 Metropolitan Session Judge Court 6 6 6 6 6 6 9 3 3 0 0 0 
11 1
st
 Asst. Metropolitan Session Judge Court, Dhaka 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 1
st
 Joint District Judge Court, Dhaka. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
13 5
th
 Joint District Judge Court, Dhaka 8 8 9 8 8 8 9 10 4 4 3 3 
14 4
th
 Joint District Judge Court, Dhaka 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 1
st
 Asst. Judge Court, Dhaka. 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
16 2
nd
 Asst. Judge Court, Dhaka. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
17 Asst. Judge Court, Savar, Dhaka. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 General Certificate Court, Dhaka 181 138 94 74 46 32 21 17 16 6 5 3 
  Total 332 274 204 174 143 125 105 94 80 75 54 43 
 





Notes: The data for 1998 was not available; the italics indicate the highest number of court cases in various courts.
Chapter Seven – Training, Corruption & Country Specific Factors          193                                                            
 




7.2.3 Comparison of Interviewees’ perceptions & reflecting 
attitudes 
 
I have summarised the first and second round interviewees’ attitudes to IFRSs 
implementation after reading and reflecting on the transcripts (see Appendices 7-4 and 
7-5). The view of each interviewee on a given topic is represented by one answer (see 
Q5 to Q9 in Appendices 7-4 and 7-5). This approach requires making a judgement 
about the interviewee’s primary opinion about a topic (i.e. whether he/she expresses 
positive/negative/no comment). This comparison of interviewees’ attitudes helps to 
establish whether the interviewee’s background characteristics such as work experience 
and qualifications are related to their expressed attitudes. However, Appendices 7-4 and 
7-5 suggest that there is no association between the interviewees’ work 
experience/qualifications and their attitudes.  
 
The evidence of the study reveals that there is a link between [i] training opportunities 
in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption (Q5, Q6 & Q7: professional syllabus, 
training opportunities and corruption). In relation to policy making groups, the four 
policymakers who are unhappy with the current professional syllabus and lack of 
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provision of any training opportunities, feel that corruption is not a big factor affecting 
the implementation process (see Table 7-11). But there are some contradictory 
comments observed. For example, although three policymakers (PM1, PM2 and PM5) 
are satisfied with the professional syllabus, two (PM1 and PM2) out of these three are 
providing training and feel that corruption is not an important factor. One possible 
observation is that PM1 and PM2 are highly placed officials in the ICAB and the ICAB 
is within the Ministry of Commerce. Therefore they are disinclined to provide negative 
views on the ICAB’s professional syllabus, training issues or possible corruption. PM1 
and PM2’s answers represent their personal views rather than an institutional view. 
PM5 is an official of the World Bank and is therefore able to talk freely about corrupt 
activities. The respondent is happy with the professional syllabus because the 
respondent is chairing quality assurance boards of the ICAB. Table 7-11 also shows that 
67% of the respondents feel that the professional syllabuses are not good enough to 
implement IFRSs; 52% of interviewees are not providing or attending training and 78% 
of respondents feel that corruption is impeding the implementation process. 
 
With respect to the AP group, those who feel that the professional syllabus is up to date 
enough have attended training on IFRSs and feel that corruption is a problem (see Table 
7-11). The only AP (AP3) who has not attended any training on IFRSs from his audit 
firms is happy with the professional syllabus. This is possibly because of his affiliation 
with the standards setting body of the ICAB. Those who perceive that the professional 
syllabus is not up to date have not attended training on IFRSs and view corruption as 
impeding the implementation process.  
 
But the majority of the APs are not getting access to any training opportunities. The 
findings of the study reveal that the big four audit firms and large companies have more 
training opportunities in Bangladesh than average, but the smaller ones do not see 
themselves as training facilitators and/or best-practice companies. The main point here 
is that the smaller companies’ managements are not worried about disclosure policy and 
therefore their directors’ attitudes toward training are vague. From the US and AR 
groups, it is important to mention that (except for US1 and US6), a majority of the 
respondents are dissatisfied with the professional syllabus and also strongly believe that 
training opportunities are essential and that corruption is holding back the 
implementation of IFRSs. One possible interpretation is that US1 and US6 may be 
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heavily linked with the ICAB. In particular, the affiliated banks Brac Bank (US1) and 
the Mercantile Bank (US6) have been awarded the 11th ICAB National Awards for best 
published accounts and reports as well. Therefore, these two interviewees provide no 
comment on politics. 
 
The purpose of the second round of interviews is to test the interviewees’ attitudes after 
a further year of the present democratic government has passed (i.e. its 3
rd
 year) (see 
Chapter Five). The perceptions of the interviewees in the 2
nd
 round of interviews are 
quite similar to previous responses (see Appendix 7-5 and Table 7-12). PM1, PM2, 
PM5, AP10 and AP12 were positive about the professional syllabus in the first round 
interviews, but in the 2
nd
 round, they were more critical about it. This could be because 
there is a very low pass rate in the professional exams and there are very few qualified 
accountants in Bangladesh. Further, agreement in 2009 that the ICAEW should update 
the professional curricula in Bangladesh may suggest that these five interviewees have 
changed their minds on professional syllabus issues (Siddiqui, 2010; see also section 
4.3.3). Some differences in the interviewees’ perceptions are observed. For instance, the 
2
nd
 round interviewees only mention corruption by government while in the 1
st
 round, 
the interviewees had pointed out corruption in various bodies (e.g. audit firms and 
professional bodies, and in companies). It is unsurprising that PM1, PM2 and PM4 held 
the opinion that corruption is not an important factor. This is possibly due to the fact 
that these interviewees are heavily involved with the government and hence are hesitant 
to talk about government corruption. Table 7-12 also shows that 100% of the 
interviewees opine that professional and university syllabuses are not suitable for the 
implementation of IFRSs, and 75% of respondents feel that corruption within the 
government is slowing down implementation. None of the interviewees provided ‘no 
comment’ on [i] training opportunities in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption 
(see Tables 7-11 and 7-12).  











Chapter Seven – Training, Corruption & Country Specific Factors          196                                                            
 
Table 7-11: Quantification of perceptions of interviewees [The 1
st




[i] Training Opportunities in the 
Accounting Profession and [ii] 
Corruption 
Q5 5(a) Q6 Q7 
PM1 1 1 1 1 
PM2 1 1 1 1 
PM3 0 1 0 1 
PM4 0 1 0 1 
PM5 1 1 0 0 
PM6 0 1 0 1 
PM7 0 1 0 1 
AP1 1 1 1 0 
AP2 0 1 0 0 
AP3 1 1 0 0 
AP4 0 1 0 0 
AP5 0 1 0 0 
AP6 0 1 0 0 
AP7 0 1 0 0 
AP8 0 1 0 0 
AP9 0 1 0 0 
AP10 1 1 1 0 
AP11 0 1 0 0 
AP12 1 1 1 0 
US1 1 1 1 0 
US2 0 1 1 0 
US3 0 1 1 0 
US4 0 1 1 0 
US5 0 1 1 0 
US6 1 1 1 0 
AR1 0 1 1 0 
AR2 0 1 1 0 


















Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Notes: Code (Interviewee): PM: Policy makers; AP: Preparers & Professionals; US: Users; & AR: 
Academics & Researchers; ‘0’ = negative perceptions & ‘1’ = positive perceptions; 
Q5: ‘0’= professional syllabus is not suitable & ‘1’ = professional syllabus is suitable to implement 
IFRSs; Q5(a): ‘0’ = university syllabus should not include IFRSs contents & ‘1’ = university syllabus 
should include IFRSs contents; Q6: ‘0’= not providing training/not attending training/training is not 
essential & ‘1’= providing training/attending training/training is essential; Q7: ‘0’ = corruption by 
government, audit firms & professional bodies & companies; ‘1’= no corruption; Q8 [other county 
specific factors] & Q9 [Comments/suggestions] cannot be quantified due to the nature of the questions 
and the perceptions of the interviewees. 
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Table 7-12: Quantification of perceptions of interviewees [The 2
nd






[i] Training Opportunities in the 
Accounting Profession and [ii] 
Corruption 
Q5 Q6 
PM1 0 1 
PM2 0 1 
PM4 0 1 
PM5 0 0 
AP5 0 0 
AP6 0 0 
AP10 0 0 
AP12 0 0 
US4 0 0 
US5 0 0 
AR1 0 0 













Total 100% 100% 
 
Notes: Code (Interviewee): PM: Policy makers; AP: Preparers & Professionals; US: Users; & AR: 
Academics & Researchers; ‘0’ = negative perceptions & ‘1’ = positive perceptions. 
Q5: ‘0’= professional syllabus & university syllabus are not suitable & ‘1’ = professional syllabus & 
university syllabus are suitable to implement IFRSs; Q6:  ‘0’ = corruption by governmental body &‘1’= 
no corruption; Q7 [other county specific factors]: cannot be quantified due to the nature of the question 
and the perceptions of the interviewees. 
 
7.2.4   Reflecting on section 7.2 
 
The findings show that (i) training opportunities in the accounting profession and (ii) 
corruption have a negative influence on implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh under 
the conditions of (a) deficiencies in the training opportunities in the accounting 
profession and (b) high levels of corruption (see section 7.2) 
 
In relation to condition (a), the effectiveness of accounting profession, the findings 
confirm that deficiencies in training opportunities in the accounting profession in 
Bangladesh inhibit the implementation process, rendering it ineffective (see section 
7.2.1). The findings suggest that the professional syllabus contains limited content on 
IFRSs, and lacks practical examples and applications; meanwhile, the interviewees are 
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not aware of the universities’ curricula content (or lack of it) on IFRSs (see section 
7.2.1.1.1). The interviewees’ attitudes suggest a generally negative perception of the 
structure of accounting education. Interviewees’ responses are also negative about the 
provision of training opportunities by policy makers and companies (see section 
7.2.1.1.2). Only the ICAB provides training facilities to its members. Some of the 
interviewees think that the regulators have very little knowledge of IFRSs, and they 
cannot therefore identify those companies who are failing to comply with IFRSs (see 
section 7.2.1.3). This is because the SEC has lack of professionals (see section 6.2.3.1). 
Preparers with no training are preparing annual reports and these annual reports do not 
reflect IFRSs. The 2
nd
 round of interviews confirms that the current professional 
syllabus of the ICAB and the universities’ curricula are not effective enough to support 
the implementation of IFRSs (see section 7.2.1.2). The number of accountants has not 
substantially increased over the last 15 years. The findings from the documentary 
analysis suggest that true interpretations of IFRSs may be rare, although the 
accountancy profession has moved with the help of the ICAEW to increase the number 
of CAs with knowledge of IFRSs in recent years (see section 7.2.1.3). Questions also 
arise around why a very low number of CA firms were penalised during the period 
1998-2010 and why the corrupt firms are continuing to freely operate; and, finally, why 
none of these firms paid any penalty. In my opinion, these practices may influence 
prospective accountants in Bangladesh towards the same corrupt practices (see section 
7.2.1.3). 
 
With respect to low/high levels of corruption (condition b), a high level of corruption in 
Bangladesh is seen to be slowing down the implementation process (see section 7.2.2). 
The findings suggest that the widespread corruption evident in governmental bodies, 
audit firms and professional bodies and companies is a significant obstacle to the 
implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh (see section 7.2.2.1). Corruption is widespread 
in both the public and private sectors (see section 4.5.2). The reason for this in 
Bangladesh is that there has been an established history of corruption ever since the 
country’s independence. Indeed, Bangladesh was ranked as the most corrupt country in 
the world for five consecutive years (see section 4.5.2).  
 
A further point from the interview findings is that almost all government agencies, 
including ministerial bodies, tax authorities and regulators, seem to be involved to some 
extent in corrupt practices. The 2
nd
 round of interviews also provides strong evidence 
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that corruption is impeding the IFRSs implementation process (see section 7.2.2.2). 
75% of the respondents in the second round of interviews only mentioned corruption by 
governmental bodies (see Table 7-6). However, the policy makers do not express any 
belief that corruption is hindering the implementation process, either in the first or the 
second round of interviews. From the documentary analysis (see section 7.2.2.3), it is 
evident that the highest number of SEC rule violations, including IFRSs related 
violations, were among the Food and Allied, Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals, Textiles, 
and Miscellaneous industry sectors. Since these industries tend to be owned by 
politicians, political influence possibly slows down the effective implementation 
process (see section 7.2.2.3.1). In addition, the increasing number of court cases and the 
corruption in (and politicisation of) the judicial system may impede the effective 
implementation of IFRSs (see section 7.2.2.3.2). 
 
In comparing interviewees’ perceptions and reflecting attitudes (see section 7.2.3), links 
between professional syllabuses, training opportunities and corruption are evident. The 
majority of members of policy making group who were interviewed do not provide 
training and are dissatisfied with the professional syllabus, but they also feel that 
corruption is not a major issue. Their views are understandable because the policy 
makers want to be seen to be supporting their government’s activities. Only account 
preparers from the ‘big four’ and large companies are given access to training 
opportunities. 
 
7.3 Influences of other Country Specific Factors  
 
7.3.1 The 1st round interviews 
 
The interviewees were asked: What are the main problems of effective implementation 
of IFRSs in Bangladesh? (see section 5.4.1). Different groups emphasised different 
problems, including a lack of qualified accountants, a lack of interest in IFRSs by 
managers of some companies, culture of secrecy, a lack of research, public sector 
dominance and a predominantly family-based private sector in an orderly fashion (see 
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Table 7-13:  Perceptions of other factors impacting on implementing IFRSs in 
Bangladesh [The 1
st
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3/27 11% VI 
 
7.3.1.1 Lack of qualified accountants 
 
According to interviewees (18 out of 27), the root of many problems in implementing 
IFRSs can be pinpointed on one principal issue: a lack of qualified accountants (see 
Table 7-13). There are not enough CAs to meet the needs of the country. Without 
adequate numbers of qualified CAs, it is nearly impossible even to consider 
implementing IFRS. There would be no one to physically implement the regulations of 
IFRS. Several factors can be attributed as causes for the small numbers of CAs, 
including the low salary, an absence of desire in students wanting to purse a CA career, 
as well as the societal perception of CAs. The comment below represents this issue: 
  
“In Bangladesh, we have only 700-800 qualified accountants, whereas we have 
more than 80,000 companies. Without qualified CAs, it is a dream to implement 
IFRSs” (AR2).  
 
 
Further, many students choose to pursue alternative careers to CA, because they feel the 
services a CA provides are not properly compensated. They also feel the salary of CAs 
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is insufficient. One of the main reasons for this is the unwillingness of companies to pay 
a decent salary to CAs. As a result of low salary levels, society in general views a career 
as a CA to be inferior to others and that CAs are incapable of supporting themselves and 
their families. One interviewee’s thoughts on this debate are given below:  
 
“There is a lack of qualified professionals because the companies don’t want to 
pay the same as those in a developed country would. The low level of audit fees 
de-motivates students from becoming CAs” (AP1).  
 
Despites the barriers and odds there are a few students who choose to study CA.  These 
students, however, have a difficult time throughout their education because of the 
inconsistencies among the assessment criteria and the difficulty of the curricula. As a 
result, many students who choose to study CA do not pass national exams. These 
students feel they are at a disadvantage. There is a continuous cycle of small numbers of 
students studying CA, and even from those, a smaller number of students actually pass 
exams and become CAs. This cycle is an overwhelming factor that causes an ongoing 
shortage in CAs to meet the needs of the country. One interviewee states his opinion on 
this issue:  
 
“The pass rate for CAs is very low due to the lack of transparency in the 
assessment criteria. It creates a real frustration for us in studying CA. Although 
nepotism plays a big role, the majority of the students still fail” (US5). 
 
7.3.1.2 Lack of interest in IFRSs by managers of some companies  
 
12 out of 27 interviewees express that in order to implement IFRS effectively the 
companies’ management have to take a wide and in-depth interest first (see Table 7-13). 
One of the main reasons companies lack interest is due to the fact that costs override 
benefits. One interviewee states:  
 
“The Company thinks that there won’t be any benefit in complying with IFRSs 
because the tax department won’t trust them. They also think [that] training and 
development costs will be higher in implementing IFRSs” (PM3). 
 
Two policy makers hold the belief that directors do not fully understand the underlying 
meaning of IRFS and its usefulness. One PM comments:  
 
“I would say [that]...... business directors think [that] if IFRSs are implemented, 
they will be unduly controlled and monitored…. Their attitude is, if the old 
system is working then why implement a new one [e.g. IFRSs]” (PM6).  
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Another core problem with the implementation of IRFS is a lack of initiative by 
management with regard to auditing and the costs associated with it. In order to save on 
costs, management often opt out from being audited by one of the ‘Big Four’. This issue 
is highlighted by one interviewee:  
 
“In the UK or other developed countries, about 95% - 96% of the listed 
companies are audited by the Big Four. Conversely, in Bangladesh, about 95% - 
96% companies are audited by Tom, Dick and Harry and only 4% by the Big 
Four. This is because companies’ management are not interested in spending 
money on being audited by one of the Big Four” (AP12).  
 
7.3.1.3 Culture of secrecy 
 
The interviewees also emphasised another topic constituting a central problem in the 
effective implementation of IRFS as being corporate practice. 11 of the 27 interviewees 
mention that the current corporate practice in Bangladesh allows for hiding and copying 
of information as well as a lack of knowledge among shareholders (see Table 7-13). The 
two interviewees from the PM group state:  
 
“Bangladesh is a closed society in terms of disclosure, as hiding of information 
is a natural phenomenon. Therefore, being in a closed society, the disclosure 
level is not [as] per expectations” (PM1). 
 
“Our company’s culture is to hide income or profit for different purposes. They 
don’t want to reveal the actual [or] true picture of the company” (PM4). 
 
Interviewees also feel that it is easy for accountants to copy extracts from the notes to 
the financial statements (e.g. accounting policies) of big companies’ financial 
statements. This type of practice occurs because of a lack of enforcement of laws and a 
lack of punishment. The thoughts of one interviewee are given below:  
 
 
“The ‘copying culture’ in our country is a very common phenomenon. For 
example, one of my friends is an accountant in another company who copied 
one particular standard practice from British American Tobacco. But this is 
very ironic, as BAT and his company are completely two different entities” 
(AP8).  
 
According to the respondents, the culture of Bangladesh is such that shareholders are 
not concerned about whether accounts are prepared in accordance with IFRSs or not; 
the culture allows for companies to neglect the following of IFRSs. One interviewee 
states:  
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“The first, immediate and direct users of accounting information are 
shareholders. However, shareholders are not concerned with whether the 
accounts have been prepared in accordance with IFRSs. How will the present 
culture of (non-)compliance with IFRSs change, if the users are not demanding 
that change?” (AP9). 
 
7.3.1.4 Lack of research 
 
According to the interviewees, a lack of research has been found to be another 
fundamental problem in the implementation of IFRS. The interviewees feel that 
research is not only important but also necessary to further current knowledge about 
accounting and finance. One reason for the small amount of research being done in 
accounting and finance could be the lack of funds provided by the government. One of 
the interviewees’ thoughts on the issue are given below:  
 
“You know in Bangladesh, there is a paucity of research with respect to 
financial reporting in particular. There has been a handful of research done on 
voluntary disclosure. Therefore, the government and the professional bodies 
should encourage researchers by providing more funds to conduct research on 
IFRSs issues” (AR1). 
 
Further, respondents (in particular, policy makers) think that not only does the 
government have an apparent lack of interest in research but academia also fails to give 
research any significance in Bangladesh. Two interviewees state:  
 
“Do the university academics care about research? No, they don’t, because of a 
lack of incentives to conduct research. Without research, how do we inform the 
policymakers of what is happening and what to do?” (PM1). 
 
“The World Bank and the IMF are helping to carry out research on accounting 
issues. I think [that] more research papers should be conducted by development 
partners and academics” (PM5).  
 
7.3.1.5 Public sector dominance and family based private sector    
 
Public sector dominance and family based prived sector play key roles in the problems 
associated with the implementation of IFRS. According to the respondents, the public 
sector has always had an overwhelming dominance in Bangladesh. During the 1980s, 
the private sector increased to vast numbers of companies, but the majority of these are 
family based (see section 4.2.2). The interviewees suggest that in order to effectively 
implement IFRS, there should be a decrease in the public sector and an increase in the 
private sector - that is not primarily family oriented. The following three comments 
Chapter Seven – Training, Corruption & Country Specific Factors          204                                                            
 
below from policy makers and academics highlight the conflicting issue of public 
versus private sectors:  
 
“Since the beginning of the country, the public sector used to dominate industry 
in Bangladesh. According to the financial System (equity based finance, bank 
finance and state finance), the public sector was/is not equity based. But you 
know, in the US, about 65% of companies are equity based and disclosure is 
much needed for them. The capital market in Bangladesh is very small in size 
which is an inherent weakness of the economy of Bangladesh. ‘The structure of 
the Bangladeshi economy does not permit disclosure’” (PM3).  
 
“If the government sector does not follow the IPSAS, why should the private 
sector follow IFRSs?” (AR1).  
 
“The private sector is gradually rising from the late eighties, but those private 
sector companies are mostly family based. More than 70,000-80,000 registered 
companies are small size private companies where there is no disclosure and no 
corporate governance practices are observed” (AR2).  
 
7.3.2 The 2nd Round Interviews  
 
The interviewees are asked: Q7. What are the main problems in the effective 
implementation of IFRSs? (see section 5.4.2). In the second round of interviews, 
interviewees emphasise four major issues, including a lack of qualified accountants, a 
lack of interest in IFRSs by managers of some companies, culture of secrecy and higher 
costs of IFRSs compliance with lower benefits for small companies according to 
ranking. All of the issues except the cost-benefit problems emerged in the 1
st
 round of 
interviews according to ranking. Firstly, eleven out of 12 interviewees respond that 
there is a lack of qualified accountants in Bangladesh (see Table 7-14). They strongly 
point out that without qualified accountants the implementation process is more rhetoric 
than reality. An AR opines that: 
 
“Of course, the lack of qualified accountants (is important)...Additionally, the 
professional accountants do not know how to properly follow these IFRSs in the 
preparation and auditing of the annual reports of the companies and in practice; 
they are copying others’ annual reports!” (AR1). 
 
Secondly, 83% of the interviewees (against 44% in the 1
st
 round interviews, Table 7-13) 
believe that companies in Bangladesh have a lack of interest in IFRSs implementation 
issues. PM5, AP5, AP10, AP12, US4, US5, AR1 and AR2 shared the same perceptions 
in the 1
st
 round of interviews. PM2 thinks that the accounting standard setting and 
adoption process will be useless if companies are not interested in following it. 
Interviewees feel that ‘A-category’ companies (i.e. large and profitable ones) are not 
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employing qualified accountants, meaning that other companies do not bother about 
qualified accountants either. AP6 comments that: 
 
“We are trying to implement IFRSs, in particular depreciation and inventory 
issues. …We are a loss making company and follow a conservative approach. 
Therefore, we can’t follow IFRSs fully. I think [that] if a company fully 
complies with IFRSs, then its weaknesses will be visible to its competitors” 
(AP6).  
 
Table 7-14:  Perceptions of other factors causing problems in the implementation of 
IFRSs in Bangladesh [The 2
nd





PM AP US AR Total % Rank 
 














11/12 92% I 
(2) Lack of interest in 
IFRSs by managers 













10/12 83% II 












8/12 66% III 
(4) higher costs of 
IFRSs compliance 
with lower benefits 








0 0 7/12 58% IV 
 
 
Thirdly, 66% (41% in the 1
st
 round of interviews, Table 7-13) of interviewees argue that 
the general corporate practice in Bangladesh is to hide information, resulting in a lack of 
transparency (see Table 7-14). In the first phase, PM5, AP10 and AR2 do not provide 
any comment on that, but they are sceptical in the second phase. The interviewees view 
that companies are inclined to hide information, and that this is facilitated by their 
political connections. In addition, directors are aware of the fact that the regulators will 
not question their non-complying activities, because they themselves are corrupt. This 
culture makes it difficult to implement IFRSs. One accountant from a multinational 
company explains that:  
 
“As a multinational company, we strictly follow IFRSs because we have global 
guidance to follow them. The orientation is also bigger than that of the local 
companies in Bangladesh. As a matter of fact, the culture of multinational 
companies is to be transparent, far more than the in local companies” (AP10). 
 
Finally, 58% of the interviewees view that cost-benefit is a significant factor in the 
implementation of IFRSs (see Table 7-14). This issue has been raised only by the PM 
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and AP groups. The US and AR groups are not involved in the implementation process 
and therefore they are not aware of the cost-benefit issues.  
 
Respondents point out that university graduates from various backgrounds (e.g. History, 
Marketing, Management, Finance, Accountancy etc.) are working as company 
accountants in small companies. These graduates have a very limited technical 
knowledge of accounting standards. The AP group criticised the regulator’s policy of 
the implementation of IFRSs by all listed companies. They believe that the regulators 
are only concerned about large companies. A partner of the audit firm expresses his 
sentiments in the following way: 
 
“First of all, size does matter. For example, a small company cannot employ a 
CA because the costs would not be bearable. Further, companies are not well 
equipped to comply with IFRSs” (AP12). 
 
7.3.3     Reflecting on section 7.3 
 
These findings reveal that other factors (i.e. a lack of qualified accountants, a lack of 
interest in IFRSs by managers of some companies, a culture of secrecy, a lack of 
research, public sector dominance and a predominantly family-based private sector - all 
ranked in order of dominance; see Table 7-13) are playing a part in slowing down the 
IFRSs implementation process in Bangladesh (see section 7.3.1). For example, a lack of 
qualified accountants is one of the key problems in implementing IFRSs in Bangladesh 
(see section 7.3.1.1). The majority of the interviewees suggest that company managers 
in Bangladesh are hesitant to comply with IFRSs (see section 7.3.1.2). Respondents 
think that normal practice is that most companies copy big companies’ reporting styles 
(see section 7.3.1.3). Shareholders do not bother to acquaint themselves with what is 
happening through annual reports, for example whether or not their companies are 
complying with IFRSs (see section 7.3.1.3). The purpose of IFRSs is therefore 
questionable, if even shareholders do not care about this compliance. The interviews 
reveal that the government is not providing enough funding to conduct research into 
IFRSs issues (see section 7.3.1.4). As mentioned in Chapter Four (see section 4.2.2), the 
government has not conducted any research into accounting standards issues over the 
last ten years. Moreover, the public sector’s dominance is apparent, and the family-
based private sector is not inclined to comply with IFRSs (see section 7.3.1.5). 
 




 round of interviews (see section 7.3.2) indicate that a lack of qualified 
accountants, a lack of interest in IFRSs by managers of some companies and culture of 
secrecy are hindering the implementation process. Interviewees from the 2
nd
 round of 
interviews express beliefs that the government and donor agencies should plan solutions 
in order to enable small companies to comply with IFRSs. Small companies in 
Bangladesh are not usually in a position to employ a qualified accountant, and the cost 
of doing so would be a major issue for them. As a result, although some of these 
companies may be interested in complying with IFRSs, the reality is that the costs 
involved do not permit them to do so. 
 
7.4 Summary and Conclusion 
 
The purpose of the present chapter is to discuss the influences of [a(i)] training 
opportunities in the accounting profession and [a(ii)] corruption, and [b] other country 
specific factors on the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh. With respect to [i] 
training opportunities in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption, the proposition 
PIIIA` and PIIIB` are examined. The evidence from the interviews suggests that (i) 
training opportunities in the accounting profession and (ii) corruption exert a negative 
influence on implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh (see section 7.2). 
 
In relation to the effective/ineffective development of training opportunities in the 
accounting profession (condition a, PIIIA), the findings show that in Bangladesh, 
deficiencies in training opportunities in the accounting profession are impeding IFRSs 
implementation (see section 7.2.1). The respondents who are directly or indirectly 
linked with the ICAB (e.g. as a member of the ICAB or by chairing any of its 
committees) display positive attitudes towards the professional syllabus (see section 
7.2.1.1.1). However, most of the respondents feel that the syllabus should be brought up 
to date. Additionally, IFRSs course content is not incorporated into the universities’ 
syllabuses. All of the interviewees agree that IFRSs should be included so that 
prospective accountants will be aware of the benefits of complying with IFRSs. 
Similarly, training opportunities are seen to be very limited for accountants (see section 
7.2.1.1.2). The findings reveal that training opportunities are a serious, inherent 
weakness with regard to compliance with IFRSs. This is because policy makers are not 
providing training and companies’ managements are not encouraging it, or to some 
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extent are not helpful, in supporting their accountants towards attending some training 
on IFRSs. Perhaps because of this, account preparers generally come to feel that the 
training is not essential, since their companies are not concerned about it.  
 
With respect to low/high levels of corruption (condition b, PIIIB), the evidence in the 
study finds that high levels of corruption in Bangladesh have a negative influence on 
implementation of IFRSs (see section 7.2.2). According to respondents, corruption is an 
everyday problem in Bangladesh. As mentioned in Chapter Four, Bangladesh was top 
of the list of the most corrupt countries in the world for five consecutive years. It is part 
of the established culture for companies to violate regulations, confident that the 
regulators (e.g. the SEC and tax officials) can be controlled through bribery. The 
enforcement evidence collected in this study suggests that a combination of a lack of 
professional ethics, the existence of corruption in the judiciary and political motivations 
impedes the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh (see section 7.2.2.3). Hence, the 
evidence in this study confirms that implementation may not be effective in a corrupt 
country, such as Bangladesh.  
 
In terms of comparing interviewees’ perceptions and attitudes, the study finds that a link 
exists between professional syllabuses, training opportunities and corruption (see 
section 7.2.3). It is found that the views of the users, academics and researchers do not 
significantly vary, while, the policymakers and account preparers provide opinions 
contrary to the aforementioned grouping. In the 2
nd
 round of interviews, all the 
interviewees, with the exception of the  policy making group, agree that corruption in 
the government is hindering the effective implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh. It is 
worth noting that the interviewees in the 1
st
 round allude to corruption in various areas 
(e.g. corruption by governmental bodies, audit firms & professional bodies and 
companies; see section 7.2.2.1). The interviewees were not satisfied with the democratic 
government’s slow move towards IFRSs implementation. Nothing has changed in the 
policy makers’ attitudes, possibly because they are representing their respective 
government institutions. According to the perceptions of the interviewees, the policy 
making group did not provide any training except by the ICAB. The respondents also 
mentioned that training opportunities were limited to the ‘big four’ and large companies 
while the majority of companies did not bother with providing IFRSs training for their 
accountants. 
Chapter Seven – Training, Corruption & Country Specific Factors          209                                                            
 
 
In relation to the influences of other factors on implementing IFRSs (see section 7.3), 
the evidence suggests that there are country specific factors which are also slowing 
down the implementation process in Bangladesh. Based on the respondents’ comments, 
the other factors were ranked in the following order of dominance: a lack of qualified 
accountants, a lack of interest in IFRSs by managers of some companies, a culture of 
secrecy, a lack of research, public sector dominance and a predominantly family-based 
private sector (see section 7.3.1). It is evident that Bangladesh’s lack of an adequate 
number of qualified accountants, as seen in Bangladesh, is unhelpful in effectively 
implementing IFRSs (see section 7.3.1.1). Several reasons are likely for the low number 
of CAs; for example, that the salary structure of CAs is much lower than in other 
comparable South Asian countries (e.g. India, Pakistan or Sri Lanka) (see Chapter 
Four). Students are perhaps less interested in studying CA because the pass rate is very 
low. Despite donor agencies’ efforts to assist in this regard, state institutions seem to be 
inactive in doing anything to rectify the problem. It has also been argued that 
companies’ management are reluctant to comply with IFRSs (see section 7.3.1.2), while 
the norm for many companies in Bangladesh is to copy the format of other companies’ 
annual reports (see section 7.3.1.3). The underlying issue therefore remains that if 
shareholders care about the quality of their annual reports, then the quality of these 
annual reports (including their compliance with IFRSs) will increase. Again, because of 
a lack of any significant research by the government and donor agencies, the real 
motivations of the companies towards IFRSs remain unknown (see section 7.3.1.4). No 
policy documents or consultation papers on IFRSs have been published by the 
government over the last decade.  
 
Negative responses are found regarding state owned enterprises’ non-compliant 
activities (see section 7.3.1.5). Respondents strongly indicate that the SEC allows non-
compliance with IFRSs because of its government affiliations. In a similar environment, 
most of the listed companies in the stock exchange are family led businesses, which 
often have close connections to various members of the government. This encourages 
these companies to hide information and any evidence of corrupt activities. In the 
second round interviews, the findings reveal that small companies are interested in 
compliance with IFRSs but following this through (e.g. by hiring qualified accountants) 
is not possible because the costs of doing so override the benefits (see section 7.3.2). 





Theory of the role of the state in the 
implementation of IFRSs as an example of 





The objective of this chapter is to present the results of research question three; RQ-3: 
How does a study of implementing IFRSs help to build an understanding of a theory of 
the role of the state in accounting change in a developing country such as Bangladesh? 
In particular, the findings of Chapters Six and Seven will be discussed in light of the 
theory of the role of the state. Based on the findings of the interviews and documentary 
analyses, I discuss institutional dynamics in order to explain how external and internal 
forces (i.e. the state-society relationship) have influenced IFRSs implementation, as an 
example of accounting change in Bangladesh, in section 8.2. Section 8.3 discusses the 
state level (i.e. the role of the state); section 8.4 presents the organisational field level, 
although this level has not been researched in this study, and section 8.5 discusses 13 
case studies of IFRSs non- compliance, in order to explore the relationship between the 
state level and the individual organisational level in terms of individual organisations’ 
tendencies towards non-payment of monetary fines. This analysis of the social and 
political dimensions of the IFRSs implementation process in Bangladesh may yield 
insights that will assist understanding of the way in which standards are developed and 
diffused from the state level to the individual organisation level. In sections 8.3.6 and 
8.5.6, I will offer a possible explanation of the extended Weberian view of theory of the 
role of the state and accounting change. Section 8.6 concludes this chapter. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two (see section 2.2.3), the drivers of accounting change (i.e. 
the most frequently discussed issues on the role of the state and accounting change) are 
accounting regulatory frameworks, politico-institutional factors, and cultural factors 
(e.g. [i] training opportunities in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption).  In terms 
of accounting regulatory frameworks (PI), the findings of the study reveal that 
accounting regulatory frameworks have a negative influence on accounting change in 
Bangladesh under the conditions of low quality investor protection laws, stakeholders’ 
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non-participation in the standard setting process and looser enforcement of the laws (see 
section 6.2.4). With respect to politico-institutional factors (PII), the findings of the 
study suggest that politics have a negative influence on accounting change under the 
conditions of a higher level of government intervention, a higher level of donor 
agencies’ pressure and a higher level of political lobbying (see section 6.3.3). The 
absence of co-operation among institutional bodies is slowing down the effective 
implementation process in Bangladesh (see section 6.3.2). Regarding cultural factors 
(PIII), the study reveals that deficiencies in the training opportunities in accounting 
profession and high levels of corruption have negative influence on accounting change 
in Bangladesh (see section 7.2.4).  
 
8.2. Institutional Dynamics (A link between the role of the 
state and individual organisations) 
 
As mentioned in section 3.2.2.1, none of the state theorists have explored the theoretical 
aspects of the state-society relationship in accounting literature. Most studies have 
employed Weber’s works in developed countries in focusing upon external forces. 
Further, very few studies employed a case study to explain their theoretical framework. 
Hence, in this study, I have employed Dillard et al. (2004)’s model of institutional 
dynamics. This model’s implications in Bangladesh are shown in figure 8-1. This model 
has three levels: the state, the organisational field and the individual organisation level.  
 
8.3  State level [the role of the state] 
 
In terms of the state level, the roles of the state (external forces) negatively influence 
accounting change, as asserted by ‘N’ in figure 8-1. The state institutions employ an 
unfavorable distribution of power which may very well prevent manifestations of 
negative outcomes of accounting change in Bangladesh (See section 6.3). In the 
external forces (E), the state level, directly (see sections 8.3.1-8.3.4), and the donor 
agencies, indirectly (see section 8.3.5), influence accounting change. Based on the 
drivers of accounting change, I also find that accounting regulatory frameworks, 
politico-institutional factors, accounting profession and corruption have a negative 
influence on accounting change (as indicated ‘N’ in figure 8-1) (see sections 6.2, 6.3 
and 7.2).  
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Figure 8-1: Theoretical Framework in relation to Bangladesh (Based on Figure 3-2)  
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Based on the findings of  drivers of accounting change (see Chapters Six and Seven), in 
this section I discuss the roles of the state in determining the outcomes of IFRSs 
implementation as an example of accounting change in Bangladesh.  
 
8.3.1  State approves experts to write rules 
 
The findings in this study indicate that the inter-play between state institutions and 
politics in the Bangladeshi context is a story shaped by the complexity of accounting 
change (see sections 6.3.1.1 and 6.3.1.3) (as indicated ‘N’ [negative] in figure 8-1). It is 
found that a higher level of government intervention in the accounting regulatory 
process negatively influences accounting change in Bangladesh (see section 6.3.3).  The 
present democratic government has not yet passed the Financial Reporting Act which 
was proposed during the military-backed government of 2006-2008. The findings reveal 
that the delayed process is due to the political interests of the government, because some 
politicians simply do not want to assist any Act which implements IFRSs. The ruling 
parties transform the core decision-making structure of the government into a political 
club. This political club is glued tightly together, and thus politics play an instrumental 
role in pulverizing state institutions’ competence in implementing IFRSs. Hence, 
continuous interference by politics renders the state dysfunctional and unaccountable to 
the people and corruption encompasses the judiciary. The state in Bangladesh as a 
manager of the market system does not reach an equilibrium of the state-society’s 
interest for the betterment of accounting change because continual intervention and 
politicisation create complexities in the regulatory process and, of course, conflicts of 
interest. Since state institutions should be democratic in general, the ultimate question is 
whether the state in Bangladesh needs to answer to its stakeholders. To minimise state 
intervention, the state should create an independent body like the FRC to ensure the 
effectiveness of the regulatory process. 
 
8.3.2  State consults with various stakeholders 
 
The findings of the present study reveal that the state does not engage stakeholders in 
the standard setting process in Bangladesh (see section 6.2.2) (as indicated ‘N’ 
[negative] in figure 8-1). National accounting has been characterised as being intimately 
linked to the exercise of national power in Bangladesh. Due to a lack of co-operation, 
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the state’s actions are considered as ‘taken for granted’ and individual organisations are 
legally restricted to following these rules. It is found that interested parties are working 
for their own interests and engaging in continual political connections. For example, a 
tension exists between two professional bodies provoked by the apparent lack of 
consultation with members of the ICAB, ICMAB and the SEC. Even the standard 
setting body is very much unknown to the stakeholders. High levels of government 
intervention and blame culture are also observed in Bangladesh, because existing state 
institutions are maintaining individualistic approaches. These institutions are reluctant 
to undertake collective actions and therefore tussles between different actors’ interests 
take place. If politics, actors’ interests and heavy involvement of the government exist 
within a regulatory process, then the process will suffer from the overwhelming 
credibility problems when trying to establish an efficient regulatory system and gain 
public trust in Bangladesh. In contrast to DiMaggio
112
 (1988), the state actors in 
Bangladesh attempt to pursue their self interests. Therefore, the interrelations between 
accounting and the role of the state in Bangladesh need to be depoliticised, establishing 
a strengthened and engagement based regulatory process in order to build effective 
regulatory systems. Standard setting bodies in Bangladesh have to respond to political 
forces and strike a balance between the needs of interested parties, in a process that is 
inescapably political in nature.  
 
8.3.3  State enforces outcomes  
 
The findings in this study show that the lack of regulatory enforcement have a negative 
influence on accounting change because of the inefficacy of the judicial system and a 
lack of punitive penalties/fines (see section 6.2.4) (as as indicated ‘N’ [negative] in 
figure 8-1). As documented in section 4.5.1 that Bangladesh has a lower rate of 
enforcement than India and Pakistan (see Table 4-7, using World Bank’s Governance 
Indicators Data, 2010). This is because Bangladesh has higher levels of corruption, 
which eventually weakens enforcement. The documentary analyses confirm that the 
enforcement mechanisms are vague and that regulatory loopholes may hinder the 
effective implementation of IFRSs (see section 6.2.3.3). There is also a concern over 
issues of political influence on enforcing accounting standards (e.g. that the Ministry of 
Finance is closely linked with the SEC) because the state enforces the standards. In this 
                                                 
112
 DiMaggio (1988, pp. 4) argues the importance of norms or taken for granted assumptions “…that 
make actors unlikely to recognize or to act upon their interests”. 
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case, since the state fails to enforce the standards, the establishment of an independent 
FRC to enforce the standards may help to produce better outcomes of accounting 
change. The military-backed government proposed a FRC in 2008, but was unable to 
follow through because of parliamentary systems’ unavailability in the military period. 
The present democratic government was less interested and failed to put out a 
consultation paper to even initiate the creation of such an independent institution. This 
raises a question: why is the democratic government not interested in establishing the 
FRC for better outcomes of accounting change? 
 
8.3.4  State is accountable to its citizens 
 
Although in this study the state’s accountability has not been implicitly examined, the 
three propositions may inform whether the state is accountable to its citizens in 
Bangladesh in terms of accounting change. As mentioned in section 4.2.2, according to 
the World Bank’s Governance Indicators [1996-2010], the voice and accountability was 
lower during the democratic government in 2004. In terms of quality of investor 
protection laws and stakeholders’ participation/non-participation in the standard setting 
process, the interviewees suggest that an independent Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) and the enforcement of accounting standards through a Financial Reporting Act 
(FRA) may create an effective framework of accountability (see sections 6.2.1.1 and 
6.2.2.1). Since accounting regulatory frameworks, politico-institutional factors, [i] 
training opportunities in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption have negative 
influences on accounting change then this may call the state’s accountability into 
question in Bangladesh (as indicated ‘N’ [negative] in figure 8-1). It is found that due to 
a lack of political independence, IFRSs practices are very poorly developed in 
Bangladesh. Since its independence in 1971, the country has frequently been ruled by 
military dictators. As the military-backed government has ruled for 19 years out of 40 
years of independence, the political freedom of the country has not been smoothly 
developed. In both democratic and in military eras, there has been an absence of 
stakeholders’ participation in the standard setting process and regulatory processes. 
Further, certain political groups’ incentives are seen as more important by those with 
political power and/or connections than the common interests of the citizens of 
Bangladesh. Therefore, democratic and military governments’ efforts in reforming 
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accounting systems may also provide insights into role of the state in a developing 
country such as Bangladesh (see section 6.3.3).  
 
8.3.5  Role of donor agencies 
 
In this study, the findings in the first round of interviews evidence the critical role of the 
donor agencies in Bangladesh (see section 6.3.1.2). In the second round interviews, the 
respondents did not provide any comments on the donor agencies’ political pressure 
(see section 6.3.1.2.2). Therefore, the donor agencies influences in Bangladesh 
regarding accounting change is indicated ‘M’ [mixed] in figure 8-1. The donor agencies 
are providing funding for the reform of accounting in Bangladesh. There is no doubt 
that these reforms are essential for the effective implementation of IFRSs. However, 
their collaboration with the state raises some issues: firstly, that funding is possibly not 
being used effectively by the state for its intended purpose. It has also been found that 
donor agencies are aware of this fact but do nothing to stop the evident practices. This 
research is unable to reveal why this is the case and what the true intentions of the donor 
agencies are. Hence, the donor agencies must presumably take a long-term view of their 
aid commitments, and their aid funding should not involve government intervention. 
Secondly, the processes of IFRSs adoption and implementation in Bangladesh are likely 
to involve taken-for granted norms without considering the engagement of societal 
values and norms. In my opinion, the donor agencies should not impose any reforms 
without considering the local or national culture, since Bangladesh’s culture is more 
secretive in nature (see sections 4.5.1 and 7.3.1.3).  
 
8.3.6  Discussion of the state level [the role of the state] 
 
At the state level, the role of the state has been discussed in explaining the diffusion of 
good practice, when donor agencies (such as the World Bank, the IMF and the EU) 
come to accept IFRS as a legitimate form of international best practice, and later 
adopters then follow in adopting it (especially developing countries like Bangladesh) in 
order to secure legitimacy, provide meaning, facilitate communication, underpin social 
action and, often, to reflect political and economic ideologies. In terms of the state-
society argument (see section 3.2.1.7), all roles of the state are seen to have negative 
influences on accounting change in Bangladesh. Power and politics create complex 
processes of accounting change in Bangladesh because the state constitutes rule and a 
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power resource towards IFRSs implementation. The state as a social agent acts in its 
own interests (see sections 8.3.1-8.3.5). In contrast to general arguments put forth by 
Friedland & Alford (1991)
113
 in relation to western developed countries, the state and 
professions share common interests in Bangladesh because the professional bodies are 
under the Ministries of Finance and Commerce, and bureaucratic arrangements are in 
place among various state institutions. Subsequently, state actors are more likely to 
create and maintain social beliefs (in particular, stakeholders’ non-participation) within 
a society, and this may ultimately impede the effective implementation of IFRSs.  
 
8.4  Organisational field level 
 
In the organisational field, lobbying groups’ activities towards influencing IFRSs 
implementation are unknown in this research (see figure 8-1, indicated as unknown 
influence); one caution is that lobbying groups were not interviewed, and the 
interviewees in this research argued about the influence of ministerial bureaucracy and 
political lobbying rather than about industry leaders’ and trade unions’ lobbying. This is 
because, in Bangladesh, the fulfillment of political functions and the election manifesto 
are seemingly deemed more important than societal and economic fitness. This is likely 
to create conflicts of interest, within which accounting choice could be a major factor at 
the organisational field level. It can be argued that political factionalism, derived from 
family politics, essentially undermines the rule of law and the independent effectiveness 
of institutions by maintaining loyal political supporters in various positions within key 
institutions in Bangladesh. This phenomenon can also be thought of as ‘personification 
of the state institutions’ in Bangladesh. 
 
8.5  Individual organisation level 
 
At the individual organisation level, the evidence presented in this study shows that the 
majority of individual organisations may negatively influence outcomes of accounting 
change, given the presence of political lobbying, family businesses, a lack of training 
facilities and corruption. The individual organisation level directly (as indicated by 
internal forces ‘I’ in Figure 8-1), influences accounting change. This section examines 
case studies in the form of 13 enforcement notices regarding IFRSs non-compliance 
during the period 1998-2010 in order to explain the individual organisation’s tendency 
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 Friedland & Alford (1991) argue that the state and professions will not share the same interests. 
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not to pay a fine or a penalty in Bangladesh. Table 8-1 shows that there were 1647 
violations of the SEC rules including IFRSs non-compliance between 1998-2010. Only 
42 violations were IFRSs related and the IFRSs related enforcement actions represent 
only 2.56% (42/1647) of total enforcement actions. The analysis in this study is limited 
to 13 violations for 12 companies. This is because these 13 companies have been 
identified as having perpetrated similar types of IFRSs non-compliance, but were then 
penalised differently. The case study of 13 enforcement notices signifies 31% (13/42) 
with reference to IFRSs non-compliance. In the following subsections, I will discuss 










Enforcement Total % 
IFRSs related 
Enforcements 




1998 59 3.6 0 0 0 0 
1999 77 4.7 0 0 0 0 
2000 10 0.6 0 0 0 0 
2001 24 1.5 0 0 0 0 
2002 29 1.8 0 0 0 0 
2003 57 3.5 0 0 0 0 
2004 62 3.8 0 0 0 0 
2005 135 8.2 0 0 0 0 
2006 326 19.7 1 2.4 0 0 
2007 281 17.1 11 26.2 5 38.5 
2008 176 10.7 7 16.7 2 15.4 
2009 172 10.3 14 33.3 2 15.4 



















8.5.1  Cases on Depreciation related violations [n=7] 
 
Seven companies were subject to depreciation related violations (see Table 8-2). Of the 
seven companies, five were ‘Z’ category
114
 companies and all were politically 
connected and family ownership based. There were also variations of the fines/penalties 
applied to those companies. For example, the minimum amount was Tk. 0.60 million 
and the maximum was Tk. 1.4 million. To explore the variations of fine amount, I 
examine the detailed nature of the violations (see Appendix 8-2). Appendix 8-2 shows 
                                                 
114
 Companies which have failed to hold current annual general meetings or have failed to declare any 
dividend (DSE Annual Report, 2009-10). 
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that six companies failed to charge depreciation on fixed assets and one company did 
not provide the method of depreciation used in the financial statements. The SEC 
provided information about five companies regarding whether the fine amount has been 
paid or not and hence information for two of the companies was unknown for the 
present study. Of the five companies, one of the companies was warned, meaning that 
no fine was imposed by the SEC. A question can be raised as to why this particular 
company was warned rather than penalised (i.e. monetary penalty). The rest of the four 
companies’ cases are still pending.  
 
8.5.2  Cases on Qualified Audit Opinion [n=2] 
 
The SEC issued enforcement actions against H Ltd. and I Ltd. because these two 
companies provided qualified opinions but their financial statements for the year ended 
30
th
 June, 2007 and 30
th
 June, 2003 respectively did not reflect a ‘True and Fair View’ 
(see Appendix 8-3). The details of the violations were not provided by the SEC. But the 
fine amount varied (e.g. Tk. 0.60 million and Tk. 3.5 million) (see Table 8-2). H Ltd. 
(public shareholding 23%) did not hold an AGM in 2008 and I Ltd. allegedly earned an 
abnormal return on shares of 6.57% in 2003; however, at the time the SEC failed to take 
action of these two companies (The Independent, 2003).  
 
8.5.3 Cases on Disclosures as prescribed by the ICAB [n=2] 
 
Two companies were issued with enforcement actions because their financial 
statements, for the year ended 30
th
 June, 2007 (J Ltd.) and 30
th
 June, 2006 (I Ltd.) 
respectively were not prepared in accordance with IFRSs and notes as prescribed by the 
ICAB (see Appendix 8-4). The SEC provided details on the nature of the violations for 
J Ltd. but not for I Ltd. Although I Ltd. is in the ‘A’ category
115
, the study reveals that 
there is no relationship between the company category and fine amount (see Table 8-2). 
Then the question may arise, on what basis does the SEC impose penalty amounts? As 
mentioned in the section 8.5.2, I Ltd. was issued with enforcement actions in 2007. 
Further, J Ltd. has not paid listing fees to the DSE amounting to Tk. 0.09 million since 
2003 (The Financial Express, 2008). These companies are repeatedly violating the rules 
but, the SEC did not provide any further information regarding the settlement of their 
fine. 
 
                                                 
115
 Companies which have regularly held annual general meetings in recent years and have declared a 
dividend at a rate of ten percent or more in the last English calendar year (DSE Annual Report, 2009-10). 
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8.5.4 Cases on Half yearly Audited Report [n=2] 
 
The SEC issued enforcement actions to two companies for violating SEC rules 
regarding half yearly audited statements including Balance Sheet, Income Statement, 
Cash Flow Statement and Changes in Equity. K Ltd. is a ‘B’ category
116
 company 
(public shareholdings only 12.5%) and was fined Tk. 0.80 million, whereas L Ltd. 
(public shareholdings 50%), a ‘Z’ category company, was fined Tk. 0.70 million (see 
Table 8-2). The study did not find any information on whether L Ltd. paid its fine or not 
and K Ltd.’s court case is pending. Both companies have violated the same regulations 
by failing to provide half yearly Financial Statements in accordance with BASs/IFRSs 
(see Appendix 8-5). These two companies are part of the K-I Group and have a regular 
record of violating SEC rules. For instance, neither of the companies held any AGM in 
2000 and 2001 respectively, nor paid any dividend to its shareholders (The Financial 
Express, 2004).   
 
8.5.5  How to avoid a penalty imposed by the SEC 
 
Generally, there are two ways to avoid incurring a financial penalty in Bangladesh. 
Firstly, a company may challenge the SEC’s enforcement action, and can file a case in 
courts of Bangladesh (see figure 8-2). Three courts
117
 handle most of the cases. The cost 
of filing a case in these courts is in general lower than the penalty amount ordered. For 
instance, the minimum penalty is Tk. 100,000 (approximately £1,000), but the 
minimum costs of going to the Supreme Court, including the writ petition/court order 
and filing a case etc. are approximately Tk. 40,000-50,000 (£400-£500). In my opinion, 
this regulatory loophole may make companies less likely to pay a penalty. It is also 
understandable that the company may think paying a penalty results in a bad record for 
                                                 
116
 Companies which have regularly held annual general meetings in recent years but have failed to 




 (a) The General Certificate Court (GCC): This court is for SEC ordinance violation related cases. If 
the SEC identifies any violations, then they issue show-cause cum-hearing. If the SEC is satisfied at the 
hearing, no further action is taken against the companies; otherwise the SEC imposes a penalty. To 
recover the penalty/revenue (Public Demands Recovery Act 1913), the SEC stands by the decision of the 
officer of the GCC. If the company opposes the GCC’s decision of a payable penalty, the company may 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. This court is the highest court in Bangladesh and has two 
divisions, namely the Appellate Division and High Court Division; (b) The Civil Court: The Company 
may also appeal against the SEC’s decision in the civil court.  If the outcome of the civil court goes 
against the company, then the company may appeal to the Supreme Court; and (c) The Criminal Court: If 
any pending case is heard in the criminal court, then before disposal/judgement in the criminal court, the 
company may also appeal to the Supreme Court challenging the order of the criminal court.The detailed 
court structure and functions of other courts are shown in Appendices 7-2 and 7-3. 
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the company (which may lose their investors’ faith and confidence). Therefore, a 
company may feel that the safer option is to file a case rather than paying a penalty. 
Secondly, as mentioned in section 8.5, all thirteen companies had political connections 
or the political affiliations which may impede the enforcement actions of the SEC. The 
court(s) may favour these companies and the decision can be classed as ‘pending’ for a 
seemingly unlimited period of time (i.e. stay order permission from the Supreme Court 
of Bangladesh, High Court Division) (see sections 8.5.1-8.5.4). I was unable to find out 
whether the six companies’ fines were paid or not because the SEC did not provide any 
information on this, raising the question ‘how many companies are paying the fines? 
(see Table 8-2). Again, the enforcement notices had no effect on the share prices (e.g. 
EPS) of the 12 companies (see Table 8-3 for EPS from 2006-2011). Since the 
enforcement notices have no market implications in Bangladesh, the companies may not 
care about the amount of fine imposed on them.   
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8.5.6  Discussion of the individual organisation level 
 
This section demonstrates that at an individual organisation level, the outcome of 
accounting change is likely to be negative in Bangladesh. Weber (1968, pp. 67-
68)[1922] emphasises the state’s role in politico-cultural terms in shaping a particular 
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[IO Level, fig. 8-1] 
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interests are transmitted from the state level to the individual organisation level (Dillard 
et al., 2004, p. 512). In Bangladesh, the state actors (i.e. state institutions, ministers and 
government MPs) are unable to restrict or modify the behaviour of individual 
organisations regarding IFRSs implementation. Such behaviour is accepted as resulting 
from social norms (see sections 6.3.3 and 8.5.1-8.5.5). Interviewees have indicated that 
state institutions in Bangladesh are politically motivated regarding IFRSs 
implementation. The individual organisations researched in this section are shown to be 
politically connected to state institutions and appear to be free to carry out corrupt 
activities, including non-compliance of IFRSs and falsification of their financial 
statements (see sections 7.2.4 and 8.5.1-8.5.4). This is also likely because actors in 
individual organisations (e.g. the directors) and their interests are likely to centre around 
the pursuit of profits, to the exclusion of compliance with the law.  
 
Several other factors are impeding the implementation of IFRSs (see section 7.3.3). 
These include a lack of qualified accountants, a lack of interest in IFRSs by managers of 
some companies, a culture of secrecy, and a predominantly family based private sector 
of individual organisations. To minimise the current tensions and struggles within 
IFRSs practices in Bangladesh, effective implementation of IFRSs will depend on 
individual organisations’ attitudes to the power which has been developed by the state 
through engaging stakeholders, and non-political connectedness. 
 
I conclude that in terms of the relationship between the state level and the individual 
organisation level, political connectedness and corruption are the strongest, most 
dominant factors, something which brings the role of the state regarding the effective 
implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh into serious question.  
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Table 8-2: Non-Disclosure Violations in relation to IFRSs (n=13) 
 










A Ltd. 2010 Cement Z √ √ 1,400,000 Pending 
B Ltd. 2010 Paper & Printing Z √ √ 1,000,000 Pending 
C Ltd. 2010 Engineering Z √ √ 1,000,000 Not Known 
D Ltd. 2009 Textile A √ √ 900,000 Pending 
E Ltd. 2008 Tannery Z √ √ 800,000 Pending 
F Ltd. 2007 Tannery Z √ √ 600,000 Not Known 
G Ltd.
121
 2007 Miscellaneous Z [A] √ √ Warning N/A 
2. Qualified Audit 
Opinion (n=2) 
H Ltd. 2009 Textile Z √ √ 600,000 Not Known 
I Ltd. 2007 Food & Allied A √ √ 3,500,000 Not Known 
3. Disclosures as 
prescribed by the ICAB 
(n=2) 
J Ltd. 2010 Pharmaceuticals 
& Chemicals 
Z √ √ 500,000 Pending 
I Ltd. 2008 Food & Allied A √ √ 1,000,000 Not Known 
4. Half yearly Audited 
Report (n=2) 
K Ltd. 2007 Food & Allied B √ √ 800,000 Pending 
L Ltd. 2007 Food & Allied Z √ √ 700,000 Not Known 
 
Notes: Fine Paid:  Pending= 6 (i.e. Court cases); Not Known =6 (i.e. the SEC did not provide any information); Warning = 1 (i.e. N/A); Company 
names have been anonymised. Detailed information is available on request from the author. 
                                                 
118
‘A’ category companies are regular in holding current annual general meetings and have declared a dividend at the rate of ten percent or more in the last English calendar year; 
‘B’ category companies are regular in holding annual general meetings but have failed to declare a dividend at the rate of ten percent; and ‘Z’ category companies have failed to 
hold current annual general meetings or have failed to declare any dividend (DSE Annual Report, 2009-10). 
119
 In terms of politics, a tick (√) indicates the company is politically connected. 
120
 In terms of family, a tick (√) indicates the company is predominantly family owned. 
121
 G Ltd. was renamed Z Ltd. after an amalgamation in August 2008. Then it became an ‘A’ category company, from Z category previously.   
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 Industry EPS  [Taka] 
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
1. Depreciation 
(n=7) 
A Ltd. Jan. 2010 Cement 0.36 1.93 0.18 -2.97 -10.74 -10.60 
B Ltd. June. 2010 Paper & Printing 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.19 -0.66 
C Ltd. Sept. 2010 Engineering 0.04 0.013 -7.20 -8.50 -34.97 1.70 
D Ltd. Nov. 2009 Textile 1.81 1.37 10.59 18.61 13.97 10.62 
E Ltd. Sept. 2008 Tannery 0.69 0.62 0.19 0.67 -0.17 -2.59 
F Ltd. May 2007 Tannery -15.22 -62.73 -66.31 -98.21 -121.19 -56.79 
G Ltd. Nov. 2007 Miscellaneous 7.36 8.23 66.57 23.41 N/A N/A 
2. Qualified Audit 
Opinion (n=2) 
H Ltd. Jan. 2009 Textile N/A N/A N/A N/A -47.43 -3.03 
I Ltd. Dec. 2007 Food & Allied 1.57   3.11 1.01 0.10 -0.14 -0.14 




J Ltd. Jan. 2010 Pharmaceuticals 
& Chemicals 
N/A N/A N/A N/A -28.00 -20.11 
I Ltd. Oct. 2008 Food & Allied 1.57   3.11 1.01 0.10 -0.14 -0.14 





Sept. 2007 Food & Allied -4.43  0.59 0.55 -10.21 -14.46 -1.35 
L Ltd. Sept. 2007 Food & Allied 
 










Notes: N/A means that information was ‘Not Available’; Company names have been anonymised. Detailed information is available on request from 
the author. 
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 The month of enforcement releases. 
123
 The year of enforcement releases. 
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8.6 Summary and Conclusion 
 
As a result of my study of Bangladesh, I can now make the following statements about 
the theory of the role of the state: 
 
Firstly, with respect to the state level [the role of the state], this study reveals that power 
struggles among state institutions may have negative outcomes on accounting change in 
Bangladesh (see section 8.3). The state acts as a social agent in Bangladesh to fulfil its 
own interests rather than the interests of the stakeholders regarding IFRSs 
implementation (see section 8.3). This study discusses the following roles of the state 
based on the findings of the interviews and documentary analyses: 
(a) State approves experts to write rules [N] (see section 8.3.1);  
(b) State consults with various stakeholders [N] (see section 8.3.2); 
(c) State enforces outcomes [N] (see section 8.3.3); and 
(d) State is accountable to its citizens [N] (see section 8.3.4). 
It is evident that, all of the state’s roles have negative influences (as indicated ‘N’) on 
IFRSs implementation. This is because of a higher level of government intervention and 
the political interests of the government in approving experts to write rules (see section 
8.3.1); the state’s actions regarding IFRSs implementation take for granted the non 
engagement of stakeholders in the decision making process (i.e. the ICAB and the SEC 
are fulfilling their own interests) (see section 8.3.2); higher levels of corruption and 
political influence on enforcing accounting standards exist (e.g. the Ministry of 
Finance’s close links with the SEC) (see section 8.3.3); a lack of political independence 
from the emergence of an independent Bangladesh onwards (i.e. regular intervals of 
military intervention, 19 years of military-backed government in 40 years of 
independence) are impeding accounting reforms and hence the state’s accountability to 
its citizens may not be guaranteed (see section 8.3.4). However, the roles of the donor 
agencies have mixed influences (as indicated by ‘M’) in accounting change (see section 
8.3.5). According to the first round of interviews, the interviewees suggest that donor 
agencies’ aid funds are transformed through the government ministries, and those funds 
are not being utilised efficiently in progressing IFRSs implementation in Bangladesh. In 
the second round of interviews, the interviewees ignored the donor agencies’ critical 
role because the interviewees were frustrated with the current democratic government in 
terms of its failures so far to approve the IFRSs Act or establish the Financial Reporting 
Council (see Chapter Six).  
Chapter Eight – The role of the state                                                 226                                 
 
 
Secondly, in relation to the organisational field level, the influence of industry leaders’ 
or trade unions’ lobbying is unknown in this research (see section 8.4). This is one of 
the limitations of this research (see also Chapter Nine). I was unable to conduct 
interviews with any members of these groups, because they were not interested in 
taking any part in this study, despite being invited to do so. Additionally, the findings 
from the interviews and documentary analyses did not reveal any particular influence of 
these groups in implementing IFRSs (see Chapters Six and Seven). The interviewees in 
this study were keen to comment on politics and corruption at state level and individual 
organisation level rather than at the organisational field level. 
 
Thirdly, in terms of the individual organisation level, the study has shown that the 
outcomes of accounting change can be negative at the individual organisation level (see 
section 8.5). The individual organisations are regarded as being politically connected to 
state institutions and this political connectedness may generate negative outcomes of 
accounting change (see section 8.5.1). This is possibly also because the directors of 
individual organisations have links to state institutions, ministers and government MPs 
in carrying out activities which are non-compliant with IFRSs without being penalised. 
In addition, many directors are not inclined to train their company accountants to 
comply with IFRSs (see Chapter Six). Furthermore, a lack of qualified accountants, a 
lack of interest by companies’ management, poor corporate practice and a 
predominance of family businesses among individual organisations, are also slowing 
down the implementation of IFRSs (see section 7.3). It is strikingly evident that thirteen 
violations by twelve companies were penalised but that none of these companies then 
paid the financial penalty imposed on them. The findings also show that all of these 
thirteen companies were politically connected family businesses and were penalised 
differently (see sections 8.5.1-8.5.4). The links between state institutions (i.e. the SEC 
and the Supreme Court of Bangladesh) and individual organisations are so politicised in 
a developing country like Bangladesh that the effective implementation of IFRSs may 
be difficult to put in practice.  
 
In summary, focusing on the institutional dynamics (i.e. the state-society relationship), 
the results show that the reasons for the slow implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh 
can be observed at the state and individual organisation field levels, and especially at 
the state level. One limitation is that the influence of the organisation field level is 
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unknown in this research. As has been mentioned in Chapter Three, according to 
Weber, cultural values explain ‘why different actors make different choices even in 
similar situations’ (Swidler, 1986, p. 274). The findings of this study extend the 
Weberian (1958)[1904], (1968)[1922] view of the state-society relationship (see 
sections 8.3.6 and 8.5.6). In the case of Bangladesh, within the state, various political 
regimes have behaved in different ways towards IFRSs implementation. More 
specifically, under a democratic government, politico-institutional factors and 
corruption (as an indication of societal values) may be more important and concentrated 








Conclusions and Contributions 
 
9.1   Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the results of the study, discuss the theory 
involved, make recommendations and offer suggestions about future research. The 
motivating research question of this thesis is to examine what factors have been 
affecting the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh from 1998 to 2010. To answer 
this motivating question, three more specific questions are studied in this research, 
which are: RQ-1: What is the relative impact of accounting regulatory frameworks and 
politico-institutional factors on the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh as an 
example of a developing country? RQ-2(a): How do (i) training opportunities in the 
accounting profession and (ii) the state of corruption, as outcomes of culture in 
Bangladesh, affect the implementation of IFRSs; RQ-2(b): What other country specific 
factors are affecting implementation of IFRSs?; and RQ-3: How does a study of 
implementing IFRSs help to build an understanding of a theory of the role of the state in 
accounting change in a developing country such as Bangladesh? These questions have 
been answered by applying mixed methods (i.e. interviews and documentary analyses; 
see sections 5.4 and 5.5).  
 
Section 9.2 summarises the findings and original contributions of this thesis. The 
subsections of 9.2 reflect original contributions in relation to RQ-1, RQ-2 and RQ-3. 
Section 9.3 discusses the limitations of the study, and suggestions for future research are 
discussed in section 9.4.  
  
9.2   Findings and original contributions 
 
 
A summary of the findings and contributions in relation to the three research questions 
is provided below: 
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9.2.1 Contribution to the relative impact of accounting 
regulatory frameworks and politico-institutional 
factors (RQ-1) 
 
This study contributes regarding the relative impact of accounting regulatory 
frameworks and politico-institutional factors on the implementation of IFRSs in a 
developing country such as Bangladesh, and it also has important implications for other 
developing countries in general.  
 
With respect to accounting regulatory frameworks, the evidence suggests that the 
accounting regulatory frameworks in Bangladesh have a negative influence on the 
implementation of IFRSs (see section 6.2.4). This is for several reasons, including low 
quality investor protection laws in Bangladesh which are hindering the effective 
implementation of IFRSs (see section 6.2.1); stakeholders’ non-participation in the 
standard setting process (see section 6.2.2); and relatively looser enforcement of the 
laws (see section 6.2.3). As mentioned in Chapters Four and Six, the Companies Act 
1994 has not been updated regarding IFRSs since 1994, and contradictions exist 
between local laws and the requirements of the IFRSs (World Bank, 2003, 2009; 
Siddiqui, 2010). Unlike the findings of prior studies on developing countries (Boross et 
al., 1995; Saudagaran & Diga, 1997; Taplin et al., 2002; Banerjee, 2002) on 
professional bodies’ engagement with stakeholders, the ICAB is responsible for 
accounting standard setting in Bangladesh but does not engage the stakeholders in the 
setting of standards; there has even been a lack of any published exposure drafts and/or 
consultation papers on standards. This is possibly because the ICAB is directly linked 
with the Ministry of Commerce and their decisions are political and based on closed-
door policy making rather than being engagement based. Prior studies argue that 
government agency is in a prime position to enforce accounting regulations effectively 
(Belkaoui, 1983; Parker, 1986; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Zeff, 1988; Tower, 1993). 
But, in Bangladesh, the continual political lobbying and government intervention in the 
SEC are impeding the operation of a stringent enforcement process. A lack of effective 
penalty criteria calls into question the SEC’s role regarding tightening enforcement 
mechanisms in Bangladesh. 
 
In terms of politico-institutional factors, the findings suggest that these factors have a 
negative influence on the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh (see section 6.3.3). 
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This is due to a higher level of government intervention (see section 6.3.1.1), a higher 
level of pressure from donor agencies (see section 6.3.1.2), and a higher level of 
political lobbying (see section 6.3.1.3). Similar to previous studies (Leuz & Oberholzer-
Gee, 2006; Siddiqui, 2010; Faccio, 2010), the evidence in this research confirms that 
government intervention and political lobbying are hindering the effective 
implementation of IFRSs. It is found that companies are often not penalised because of 
their political connections with the government. In addition, a lack of co-operation 
among institutional bodies is hindering the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh (see 
section 6.3.2). This is because of an absence of participatory rights for the stakeholders 
and an undemocratic government (McKinnon, 1984). The study finds a lack of co-
operation to be evident among the institutional bodies in both democratic and 
undemocratic governments (see sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3). It is important to mention that 
military-backed government in Bangladesh was effective in comparison to democratic 
government in terms of taking action against companies identified as being corrupt (see 
section 6.3.2.3). Although the blame culture has previously been limited to developed 
countries (Hood, 2007, 2009; O’Neill, 2002), the state institutions and professional 
bodies in Bangladesh (as an example of a developing country) are blaming each other 
regarding the IFRSs implementation process. This could be because ‘the blame game’ 
may be aimed at attempting to remove power and responsibility from other institutions 
in order to facilitate the legitimacy, and increase the scope of government bureaucracy 
(see sections 6.3.2.1 and 6.3.2.2).   
 
Prior research argues that common-law origin is more transparent in terms of setting 
accounting standards (La Porta et al., 1998; Kothari, 2000; Ball et al., 2000, 2003; Leuz 
et al., 2003). However, in this research, common-law origin has little or no influence on 
implementing IFRSs in Bangladesh (see sections 6.2 and 6.3). This is possibly because 
Bangladesh contains an unique environment which may be explained via several factors 
(e.g. [a(i)] training opportunities in the accounting profession, [a(ii)] corruption and [b] 
other country specific factors) (see Chapter Seven). The legal origins (common-law vs. 
code-law) argument in this study raises a question as to why a  country with common-
law origins has no influence on the implementation of IFRSs  or has moved toward 
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This study also finds that politico-institutional factors are stronger and more dominant 
factors than accounting regulatory frameworks in inhibiting the implementation of 
IFRSs (see section 6.4). The findings suggest that policy makers are keen to comment 
on donor agencies’ political influence, while denying the existence of government 
intervention or political lobbying. This is because the policy makers appointed by the 
government represent different government institutions and want, therefore, to be seen 
to support the government. By contrast, the account preparers and professionals seemed 
hesitant to talk about government intervention and it is possible that the account 
preparers and professionals feel under pressure because they are fearful of losing their 
jobs if they become involved in commenting on politics (see section 6.5). 
 
9.2.2 Contribution to training opportunities in the accounting 
profession, corruption and other country specific 
factors (RQ-2) 
 
The evidence in this research suggests that [i] training opportunities in the accounting 
profession and [ii] corruption have a negative influence on implementing IFRSs in 
Bangladesh (see section 7.2). As mentioned in Chapter Two, two factors are 
investigated in the present research: (a) training opportunities in the accounting 
profession and (b) corruption. With respect to the training opportunities in the 
accounting profession, this study finds that deficiencies in the training opportunities in 
accounting profession are inhibiting IFRSs implementation (see section 7.2.1). The 
majority of respondents feel that the curricula should be brought up to date and that 
IFRSs course content is not incorporated into the universities’ curricula (see section 
7.2.1.1.1). The respondents affiliated with the ICAB (e.g. as a member of the ICAB or 
by chairing any of its committees) were positive regarding the professional curricula of 
the ICAB. In addition, the limited training facilities for accountants are an issue of 
concern in compliance with IFRSs (see section 7.2.1.1.2). Although the policy makers 
argued for the necessity of IFRSs related training facilities, they are not providing any 
training. With the exception of ‘big 4’ and other large companies, a majority of 
companies are reluctant to provide training for their company accountants. These 
findings are in disagreement with prior studies in developing countries (Parry & Groves, 
1990; Abayo & Roberts, 1993; Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002), who 
argue that the training opportunities in the accounting profession are not an important 
factor in explaining levels of corporate disclosure. However, the training opportunities 
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in the accounting profession is an important factor in Bangladesh as an example of a 
developing country
124
 in explaining issues with the implementation of IFRSs. 
 
This research also finds that high levels of corruption in Bangladesh have a negative 
influence on implementing IFRSs (see section 7.2.2). As mentioned in Chapter Four 
(see section 4.5.2), Bangladesh was top of the list of the most corrupt countries in the 
world from 2001-2005. The respondents feel that corruption is deeply rooted in 
Bangladeshi society. Listed companies can violate the SEC’s regulations, including 
IFRSs non-compliance and can satisfy the relevant authority (e.g. the SEC, tax officials 
etc.) through their political connections. It is found that a perceived lack of professional 
ethics among auditors and company accountants is inhibiting effective IFRSs 
implementation (see section 7.2.2.3). It is not surprising that the policy makers and 
users who have links with the ICAB and state institutions were in agreement that 
corruption is not an important issue in implementing IFRSs, while for a majority of 
account preparers, users and academics, corruption is a big threat in a developing 
country like Bangladesh towards effectively implementing IFRSs (see section 7.2.3). 
The findings in this research are somewhat similar to Hofstede et al. (2010)’s index of 
Bangladesh (see section 4.5.1), in which Bangladesh has the highest Power Distance 
score, indicating a high level of inequality of power and wealth within its society. In 
addition, Bangladesh has a more secretive culture than India or Pakistan (Mir & 
Rahaman, 2005). Hence, company managements are less likely to pursue a high level of 
disclosure. Moreover, using the World Bank’s Governance Indicators Data (2010) and 
La Porta et al. (1998) [see also Leuz et al., 2003 and Han et al., 2012]’s data, the 
present study reveals a lower rate of enforcement in Bangladesh compared with India 
and Pakistan. This is due to higher levels of corruption, a factor which weakens 
enforcement of the laws (see section 4.5.1). The study also finds that Bangladesh and 
Pakistan’s secrecy scores and enforcement scores are relatively similar, compared to 
India (see section 4.5.1). This is due to the fact that both Bangladesh and Pakistan have 
experienced political instability due to military intervention. Levels of corruption were 
noticeably lower in Bangladesh during the military-backed government. Although the 
government established the Anti-Corruption Bureau to tackle corruption in Bangladesh, 
the government’s involvement and the political appointment of the chairman and the 
staff of that Bureau mean that the independence of this institution must seriously be 
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and Zeghal & Mhedhbi (2006) in developing countries. 
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questioned (Choudhury, 2008; Knox, 2009; IMF, 2005, 2010; Huque, 2010) (see 
section 4.5.2).  
 
In relation to the influences of other factors on implementing IFRSs, this study finds 
that country specific factors (e.g. a lack of qualified accountants, a lack of interest in 
IFRSs by managers of some companies, a culture of secrecy, higher costs of IFRSs 
compliance with lower benefits for small companies, a lack of research, public sector 
dominance and a predominantly family based private sector - all ranked in order of 
dominance) are also impeding the implementation process in Bangladesh (see section 
7.3). The study reveals reasons for the lack of qualified accountants: (i) the poor salary 
structure of CAs in Bangladesh compared with India, Pakistan or Sri Lanka, and (ii) the 
low pass rate to become a CA; hence students are not interested in studying CA (Var, 
1976; Perera, 1989) (see section 7.3.1.1). Companies’ managements are not inclined to 
comply with IFRSs (see section 7.3.1.2) while a majority of companies are copying 
extracts from the notes to the financial statements (e.g. accounting policies) of big 
companies’ (i.e. a culture of secrecy) financial statements (see section 7.3.1.3). Again, 
state companies are relaxed about IFRSs compliance (Jones & Sefiane, 1992; Abu-
Nassar & Rutherford, 1995). As seen in prior studies in Bangladesh (Uddin & Hopper, 
2001, 2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Farooque et al., 2007; Khan et al., 2011), the 
interviewees comment that most listed companies in Bangladesh are family led 
businesses which tend to follow non-compliance with IFRSs (see section 7.3.1.5). It is 
important to add that small companies’ IFRSs compliance is an issue of concern 
because for them the costs of complying with IFRSs will exceed the benefits (see 
section 7.3.2). According to interviewees, if the shareholders do not care about, or 
demand, higher quality annual reports, then the effectiveness of the implementation 
process remains questionable in Bangladesh.  
 
In summary, effective implementation may require the depoliticising of state institutions 
and the establishment of an independent financial reporting council. Since managers and 
directors in Bangladesh conventionally strive to reap maximum benefits from political 
relationships and tend to follow a secretive culture, the state should pursue a stringent 
enforcement of the laws. In this regard, the state should make sure that politicians and 
their associates are not abusing their powers in order to violate the SEC rules. The 
current democratic government has acknowledged the need to introduce a culture of 
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transparency in the public and private sectors through the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the 
Financial Reporting Act and the Financial Reporting Council. To date, though, these 
remain more promising rhetoric than concrete reality. 
 
9.2.3 Contribution to the theory of the role of the state and 
accounting change (RQ-3) 
 
As has been mentioned in Chapters Three and Eight, the contribution of this study is to 
discuss the literature on the role of the state and accounting change in a developing 
country and to link the findings with theories of the role of the state. The theoretical 
contribution of this study in response to RQ-3 is fourfold, as is outlined below.  
 
Firstly, the study contributes to literature on accounting change studies in developing 
countries such as Bangladesh by applying a Weberian view of the theory of the role of 
the state (see section 3.2.2.1 and Chapter Eight). Through this, the study has been able 
to show that different outcomes of accounting change in Bangladesh can be explained 
by the most frequently discussed issues in the literature, i.e. drivers of accounting 
change (see section 8.2).  
 
Secondly, the study takes into consideration how external and internal forces influence 
accounting change. The prior research which employed the Weberian framework to 
both developed and developing countries, did not consider the state-society relationship 
(see section 3.2.1.6). In this study, the adoption of institutional dynamics has allowed a 
broader understanding of the theory of the state and to overcome some of the limitations 
of previous studies by considering accounting change on at least two levels (i.e. external 
and internal forces) (see sections 3.2.2.1, 8.3 and 8.5). In particular, outcomes of 
accounting change in Bangladesh are observed from the state level and the individual 
organisation level (see sections 8.3 and 8.5). However, the influence of the 
organisational field level is unknown in this research because industry lobbying groups 
were not interviewed. Extending Weber’s (1958)[1904], (1968)[1922] argument on 
state-society (see sections 8.3.6 and 8.5.6), the study finds that for a state in an era of 
democratic government, politico-institutional factors and corruption (as an indication of 
societal values) may be more important and concentrated factors than for a state under a 
military-backed government in terms of impeding IFRSs implementation.  
 
Chapter Nine - Conclusions                                                               235                                 
 
Thirdly, as has been mentioned, very limited research has been conducted on the theory 
of the role of the state, and the roles of the state are vague in the prior research (see 
section 3.2.1). I have discussed roles of the state (i.e. the state approves experts to write 
rules; it consults with various stakeholders; it enforces outcomes; it is accountable to its 
citizens; and it engages with donor agencies) in a developing country’s experience 
during the process of change (see sections 3.2.1 and 8.3-8.5). The study reveals that all 
roles of the state have negative influences on accounting change. Several consequences 
arise from this. Accounting regulatory frameworks have not been updated to include 
IFRSs requirements and a contradiction exists between the Companies Act and IFRSs. 
Stakeholders’ participation is not guaranteed in the standard setting process in 
Bangladesh. Political pressure by the government and in particular by successive 
democratic governments inhibits the IFRSs implementation process. A lack of co-
operation among state institutions and professional bodies negatively impacts the 
outcomes of accounting change. Finally, corruption (as a societal value) is one of the 
major contributing factors in impeding IFRSs implementation (see Chapters Six and 
Seven). However, interviewees’ initial concerns about the roles of donor agencies are 
transformed into concerns about the democratic government’s failure to implement 
IFRSs. 
 
Finally, the new understanding which emerges from my thesis regarding the theory of 
the role of the state can be summarised as follows: 
 
(a) For Weber (1958, p. 113)[1904], the social sources of the role of the state may 
change. However, in Bangladesh, individuals in society follow consistent societal 
values (i.e. continuous corruption) because corruption is considered to be natural 
and is widely accepted by the country’s society (see sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.4).  
 
(b) Weber (1968, p. 72)[1922] argues that different actors make different choices, and 
stresses that power is exercised over the state’s citizens, who have a duty to obey, 
and the state’s power (e.g. compliance with laws) becomes the objective of social 
action. In Bangladesh, different actors (in different democratic governments) have 
been seen to make the same choices in terms of not effectively implementing IFRSs. 
Some specific observations can be made regarding IFRSs implementation: the state 
tends to be politicised, with a looser enforcement of laws which allows corruption 
and pays scant attention towards actual, effective implementation. Nevertheless, the 
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present study raises major questions around how effective implementation can be 
achieved, given the state’s ongoing failure to initiate and enable it over the past 
thirteen years or more (see sections 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.3.3).  
 
(c) Weber (1968, pp. 156-157)[1922] saw that a democratic state, by means of elections 
and a parliamentary process, can reduce tension and struggles for power. Weber 
predicted that the essential role of the state is to make and enforce rules. In my 
opinion, Weber did not allow in his argument for the consequences of a developing 
country’s experiences. In a developing country like Bangladesh, regulatory 
frameworks are often unenforceable in the presence of strong political 
connectedness, and obligations to the state become insignificant in the face of 
obligations to political connectedness. In particular, successive democratic eras in 
Bangladesh have been marked by inhibited IFRSs implementation in comparison to 
the military era (see sections 6.3.3 and 6.4). Weber (1968, p. 156)[1922] argues for 
the creation of meaning in everyday life, and that power is ultimately social through 
the parliamentary process and democracy. In the case of Bangladesh, the 
parliamentary process and democracy do not guarantee power to all citizens, 
meaning that power may not be ultimately social because of politicisation and 
continuum corruption within a state (see sections 8.3.6 and 8.5.6).  
 
9.3 Limitations of the study 
 
The following limitations are inherent in this study. 
 




 round of 
interviews) in a developing country such as Bangladesh. As mentioned in section 5.4.5, 
some of the interviewees cancel their appointments, and in some cases the waiting time 
is too long. Another limitation was in relation to translating and transcribing the 
interviews. Although the interviews were conducted in English, the interviewees 
respond mostly in Bengali and to some extent a mixture of Bengali and English. 
Further, respondents were often reluctant to explain much or talk extensively (e.g. 
offering only ‘yes/no/no comment’), and some of the Bengali words used by the 
interviewees have the same meaning, a different meaning or no equivalent meaning in 
English. Researchers like Miles & Huberman (1994) and Williamson (2011) argue that 
that coding and interpretation is dependent on the knowledge and skill of the researcher. 
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As the present researcher is fluent in Bengali and English, the experience and 
knowledge of the researcher (in sharing the cultural background of the participants)  in 
terms of translating and transcribing interview data could minimise any interpretation 
bias.  
 
Secondly, another limitation of the research is the small sample size of the interviews. It 
may be argued that conducting more interviews could have obtained a deeper insight 
into the issues at hand. Miles & Huberman (1994) suggest that six to eight interviews 
are enough to justify the results of a study. This study purposively selected interviewees 
likely to be able to help the researcher to understand the specific problems and the 
research question (Street, 2002; Creswell, 2007). Accordingly, 27 interviews were 
conducted in the 1
st
 round of interviews consisting of four groups (i.e. (a) policy makers 
[PM]; (b) accounts preparers and professionals [AP]; (c) users [US]; and (d) 
academics/researchers [AR]) (see section 5.4.1). According to Myers & Newman 
(2007), representing a variety of voices can overcome various biases. However, in the 
2
nd
 round only 12 of 27 agreed to participate. In particular, interviewees in the AP and 
US groups were disinclined to participate (representing 33% of the sample when 
comparing the 2
nd
 round to the 1
st
 round of interviews) (see section 5.4.2). Patton (2001) 
argues that qualitative research does not necessarily suggest a large number of 
participants. Nevertheless, two rounds of interview data were available to be used for 
the generalisation of the findings of this study.  
 
Thirdly, the leaders of the industry groups (e.g. BAB, BAPLC, BGMEA, BIGUF, 
BTMA, DCCI, FBCCI and NGWF) were not interviewed. Although this group of 
people are undeniably important to the effective implementation of IFRSs, it is not easy 
to interview this group in Bangladesh. The researcher contacted those leaders several 
times but they were not interested in participating in the study. In addition, during the 
period of this research, Bangladesh experienced some trade union turbulence, making it 
even more difficult to set up interviews with this group. The researcher decided to use 
other sources of information instead, such as documentary analyses. Hence, the 
activities of these individuals and groups towards influencing IFRSs implementation 
remain unknown in this research (see section 8.4) and the theoretical framework in this 
study limits the generalisation of the findings, in particular at the organisational field 
level.  
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Fourthly, the state’s accountability to its citizens has not been implicitly examined in 
this study. The findings of the three propositions may offer insight as to whether the 
state is accountable to its citizens in Bangladesh in terms of accounting change. 
Nevertheless, the World Bank’s Governance Indicators [1996-2010], interviewees’ 
comments on the quality (or lack of it) of investor protection laws and stakeholders’ 
participation/non-participation in the standard setting process all illustrate why the state 
is not accountable to its citizens in Bangladesh. 
 
Finally, with respect to documentary analyses, some limitations were observed (see 
section 5.5). For instance, part of the some of the enforcement notices are illegible, 
some of the notices were not available on the website, the releases contain repeated 
information on the same enforcement actions (Bremser et al., 1991; Feroz et al., 1991; 
Campbell & Parker, 1992; Files, 2012), the bandwidth of the SEC website is very low, 
no full record of enforcement documents was available (i.e. data related to thirteen years 
ago were not available), there was a tendency to frequently cancel meetings with the 
researcher, and dealing with the lack of co-ordination among various departments in the 
SEC and collecting data in a developing country like Bangladesh from state institutions 
(such as the SEC) is generally time consuming. Further, the study follows a subjective 
analysis of the SEC enforcement releases because the material does not lend itself to 
quantitative analysis. Nonetheless, this limitation is mitigated by the fact that a 
substantial number of enforcement releases are analysed.  
 
9.4 Avenues for future research 
 
Several suggestions can be made as to possible avenues for further research which arise 
from this study’s focus and findings. 
 
Firstly, in accounting literature, different researchers have applied a Weberian view in 
different ways. Future research could be conducted on the Weberian perspective of 
accounting change in broader terms. This theory could help a researcher to understand 
how and why some states are more successful than others in relation to the outcomes of 
their accounting change, and in particular, in terms of their implementation of IFRSs.  
 
Secondly, this study focuses upon theory of the role of the state. According to the 
findings of this study, agency theory is one possible theory which might explain 
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effective implementation of IFRSs. Therefore, for future research, researchers may gain 
more insight by utilising agency theory in their studies. 
 
Thirdly, this study does not include interviews with industry leaders due to the 
limitations mentioned in Chapter Five and in section 9.3. For future research, it would 
be interesting to study the perspectives of industry leaders and trade unions towards 
IFRSs implementation. This kind of further research may consider how best to proxy 
these particular groups (if the groups remain reluctant to participate in the research) to 
explain the theoretical framework involved in the study. It would also be interesting to 
compare these groups across various developing countries. 
 
Fourthly, this study does not focus on social values or beliefs to explain cultural values; 
instead, [i] training opportunities in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption are 
discussed. Cultural theory, as proposed by Hofstede (1980), Hofstede et al. (2010) and 
Gray (1988), is not discussed in detail in this research because cultural theory is seen as 
the opposite of the Weberian view of the state (see sections 2.5.3 and 7.1). For future 
research, it would be interesting to study social values or beliefs and their effects on 
accounting change using Hofstede’s or Gray’s model. The findings in this study are 
discussed in the reflection section in the context of South Asian culture (comparing 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) using Hofstede’s (2010) scores, the World Bank 
Governance Index (2010) and La Porta et al. (1998)’s scores. 
 
Fifthly, future research could be conducted which defines corruption as an institutional 
factor in the implementation of IFRSs in developing countries. 
 
Finally, it is suggested that the theoretical perspectives, interviews and the documentary 
analyses embraced within this broader study could be replicated in studies of another 
developing country, or for a group of developing countries, in order to determine and 
compare the outcomes of accounting change, and in particular the different levels of 
effectiveness seen in the implementation of IFRSs.  
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%20Act,1994%20Bangla.pdf) 
25. The Companies Act No. 18, 1994 
(http://www.vakilno1.com/saarclaw/bangladesh/companies_act.htm) 
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Relevant Regulations regarding court cases in Bangladesh: 
 
1. Article 94(1), 94(2), 101, 103, 103(1) &106, Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972; 
2. Civil Courts Act 1887, Sec. 8, 11, 21(4) & 23; 
3. Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, Sec. 4(2)(b), 6(3), 9, 9(3), 10, 12 (1), 17(1), 32(a), 32(b) & 32(c); 
4. Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, Sub sec. 15 & 19; 
5. Financial Loan Court Act 1990, Sec. 4; 
6. Public Demands Recovery Act 1913; 
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13. The High Court of Bangladesh Order, 1972 (P.O. No. 5 of 1972); 
14. The Provisional Constitution of Bangladesh Order, 1972. 
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1. 1973, Vol. 25, Dhaka Law Reports; 
2. 1979, Vol. 31, Dhaka Law Reports; 
3. 1983, Vol. 35, Dhaka Law Reports; 
4. 1988, Vol. 40, Dhaka Law Reports; 
5. 1991, Vol. 43, Dhaka Law Reports; 
6. 1998, Vol. 50, Dhaka Law Reports; 
7. 2003, Vol. 55, Dhaka Law Reports; 
8. 2008, Vol. 60, Dhaka Law Reports; 
9. 2009, Vol. 61, Dhaka Law Reports; 
10. 2010, Vol. 62, Dhaka Law Reports. 
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Appendix 2-2:  Articles in relation to role of the state and accounting change from Google scholar 
 
Accounting Perspectives/Perspectives Comptables 
Australian Journal of Management 
Economia Aziendale 
European Sociological Review 
Journal of Financial Economics 
Journal of Management and Governance 
Journal of Modern African Studies 
Research in Accounting Regulation 
Review of International Political Economy 
The British Journal of Sociology 
The Journal of Accountancy 
 
 





Accounting and Business Research 
Accounting Horizons 
Accounting Perspectives/Perspectives Comptables* 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 
Australian Journal of Management 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting 
Economia Aziendale 
European Accounting Review 
European Sociological Review 
Financial Accountability and Management 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 
Journal of Accounting Literature 
Journal of Financial Economics 
Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting 
Journal of Management and Governance 
Journal of Modern African Studies 
Management Accounting Research 
Research in Accounting Regulation 
Review of International Political Economy 
The Accounting Review 
The British Accounting Review 
The British Journal of Sociology 
The International Journal of Accounting Education and Research  
(Retitled, The International Journal of Accounting, in 1989) 
The Journal of Accountancy 
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Appendix 2-4(a): Papers related to the role of the state in relation to regulatory frameworks, politico-



























influencing the development of 
accounting objectives, standards 
and practices in Peru   
Theory of culture on 









Watts (1977) Corporate financial statements: 
A product of the market and 
political processes 
- Agency theory 
- Economic regulation  
theory 
- Public choice theory 




The role of colonial and post-
colonial states in imperialism – a 
case-study of the Sierra Leone 
development company 
State theory -- P -- -- 
Solomons 
(1978) 
The politicization of accounting No theory -- P -- -- 
Burchell et 
al. (1980) 
The roles of accounting in 
organizations and society 
- Organisation theory 
- Institutional theory 





Towards a political economy of 
accounting: An empirical 
illustration of the Cambridge 
controversies 




R P -- -- 
Lowe et al. 
(1983) 
Simple theories for complex 
processes: Accounting policy 
and the market for myopia  
Positive accounting theory R P C -- 
Belkaoui 
(1983) 
Economic, political, and civil 
indicators and reporting and 
disclosure adequacy: empirical 
investigation 
No theory R P C -- 
Tinker 
(1984) 
Theories of the state and the 
state of accounting: Economic 
reductionism political 
Voluntarism in accounting 
regulation theory 
State theory R P -- -- 
Sutton 
(1984) 
Lobbying of accounting 
standard-setting bodies in the 
UK and the USA: A Downsian 
analysis 
No Theory [Cost-benefit 
framework of  the 
Downsian voting model on 
lobbying] 




Cultural influence on corporate 
and governmental involvement 
in accounting policy 
determination in Japan  




Community, market, state - and 
associations?: The prospective 
contribution of interest 
governance to social order  
- State theory 
- Organisation theory 
 
R P -- -- 
Miller (1986) Accounting for Progress - 
National Accounting and 
Planning in France: a review 
essay  




Culture and Accounting Change: 
A New Perspective on 
Corporate Reporting Regulation 
and Accounting Policy 
Formulation  
- Diffusion of innovation 
theory 
- Theory of culture 
R -- C -- 
Puxty et al.  Modes of Regulation in Theory of regulation R -- -- -- 
























(1987) Advanced Capitalism: Locating 
Accountancy in Four Countries  
Armstrong 
(1987) 
The Rise of Accounting 
Controls in British Capitalist 
Enterprises  
Economics theory  
(Functions of capital) 




Australia’s ASRB: A Case 
Study of Political Activity and 
Regulatory Capture 
Regulatory capture theory R P-I -- -- 
Sunder 
(1988) 
Political economy of accounting 
standards  
Review of Economics 
theory   
R P  Ca 
Giroux 
(1989) 
Political Interests and 
Governmental Accounting 
Disclosure 
Public choice theory 
(median voter model &  the 
bureaucratic model) 
-- P -- -- 
Baber (1990) Toward a framework for 
evaluating the role of accounting 
and auditing in political 
markets: The influence of 
political competition 




Financial Disclosure Regulation 
and Its Environment: A Review 
and Further Analysis 
- The environmental 
determinism theory 
- Agency theory 




R P C E 
Pn 
Eg 
Miller (1990) On the interrelations between 
accounting the state  
State theory R P -- -- 
Jonsson 
(1991) 
Role making for accounting 
while the state is watching 
- Cultural theory 
- Communicative theory 
-  Role of the state  
R P C E 
Young 
(1991) 
Interest group politics and the 
licensing of public accountants 




Political and Economic forces 
shaping regulatory accounting 
for troubled debt restructuring  
Positive accounting theory  R P C -- 








Political Power beyond the 
State: Problematics of 
Government 
- Social theory 
- Theories of power 
- Role of the state 
-- P -- -- 
Cheng 
(1992) 
An Empirical Analysis of 
Theories on Factors Influencing 
State Government Accounting 
Disclosure 
- Positive accounting 
theory  
- Interest-group theory 
(Agency theory) 




Government and the Profession 
in the Regulation of Financial 
Reporting: The Australian 
Experience  
No theory -- P -- E 
Napier & 
Noke (1992) 
Accounting and the law: An 




R -- C  -- 
Stiglitz 
(1993) 
The Role of the State in 
Financial Markets 
No theory R P -- -- 
Zeff (1993) The Politics of Accounting 
Standards 
No theory R P -- -- 
Walker & A critical assessment of the No theory R P -- -- 


























literature on political activity 
and accounting regulation  
 
Miller (1994) Accounting as social and 
institutional practice: an 
introduction 
- Institutional theory 
- Political economy 
-- P-I -- -- 
Boross et al. 
(1995) 
Pressures and conflicts in 
moving towards harmonization 
of accounting practice: the 
Hungarian experience 
No theory R P C -- 
Krzywda et 
al. (1995) 
A theory of European 
accounting development applied 
to accounting change in 
contemporary Poland 
State theory (Max 
Weberian concept) 
R P -- -- 
 
Zeff (1995) A perspective on the U.S. 
public/private-sector approach 
to the regulation of financial 
reporting 




effects of culture and market 
forces on accounting disclosure 
practices 
- Theory of culture 
- Resource dependency 
theory 




Accounting Regulation in 
ASEAN: A Choice between the 
Global and Regional Paradigms 
of Harmonization 




Post Colonial Accountancy 
Regulation in ASEAN: 
Accounting Ideology in an 
International Context 
No theory R P -- -- 
Nobes (1998) Towards a General Model of the 
Reasons for International 
Differences in Financial 
Reporting  
- Theory of culture 
- Positive accounting 
theory 





State regulation and professional 
accounting education reforms: 
an empirical test of regulatory 
capture theory 
- Theories of economic 
regulation 
- Capture theory 
- Predatory capture 
theory 
R P -- E 
Klumpes 
(1998) 
Competition Among Pressure 
Groups for Political Influence 
over the Determination of 
Accounting Standards 
- Agency theory 
- Economic theory of 
regulation 
R -- -- -- 
Ryan et al. 
(1999) 
Constituent participation in the 
Australian Public Sector 
Accounting Standard-setting 
process: the case of ED 55 
No theory R P-I -- -- 
McLeay et 
al. (2000) 
Constituent lobbying and its 
impact on the development of 
financial reporting regulations: 
evidence from Germany 
No theory R P -- -- 
Stoddart 
(2000) 
Political influences in changes 
to setting Australian Accounting 
Standards 




A Bangladesh soap opera: 
Privatisation, accounting, and 
regimes of control in a less 
developed country 
Labour process theory R P -- Pr 



























Politics, Processes and the 
Future of Australian Accounting 
Standards 
Interest group theory R P -- -- 
Zeff (2002) Political Lobbying on Proposed 
Standards: A Challenge to the 
IASB 




Can They Squeeze the State? 
No theory -- P -- -- 
Caramanis 
(2002) 
The interplay between 
professional groups, the state 
and supranational agents: Pax 
Americana in the age of 
‘globalisation’ 
State theory R P -- -- 
Sunder 
(2002) 
Regulatory competition among 
accounting standards within and 
across international boundaries 
No theory R -- -- -- 
Xiao et al. 
(2004) 
 Political influence and 
coexistence of a uniform 
accounting system and 
accounting standards: Recent 
developments in China 




 The Politics of Accounting: A 
Framework  
No theory -- P C -- 
Sunder 
(2005) 
Minding our manners: 
Accounting as social norm 




Political Relationships, Global 
Financing, and Corporate 
Transparency: Evidence from 
Indonesia 




Accounting, professions and 
regulation: Locating the sites of 
professionalization 
- Public choice theory 
- Theory of hegemony 
- Actor network theory 
R P -- Pr 
E 
Ball (2006) International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS): 
pros and cons for investors 




An analysis of the factors 
affecting the adoption of 
international accounting 
standards by developing 
countries  




Zeff (2006) Political lobbying on 
Accounting Standards - National 
and International experience 
No theory R P -- -- 
Perry &  
Nӧlke (2006) 
The political economy of 
International Accounting 
Standards  
No theory -- P -- -- 
Napier 
(2006) 
Accounts of change: 30 years 
of historical accounting research 
- Labour process theory 
- Positive accounting 
theory              
- Institutional theory                          
Review 












Accounting for the nation-state 
in mid nineteenth-century 
Thailand 
State theory -- P C -- 
Ezzamel et Political ideology and Capitalist accounting R P -- -- 
























al. (2007) accounting regulation in China theory 
Zeff (2007) Some obstacles to global 
financial reporting 
comparability and convergence 
at a high level of quality 




The implications of fair-value 
accounting: Evidence from the 
political economy of goodwill 
accounting 




Economic Consequences of 
Financial Reporting and 
Disclosure Regulation: A 
Review and Suggestions for 
Future Research 




- Agency theory 
R P -- -- 
Nobes & 
Zeff (2008) 
Auditors’ Affirmations of 
Compliance with IFRS around 
the World: An Exploratory 
Study 
No theory R P -- -- 
Königsgruber 
(2010) 
A Political Economy of 
Accounting Standard Setting  
No theory -- P -- -- 
Sunder 
(2010) 
Adverse effects of uniform 
written reporting standards on 
accounting practice, education, 
and research 






Lobbying on Accounting 
Standard Setting in a 
Parliamentary Environment – A 
Qualitative Approach 
No theory R P -- -- 
Jones (2010) Sources of power and 
infrastructural conditions in 
medieval governmental 
accounting 
Social theory of 
Michael Mann (Power 
framework) 
R R C -- 
Moran 
(2010) 
The political economy of 
regulation: does it have any 
lessons for accounting research? 
- State theory 
- Political theory 












Towards a theory of accounting 
regulation: A discussion of the 
politics of disclosure regulation 
along the economic cycle 
- Theory of accounting 
regulation 
R P-I -- -- 
Kurunmaki 
et al. (2011) 
Accounting within and beyond 
the state 
- Institutional Theory 
- Structuration Theory 
- Role of the state 




Accounting change: explaining 




- Archetype Theory 
- Role of the state 
R -- C -- 
Norton 
(2012) 
Judicial interpretation of the will 
of the state: A Hegelian 
perspective in the context of 
taxation 
- Critical accounting 
theory 
- Social Contract Theory 
- Role of the state 




Accounting and the Welfare-
state: The Missing Link 
- State theory 
- Neo-institutional 
theory 
R P -- -- 
 Total 79 articles   62 68
*a
 27  
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Notes:  R = Accounting Regulatory Frameworks; P-I = Politico-institutional factors; P = Politics; C = 
Cultural factors; O = Other country specific factors [E = Accounting Education; Pn = Accounting 
Profession; Ca = Capital Markets; Pr = Privatisation; Eg = Economic growth; Mn = Manipulation of 
Accounting; Au = Auditing;  La = Language]  
 
* The italics indicate working papers, book chapters and a research report are also included  
 
*a
: 58 papers are based on Politics and 10 papers are based on Politico-institutional factors, [58+10 = 68].  
 
Summary of Articles: (i) Total 79 articles; (ii) 15 are based on the theory of the role of the state 
[Hoogvelt & Tinker (1978); Tinker (1984); Streeck & Schmitter (1985); Miller (1990); Jonsson (1991); 
Rose & Miller (1992)[2010]; Krzywda et al. (1995); Caramanis (2002); Constable & Kuasirikun (2007); 
Moran (2010); Alexander & Servalli (2010); Kurunmaki et al. (2011); Liguori & Steccolini (2012); 
Norton  (2012);  Oehr & Zimmermann (2012)]; (iii) 34 Other theories; and (iv) 30 No theories. 
 
Appendix 2-4(b): Theory & Non-theory based papers in relation to Developing vs. Developed countries 
 





 Ezzamel et al. (2007): China  
 Constable & Kuasirikun 
(2007): Thailand  
 Uddin & Hopper (2001): 
Bangladesh  
 Krzywda et al. (1995): Poland  
 Hoogvelt & Tinker (1978): 
Sierra Leone  
 Radebaugh (1975): Peru 
 Liguori &  Steccolini (2012): Italy  
 Norton  (2012): The UK & the USA  
 Alexander & Servalli (2010): The EU & the IASB  
 Moran (2010): The USA  & the UK  
 Jones (2010): Medieval country  
 Sunder (2010): The USA & the EU  
 Oehr & Zimmermann (2012): Germany, Canada & the UK  
 Leuz & Wysocki (2008): The USA   
 Ramanna (2008): The USA  
 Cooper & Robson (2006): The UK  
 Sunder (2005): The USA  
 Caramanis (2002): Greece   
 Brown &Tarca (2001): Australia  
 Klumpes (1998): Australia  
 Roberts & Kurtenbach (1998): The USA  
 Zarzeski (1996): France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Norway, the UK & the USA 
 Napier & Noke (1992): The UK & New Zealand  
 Cheng (1992): The USA 
 Rose & Miller (1992)[2010]: The UK & the USA 
 Jonsson (1991): Sweden 
 Rose (1991): The USA 
 Pushkin & Pariser (1991): The USA  
 Miller (1990): France  
 Giroux (1989): The USA  
 Sunder (1988): The USA  
 Walker (1987): Australia  
 Armstrong (1987): The UK  
 Puxty et al. (1987): Germany, the UK, Sweden & the USA  
 Harrison & McKinnon (1986): Japan  
 Lowe et al. (1983): the UK & the USA  
 Tinker (1980): The UK  
Both developed & developing countries: 
 Nobes (1998) 
 Cooke & Wallace (1990) 
 
General Theory: (Theory based only) 
 Kurunmaki et al. (2011) 
 Wagenhofer (2011) 
 Napier (2006) 
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 Miller (1994) 
 Baber (1990) 
 Streeck & Schmitter (1985) 
 Tinker (1984) 
 Burchell et al. (1980) 
 Watts (1977) 
Non-theory based papers 
Developing country Developed country 
 Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee (2006): 
Indonesia 
 Zeghal & Mhedhbi (2006) 
 Xiao et al. (2004): China 
 Saudagaran & Diga (1998): 
ASEAN , Malaysia, Philippines,  
Indonesia, Thailand & 
Singapore [except Singapore all 
are developing countries] 
 Saudagaran & Diga (1997): 
ASEAN , Malaysia, Philippines,  
Indonesia, Thailand & 
Singapore [except Singapore all 
are developing countries] 
 Boross et al. (1995): Hungary 
 Zülch & Hoffmann (2010): Germany 
 Königsgruber (2010): The EU & the USA 
 Perry &  Nӧlke (2006): The EU & the USA 
 Zeff (2006): The USA, the UK, Canada & Sweden 
 Zeff (2002): The USA, the UK, & Australia 
 Sunder (2002): The USA 
 Stoddart (2000): Australia 
 McLeay et al. (2000): Germany 
 Ryan et al. (1999): Australia 
 Zeff (1995): The USA 
 Zeff (1993): The USA 
 Walker (1992): Australia 
 Young (1991): The USA 
 Miller (1986): France  
 McKinnon & Harrison (1985): Japan 
 Sutton (1984): The UK & the USA 
 Solomons (1978): The USA 
Both developed and developing countries: 
 Nobes & Zeff (2008) 
 Zeff (2007) 
 Ball (2006) 
 Ordelheide (2004) 
 Faccio (2002) 
 Walker & Robinson (1993)  
 Belkaoui (1983) 
 
Note: The italics indicate papers relating to the theory of the role of the state.
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Appendix 4-2: Copyright permission from Geert Hofstede B.V. 
 
 
Date:  Fri, 29 Jun 2012 10:27:29 +0200 [29/06/2012 09:27:29 BST] 
From:  Rights Geert Hofstede <rights@geerthofstede.nl> 








Thank you very much for specifying how you intend to use the Hofstede model in your research. It is 
therefore with pleasure that I grant permission to do so. 
As few studies are known to me based on data from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, we would be most 
pleased to receive a copy of your study. Would that be possible? 
In that case, could you send a hard copy to the address below, to the attention of Professor Hofstede? 
 
Thank you very much and good luck with your thesis.  
 
With kind regards,  
Geert Hofstede B.V.  
 
Loes Cornelissen  
Rights Manager  
Den Bruijl 15  
6881 AN Velp  
 
The Netherlands  
 
---------------------------------------- 
Van: Mohammad NURUNNABI <M.Nurunnabi@sms.ed.ac.uk> 
verzonden: donderdag 21 juni 2012 12:46 
Aan: rights@geerthofstede.nl 




I am using cultural scores of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh from Hofstede et al. (2010). Source: 
Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G.J. and Minkov, M. (2010). Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. 





PhD Candidate in Accounting 
Business School 
The University of Edinburgh 
 
 -- 
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Appendix 4-3: Copyright permission from the University of Chicago Press  
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Appendix 5-1: An e-mail communication for conducting interviews  
 
Date:  Thu, 15 Apr 2010 03:53:41 -0700 [15/04/10 11:53:41 AM BST] 
From:  Nasim Anwar <nasim66anwar@yahoo.com> 
Reply-
To:  
Mohammad NURUNNABI <M.Nurunnabi@sms.ed.ac.uk> 
Subject:  Re: Interview on IFRSs implementation in Bangladesh 
Thanks for your mail. Please contact me when you are in Bangladesh. I will try my level best to help you 




Nasim Anwar FCA 
 
Sent from my iPhone 
 




I am engaged in preparing my Doctoral Thesis entitled ‘The implementation of IFRSs in a developing 
country: the Case of Bangladesh’. I am really interested in your experience of implementing IFRSs. 
 
I would very much appreciate a discussion with you. I am sending the attached interview questions which 
are prepared under the supervision of Pauline Weetman, Professor of Accounting, University of 
Edinburgh Business School, United Kingdom. Accordingly, I would be grateful if you would allow me to 
conduct an interview lasting around an hour. I will be in Bangladesh from 3 June 2010 to 30 August 
2010. May I request you to let me know a suitable time and date for the interview by 20 May 2010? 
 
All the discussion in the interview will be treated as strictly confidential and no individuals or 






PhD Candidate in Accounting 
University of Edinburgh 
8 Buccleuch Place, 
Edinburgh, EH8 9LW 
United Kingdom 
Tel: +44 (0) 131 650 8334 
Mob: +44 (0) 796 179 2893 
E-mail: M.Nurunnabi@sms.ed.ac.uk 
--  
The University of Edinburgh is a charitable body, registered in 
Scotland, with registration number SC005336. 
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Interviewee Type: ______________________________________________________ 
 








Job Title: _____________________________________________________________ 
 









This interview is a part of doctoral research that explores the implementation of IFRSs in Bangladesh. 
You have been invited to participate in this study based on your involvement in the policy 
making/accounts preparing/using/researching of accounting arenas in Bangladesh.  
 
All responses to this interview are absolutely confidential and results will be presented in an anonymous 
form. 
 
With your permission, I would like to record the interview to ensure that I do not miss any important 
points. I will make the transcript available if you wish. (Yes/No) 
 
Would you like me to acknowledge your support in my thesis? (Yes/No) 
 
Do you have any questions before we commence? 




Background information: The definition of ‘implementation’ regarding my research is: The actual observed outcomes of introducing and monitoring the standards. These 













1. How would you describe the 
accounting regulatory 
frameworks in relation to the 
existing laws for investor 
protection, standard setting 
process and enforcement issues in 
Bangladesh? 
 
2. Who really regulates 
accounting issues in the country 
today? 
1. How would you describe the 
accounting regulatory 
frameworks in relation to the 
existing laws for investor 
protection, standard setting 
process and enforcement issues 
in Bangladesh? 
 
2. Who really regulates 
accounting issues in the 
country today? 
1. How would you describe the 
accounting regulatory frameworks in 
relation to the existing laws for investor 
protection, standard setting process and 




2. Who really regulates accounting 
issues in the country today? 
1. How would you describe the 
accounting regulatory frameworks in 
relation to the existing laws for 
investor protection, standard setting 




2. Who really regulates accounting 







3. Is there any higher/lower level 
of political pressure (e.g. 
government intervention, donor 
agencies’ pressure and political 
lobbying) to implement or not 
implement IFRSs? 
 
4. Do you feel the institutional 
and professional bodies can work 
together to better implement 
IFRSs?  
3. Is there any higher/lower 
level of political pressure (e.g. 
government intervention, 
donor agencies’ pressure and 
political lobbying) to 
implement or not implement 
IFRSs? 
4. Do you feel the institutional 
and professional bodies can 
work together to better 
implement IFRSs?  
3. Is there any higher/lower level of 
political pressure (e.g. government 
intervention, donor agencies’ pressure 
and political lobbying) to implement or 
not implement IFRSs? 
 
 
4. Do you feel the institutional and 
professional bodies can work together 
to better implement IFRSs? 
3. Is there any higher/lower level of 
political pressure (e.g. government 
intervention, donor agencies’ pressure 
and political lobbying) to implement 
or not implement IFRSs? 
 
 
4. Do you feel the institutional and 
professional bodies can work together 





in the accounting 
profession & 
Corruption) 
5. Do you feel that the current 
syllabus of the professional 
accountancy qualification is 
suitable to implement IFRSs 
effectively? 
5(a) Will the IFRSs be included 
in the universities' curricula? 
5. Do you feel that the current 
syllabus of the professional 
accountancy qualification is 
suitable to implement IFRSs 
effectively? 
5 (a) Should the IFRSs be 
included in the universities' 
5. Do you feel that the current syllabus 
of the professional accountancy 
qualification is suitable to implement 
IFRSs effectively? 
 
5(a) Should the IFRSs be included in 
the universities' curricula? 
5. Do you feel that the current syllabus 
of the professional accountancy 
qualification is suitable to implement 
IFRSs effectively? 
 
5(a) Do you know whether the IFRSs 
will be included in the universities' 









6. What kind of training and 
development you are offering 
them (the preparers and 
professionals) to cope with 
IFRSs? 
 
7. How would you regard 
corruption as an issue in 




6. What are the training and 
development you attained to 




7. How would you regard 




5(b) Is there any lack of research in this 
sector? 
 
6. What do you think about what kind 
of training and development they (the 
preparers & professionals) needed to 
cope with IFRSs? 
 
 
7. How would you regard corruption as 






6. Would you feel that the preparers 
and professionals need training and 




7. How would you regard corruption 






8. What are the main problems of 
effective implementation of 
IFRSs in Bangladesh? 
8. What are the main problems 
of effective implementation of 
IFRSs in Bangladesh? 
8. What are the main problems of 
effective implementation of IFRSs in 
Bangladesh? 
 
8. What are the main problems of 
effective implementation of IFRSs in 
Bangladesh? 
 9. Are there any other comments 
you would like to make regarding 
the implementation of IFRSs? 
 
9.  Are there any other 
comments you would like to 
make regarding the 
implementation of IFRSs? 
9.  Are there any other comments you 
would like to make regarding the 
implementation of IFRSs? 
 
9.  Are there any other comments you 
would like to make regarding the 
implementation of IFRSs? 
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PM1 ICAB  (The Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Bangladesh ) 
26 years PhD 12/06/10 9:30-10:43 Not recorded 
PM2 ICAB  (The Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Bangladesh ) 
10 years ACA 14/06/10 11:23-12:39 Recorded 
PM3 ICMAB (The Institute of Cost & Management 
Accountants of Bangladesh) 
30 years FCMA 23/06/10 15:00-16:00 Recorded 
PM4 SEC (The Securities & Exchange Commission of 
Bangladesh) 
11 years MBA 24/06/10 14:30-15:20 Not recorded 
PM5 World Bank 14 years  FCA 30/06/10 16:00-17:12 Not recorded 
PM6 Bangladesh Bank [The Central Bank] 40 years PhD 16/06/10 12:00-13:10 Recorded 




















AP1 Big 4 Accountancy Firm in Bangladesh  32 years ACA 04/07/10 9:00-10:00 Not recorded 
AP2 A Pharmaceutical company 24 years ICMA (Part) 05/07/10 9:00-9:55 Recorded 
AP3 Big 4 Accountancy Firm in Bangladesh 9 years ACA  06/07/10 14:00-15:15 Not recorded 
AP4 Small Accountancy Firm  10 years ACA 11/07/10 12:00-13:10 Recorded 
AP5 Bank  10 years M.Com. 14/07/10 9:00-10:15 Not recorded 
AP6 An Engineering company 8 years 2 months MBA 17/07/10 10:00-11:30 Not recorded 
AP7 Bank  15 years M.Com 18/07/10 11:00-12:15 Recorded 
AP8 Small Accountancy Firm 5 years ACA 19/07/10 9:00-10:17 Not recorded 
AP9 Small Accountancy Firm 20 years FCA 21/07/10 15:00-16:20 Recorded 
AP10 Multinational company 11 years ACMA 22/07/10 10:00-10:49 Recorded 
AP11 A Pharmaceutical company 7 years ACA 27/07/10 16:00-16:53 Not recorded 
AP12 Big 4 Accountancy Firm in Bangladesh 15 years FCMA, FCA 29/07/10 13:00-14:15 Not recorded 
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  13 interviewees declined to record the interviews. 





























US1 Bank 10 years MBA 02/08/10 10:45-11:38 Recorded 
US2 Stock Broker and Central Depository Bangladesh 
Limited (CDBL) participatory 
9 years MA 05/08/10 9:00-9:47 Not recorded 
US3 Financial Institution and Central Depository 
Bangladesh Limited (CDBL) participatory 
8 years 7 months MBA 08/08/10 9:00-10:11 Recorded 
US4 Bank  10 years CMA(Part) 09/08/10 13:00-14:02 Recorded 
US5 Credit Rating Agency of Bangladesh  5 years 10 months MBA 12/08/10 11:00-11:52 Not recorded 































A Public University, Bangladesh 10 years MBA 19/08/10 13:15-14:27 Recorded 
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 Appendix 5-5: Interview guide of the study 
 
Introduction 
 Welcome to the interviewee for participating this research. 
 The introduction and the general purposes of the topic are discussed for few minutes. 
 I explain the use of recording equipment to the interviewee.  
 I also address the issue of ethical guidelines, (e.g. anonymity & confidentiality). 
 Finally, I read a protocol summary to the interviewee. 
 
Interview 
After the introduction the questions relevant to the topics are asked to the interviewees. They are given some opportunities to provide some examples relevant to the questions 
which may bring forth their opinions that they have been waiting to share knowing. 
Closing remarks 




Appendix 5-6: The 2
nd
 Round Interview Questions 
 
Drivers of Accounting Change PM, AP, AR and US 
[A] Accounting Regulatory Frameworks (RQ-1) 
1(a).  How would you describe the accounting regulatory process in Bangladesh? 
1(b).  How would you describe the accounting standard setting process in Bangladesh? 
2. How effective is the enforcement mechanism in implementing IFRSs? 
 
[B] Politico-Institutional Factors (RQ-1) 
3. How do you regard the political pressure to implement or not implement IFRSs? 
4. How important is the institutional co-operation to implement IFRSs effectively?  
[C] Cultural factors (e.g. [i] training opportunities 
in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption) 
[RQ-2(a)] 
5. How effective are accounting education and training opportunities in implementing IFRSs? 
6. How does corruption affect effective IFRSs implementation?  
[C] Other Country Specific Factors [RQ-2(b)] 7. What are the main problems in the effective implementation of IFRSs? 
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Appendix 5-8: An example of the colour coding of semi-structured interview (Translated & transcribed) 
 
Open Coding [Background Colour] Axial coding [Font Colour] 
Interviewee Code Quality of investor protection laws 
Accounting Regulatory Frameworks   Standard setting process 
Politico-Institutional Factors Regulator responsibility 
Cultural Factors (e.g. [i] training opportunities  
in the accounting profession and [ii] corruption) 
 
Enforcement of the laws 
Other Country Specific Factors Level of donor agencies’ pressure 
 Level of  government intervention 
 Level of political lobbying 
 Co-operation among institutional bodies 
 Professional Syllabus 
 Universities Curricula 
 Training and development 
 Corruption 




[Example of an Interview Extract] 
Interviewee Type:  Policymakers  
Interviewee Code:  PM6 
Interview date:    16/06/2010 
Time and Duration:   12:00 p.m. – 1:10 p.m. (1 hour 10 minutes) 
Name of the interviewee:   Dr. A 
Company/Organisation:   Bangladesh Bank 
Job Title:    Ex. Governor 
Work Experience (in Years):  40 years 
Qualification:    PhD in Economics 
Date of Qualification:   1978 
 
Interview preamble: 
With your permission, I would like to record the interview to ensure that I do not miss any important 
points. I will make the transcript available if you wish. (√Yes/No) 
Would you like me to acknowledge your support in my thesis? (√Yes/No) 
 
Nurunnabi [The researcher]: Do you have any questions before we commence? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, I have few queries. Are you considering IFRS 7 or BAS 30 in your research because it 
is very important? 
 
Nurunnabi: The previous research on Bangladesh identified that the IFRSs compliance rate is very low. 
Therefore, in my research, I am investigating problems of IFRSs implementation. No, I am not 
investigating particular standards, for example IFRS 7.  
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1. Nurunnabi: Who really regulates accounting issues in the country today? 
 
Interviewee: Strictly speaking, there is no regulatory body as such to regulate the accounting 
regulations’ concerns. What happens is like the regulatory bodies like Bangladesh Bank and 
SEC who require some kind of financial statements formats which are mandatory. According to 
that, banks, financial institutions and other companies must submit their quality report 
following IFRSs and ISA audit compliance to respective regulatory bodies. However, IFRSs or 
BFRSs are not strictly being examined by any particular body. When it comes to the regulatory 
body like Bangladesh Bank, they point out that some of IFRSs or BFRSs have not been 
implemented but as you know [that] no particular body cares really much. But in fact, I think 
that [this] is one of the weaknesses. ICAB should give orientation and guidelines that whenever 
the Chartered Accountants audit or send their reports they should comply with it. ICAB is 
supposed to really look into this matter. But I don’t think ICAB is also that much competent or 
they have the mandate to do that. 
 
2. Nurunnabi: How would you describe the current situation of accounting regulation in 
Bangladesh? 
 
Interviewee:  [Arm..] I have already answered the question as I don’t think it is very 
satisfactory. Because CA people are paid fees and they submit the reports to the bodies and in 
fact the firms are little bit obligated to the clients which they should not be. They should give a 
very impartial view but I have seen in my past experience as a Governor that many of the 
reports [by] companies, banks or financial institutions [send] Bangladesh Bank and different 
agencies [to] reflect their wishes and all that. So, there is impartiality and professionalism in 
preparing the reports [require] some models. I think [that] there are lots of scopes for 








3. Nurunnabi: Is there any higher/lower level of political pressure to implement or not 
implement IFRSs? 
 
Interviewee: Yes, you know [that] politics is a big problem. I really appreciate the initiative that 
the Caretaker Government [Military Government] took for Financial Reporting Ordinance 
2008, but it has not been enacted as well. That was a very good attempt. I think this was 
initiated during the BNP Government when Mr. Saifur Rahman, Ex- finance minister, being a 
chartered accountant also felt the necessity for such an Act. But I think [that] he was also a little 
bit influenced by business people or political pressure not to do very fast. But he really felt it 
otherwise [that] he would not have done some preliminary work. When the caretaker 
Government came, it was finalised after taking the comments of the chartered accountants, 
comments of the business people and comments from the trade bodies. I think the Caretaker 
Government passed the principles but they could not implement it. In fact at that Act, the 
Bangladesh Bank Governor was supposed to be the Chairman of the regulatory body because 
[it is a] impartial body. I think after the Awami league Government came, they found it as a 
very sensitive and a very loaded Act because lots of people possibly do not really want to go 
ahead with it. But I hope [that] this political Government will implement it. If they want to 
modify the draft made by Caretaker Government was ok, but I think they must enact that 
financial reporting Act which is very important. (A telephone call, interrupting) 
 
4. Nurunnabi: Do you feel the institutional and professional bodies can work together to better 
implement IFRSs?  
 
Interviewee: I think [that] there should be some kind of discussion and all that. But to 
implement or formulate IFRSs, you cannot please everyone. So it is not like an open ended 
participatory approach because trade bodies and business people will object so many things 
specially some of the regulatory laws. So, I think [that] if possible the ICAB, ICMAB, SEC, 
Bangladesh Bank, listed companies and the Government should take a lead to implement that. 
They can take the opinion from business people but I am doubtful whether it can be 
implemented because these people will give so many comments and you would not be able to 
implement it. My comment [would be] that they can now make a comprehensive report based 
on the comments received and they can incorporate and adjust. As [at] the last stage, they can 
discuss about the report with the stakeholders and then place it to the cabinet. But what happens 




5. Nurunnabi: Do you feel that the current syllabus of the professional accountancy 
qualification is suitable to implement IFRSs effectively? 
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Interviewee: I don’t think the syllabus is up to date to really implement IFRS and Basel II. I 
have seen many people don’t know about this. I have seen some ICAB people know [about] it 
and write some articles but this information should be disseminated. Knowledge dissemination 
by seminars, workshops and more training must be needed. The ICAB should include IFRSs in 
their syllabus and also engage students in arranging regular seminars and workshops on IFRSs. 
 
5(a). Nurunnabi:  Will the IFRSs be included in the universities' curricula? 
 
Interviewee: I think [that] IFRSs will be included in University curriculum. It should be 
included because when the university students are taught about the different accounting 
methods and all that, the general accounting principles, they should also know about the 
difference between those. I think [that] many people in the accounting professions even also 
don’t know about IFRSs or BFRSs. So, they should be oriented and of course IFRS should be 
included. The finance, accounting, [and] banking students should know about Basel II and 
IFRSs. 
 
6. Nurunnabi: What kind of training and development you are offering them (the preparers and 
professionals) to cope with IFRSs? 
 
Interviewee: There are no training facilities in Bangladesh Bank but there have been several 
talks regarding IFRSs training among ICAB, SEC, Bangladesh Bank and some donor agencies. 
Donor agencies, in particular World Bank are providing technical assistance. I think this should 
be expedited. What they are doing is that they are talking and discussing but there are no 
practical training models. For the accountant, executives or CEOs or others like people in-
charge of the finance, I think this should be immediately done. I feel [that] the regulatory 
bodies also should be trained. 
 
7. Nurunnabi: How would you regard corruption as an issue in implementing IFRSs 
effectively? 
 











8. Nurunnabi: What are the main problems of effective implementation of IFRSs in 
Bangladesh? 
 
Interviewee: I would say one kind of Inertia is the part of accountant, business people, lack of 
orientation and commitment. Business directors think [that] if IFRSs are implemented, they will 
be unduly controlled and checked on. But they should be made aware that this implementation 
satisfies the basic principles of accountability and transparency. But they believe that if the old 
system is working then why implement a new one. Therefore, so many problems are arising and 
we are not keeping updated with the world standards. So, they should be given orientation and 
there should be a common need. I think if it is enacted, then people will definitely take action to 
implement it. You know [that] the lower number of CAs are not helpful to implement IFRSs. 
The ICAB should be more proactive on that. 
 9. Nurunnabi: Are there any other comments you would like to make regarding the 
implementation of IFRSs? 
 
Interviewee: The businessman, users and the government should have a common need, they 
should feel that it is very much needed and this is for everybody. If IFRS is followed then 
transparency, accountability and all kinds of transactions specially finance and business 
transactions will be ensured. If it is implemented then the environment, governance issues [will] 
also [be] improved if those are really done. So, this is important. For IFRS implementation, the 
auditing standard are also related, these are not addressed effectively now-a-days. In 
Bangladesh Bank, we have risk based auditing which is different than simple voucher auditing. 
In risk based auditing managers are held responsible for minimising risk of any kind of 
operation. So, the auditing standard also has to be examined. Chartered Accountants and 
professionals should also be involved in its implementation. I think [that] good professionals 
should also be involved in its implementation. I think [that] in Bangladesh what we should do is 
a kind of very close interaction of some other countries and bodies. We can follow the Pakistan, 
India and Malaysia for example, because they have very good regulation in their accounting 
system like Islamic Banking. I think interaction is very important. We the Bangladesh Bank are 
doing this job, but the whole country should do it and disseminate knowledge to the public. 
 
Thank you Dr. A for giving your valuable time. 










 Industry Violation Type Relevant 
Accounting 
Standard(s) 
Relevant Regulations Actions 






January 50 Cement Non Application of Depreciation on 
fixed assets, True & Fair View 
IAS 1, 
IAS 16 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 





January 51 Food & Allied Going concern; Selling, Distribution & 
Sales Promotion; sales/turnover; 
falsification, True & Fair View 
IAS 1 SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[300,000] 
January 57 Food & Allied Provision for bad & doubtful debts, 
unreliability of unconfirmed balance of 
Debtors, True & Fair View 
IAS 1,  
IAS 39 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[1,200,000] 
January 58 Textile  Inventory, Financial expenses, Advance 
& deposits, Deferred expenses, Tax 
holiday reserve, True & Fair View 
IAS 1,  
IAS 2,  
IAS 12, 
IAS 23 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 






Going concern (The machineries were 
non-operative from 2006),  Provision for 
bad & doubtful debts 
IAS 1, 
IAS 39 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[1,500,000] 
May 20 Food & Allied Most of the amounts of inventories have 
not been changed over the years 
IAS 2,  
IAS 36 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 2(g), 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[1,200,000] 
June 29 Paper & 
Printing 
No appropriate method 
was followed in charging depreciation of 
other fixed assets 
IAS 16 SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 2(g), 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[1,000,000] 
September 7 Engineering  No depreciation has been charged 
 
IAS 16 SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 2(g), 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[1,000,000] 
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 The word IFRSs and BFRSs are interchangeably used. 
127
 The Sl. is the serial number of the SEC’s monthly enforcement notices. 
128
 The values are given in Bangladeshi Currency, i.e. the Taka (Tk.). The exchange rate on 31.03.2012 was [Tk. 1 = £0.0083 or £1 = Tk. 119.815], source: 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/exrate/bangladesh.htm 






 Industry Violation Type Relevant 
Accounting 
Standard(s) 
Relevant Regulations Actions 
& Amount (Tk.) 
November 4 Food & Allied Closing stock of the inventories does not 
assure the balance of inventories 
IAS 1, 
IAS 2 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 2(g), 








January 14 Textile  True & Fair View & Qualified Audit 
Opinion 
IAS 1 SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 






No detailed noted as prescribed by the 
ICAB &True & Fair View, 
IAS 1 SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[500,000] 
June 6 Textile  Financial Expenses, Non declaration of 
the date of AGM, True & Fair View 
IAS 1 SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[400,000] 
July 1 Textile  Accounts Receivable & Non-payment of 
dividend, True & Fair View 
IAS 1 SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[15,000,000] 
July 7 Food & Allied Inventory, Deferred Liabilities, Financial 
Expenses, Loans from Associated 
Companies & Loan from other parties, 
True & Fair View 
IAS 1,  
IAS 2 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[300,000] 
July 8 Food & Allied True & Fair View, No disclosure of  
Income from Insurance of damaged 
goods 
IAS 1 SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[400,000] 
July 12 Tannery No disclosure of amount due by 
directors of the company or associate 
concerns, True & Fair View 
IAS 1 SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 






Inventory Valuation, Deferred 
Expenditure, Amortisation, True & Fair 
View 
IAS 1,  
IAS 2 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[6,000,000] 
August 6 Textile  Inventory Valuation, Deferred 
Expenditure, Amortisation, Provision for 
Taxation, Falsification, True & Fair 
View 
IAS 1, 
 IAS 2 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[6,000,000] 






 Industry Violation Type Relevant 
Accounting 
Standard(s) 
Relevant Regulations Actions 
& Amount (Tk.) 
August 7 Miscellaneous Inventory Valuation, Deferred 
Expenditure, Amortisation, True & Fair 
View 
IAS 1,  
IAS 2 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[6,000,000] 
August 9 Jute Taxation, Contingent Liabilities, Stock 
of Finished Goods, Sundry Debtors, 
Provident Fund, Interim Unpaid 
Dividend, True & Fair View 
IAS 1,  
IAS 2, 
IAS 12,  
IAS 37 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 






Creditors for expense & accruals, 
Creditors for finance, Custom Debenture, 
True & Fair View 
IAS 1, IAS 37 SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[400,000] 
November 11 Textile  Depreciation on revalued amount of 
Fixed Assets, True & Fair View 
IAS 1,  
IAS 16 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[900,000] 
November 12 Textile  Inter Company Current Account, True & 
Fair View 
IAS 1,  
IAS 24 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 








April 12 Food & Allied Old Loan, True & Fair View IAS 1,  
IFRS 7 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[100,000] 
April 13 Food & Allied Administrative Expenses, Turnover & 
other income, Selling & Distribution 
expenses, Collection from turnover & 
other income, payment for cost & 
expenses, Loan received & Loan repaid, 
True & Fair View 
IAS 1 SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 13(A) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[100,000] 
July 6 Textile  Accounts Receivables, True & Fair View IAS 1,  
IFRS 7 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[1,000,000] 
September 8 Tannery Property Plant & Equipment, True & 
Fair View 
IAS 1,  
IAS 16 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[800,000] 
October 4 Insurance Receivables, Advance Business 
Expenses, No accounting for deferred 
Taxation,  IAS, True & Fair View 
IAS 1,  
IAS 12 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 










 Industry Violation Type Relevant 
Accounting 
Standard(s) 
Relevant Regulations Actions 
& Amount (Tk.) 
October 6 Food & Allied No detailed disclosures as prescribed by 
the ICAB, True & Fair View 
IAS 1 SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[1,000,000] 
October 7 Paper & 
Printings 




SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 








March 19, 20, 
21, 22, 
23, 24 
Miscellaneous True & Fair View, Non disclosure of 
loan default & Information about selling 
of mortgages in Annual Report 
IAS 1,  
IFRS 7 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 




May 17, 18, 
19, 20, 
21, 22 
 Tannery Intangible Assets,  Depreciation on 
Factory Assets, Lease 
IAS 16,  
IAS 17,  
IAS 38 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[600,000] 
May 23, 24, 
25, 26 
Textile  Chance of error & omission in Internal 
Control Procedures, cost of goods sold, 
Not adopting an appropriate accounting 
system of controlling Inventory, True & 
Fair View 
IAS 1,  
IAS 2 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[400,000] 




Cement Full details & locations of all individual 
Assets in Fixed Assets has not been 
shown 
 IAS 16 SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[700,000] 
May 52, 53, 
54, 55, 
56, 57 
Miscellaneous Balance Sheet & Change in Equity are 
not prepared accordance with the IASs 
IAS 34- Para 
20(a) & (c)  
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 13(A) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[600,000] 
July 25 Food & Allied No stock register for auditors'  
verification, No provision to employees 
leave pay & gratuity 
IAS 19, IAS 
2-Para 36(a) 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[600,000] 






 Industry Violation Type Relevant 
Accounting 
Standard(s) 
Relevant Regulations Actions 
& Amount (Tk.) 
September 6 Food & Allied Deficiency in internal control, lack of 
detailed record of fixed assets, biological 
assets, current & noncurrent assets, 
Presentation of Biological Assets, No 
double entry cash book maintained, True 
& Fair View 
IAS 41,  
IAS 1 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2g) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[400,000] 
September 7 Food & Allied ISA, Half Yearly Audited report,  
Balance Sheet, Income Statement, Cash 
flow statement, Change in Equity 
IAS 34- Para 
20(a), (b), (c) 
& (d)  
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 13(A) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[800,000] 
September 8 Food & Allied ISA, Half Yearly Audited report,  
Balance Sheet, Income Statement, Cash 
flow statement, Change in Equity 
IAS 34- Para 
20(a), (b), (c) 
& (d) 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 13(A) of SEC Rule 1987 
Fine 
[700,000] 
November 1 Miscellaneous Depreciation, Deferred Tax  IAS 12,  
IAS 16 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
Rule 12(2) of SEC Rule 1987 
Warning 
December 13 Food & Allied Qualified Audit Opinion, True & Fair 
View 
IAS 1 SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 




















sub Para 1 
A(1) 
SEC Ordinance 1969 S. 18, 
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Appendix 6-2: The Companies Act 1994 regarding penalties in Bangladesh 
 
 
Section 190. Copy of balance-sheet, etc. to be filed with Registrar: 
(1) After the balance sheet and profit and loss account or the income and expenditure account, as the case 
may be, have been laid before a company at an annual general meeting as aforesaid, there shall be filed 
with the Registrar, within thirty days from the date on which the balance sheet and the profit and loss 
accounts were so laid, or where the annual general meeting of a company for any year has not been held, 
there shall be filed with the Registrar within thirty days from the last day on which that meeting should 
have been held in accordance with the provisions of this Act three copies of the balance-sheet, and of the 
profit and loss account or the income and expenditure account, as the case may be signed by the managing 
director, managing agent, a manger or secretary of the company or if there be none of these, by a director 
of the company, together with three copies of all documents which are required by this Act to be annexed 
or attached to such balance-sheet or profit and loss account or income and expenditure account:  Provided 
that in the case of a private company, which is not an subsidiary of a public company, no person other 
than a member of the company shall be entitled to inspect or to obtain copies of the profit and loss account 
of that company.  
(2) If the annual general meeting of a company before which a balance sheet is laid as aforesaid does not 
adopt the balance-sheet or, if the annual general meeting of a company for any year has not been half, a 
statement of that fact and of the reasons there for shall be annexed to the balance-sheet and to the copies 
thereof required to be file with the Registrar.  
(3) If a company makes default in complying with the requirements of this section, it shall be liable to a 
fine not exceeding one hundred taka for every day during which the default continues, and every office 
of the company who knowingly and wilfully authorises or permits the default shall be liable to the like 
penalty.  
 
Statement to be published by Banking and certain other companies: 
Section 192. Certain companies to publish statement in schedule: 
(1) Every company being a limited Banking company or an insurance company for a deposit, provident or 
benefit society shall, before, it commences bushiness, and also on the first Monday in February and the 
First Monday in August in every year during which it carries on business make a statement herein after 
referred to as the said statement in the form as in Schedule XII, or as near thereto as circumstances will 
admit. 
(2) If a company makes default in complying with the requirements of this section, it shall be liable to a 
fine not exceeding one hundred taka for everyday during which the default continues; and, also every 
officer of the company who knowingly and wilfully authorises or permits the default shall be liable to the 
like penalty. 
 
Section 332. Penalty for falsification of book.--In any director, manager, officer or contributory of any 
company being wound up destroys, mutilates, alters of falsifies or fraudulently secrets any books papers 
or securities or makes or is privy to the making of any false or fraudulent entry in any register book of 
account or document belonging to the company with intent to defraud or deceive any person, he shall be 
liable to imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
 
Section 334. Penalty for false evidence.-- If any person, upon any examination  authorised under this 
Act, or in any affidavit, depositing or solemn affirmation, in or about the winding up of any company 
under this Act, or otherwise in or about any matter arising under this Act intentionally give false evidence, 
he shall be liable to imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable 
to find. 
 
Section 397. Penalty for false statement. -- Whoever in any return, report, certificate balance-sheet or 
other documents, required by or for the purposes of any of the provisions of this Act, wilfully makes a 
statement false in any material particular, knowing it to be false, shall be punishable with imprisonment 
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Appendix 6-3: The SEC Act 1993 regarding penalties in Bangladesh 
 
 
Section 19. Cognizance.- 
(1) No Court other than a Session Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act. 
 
(2)  No offence under this Act shall be taken cognizance of except on a complaint in writing made 
by the Commission or any person authorised by the Commission.  
 
Section 20. Offences by companies.- If the person contravening any of the provisions of this Act is a 
company, the owner, director, manager, secretary or any other officer or agent of the company shall be 
deemed guilty of the contravention of the provision, unless he proves that the contravention was 
committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the contravention.  
 
Section 21. Appeal.- 
(1) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by any member or officer in accordance with this Act, 
the rules or regulations may, within such period as may be specified by regulation, prefer an 
appeal to the Commission against such order and the decision of the Commission there upon 
shall be final.  
 
(2)  No appeal filed after the expiration of the specified period shall be acceptable, but if the 
appellant satisfies the Commission to the effect that there existed reasonable grounds for the 
appeal not to have been filed within the specified period, the Commission may accept an 
appeal filed after the expiration of the specified period.  
 
(3) An appeal under this section shall be made in such form, and shall be accompanied by such fee, 
as may be specified by regulation and shall be filed together with a copy of the order against 
which it has been filed.  
 
(4) Every appeal shall be decided on in such manner as may be specified by regulation; and no 
appeal shall be decided on without giving reasonable opportunity for hearing to the appellant. 
 
(5)  The Commission may, at its own instigation or in the light of any application, reconsider any 
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Appendix 6-4: Comparison of perceptions of interviewees based on Q1 to Q4 [1
st














Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
 





Yes  (PD) 
Yes (Need co-
operation) 
26 years PhD 
 
PM2 - (Enforcement) 
ICAB, SEC 





10 years ACA 
 
PM3 - (Need 
regulation) 
ICAB, 





30 years FCMA 
 








11 years MBA 
 







14 years  FCA 
 
PM6 - (Need 
regulation) 
ICAB, SEC 





40 years PhD 
 
 
PM7 + (Satisfactory) ICAB 
 
Yes (PD) & 
No (PG)  
Yes (Need co-
operation) 






& BB  




32 years ACA 
 
AP2 + (Satisfactory) ICAB 
 




24 years ICMA 
(Part) 
 







9 years ACA  
 






10 years ACA 
 
AP5 - (Need 
regulation) 






10 years M.Com. 
 
AP6 - (Standard 
setting) 



















15 years M.Com 
 
















20 years FCA 
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Code 









Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
 
AP10 - (Standard 






11 years ACMA 
 






7 years ACA 
 


















10 years MBA 
 







































10 years CMA 
(Part) 
 




































21 years PhD 
 















10 years MBA 
 
Notes: Code (Interviewee): PM: Policy makers; AP: Preparers & Professionals; US: Users; & AR: 
Academics & Researchers; Work Experience & Qualifications of the interviewees  
 
Q1: ‘–’ means a negative (non-satisfactory) perception of accounting regulation (e.g. need for 
high quality investor protection regulations, standard setting and enforcement); ‘ +’ means a 
positive (satisfactory) perception of accounting regulation; 
Q2: ICAB: The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh; SEC: The Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Bangladesh; ICMAB: The Institute of Cost and Management 
Accountants of Bangladesh; DSE: the Dhaka Stock Exchange; BB: the Bangladesh Bank; 
MOC: the Ministry of Commerce; & MOF: the Ministry of Finance; 
Q3: Yes (PD): political pressure from donor agencies; Yes (PG): political lobbying and the 
government intervention; No (PG): No politics (i.e. no political pressure) by the 
government; IP (PG): Indirect politics by the government; and No comment: no comment 
on politics;  
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Appendix 6-5: Comparison of perceptions of interviewees based on Q1 to Q4 [2
nd








cations Q1(a) Q1(b) Q2 Q3 Q4 
PM1 - Need 





Yes (PG) Yes (Need 
co-operation) 
26 years PhD 
PM2 - Need 





Yes (PG) Yes (Need 
co-operation) 
10 years ACA 
PM4 + Need 





Yes (PG) Yes (Need 
co-operation) 
11 years MBA 
PM5 - Need 





Yes (PG) Yes (Need 
co-operation) 
14 years  FCA 






Yes (PG) Yes (Need 
co-operation) 
10 years M.Com. 










8 years 2 
months 
MBA 










11 years ACMA 










15 years FCMA, 
FCA 






Yes (PG) Yes (Need 
co-operation) 
10 years CMA 
(Part) 






Yes (PG) Yes (Need 
co-operation) 
















21 years PhD 








10 years MBA 
 
Notes: Code (Interviewee): PM: Policy makers; AP: Preparers & Professionals; US: Users; & AR: 
Academics & Researchers; Work Experience & Qualifications of the interviewees.  
 
Q1(a): ‘- Need regulation’: non-satisfactory perception of accounting regulation and therefore need 
for high quality investor protection regulations; ‘+ Need regulation’: satisfactory perception 
of accounting regulation and therefore no need to introduce more regulations;   
Q1(b):  ‘- Standard setting’:  non-satisfactory perception of the standard setting process; ‘+ 
Standard setting’: satisfactory perception of the standard setting process; 
Q2: ‘- (Enforcement)’: non-satisfactory perception of enforcement; ‘+ (Enforcement)’:  
satisfactory perception of enforcement; 
Q3: Yes (PG): political lobbying and the government intervention; No comment: no comment on 
politics; 
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Appendix 7-1: Enforcement Actions Comparison, by Year (1998-2010) 
 
 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 
Total enforcement actions 239 172 176 281 326 135 62 57 29 24 10 77 59 
Violation type 
Price Sensitive Information (PSI) related violations 29 8 16 42 11 4 1 1 0 2 4 0 0 
Non  co-operation with SEC appointed auditors  50 60 68 58 45 37 14 3 5 1 2 13 0 
Non/delayed submission of half yearly/interim financial statements 4 2 0 11 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Non/delayed submission of yearly audited financial statements 4 8 5 11 22 21 15 2 4 1 0 0 0 
Non submission of capital & shareholding position  0 1 0 7 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Non holding/delay of AGM 36 12 19 22 27 12 2 1 0 5 0 10 7 
Non submission of audio visual recording of AGM 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Trading related violations by securities companies 1 0 0 12 17 5 6 1 1 3 0 8 27 
Violation related to corporate governance guidelines 24 0 12 0 12 1 5 41 10 5 0 2 2 
Non/delayed payment of dividend to the shareholder 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Non Compliance of SEC's Rules/Laws/ notifications/Ordinance 15 15 8 23 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Violation relating to auditors qualification 3 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Non compliance with IFRSs 9 14 7 11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Retention of auditors for more than 3 consecutive years 1 0 6 0 15 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Non/delayed payment of Beneficiary Owners' (BO)  A/C Maintenance Fee 
0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Violation of depository (CDBL ) regulations by its members 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cancellation of irrevocable declaration for buy/sell of shares 0 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 
IPO related violations 0 0 0 16 11 2 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 
Non-payment of interest & principal against debenture 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Falsification/Misrepresentation/Failure to present ‘True & Fair View’ 
0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Failure to audit by SEC recommended partnership firms 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 
Failure to provide explanation of SEC enquiry 14 20 13 20 17 3 3 2 1 2   44 23 
Non-payment of auditors remuneration   20 8 11 15 14 4 1 1 0 2 3 0 0 
Others 18 11 10 25 23 21 15 1 4 3 0 0 0 
By report type 
Annual report 53 60 68 58 45 49 24 3 5 1 2 13 0 
Interim report 22 8 16 42 11 4 1 1 0 2 4 0 0 
Type of Enforcement Action(s) 
Warning 135 71 106 110 194 75 42 47 4 13 3 63 50 
Waiver/Exemption from imposed penalty 11 11 9 22 13 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Upholding the imposed penalty/Rejection of appeal 24 7 3 0 10 0 1 1 7 0 0 0 0 
Penalty/Fine 62 63 53 128 88 56 14 3 17 6 7 14 9 
Payment of penalty by instalments 0 1 0 12 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Disposal of alleged matter 7 3 1 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Registration/License cancellation/suspension of trading facilities 0 2 2 0 1 1 2 2 1 5 0 0 0 
Others 0 14 2 4 10 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendices                                                                                       308 
 
Appendix 7-3: Functions of the various court(s) in Bangladesh 
 
 
(a) The Supreme Court of Bangladesh: After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, Bangladesh 
adopts its constitution in 1972. The constitution states that the Supreme Court is the highest court 
of Bangladesh. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh is divided into two divisions namely the 
Appellate Division and High Court Division (Article 94(1) & 94(2), Constitution of Bangladesh, 
1972. The Constitution of Bangladesh 1972 effects from the 16
th
 December, 1972. According to 
Panday & Mollah (2011), there have been 13 amendments to date and the latest amendment is 
made in 1996.  
 
(1) High Court Division: Panday & Mollah (2011, p. 16) state that “The High Court Division has 
original, appellate and other jurisdictions and powers as are conferred on it by the constitution or 
any other law” (Article 101, 103(1), 106). It has also a special original jurisdiction. According to 
Article 102, this jurisdiction is authorised to enforce fundamental rights of the citizens and issue 
orders (e.g. writs of prohibition). Further, there are two sources of power in High Court Division: 
(a) Ordinary or general jurisdiction in which the main sources of ordinary law jurisdiction are the 
Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure; and (b) Constitutional jurisdiction in which the ordinary 
jurisdictions are original jurisdiction, appellate jurisdiction, revisional jurisdiction & reference 
jurisdiction (Halim, 2008). 
 
(2) Appellate Division: The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction. The 
source of jurisdiction of the Appellate Division is similar to the in High Court Division. There are 
two sources (1) the constitution & (2) ordinary law (Akkas, 2004). According to Article 103, the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Appellate Division applies only against the judgment, decree, order or 
sentence of the High Court Division.  
 
(b) Civil Court: There are two types of subordinate courts in Bangladesh- Civil and Criminal. The 
civil court system is created under the Civil Courts Act 1887. The act provides for five tiers of 
civil courts in a district which are: 
 
(1) Court of the District Judge: This is the principal court at the district level. It is also named as 
appellate court with very limited original jurisdiction. It deals the cases relating to probate and 
letters of administration. In the appellate jurisdiction, a District Judge hears and determines 
appeals against all judgments or orders of Senior Assistant Judges and Joint District Judges (Sec. 8 
& 11, Civil Court Act 1887). 
 
(2) Court of Additional District Judge: This court’s jurisdiction is similar to the District Judges’ 
except that ‘they cannot receive appeals from any inferior courts (Panday & Mollah, 2011, p. 21). 
The Additional District Judge exercises the same power as the District Judge. 
 
(3) Court of Joint District Judge: This Court exercises both original and appellate jurisdiction. This 
court has jurisdiction to try those cases if the value exceeds Tk. 400,000 (£4,000). According to 
Sec. 21(4), Civil Court Act 1887, the Joint District Judge can hear and determine appeals against 
judgments or orders of Senior Assistant Judges.  
 
(4) Court of Senior Assistant Judge: This court has original jurisdiction of a claim the value of which 
does not exceed Tk. 400,000 (£4,000). According to Sec. 23, Civil Court Act 1887, the District 
Judge may withdraw any proceeding from a court below and may either dispose or transfer them 
to the Assistant Judge’s Court (Mollah, 2008; Laskar, 2007).  
 
(5) Court of Assistant Judge: The Court of Assistant Judge is the base of hierarchy of subordinate 
civil judiciary (Panday & Mollah, 2011). All civil servants are filed in the Court of Assistant Judge 
unless barred by the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court of Assistant Judge is limited to Tk. 
200,000 (£2,000) (Akkas, 2004; Mollah, 2008). According to Sec. 23, Civil Court Act 1887, the 
appeal from this court lies to the Court of District Judge.  
 
(c) Criminal Court: The legal basis of the criminal court is the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. 
The subordinate courts of criminal jurisdiction are mainly classified as Court of Sessions and 
Court of Magistrates. 
 
(1) Court of Sessions: There are three tiers of judges in the court of Sessions: Sessions Judge, 
Additional Sessions Judge and Joint Sessions Judge (Sec. 4(2)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure 
1898). Court of Session Judges deals with severe criminal offences (Sec. 9 & 10). Session Judge 
and Additional Session Judge hold same powers (e.g. may impose any penalty including death 
penalty), while Joint Session Judge enjoys less power (e.g. may pass any sentence except death 
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penalty) (Sec. 9(3)). The Court of Sessions for a metropolitan area is known as the Metropolitan 
Court of Session. 
 
(2) Court of Magistrates: There are four types of Magistrates: Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or Chief 
Judicial Magistrate, First Class Magistrate, Second Class Magistrate and Third Class Magistrate. 
Such classification of magistrates is made on the basis of powers and functions. The Additional 
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate are not separate courts and 
part of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (Sec. 6(3)) and Chief Judicial Magistrate and exercise 
the same power of sentence as that of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and Chief Judicial 
Magistrate (Sec. 17(1)). The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and First Class Magistrate are in 
metropolitan areas and Chief Judicial Magistrate in other areas (Sec. 12(1)). The First Class 
Magistrate impose sentences of imprisonment not exceeding five years or fine not exceeding Tk. 
10,000 (£100); The Second Class Magistrate impose imprisonment not exceeding three years or 
fine not exceeding Tk. 5,000 (£50); and The Third Class Magistrate impose imprisonment not 
exceeding two years or fine not exceeding Tk. 2,000 (£20) as enumerated in sec. 32(a), 32(b) & 
32(c) and Sub sec. 15 & 19. 
 
(d) General Certificate Court (GCC)/Other Courts: This court is for the SEC ordinance violations 
related cases. If the SEC identifies any violations then they issue show-cause cum-hearing. If the 
SEC is satisfied in the hearing no further actions against the companies, otherwise the SEC 
imposes penalty. To recover penalty/revenue (Public Demands Recovery Act 1913) the SEC 
stands with the decision of the officer of general certificate court. If the company goes against the 
GCC’s decisions of paying penalty, they can appeal to the district judge court. It is then distributed 
to different courts.  The other courts include Money Loan Courts, Bankruptcy Courts, Income Tax 
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Notes: Code (Interviewee): PM: Policy makers; AP: Preparers & Professionals; US: Users; & AR: 
Academics & Researchers. Work Experience and Qualifications of the interviewees: 
 
Q5: ‘+ (Professional syllabus)’: current professional syllabus is suitable for IFRSs implementation; & ‘ - 
(Professional syllabus)’: current professional syllabus is not suitable for IFRSs implementation;  
Q5(a): Yes (Need IFRSs in University syllabus): University syllabus should include IFRSs contents to 
implement IFRSs;  
Q6: PM: Provide training/no training; AP: Attend training/ no training; US & AR: Training is essential; 
Q7: Corruption (GB): Corruption by governmental body; Corruption (AF & PB): corruption by Audit 
firms & professional bodies; & Corruption (Companies):  Corruption by companies; Q8 & Q9:  CS: 
Culture of secrecy; LQA: Lack of qualified accountants; LIC: Lack of interest in IFRSs by managers of 
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[i] Training Opportunities in the 
Accounting Profession and [ii] 
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Q5 Q6 Q7 
PM1 - (Professional 





LQA, CS, CBS 26 years PhD 
PM2 - (Professional 





LQA, LIC, CBS 10 years ACA 
PM4 - (Professional 





CS, CBS 11 years MBA 
PM5 - (Professional 




LQA, LIC, CS, 
CBS 
14 years  FCA 
AP5 - (Professional 




LQA, LIC, CBS  10 years M.Com. 
AP6 - (Professional 




LQA,LIC, CBS 8 years 2 
months 
MBA 
AP10 - (Professional 




LQA, LIC, CS 11 years ACMA 
AP12 - (Professional 




LQA, LIC, CS, 
CBS 
15 years FCMA, 
FCA 
US4 - (Professional 




LQA, LIC,  10 years CMA 
(Part) 
US5 - (Professional 














LQA, LIC, CS  21 years PhD 
AR2 - (Professional 




LQA, LIC, CS  10 years MBA 
 
 
Notes: Code (Interviewee): PM: Policy makers; AP: Preparers & Professionals; US: Users; & AR: 
Academics & Researchers. Work Experience and Qualifications of the interviewees:  
Q5: ‘- (Professional syllabus & university syllabus)’: current professional syllabus & university syllabus 
should be updated to implement IFRSs;  
Q6: Corruption (GB): Corruption by governmental body;  
Q7: CS: Culture of secrecy; LQA: Lack of qualified accountants; LIC: Lack of interest in IFRSs by 
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Appendix 8-1: Violations of the SEC rules (Bengali version) 
 
1. Depreciation [Warning, 4,0000 -1,400,000] related violations [n=7] 
 
 




‡h‡nZz, Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987 Gi rule 12 Abyhvqx Bmÿ qvi Ryb 30, 2007 Bs Zvwi‡L mgvß erm‡ii Rb¨ 
cÖ¯‘ZK…Z Avw_©K weeiYx Bmÿ  K‡i‡Q hv †gmvm© Rwni Avn‡g` GÛ †Kvs, PvU©vW© GKvD›U¨v›Um& (wewae× wbix¶K), KZ©„K wbix¶xZ n‡q‡Q 
Ges D³ wbix¶v cÖwZôvb, wbix¶v msμvš— Kvh©vw` m¤úv`b c~e©K GZ`&mswk −ó wbix¶v cÖwZ‡e`b Bmÿ  K‡i‡Q; ‡h‡nZz, Av‡jvP¨ wbix¶v 
cÖwZ‡e`‡b, Ab¨v‡b¨i g‡a¨, Kwgkb KZ©„K cwijw¶Z nq †h, Bmÿ qvi Ryb 30, 2007 Bs Zvwi‡L mgvß erm‡ii Rb¨ ¯’vqx m¤ú` 
(fixed assets) Gi Dci AePq (depreciation) avh©¨ K‡iwb Ges Gi gva¨‡g Bmÿ qvi KZ…©K D³ Avw_©K erm‡i ¶wZi (loss) 
cwigvb Kg †`Lv‡bv n‡q‡Q; ‡h‡nZz, Dc‡iv³ wel‡qi djkÖ“wZ‡Z †`Lv hvq †h, Ryb 30, 2007 Bs Zvwi‡L mgvß erm‡ii Avw_©K 
weeiYx‡Z Bmÿ qv‡ii ev¯—e Ae¯’v mwVK I ¯^”Q (true and fair) fv‡e cÖwZdwjZ nqwb Z_v D³iƒc Kg©Kv‡Ûi gva¨‡g Bmÿ qvi Av‡jvP¨ 
Rules Gi mswk−ó weavb jsNb K‡i‡Q, hv Av‡jvP¨ Ordinance Gi section 18 Gi mȳ úó jsNb 
 




‡h‡nZz, D³ Avw_©K cÖwZ‡e`‡bi Dci wbix¶K Gi Dc‡iv³ AwfgZ QvovI Kwgk‡bi, Ab¨v‡b¨i g‡a¨, wb‡æv³ ch©‡e¶b i‡q‡Q: 
“a. It appears from Note no. 4.02: (a) Property, Assets and Depreciation that no appropriate method was 
followed in charging depreciation of other fixed assets, depreciation of all fixed assets was charged on a 
lump sum basis without following appropriate rate and depreciation was charged neither on written down 
value nor straight line method also appropriate rate was not followed in changing the annual depreciation 
rates. 
b. It also appears from Note no. 13: Custom Debenture of Tk. 10,137,888.00 that the balance of custom 
debenture has been brought forward from last year and provision for interest payable on custom debenture 
has not been made in the accounts. 
c. It further appears form Note no. 16: Temporary Loan of Tk. 21,887,681.00 that temporary loan amount 
is not supported with the board of directors’ approval and not supported with valid documentary 
evidences, as such the auditors could not ascertain the genuineness of obtaining temporary loan by the 
company. 
d. It further appears from Note no. 22: Others that Managing Director & Director received Tk. 230,000.00 
as remuneration although the tenure of the managing director is not approved by the board in line with the 
Memorandum and Articles of Association and Note no. 23: Other Observations and Comments that (a) 
the management produced a list of Fixed Assets and Inventory related papers/documents and inform that 
the company physically verified the fixed assets and closing stock although in absence of logistics 
support, the auditors could not conduct physical inventory, (b) during the course of audit, the auditors 
observed that the company did not maintain any fixed assets register, (c) during the course of audit, the 
auditors observed the company did not maintain Debtors and Creditors ledger properly and should 
maintain related party ledger properly and (d) during the course of audit, the auditors observed that there 
are some lapses and lacunas in maintaining the cash book and ledger book and should maintain those 
books properly with perfection.” ewY©Z Ae¯’vq cÖZxqgvY nq †h, Bmÿ qv‡ii wW‡m¤^i 31, 2008 mgvß erm‡ii wbixw¶Z 
Avw_©K weeibx‡Z Avw_©K Ae¯’vi mwVK I mZ¨ Z_¨ cªwZdwjZ nqwb, hv Kwgk‡bi wbKU fyj Z_¨ cÖ`vb Kiv n‡q‡Q e‡j MY¨ n‡q‡Q | 
‡h‡nZz, Dc‡iv³ welqmg~‡ni Dci e¨vL¨v cÖ`v‡bi Rb¨ Kwgkb KZ©„K cÖ`Ë cÎ bs SEC/CFD/8:1/99/502 ZvwiL Ryb 16, 2009 
Bs Gi Rev‡e Bmÿ qvi KZ©„K cÖ`Ë cÎ bs bvB ZvwiL Ryb 29, 2009 Bs Gi gva¨‡g †h e¨vL¨v cÖ`vb Kiv nq Zv Kwgk‡bi wbKU 
MÖnb‡hvM¨ e‡j we‡ewPZ nqwb; ‡h‡nZz, Dc‡iv³ welqmg~‡ni djkÖ“wZ‡Z †`Lv hvq †h, Bm¨yqvi wW‡m¤^i 31, 2008 Bs Zvwi‡L mgvß 
erm‡ii Avw_©K weeiYx IAS Abyhvqx cÖ¯‘Z Ki‡Z e¨_© n‡q‡Q weavq D³ Avw_©K weeiYx‡Z Bm ÿqv‡ii ev¯—e Ae¯’v mwVK I ¯^”Q (true 
and fair) fv‡e cÖwZdwjZ nqwb Z_v D³iƒc Kg©Kv‡Ûi gva¨‡g Bm ÿqvi Av‡jvP¨ Rules Gi mswk−ó weavb jsNb K‡i‡Q, hv Av‡jvP¨ 
Ordinance Gi section 18 Gi my¯úó jsNb 
 
 




‡h‡nZz, Av‡jvP¨ wbix¶v cÖwZ‡e`‡b, Ab¨v‡b¨i g‡a¨, Kwgk‡bi observations wb‡æviƒc: 
“On examination of audited financial statements of the issuer for the year ended on June 30, 2009 the 
Commission observed, among others, the following on the said financial statements: 
i) In the Balance Sheet of the said financial statements, NAV has been shown Tk.118.60 per share. But as 
per our observation the NAV is Tk.75.34 per share, which arises as under: 
Share Capital Tk.             132,000,000 
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Tax Holiday Reserve         34,057,703 
Retained Earnings             (9,505,965) 
                                        156,551,738 
Less: Deferred Expenses (57,103,194) 
Total NAV                        99,448,544 
Total No. of shares              1,320,000 
NAV per share                     Tk.75.34 
ii) In the Balance Sheet, Deferred Expenses have shown Tk.45,886,219 and Tk.57,103,194 for the years 
ended on June 30, 2008 and 2009 respectively, but there is no explanation/notes regarding the creation 
and increase of said expenses for the year ended on June 30, 2008 and 2009 respectively. 
iii) The Statement of Changes in Equity for the year ended on June 30, 2009 has not been prepared on the 
basis of the Statement of Changes in Equity for the year ended on June 30, 2008; because the balance of 
negative Retained Earnings for the year ended on June 30, 2008 has not been considered in preparing the 
Statement of Changes in Equity for the year ended on June 30, 2009. As a result the balance shown in the 
Statement of Changes in Equity for the year ended on June 30, 2009 and the figure reported as 
shareholders equity in the Balance Sheet has been overstated. 
iv) It has been mentioned in the note No.2.3 of the said financial statements that no depreciation has been 
charged during the year due to suspended of its production activities since 2006. But as per the 
requirement of Bangladesh Accounting Standards the issuer should have to charge the required 
depreciation.” ewY©Z Ae¯’vq cÖZxqgvY nq †h, Bmÿ qv‡ii Ryb 30, 2009 mgvß erm‡ii wbixw¶Z Avw_©K weeibx‡Z Avw_©K Ae¯’vi 
mwVK I mZ¨ Z_¨ cªwZdwjZ nqwb, hv Kwgk‡bi wbKU fyj Z_¨ cÖ`vb Kiv n‡q‡Q e‡j MY¨ n‡q‡Q | ‡h‡nZz, Dc‡iv³ welqmg~‡ni 
Dci e¨vL¨v cÖ`v‡bi Rb¨ Kwgkb KZ©„K cÖ`Ë cÎ bs SEC/CFD/3:19/99/571 ZvwiL b‡f¤^i 04, 2009 Bs Gi Rev‡e Bmÿ qvi 
KZ©„K cÖ`Ë cÎ bs bvB ZvwiL b‡f¤^i 12, 2009 Bs Bs Gi gva¨‡g †h e¨vL¨v cÖ`vb Kiv nq Zv Kwgk‡bi wbKU MÖnb‡hvM¨ e‡j 
we‡ewPZ nqwb; ‡h‡nZz, Dc‡iv³ welqmg~‡ni djkÖ“wZ‡Z †`Lv hvq †h, Bm¨yqvi Ryb 30, 2009 Bs Zvwi‡L mgvß erm‡ii Avw_©K 
weeiYx IAS Abyhvqx cÖ¯‘Z Ki‡Z e¨_© n‡q‡Q weavq D³ Avw_©K weeiYx‡Z Bm¨yqv‡ii ev¯—e Ae¯’v mwVK I ¯^”Q (true and fair)  
fv‡e cÖwZdwjZ nqwb Z_v D³iƒc Kg©Kv‡Ûi gva¨‡g Bm¨yqvi Av‡jvP¨ Rules Gi mswk−ó weavb jsNb K‡i‡Q, hv Av‡jvP¨ Ordinance 
Gi section 18 Gi my¯úó jsNb 
 





‡h‡nZz, Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987 Gi rule 12 Abyhvqx Bm¨yqvi Ryb 30, 2007 Bs Zvwi‡L mgvß erm‡ii Rb¨ 
cÖ¯‘ZK…Z Avw_©K weeiYx Bm¨y K‡i‡Q hv †gmvm© Rwni Avn‡g` nK GÛ †Kvs, PvU©vW© GKvD›U¨v›Um& (wewae× wbix¶K) KZ©„K wbix¶xZ 
n‡q‡Q Ges D³ wbix¶v cÖwZôvb, wbix¶v msμvš— Kvh©vw` m¤úv`b c~e©K GZ`&mswk −ó wbix¶v cÖwZ‡e`b Bmÿ  K‡i‡Q;  ‡h‡nZz, D³ 
wbixw¶Z Avw_©K weeiYxi †bvU bs 03 I 07 n‡Z cwijw¶Z nq †h, Bmÿ qvi 1994-95 A_© ermi n‡Z 29,66,29,689.00 (EbwÎk 
†KvwU wQlwÆ j¶ EbwÎk nvRvi QqkZ DbbeŸB) UvKvi cybg©~j¨vwqZ ¯’vqx m¤úwË (revalued amount of fixed assets) Dci 
†Kvbiƒc AePq avh© K‡iwb Ges G e¨vcv‡i Bmÿ qvi †Kvb MÖnb‡hvM¨ e¨vL¨v Kwgk‡bi wb‡`©k †gvZv‡eK cÖ`vb Ki‡Z cv‡iwb;  ‡h‡nZz, 
Dc‡iv³ wel‡qi djkÖ“wZ‡Z †`Lv hvq †h, Bm ÿqvi, Ryb 30, 2007 Bs Zvwi‡L mgvß erm‡ii Avw_©K weeiYx IAS Abyhvqx cÖ¯‘Z 
Ki‡Z e¨_© nIqvq D³ Avw_©K weeiYx‡Z Bm¨yqv‡ii ev¯—e Ae¯’v mwVK I ¯^”Q (true and fair) fv‡e cÖwZdwjZ nqwb Z_v D³iƒc 
Kg©Kv‡Ûi gva¨‡g Bm¨yqvi Av‡jvP¨ Rules Gi mswk−ó weavb jsNb K‡i‡Q, hv Av‡jvP¨ Ordinance Gi section 18 Gi my¯úó jsNb 
 




‡h‡nZz, Av‡jvP¨ wbix¶K GZ`&mswk−ó wbix¶v cÖwZ‡e`‡b, Ab¨v‡b¨i g‡a¨, wb‡æv³ AwfgZ e¨³   K‡i‡Q: “Financial Expenses: 
During the year, the company settled the case with BSB through mutual agreement and the company has 
to pay Tk. 143,000,000 over a period of 7 years inplace of Tk. 95,700,000 and accordingly excess amount 
of Tk. 47,300,000 has been booked in the respective fixed assets. The company and the National Bank 
have gone into litigation to mitigate their respective grievances. The company filed a money suit against 
NBL for the realisation of Tk. 315 crore (Approx.) as compensation.” ‡h‡nZz, AwWU‡ii Dc‡iv³ AwfgZ QvovI 
D³ Avw_©K weeiYx‡Z Kwgkb KZ©„K wbæwjwLZ AmsMwZ cwijw¶Z nq: 
“Reference Note No.-2: Recognition of property, plant & Equipment and Depreciation: Cost of property, 
plant & Equipment represents cost of acquisition or construction and include purchase price and other 
directly attributable cost of bringing the assets to working conditions for its intended use, but do not 
include any capitalised borrowing cost.” ‡h‡nZz, Dc‡iv³ AwfgZmg~‡ni djkÖ“wZ‡Z †`Lv hvq †h, Bm¨yqvi ‡m‡Þ¤^i 30, 
2006 Bs Zvwi‡L mgvß erm‡ii Avw_©K weeiYx IAS Abyhvqx cÖ¯‘Z Ki‡Z e¨_© n‡q‡Q weavq D³ Avw_©K weeiYx‡Z Bm¨yqv‡ii ev¯—e 
Ae¯’v mwVK I ¯^”Q (true and fair) fv‡e cÖwZdwjZ nqwb Z_v D³iƒc Kg©Kv‡Ûi gva¨‡g Bm¨yqvi Av‡jvP¨ Rules Gi mswk−ó weavb 
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‡h‡nZz, Av‡jvP¨ wbix¶K wbix¶v msμvš  Kvh©vw` m¤úv`b c~e©K GZ`&mswk−ó wbix¶v cÖwZ‡e`b Ryb 15, 2006 Bs Zvwi‡L Bm ÿ K‡i‡Q 
hvnv‡Z , Ab¨v‡b¨i g‡a¨, wb‡æv³ AwfgZ e¨³ Kivi d‡j †`Lv hvq †h, Bm¨yqvi wW‡m¤^i 31, 2005 Bs Zvwi‡L mgvß erm‡ii Avw_©K 
weeiYx IAS Abyhvqx cÖ¯‘Z Ki‡Z e¨_© n‡q‡Q weavq D³ Avw_©K weeiYx‡Z Bm¨yqv‡ii ev¯—e Ae¯’v cÖwZdwjZ nqwb Z_v D³iƒc 
Kg©Kv‡Ûi gva¨‡g Bm¨yqvi Av‡jvP¨ Rules Gi mswk−ó weavb jsNb K‡i‡Q Z_v D³iƒc Kg©KvÛ Av‡jvP¨ Ordinance Gi section 
18 jsN‡biI mvwgj:- 
“1. Three fourth of Bank Interest amounting to Tk. 1,98,55,492.00 has been deferred and shown as 
“Intangible Assets” and one fourth of interest amounting to Tk. 66,18,497.00 has been charged to Profit 
& Loss Account as per decision of Board in its 143rd meeting held on 5th June 2004. This decision does 
not conform to accounting principles and as per Bangladesh Accounting Standard (BAS 23); 
2. Depreciation on factory assets, such as, Factory Building, Plant & Machinery and other factory assets 
have not been charged for the year under audit; 
3. Lease rental for IDLC machines for Tk. 432,420.00 only has been recognised as expenses whereas 
lease agreement discloses yearly installments with rental amount of Tk. 20, 29,690.00 which was not 
accounted as per BAS-17 Leases; 
4. Year wise tax provision as well as assessment position could not be made available to us. As such 
actual tax liability could not be worked out” 
 




Whereas, as required by rule 12 of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987, the issuer submitted the 
audited financial statements for the year ended on August 31, 2006 to the Commission and others 
concerned; Whereas, it appeared from the said audited financial statements that the auditors have made, 
among others, the following observations/qualified opinion on the financial statements: 
“1. The company did not provide depreciation for Tk. 53,295,203 including for the period of Tk. 
6,178,001 in respect of unit-4 which was in operation throughout the year. Depreciation remains 
unprovided in respect of other units although there was partial operation in unit-1 during the year under 
review (Note-9.01). 
2. The company did not compute deferred taxation. 
3. Depreciation on value increased by revaluation was not charged.” 
 
Whereas, as regard to Unit 1 & 2, the issuer company mentioned that depreciation remained unprovided 
because capacity utilisation of the said Units was only 1.09% and as there was no operation of those Units 
for the half year ended February 28, 2007, depreciation for the said half year was also not provided by the 
company;  
 
Whereas, as a result of the above, the audited financial statements of the issuer for the years ended on 
August 31, 2006 do not portray true and fair view of the financial position which tantamount to furnishing 
of incorrect information to SEC; and Whereas, furnishing of incorrect audited financial statements for the 
year ended on August 31, 2006 is a clear contravention of section 18 of the Securities and Exchange 
Ordinance, 1969, read with sub-rule (2) of rule 12 of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987, which 
appeared to be deliberate attracting appropriate provisions of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 
1969. 
 
2. Qualified Audit Opinion and True & Fair View [600,000-3,500,000] [n=2] 
 




‡h‡nZz, Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987 Gi rule 12 Abyhvqx Bmÿ qvi Ryb 30, 2007 Zvwi‡L mgvß erm‡ii Rb¨ 
cÖ¯‘ZK…Z Avw_©K weeiYx Bmÿ  K‡i‡Q hv †gmvm© G. Inve GÛ †Kvs, PvU©vW© GKvD›U¨v›Um& (wewae× wbix¶K) KZ©„K wbix¶xZ n‡q‡Q Ges 
D³ wbix¶v cÖwZôvb, wbix¶v msμvš8. Kvh©vw` m¤úv`b c~e©K GZ`&mswk−ó wbix¶v cÖwZ‡e`b Bmÿ  K‡i‡Q; ‡h‡nZz, Av‡jvP¨ wbix¶K 
GZ`&mswk−ó wbix¶v cÖwZ‡e`‡b, Ab¨v‡b¨i g‡a¨, KwZcq AwfgZmg~n (qualified opinion) e¨³ K‡i‡Q hvi djkÖ“wZ‡Z †`Lv hvq 
†h, Ryb 30, 2007 Zvwi‡L mgvß erm‡ii Avw_©K weeiYx‡Z Bmÿ qv‡ii ev¯—e Ae¯’v mwVK I ¯^”Q (true and fair) fv‡e cÖwZdwjZ  
nqwb Z_v D³iƒc Kg©Kv‡Ûi gva¨‡g Bmÿ qvi Av‡jvP¨ Rules Gi mswk−ó weavb jsNb K‡i‡Q, hv Av‡jvP¨ Ordinance Gi section 
18 Gi my¯úó jsNb; 
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‡h‡nZz, rule 12 of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987, Abyhvqx Bm ÿqvi Ryb 30, 2003 Bs Zvwi‡L mgvß erm‡ii 
Rb¨ cÖ¯‘ZK…Z Avw_©K weeiYx Bm¨y K‡i‡Q hv ‡gmvm© Gg. G. gv‡jK wmwÏKx Iqvwj GÛ †Kvs, PvU©vW© GKvD›U¨v›Um& (wewae× wbix¶K) 
KZ©„K wbix¶xZ n‡q‡Q; ‡h‡nZz, Av‡jvP¨ wbix¶K wbix¶v msμvš8212 . Kvh©vw` m¤úv`b c~e©K GZ`&mswk−ó wbix¶v cÖwZ‡e`‡b KwZcq 
kZ©vaxb AwfgZ (qualified opinoin) e¨³ K‡i‡Q hvi djkÖ“wZ‡Z †`Lv hvq †h, Bm¨yqvi Ryb 30, 2003 Bs Zvwi‡L mgvß erm‡ii 
Avw_©K weeiYx IAS Abyhvqx cÖ¯‘Z Ki‡Z e¨_© n‡q‡Q weavq D³ Avw_©K weeiYx‡Z Bm ÿqv‡ii ev¯—e Ae¯’v true and fair wnmv‡e 
cÖwZdwjZ nqwb Z_v D³iƒc Kg©Kv‡Ûi gva¨‡g Bm ÿqvi Av‡jvP¨ Rules Gi mswk−ó weavb jsNb K‡i‡Q, hv Av‡jvP¨ Ordinance Gi 
section 18 Gi my¯úó jsNb; 
 
 
3. Disclosures as prescribed by the ICAB [500,000-10,00,000] [n=2] 
 




‡h‡nZz, Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987 Gi rule 12 Abyhvqx Bmÿ qvi Ryb 30, 2007 Zvwi‡L mgvß erm‡ii Rb¨ 
cÖ¯‘ZK…Z Avw_©K weeiYx Bmÿ  K‡i‡Q hv †gmvm© Gg. Avn‡g` GÛ †Kvs, PvU©vW© GKvD›U¨v›Um& (wewae× wbix¶K) KZ©„K wbix¶xZ n‡q‡Q 
Ges D³ wbix¶v cÖwZôvb, wbix¶v msμvš8212 . Kvh©vw` m¤úv`b c~e©K GZ`&mswk−ó wbix¶v cÖwZ‡e`b Bmy¨ K‡i‡Q; ‡h‡nZz, Av‡jvP¨ 
wbix¶v cÖwZ‡e`‡b, Ab¨v‡b¨i g‡a¨, KwZcq ‡bvUm (Notes) Gi cÖwZ Kwgk‡bi `„wó AvKwl©Z n‡q‡Q, hvi djkÖ“wZ‡Z †`Lv hvq †h, Ryb 
30, 2007 Zvwi‡L mgvß erm‡ii Avw_©K weeiYx‡Z Bmÿ qv‡ii ev¯—e Ae¯’v mwVK I ¯^”Q (true and fair) fv‡e cÖwZdwjZ nqwb Z_v 
D³iƒc Kg©Kv‡Ûi gva¨‡g Bmÿ qvi Av‡jvP¨ Rules Gi mswk−ó weavb jsNb K‡i‡Q, hv Av‡jvP¨ Ordinance Gi section 18 Gi 
mȳ úó jsNb; 
 
 
(b) Company Name: I Ltd. 
 
Violations: 
‡h‡nZz, Av‡jvP¨ wbix¶K GZ`&mswk−ó wbix¶v cÖwZ‡e`‡b, Ab¨v‡b¨i g‡a¨, wb‡æv³ AwfgZmg~n e¨³ K‡i‡Q: “Management of the 
company has filed a case against Mr. X, Ex. Chairman of the said company at Kishorganj Sadar Thana 
(Case#1116 dated 14.12. 2004) and he was expelled from the Directorship & Chairmanship of the company 
in the Board Meeting Dated 4th November 2004 for harmful activities at Kishorganj project site and the 
progress of the case was not known. We observe that management has no control on Kishorganj project site, 
production, stock and sales. The management estimated that stock of Tk. 8,345,000.00 (Note 9) was taken by 
Mr. X, Ex-Chairman of the company (who was in charge of the project). The management failed to produce 
details of the said stock as well as documentary evidence. Balance confirmation by Mr. X has not been 
received by us. In our opinion, the financial statements do not give a true and fair view of the state of affairs 
of the company as of 30th June, 2006 and of the result of the operations and its cash flows for the year then 
ended.” ‡h‡nZz, Dc‡iv³ AwfgZmg~‡ni djkÖ“wZ‡Z †`Lv hvq †h, Bm ÿqvi Ryb, 2006 Bs Zvwi‡L mgvß erm‡ii Avw_©K weeiYx IAS 
Abyhvqx cÖ¯‘Z Ki‡Z e¨_© n‡q‡Q weavq D³ Avw_©K weeiYx‡Z Bmÿ qv‡ii ev¯—e Ae¯’v mwVK I ¯^”Q (true and fair) fv‡e cÖwZdwjZ nqwb 
Z_v D³iƒc Kg©Kv‡Ûi gva¨‡g Bmy¨qvi Av‡jvP¨ Rules Gi mswk−ó weavb jsNb K‡i‡Q, hv Av‡jvP¨ Ordinance Gi section 18 Gi 
mȳ úó jsNb; 
 
 
4. Half yearly Audited Report [700,000-800,000] [n=2] 
 




‡h‡nZz, D³ Aa©-evwl©K Avw_©K weeiYx n‡Z cÖZxqgvb nq †h, Bm¨yqvi Para 20(a) of Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BAS-
34) Abyhvqx Zzjbvg~jK DØZ©cÎ (Balance Sheet); Para (b) of Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BAS-34) Abyhvqx 
Zzjbvg~jK Avq weeiYx (Income Statement); Para (d) of Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BAS-34) Abyhvqx 
Zzjbvg~jK bM` cÖevn weeiYx (Cash Flow Statement) Ges Para (c) of Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BAS-34) 
Abyhvqx BKzBwU cwieZ©b (Changes in Equity) msμvš8212 . weeiYx Dc¯’c‡b e¨_© n‡q‡Q; ‡h‡nZz, Av‡vP¨ bM` cÖevn weeiYx (Cash 
Flow Statement) ‡Z 22,627,306.00 UvKv Fb cwi‡kva Lv‡Z †`Lv‡bv m‡Ë¡I Ryb 30, 2006 Ges wW‡m¤^i 31, 2006 G mgvß wnmve 
weeiYx‡Z ‘Loan Fund’ Ges ‘Cash Credit and Overdraft’ Lv‡Z mgcwigvb A_© †`Lv‡bv n‡q‡Q Ges D³ mgqKv‡j †Kv¤úvbx eÜ 












‡h‡nZz, rule 13 of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987, as amended, states, “Every issuer shall, within one 
month of close of the first half-year, transmit to the stock exchange in which its securities are listed, to the 
security holders and to the Commission half-yearly financial statements which shall be prepared in the same 
manner and form as the annual financial statements.”; ‡h‡nZz, rule 13A of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 
1987, as amended, states, “Forms prescribed for the purpose of preparing the financial statements and the 
audit report may be adapted or amended, if deemed necessary, for compliance with the International 
Accounting 
Standards (IAS) and International Standards of Auditing (ISA).”; ‡h‡nZz, Av‡jvP¨ Bm¨yqvi cÎ m~Î bs 
GgwcAvBGj/†gtAt/786/07/079 ZvwiL Rvbyqvix 28, 2007 Bs Gi gva¨‡g wW‡m¤^I 31, 2006 Bs Zvwi‡L mgvß Aa©-evwl©K Avw_©K 
weeiYx Kwgk‡bi wbKU `vwLj K‡i; ‡h‡nZz, D³ Aa©-evwl©K Avw_©K weeiYx n‡Z cÖZxqgvb nq †h, Bm¨yqvi Para 20(a) of Bangladesh 
Accounting Standards (BAS-34) Abyhvqx Zzjbvg~jK DØZ©cÎ (Balance Sheet); Para (b) of Bangladesh Accounting 
Standards (BAS-34) Abyhvqx Zzjbvg~jK Avq weeiYx (Income Statement); Para (d) of Bangladesh Accounting 
Standards (BAS-34) Abyhvqx Zzjbvg~jK bM` cÖevn weeiYx (Cash Flow Statement) Ges Para(c) of Bangladesh 
Accounting Standards (BAS-34) Abyhvqx BKzBwU cwieZ©b (Changes in Equity) msμvš8212 . weeiYx Dc¯’c‡ e¨_© n‡‡; ‡‡Zz, 
Av‡vP¨ bM` cÖevn weeiYx (Cash Flow Statement) ‡Z 10,067,760.00 UvKv ‘Bank overdraft’ Lv‡Z †`Lv‡bv m‡Ë¡I Ryb 30, 
2006 Ges wW‡m¤^i 31, 2006 G mgvß wnmve weeiYx‡Z ‘Cash Credit and Overdraft’ Lv‡Z gvÎ 89,701.00 UvKv e„w× wnmv‡e 
†`Lv‡bv n‡q‡Q; ‡h‡nZz, wW‡m¤^i 31, 2006 G mgvß bM` cÖevn weeiYx (Cash Flow Statement) Abyhvqx closing cash and bank 
balance Lv‡Z 4,294,983.00 UvKv †`Lv‡bv n‡qwQj, wKš‘ Av‡jvP¨ †Kv¤úvbx D³ Lv‡Z gvÎ 13,835.00 UvKv †`wL‡q‡Q; †h‡nZz, 
Bm¨yqv‡ii Dc‡iv³ e¨_©Zvi Rb¨ Kwgkb cÎ m~Î bs SEC/CFD/2:41/2001/3028 ZvwiL †deª“qvix 15, 2007 Bs Gi gva¨‡g D³ Aa©-
evwl©K Avw_©K weeiYx cybwe©b¨¯ — (revised) K‡i Kwgk‡bi wbKU `vwLj Kivi Rb¨ Aby‡iva Kiv nq; ‡h‡nZz, Av‡jvP¨ Bm¨yqvi cÎ ZvwiL gvP© 
17, 2007 Bs Gi gva¨‡g wW‡m¤^i 31, 2006 Bs Zvwi‡L mgvß cybwe©b¨¯— (revised) Aa©-evwl©K Avw_©K weeiYx Kwgk‡bi wbKU `vwLj K‡i 
hv‡Z Bm¨yqv‡ii GKB ai‡bi e¨_©Zv cwijw¶Z nq hv B”QvK…Z e‡j cÖZxqgvb n‡q‡Q; 
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Appendix 8-2: Depreciation related violations by companies (n=7) 
 
Company  Violations (Detailed)
129
 Fine Paid or Not Paid 
(a) A Ltd. 
 
Whereas, as per section 2 (g) of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 (ORDINANCE No. XVII OF 1969) A Ltd. is an issuer 
(herein after referred to as issuer); 
Whereas, required by rule 12 of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987, the issuer has prepared ‘Financial Statements’ for the year ended 
June 30, 2007 which has been audited by M/S A & Co, Chartered Accountants (registered auditor). Whereas, it appeared from the said 
audited financial statements, it has been observed by the commission among others, that the issuer has not charged depreciation on fixed 
assets for the year ended June 30, 2007 and the issuer has shown lower loss in the ‘Financial Statements’ for the year. After observing the 
above mentioned facts, it is very clear that the Income Statement for the year ended June 30, 2007 does not reflect a ‘True and Fair View’ 
and hence, the issuer has clearly violated section 18 of the above said Ordinance. 
Case: A Ltd. vs. SEC, 
General Certificate Court  
GCC No. 289/2010  




(b) B Ltd. On examination of audited financial statements of the issuer for the year ended December 31, 2008, the Commission observed, among 
others, the following on the said financial statements: 
“a. It appears from Note no. 4.02: (a) Property, Assets and Depreciation that no appropriate method was followed in charging 
depreciation of other fixed assets, depreciation of all fixed assets was charged on a lump sum basis without following appropriate rate and 
depreciation was charged neither on written down value nor straight line method also appropriate rate was not followed in changing the 
annual depreciation rates. 
b. It also appears from Note no. 13: Custom Debenture of Tk. 10,137,888.00 that the balance of custom debenture has been brought forward 
from last year and provision for interest payable on custom debenture has not been made in the accounts. 
c. It further appears form Note no. 16: Temporary Loan of Tk. 21,887,681.00 that temporary loan amount is not supported with the board of 
directors’ approval and not supported with valid documentary evidences, as such the auditors could not ascertain the genuineness of 
obtaining temporary loan by the company. 
d. It further appears from Note no. 22: Others that Managing Director & Director received Tk. 230,000.00 as remuneration although the 
tenure of the managing director is not approved by the board in line with the Memorandum and Articles of Association and Note no. 23: 
Other Observations and Comments that (a) the management produced a list of Fixed Assets and Inventory related papers/documents and 
inform that the company physically verified the fixed assets and closing stock although in absence of logistics support, the auditors could 
not conduct physical inventory, (b) during the course of audit, the auditors observed that the company did not maintain any fixed assets 
register, (c) during the course of audit, the auditors observed the company did not maintain Debtors and Creditors ledger properly and 
should maintain related party ledger properly and (d) during the course of audit, the auditors observed that there are some lapses and 
lacunas in maintaining the cash book and ledger book and should maintain those books properly with perfection.” 
Whereas, in view of the all above, the commission believes that the ‘Financial Statements’ issued by the issuer for the year ended December 
31, 2008 has not reflected a ‘True and Fair’ view, which is considered as wrong information given to the commission. The commission has 
sent a letter to the issuer (reference no. SEC/CFD/8:1/99/502, dated June 16, 2009) requiring clear explanation of the above mentioned 
issues. In response, the issuer submitted their explanations to the Commission vide letter, dated June 29, 2009. However, the commission 
Case: B Ltd. vs. SEC, 
General Certificate Court 
GCC No. [?]* / 2011 
* The case has recently been 
filed in the GCC Court and 




                                                 
129
 The details of the violations were translated from Bengali. See Appendix 8-1 for Bengali version. 
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Company  Violations (Detailed)
129
 Fine Paid or Not Paid 
did not consider their explanations because the issuer has failed to provide the ‘Financial Statements’ in accordance with IASs for the year 
ended December 31, 2008. Therefore, the issuer has clearly violated section 18 of the above said Ordinance. 
 
(c) C Ltd. Whereas, it appeared from the said audited financial statements for the year ended June 30, 2009, the commission, among others, has made 
the following observations: 
i) In the Balance Sheet of the said financial statements, NAV has been shown Tk.118.60 per share. But as per our observation the NAV is 
Tk.75.34 per share, which arises as under: 
Share Capital Tk.               132,000,000 
Tax Holiday Reserve           34,057,703 
Retained Earnings               (9,505,965) 
                                           156,551,738 
Less: Deferred Expenses    (57,103,194) 
Total NAV                           99,448,544 
Total No. of shares                1,320,000 
NAV per share                       Tk.75.34 
 
ii) In the Balance Sheet, Deferred Expenses have shown Tk.45,886,219 and Tk.57,103,194 for the years ended on June 30, 2008 and 2009 
respectively, but there is no explanation/notes regarding the creation and increase of said expenses for the year ended on June 30, 2008 and 
2009 respectively. 
iii) The Statement of Changes in Equity for the year ended on June 30, 2009 has not been prepared on the basis of the Statement of Changes 
in Equity for the year ended on June 30, 2008; because the balance of negative Retained Earnings for the year ended on June 30, 2008 has 
not been considered in preparing the Statement of Changes in Equity for the year ended on June 30, 2009. As a result the balance shown in 
the Statement of Changes in Equity for the year ended on June 30, 2009 and the figure reported as shareholders equity in the Balance Sheet 
has been overstated. 
iv) It has been mentioned in the note No.2.3 of the said financial statements that no depreciation has been charged during the year due 
to suspended of its production activities since 2006. But as per the requirement of Bangladesh Accounting Standards the issuer should 
have to charge the required depreciation.”  
Whereas, in view of the all above, the commission believes that the ‘Financial Statements’ issued by the issuer for the year ended June 30, 
2009 do not reflect a ‘True and Fair’ view. From the commission’s point of view, the issuer has provided wrong information. The 
commission has sent a letter to the issuer (reference no. SEC/CFD/3:19/99/571, dated November 04, 2009) requiring clear explanation of 
the above mentioned issues. In response, the issuer submitted their explanations to the Commission vide letter, dated November 12, 2009 to 
the commission. The commission decided not accept the issuer’s explanations. Since the issuer has failed to provide ‘Financial Statements’ 
for the year ended June 30, 2009 in accordance with IAS, the issuer has clearly violated section 18 of the above said ordinance. 
 
 
No information has been 
provided by SEC 
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(d) D Ltd. 
 
Whereas, required by rule 12 of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987, the issuer has prepared ‘Financial Statements’ for the year ended 
June 30, 2007 which has been audited by M/S B & Co, Chartered Accountants (registered auditor).  
Whereas, it appeared from the said audited financial statements that the auditors have made, among others, it has been observed by the 
commission that in Note no. 03 & 07 of the audited ‘Financial Statements’, the issuer has not charged any depreciation on its revalued 
amount of fixed assets Tk. 296,629,689.00 since 1994-95. The issuer failed to provide clear explanations on this to the commission. The 
commission decided that the issuer has clearly failed to provide the ‘Financial Statements’ for the year ended June 30, 2007 in accordance 
with IAS and therefore a clear violation of section 18 of the above mentioned Ordinance. 
 
Case: D Ltd. vs. SEC, 
General Certificate Court 




(e) E Ltd. 
 
Whereas, it appeared from the said audited financial statements for the year ended September 30, 2006, the commission, among others, has 
made the following observations: 
 
“Financial Expenses: During the year, the company settled the case with BSB through mutual agreement and the company has to pay Tk. 
143,000,000 over a period of 7 years in place of Tk. 95,700,000 and accordingly excess amount of Tk. 47,300,000 has been booked in the 
respective fixed assets. The company and the National Bank have gone into litigation to mitigate their respective grievances. The company 
filed a money suit against NBL for the realisation of Tk. 315 crores
130
 (Approx) as compensation.” The commission also observed the 
following inconsistencies in the issuer’s financial statements: 
 
“Reference Note No.-2: Recognition of property, plant & Equipment and Depreciation: Cost of property, plant & equipment represent 
the cost of acquisition or construction and include purchase price and other directly attributable cost of bringing the assets to working 
conditions for its intended use, but do not include any capitalised borrowing cost.” 
Whereas, it appeared from the said audited financial statements that the issuer failed to provide the ‘Financial Statements’ for the year 
ended September 30, 2006  in accordance with IAS. The financial statements does not reflect a ‘true and fair view’ and hence it is a clear 
violation of section 18 of the above mentioned Ordinance. 
 
Case: E Ltd. vs. SEC, 
General Certificate Court 
GCC No. 217/2009 
GCC No. 258/2009 
GCC No. 318/2009 
Pending 
 
(f) F Ltd. 
 
Whereas, it appeared from the said audited financial statements that the issuer failed to provide the ‘Financial Statements’ for the year 
ended December 31, 2005 and therefore the ‘Financial Statements’ have failed to reflect a ‘true and fair view’. The issuer has clearly 
violated section 18 of the above said Ordinance. 
“1. Three fourth of Bank Interest amounting to Tk. 1,98,55,492.00 has been deferred and shown as “Intangible Assets”, and one fourth of 
interest amounting to Tk. 66,18,497.00 has been charged to Profit & Loss Account as per decision of Board in its 143rd meeting held on 5th 
June 2004. This decision does not conform to accounting principles as per the Bangladesh Accounting Standard (BAS 23); 
1. Depreciation on factory assets, such as, Factory Building, Plant & Machinery and other factory assets have not been charged 
for the year under audit; 
2. Lease rental for IDLC machines for Tk. 432,420.00 only has been recognised as expenses whereas lease agreement discloses yearly 
No information has been 
provided by SEC. 
 
                                                 
130
 100 crores = 1 billion, so here, 315 crores is equivalent to 3.15 billion. 
Appendices                                                                                       321 
 
Company  Violations (Detailed)
129
 Fine Paid or Not Paid 
instalments with rental amount of Tk. 20, 29,690.00 which was not accounted as per BAS-17 Leases; 
3. Year wise tax provision as well as assessment position could not be made available to us. As such actual tax liability could not be 
worked out”. 
(g) G Ltd. 
 
Whereas, as required by rule 12 of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987, the issuer submitted the audited financial statements for the 
year ended August 31, 2006 to the Commission and others concerned;  
Whereas, it appeared from the said audited financial statements that the auditors have made, among others, the following 
observations/qualified opinion on the financial statements: 
“1. The company did not provide depreciation for Tk. 53,295,203 including for the period of Tk. 6,178,001 in respect of unit-4 which 
was in operation throughout the year. Depreciation remains unprovided in respect of other units although there was partial operation in unit-
1 during the year under review (Note-9.01). 
2. The company did not compute deferred taxation. 
3. Depreciation on value increased by revaluation was not charged.” 
Whereas, as regard to Unit 1 & 2, the issuer company mentioned that depreciation remained unprovided because capacity utilisation of the 
said Units was only 1.09% and as there was no operation of those Units for the half year ended February 28, 2007, depreciation for the said 
half year was also not provided by the company; 
Whereas, as a result of the above, the audited financial statements of the issuer for the years ended on August 31, 2006 do not portray a true 
and fair view of the financial position which is tantamount to the furnishing of incorrect information to SEC;  
Whereas, furnishing of incorrect audited financial statements for the year ended on August 31, 2006 is a clear contravention of section 18 of 
the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, read with sub-rule (2) of rule 12 of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987, which appeared 
to be deliberate attracting appropriate provisions of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969. 
 
Not Applicable since no fine 
was imposed 
 
Since the company has been 
warned, no fine or penalty 
has been imposed. 
 
 
Appendix 8-3: Qualified Audit Opinion related violations by companies (n=2) 
 
 
Company  Violations (Detailed) Fine Paid or Not Paid 
(a) H Ltd. 
 
Whereas, as required by rule 12 of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987, the issuer submitted the financial statements which has been audited by 
M/S C & Co, Chartered Accountants (registered auditor) for the year ended June 30, 2007; On examination of audited financial statements, among 
others, the auditor has provided qualified opinion. But the ‘Financial Statements’ for the year ended June 30, 2007 do not reflect a ‘True and Fair 
View’ and therefore the issuer clearly violates section 18 of the Ordinance. 
No information has 
been provided by the 
SEC 
 
(b) I Ltd. 
 
Whereas, as required by rule 12 of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987, the issuer submitted the financial statements which have been audited by 
M/S D & Co, Chartered Accountants (registered auditor) for the year ended June 30, 2003; On examination of audited financial statements, among 
others, the auditor has provided qualified opinion. But the ‘Financial Statements’ for the year ended June 30, 2003 have not been prepared in 
accordance with IAS and do not reflect a ‘True and Fair View’ and hence the issuer clearly violates section 18 of the above said Ordinance. 
 
No information has 
been provided by SEC 
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Company  Violations (Detailed) Fine Paid or Not Paid 
(a) J Ltd. 
 
Whereas, as required by rule 12 of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987, the issuer submitted the financial statements which has been audited by 
M/S E & Co, Chartered Accountants (registered auditor) for the year ended June 30, 2007; On examination of audited financial statements, among 
others, the auditor has provided some ‘Notes of Financial Statements’ for the year ended June 30, 2007 which are not prepared in accordance 
with IAS and as prescribed by the ICAB. Therefore, the ‘Financial Statements’ of the issuer do not reflect a ‘True and Fair View’ and the issuer 
clearly violates section 18 of the above said Ordinance. 
Case: J Ltd. vs. SEC, 
General Certificate 
Court,GCC No. 85/2010 
GCC No. 155/2010 
 Pending 
(b) I Ltd. 
 
On examination of audited financial statements of the issuer, the Commission observed, among others, the following on the said financial statements: 
“Management of the company has filed a case against Mr. X, Ex. Chairman of the said company at Kishorganj Sadar Thana (Case#1116 dated 14.12. 
2004) and he was expelled from the Directorship & Chairmanship of the company in the Board Meeting Dated 4th November 2004 for harmful 
activities at Kishorganj project site and the progress of the case was not known. We observe that management has no control over the Kishorganj 
project site, production, stock and sales. The management estimated that stock of Tk. 8,345,000.00 (Note 9) was taken by Mr. X, Ex-Chairman of the 
company (who was in charge of the project). The management failed to produce details of the said stock as well as documentary evidence. Balance 
confirmation by Mr. X has not been received by us. In our opinion, the financial statements do not give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of 
the company as of 30th June, 2006 and of the result of the operations and its cash flows for the year then ended”. Whereas, in view of the above facts, 
the commission believes that the audited ‘Financial Statements’ for the year ended June 30, 2006 is not prepared in accordance with IAS and 
notes as prescribed by the ICAB. Hence, the financial statements do not reflect a ‘True and Fair’ view. Whereas, the aforesaid activities are 
tantamount to non-compliance of securities law, deliberate and clear contravention of the above mentioned Rule. The said violation attracts penal 
provision of section 18. 
No information has been 




Appendix 8-5: Half-yearly Audited report related violations by companies (n=2) 
 
 
Company  Violations (Detailed) 
 
Fine Paid or Not Paid 
(a) K Ltd. On examination of audited financial statements of the issuer, the Commission observed, among others, the following on the said financial 
statements: The issuer has failed to provide half yearly ‘Financial Statements’ in accordance with BAS
131
: ‘Balance Sheet’ as per Para 20(a) of 
Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BAS-34); ‘Income Statement’ as per Para 20(b) of Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BAS-34); ‘Cash Flow 
Statement’ as per Para(d) of Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BAS- 34) and ‘Changes in Equity’ as per Para(c) of Bangladesh Accounting 
Standards (BAS-34); Whereas, in the Cash Flow Statement, the loan repayment is Tk. 22,627,306.00 even though in the Financial Statement as of 
June 30, 2006 and December 31, 2006 the same amount of money is shown in the ‘Loan Fund’ and ‘Cash Credit and Overdraft’. Despite the 
company was closed during that time, , a ‘Factory Overhead’ was shown, of Tk. 16,535,303.00. 
Case: K Ltd. vs. SEC, 
Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh (High Court 
Division) 
Writ Petition (WP) No. 
4495/2008 
Stay Order  Pending 
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 BAS (Bangladesh Accounting Standard) refers to IFRSs. 
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Fine Paid or Not Paid 
 
(b) L Ltd. 
 
As, rule 13 of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987, as amended, states, “Every issuer shall, within one month of close of the first half-year, 
transmit to the stock exchange in which its securities are listed, to the security holders and to the Commission half-yearly financial statements 
which shall be prepared in the same manner and form as the annual financial statements.”; As, rule 13A of the Securities and Exchange Rules, 
1987, as amended, states, “Forms prescribed for the purpose of preparing the financial statements and the audit report may be  adapted or amended, 
if deemed necessary, for compliance with the International Accounting Standards (IAS) and International Standards of Auditing (ISA).”; The issuer 
has submitted its half yearly Financial Statements to the Commission, reference no. MPIL/MA/786/07/079, dated January 28, 2007;  
On examination of the statements, the commission, among others, observes that the issuer has failed to prepare half yearly statements in 
accordance with BAS: ‘Balance Sheet’ as per Para 20(a) of Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BAS-34); ‘Income Statement’ as per Para 20(b) of 
Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BAS-34); ‘Cash Flow Statement’ as per Para(d) of Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BAS- 34) and ‘Changes 
in Equity’ as per Para(c) of Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BAS-34);  In the Cash Flow Statement, the issuer has shown Tk. 10,067,760.00 as 
‘Bank Overdraft’ even though in the Financial Statement as of June 30, 2006 and December 31, 2006, the issuer has shown an increase of Tk. 
89,701.00 as ‘Cash Credit and Overdraft’. The issuer also shows closing cash and bank balance of TK. Tk. 4,294,983.00 in the Cash Flow 
Statement, but it should be Tk, 13,835.00. Whereas, the aforesaid activities are tantamount to non-compliance of securities law, the commission 
asks the issuer (reference: SEC/CFD/ 2:41/2001/3028, dated February 15, 2007) to submit the revised half yearly financial statements to the 
commission. The issuer submitted the revised half yearly financial statements for the period ended December 31, 2006 (vide letter, dated March 17, 
2007). On examining the statements and the issuer’s explanations, the commission observes that the issuer fails to rectify the above mentioned 
inconsistencies. The said violation clearly attracts the penal provision of section 18 of the SEC Ordinance, 1969. 
No information has been 
provided by SEC 
 
 
